A CRITICISM OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF PROMISCUITY
(_Continued_)
We are indebted to Mr. Lewis H. Morgan for information as to the
names of various degrees of kinship among no fewer than 139 different
races or tribes. This collection shows that very many peoples have
a nomenclature of relationships quite different from our own. Mr.
Morgan divides the systems into two great classes, the descriptive
and the classificatory, which he regards as radically distinct. “The
first,” he says, “which is that of the Aryan, Semitic, and Uralian
families, rejecting the classification of kindred, except so far as
it is in accordance with the numerical system, describes collateral
consanguinei, for the most part, by an augmentation or combination of
the primary terms of relationship. These terms, which are those for
husband and wife, father and mother, brother and sister, and son and
daughter, to which must be added, in such languages as possess them,
grandfather and grandmother, and grandson and granddaughter, are thus
restricted to the primary sense in which they are here employed. All
other terms are secondary. Each relationship is thus made independent
and distinct from every other. But the second, which is that of the
Turanian, American Indian, and Malayan families, rejecting descriptive
phrases in every instance, and reducing consanguinei to great classes,
by a series of apparently arbitrary generalizations, applies the
same terms to all the members of the same class. It thus confounds
relationships, which, under the descriptive system, are distinct, and
enlarges the signification both of the primary and secondary terms
beyond their seemingly appropriate sense.”[435]
The most primitive form of the classificatory group is the system
of the “Malayan family,”[436] which prevails among the Hawaiians,
Kingsmill Islanders, Maoris, and, presumably, also among several
other Polynesian and Micronesian tribes.[437] According to this
system, all consanguinei, near and remote, are classified into five
categories. My brothers and sisters and my first, second, third, and
more remote male and female cousins, are the first category. To all
these without distinction I apply the same term. My father and mother,
together with their brothers and sisters, and their first, second, and
more remote cousins, are the second category. To all these without
distinction I apply likewise the same term. The brothers, sisters, and
several cousins of my grandparents I denominate as if they were my
grandparents; the cousins of my sons and daughters, as if they were
my sons and daughters; the grandchildren of my brothers and sisters
and their several cousins, as if they were my own grandchildren. All
the individuals of the same category address each other as if they
were brothers and sisters. Uncleship, auntship, and cousinship being
ignored, we have, as far as the nomenclature is considered, only
grandchildren.[438]
From this system of nomenclature all the others belonging to the
classificatory group have, according to Mr. Morgan, been gradually
developed. The system of the Two-Mountain Iroquois differs from that
of the Hawaiians essentially in two respects only, the mother’s
brother being distinguished by a special term, and so also a sister’s
children. The Micmac system is somewhat more advanced. Not only does
a man call his sister’s son his nephew, but a woman applies the same
term to her brother’s son; and not only is a mother’s brother termed
an uncle, but also the father’s sister is distinguished by a special
term, as an aunt. A father’s brother is called a “little father;”
and a mother’s sister, a “little mother.” Still more advanced is the
system of the Wyandots, which may be regarded as the typical system of
the Indians.[439] A mother’s brother’s son and a father’s sister’s son
are no longer called by the same terms as brothers, but are recognized
as cousins; and women apply to their mother’s brother’s grandsons no
longer the same term as to their sons, but call them nephews.
It is needless to enter into further details. Those who shrink from
the trouble of reading through Mr. Morgan’s extensive tables, will
find an excellent summary of them in the fifth chapter of Sir John
Lubbock’s great work on ‘The Origin of Civilization.’ It may, however,
be added that the most advanced system of the classificatory group is
that of the Karens and Eskimo, which differs from our own in three
respects only. The children of cousins are termed nephews; the children
of nephews, grandchildren; and a grandfather’s brothers and sisters,
respectively, grandfathers and grandmothers. “Hence,” says Sir John
Lubbock, “though the Karens and Eskimo have now a far more correct
system of nomenclature than that of many other races, we find, even in
this, clear traces of a time when these peoples had not advanced in
this respect beyond the lowest stage.”[440]
From these systems of nomenclature Mr. Morgan draws very far-reaching
conclusions, assuming that they are necessarily to be explained by
early marriage customs. Thus, from the “Malayan system,” he infers
the former prevalence of “marriage in a group” of all brothers
and sisters and cousins of the same grade or generation; or, more
correctly, his case is, that if we can explain the “Malayan system”
on the assumption that such a general custom once existed, then we
must believe that it did formerly exist. “Without this custom,” he
says, “it is impossible to explain the origin of the system from the
nature of descents. There is, therefore, a necessity for the prevalence
of this custom amongst the remote ancestors of all the nations which
now possess the classificatory system, if the system itself is to
be regarded as having a natural origin.”[441] The family resulting
from this custom he calls, in his latest work, the “consanguine
family,” and in this, consisting of a body of kinsfolk, within which
there prevailed promiscuity, or “communal marriage,” between all men
and women of the same generation, the family in its first stage is
recognized.[442] Mr. Morgan believes, however, that as a necessary
condition antecedent to this form of the family, promiscuity, in a
wider sense of the term, may be theoretically deduced, though, as he
says, “it lies concealed in the misty antiquity of mankind beyond the
reach of positive knowledge.”[443]
It is needless here to consider whether the last conclusion holds good.
I shall endeavour to prove that Mr. Morgan’s inference of a stage of
promiscuous intercourse even within the prescribed limits is altogether
untenable. All depends on the point whether the “classificatory
system” is a system of blood-ties, the nomenclature having been founded
on blood-relationship, as near as the parentage of individuals could be
known. Mr. Morgan assumes this, instead of proving it.
Yet in the terms themselves there is, generally, nothing which
indicates that they imply an idea of consanguinity. Professor Buschmann
has given us a very interesting list of the names for father and
mother in many different languages.[444] The similarity of the terms
is striking. “Pa,” “papa,” or “baba,” for instance, means father in
several languages of the Old and New World, and “ma,” “mama,” means
mother. The Tupis in Brazil have “paia” for father, and “maia” for
mother;[445] the Uaraguaçú, respectively, “paptko” and “mamko.”[446]
In other languages the terms for father are “ab,” “aba,” “apa,”
“ada,” “ata,” “tata”; those for mother, “ama,” “emä,” “ana,”
“ena,” &c. According to Buschmann, there are four typical forms of
words for each of these ideas: for father, “pa,” “ta,” “ap,” “at”;
for mother, “ma,” “na,” “am,” “an.” Sometimes, however, the meaning
of the types is reversed. Thus, in Georgian,[447] as well as in the
Mahaga language of Ysabel,[448] “mama” stands for father; whilst the
Tuluvas in Southern India call the father “amme,” and the mother
“appe.”[449]
The terms used often fall outside of the types mentioned. In the Lifu
tongue, for example, one term for father is “kaka;”[450] in the Duauru
language of Baladea, “chicha”;[451] in the Maréan tongue, “chacha”
or “cheche.”[452] Again, among the Chalcha Mongols and some related
peoples, mother is “ekè.”[453] In the Kanúri language, of Central
Africa, the mother is called “ya”;[454] while the Kechua in Brazil
call the father “yaya.”[455] Among the Bakongo, as I am informed by
Mr. Ingham, “se” means father; in Finnish, “isä.” Again, by the
Brazilian Bakaĭri, the mother is called “ise”;[456] and, by the people
of Aneiteum, New Hebrides, “risi.”[457]
Similar terms are often used for other relationships. The Greek,
“πάππος” signifies grandfather, and “μάμμα” grandmother. In the
Kanúri language, “yaya” stands for elder brother;[458] and, in
Lifuan, “mama” and “dhina” are terms for brother, whilst mother is
“thine.”[459]
The origin of such terms is obvious. They are formed from the easiest
sounds a child can produce. “‘Pa-pa,’ ‘ma-ma,‘ 'tata,’ and
‘apa,’ ‘ama,’ ‘ata,’” Professor Preyer says, “emerge originally
spontaneously, the way of the breath being barred at the expiration,
either by the lips (_p_, _m_), or by the tongue (_d_, _t_).”[460]
Yet the different races vary considerably with regard to the ease
with which they produce certain sounds. Thus the pronunciation of the
labials is very difficult to many Indians,[461] on account of which
their terms for father, mother, or other near kinsfolk, often differ
much from the types given by Professor Buschmann.
It is evident that the terms borrowed from the children’s lips have
no intrinsic meaning whatever. Hence, if a Bakaĭri child calls its
father and father’s brother “tsogo,” its mother and mother’s sister
“tsego”;[462] if a Macúsi names his paternal uncle “papa” as well as
his father, and an Efatese names his father and all the tribe brothers
of his father “ava” or “tama”;[463] if the Dacotahs apply the term
“ahta” not only to the father, but also to the father’s brother, to
the mother’s sister’s husband, to the father’s father’s brother’s son,
&c., and the term “enah” not only to the mother, but also to the
mother’s sister, to the mother’s mother’s sister’s daughter, &c.;[464]
if, among the New Caledonians, an uncle, taking the place of a father,
is called “baba” like the father himself, and an aunt is called
“gnagna” like a mother;[465] if, as Archdeacon Hodgson of Zanzibar,
writes to me, a native of Eastern Central Africa uses the words “baba”
and “mama” not only for father and mother respectively, but also, very
commonly, for “any near relationship or even external connection;” if,
finally, the Semitic word for father, “ab” (“abu”), is not only used
in a wide range of senses, but, to quote Professor Robertson Smith,
“in all dialects is used in senses quite inconsistent with the idea
that procreator is the radical meaning of the word,”[466]—we certainly
must not, from these designations, infer anything as to early marriage
customs.
Of course there are other terms applied to kinsfolk besides words
taken from the lips of children, or words derived from these. But
though considerable, their number has been somewhat exaggerated.
Thus, for instance, Professor Vámbéry, in his work upon the primitive
culture of the Turko-Tartars, says that the terms for mother, “ana”
or “ene” have originally the meaning of woman or nurse, being derived
from the roots “an” and “en.”[467] Exactly the reverse seems to be
the fact, the terms for mother being the primitive words. In the same
way, I cannot but think that Professor Max Müller and several other
philologists are in error in deriving “pitár,” “pater,” “father,”
from the root “pa,” which means to protect, to nourish; and “mâtár,”
“mater,” “mother,” from the root “ma,” to fashion.[468] It seems,
indeed, far more natural, as has been pointed out by Sir J. Lubbock
and others, that the roots “pa,” to protect, and “ma,” to fashion,
come from “pa,” father, and “ma,” mother, and not _vice versa_.[469]
I am the more inclined to accept this explanation, as Mr. A. J. Swann
informs me, from Kavala Island, Lake Tanganyika, that among the Waguha,
the words “baba,” and “tata,” which mean father, also have the
meaning of protector, provider.
I do not deny that relationships—especially in the collateral and
descending lines—are in some cases denoted by terms derived from roots
having an independent meaning; but the number of those that imply an
idea of consanguinity does not seem to be very great. Mr. Bridges
writes that, among the Yahgans, “the names ‘imu’ and ‘dabi’—father and
mother—have no meaning apart from their application, neither have any
of their other very definite and ample list of terms for relatives,
except the terms ‘macu’ and ‘macipa’ son and daughter. These terms
refer to ‘magu’ which means parturition; ‘cipa’ (‘keepa’) signifies
woman or female.” In Bakongo, according to Mr. Ingham, “se” and
“tata” denote father; “mama,” “mbuta,” and “ngudi,” mother;
“nfumu,” elder brother or sister; “mbunzi,” younger brother; and
“mbusi,” younger sister. “Nfumu” means also Sir, chief; “mbuta”
means “the one who bore,” from “buta,” or “wuta,” to beget; and
“ngudi,” “the one we descended from.” Again, Mr. Radfield informs
me that, in the language of Lifu, the term for father means root;
the term for mother, foundation or vessel; the term for sister,
forbidden or “not to be touched;” and the terms for eldest and younger
brother, respectively, ruler and ruled. It is possible—I should even
say probable—that, in these instances also, the designations for
relationships are the radical words. Besides, it should be observed
that, in Yahgan, “the terms for relatives are strictly reserved for
such, neither are they interchanged,” and that in Bakongo, the terms
“tata” and “mama” are used as signs of respect to any one, whilst
the terms “mbuta” and “ngudi” seem to be applied exclusively to the
mother.
Not only has Mr. Morgan given no evidence for the truth of his
assumption that the “classificatory system” is a system of blood-ties,
but this assumption is not even fully consistent with the facts he
has himself stated. It is conceivable that uncertainty as regards
fatherhood might have led a savage to call several men his fathers, but
an analogous reason could never have induced him to name several women
his mothers. Hence, if a man applies the same term to his mother’s
sisters as to his mother, and he himself is addressed as a son by a
woman who did not give birth to him, this evidently shows that the
nomenclature, at least in certain cases, cannot be explained by the
nature of descent.[470]
There can be scarcely any doubt that the terms for relationships are,
in their origin, terms of address. “The American Indians,” says
Mr. Morgan, “always speak to each other, when related, by the term
of relationship, and never by the personal name of the individual
addressed.”[471] From a psychological point of view, it would, indeed,
be surprising if it could be shown that primitive men, in addressing
all the different members of their family or tribe, took into
consideration so complicated a matter as the degree of consanguinity.
Can we really believe that a savage whose intelligence, perhaps, was so
deficient that he was scarcely able to count his own fingers, applied
the same term to his cousins as to his brothers, because he was not
certain whether, after all, they were not his brothers and that, when
he did make a distinction between them, he did so _because_ they were
begotten by different fathers? Facts show that savages generally
denominate their kindred according to much simpler principles, the
names being given chiefly with reference to sex and age, as also to the
external or social, relationship in which the speaker stands to the
person whom he addresses.
In every language there are different designations for persons of
different sexes. In the rudest system of nomenclature, the Hawaiian,
father and other kinsmen of the same generation are called “makua
kana;” mother, mother’s sisters, father’s sisters, &c., “makua
waheena,” “kana” and “waheena” being the terms for male and female.
A son is called “kaikee kana,” a daughter “kaikee waheena,” whilst
“kana” alone is applied to husband, husband’s brother, and sister’s
husband, and “waheena” to wife, wife’s sister, brother’s wife, &c.
There are also separate terms in every language for relations belonging
to different generations. Among the lower races especially, age, or,
more exactly, the age of the person spoken to compared with that of the
speaker, plays a very important part in the matter of denomination.
According to Dr. Davy, the Veddahs appear to be without names; “a
Veddah interrogated on the subject, said, ‘I am called a man: when
young, I was called the little man: and when old, I shall be called
the old man.’”[472] The Hawaiians, as we are informed by Judge
Andrews, have no definite general word for brother in common use. But
“kaikuaána” signifies any one of my brothers, or male cousins, older
than myself, I being a male, and any one of my sisters, or female
cousins, older than myself, I being a female; whilst “kaikaina”
signifies a younger brother of a brother, or a younger sister of a
sister.[473] Such distinguishing epithets applied to older and younger
are, in fact, very frequently met with among uncivilized peoples. Thus,
touching the Andamanese, Mr. Man states that “brothers and sisters
speak of one another by titles that indicate relative age: that is,
their words for brother and sister involve the distinction of elder or
younger.” A like system is adopted by them in respect to half-brothers,
half-sisters, cousins, brothers-in-law, and sisters-in-law.[474] In
certain languages, too, there are special terms for an uncle on the
father’s side older than the father, and for an uncle younger than
he;[475] and in the Fulfúlde tongue, the age of the uncles is so
minutely specified, that the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth
uncle, on both the father’s and the mother’s side, are each called by a
particular name.[476]
The wider meaning in which many terms for kinship are used bear witness
in the same direction. The Rev. J. Sibree states that, in Hova, “ray,”
father, does not take the sense the corresponding word in many Semitic
languages has, of “maker” of a thing, but it is used in a wide sense
as an elder or superior; and “rény,” mother, is also used in a
wide sense as a respectful way of addressing an elderly woman.[477]
Mr. Swann writes to me that, among the Waguha, West Tanganyika, men
advanced in years are termed “baba,” father, whilst, in other parts
of Equatorial Africa, according to Mr. Reade, old men are addressed as
“rera,” father, and old women as “ngwe,” mother.[478] The Russian
“batushka” and “matushka,” as also the Swedish “far” and “mor,”
are often used in a similar way. Again, Mr. Cousins asserts that,
among the natives of Cis-Natalian Kafirland, the terms for father,
mother, brother, and sister, are not restricted to them only, but are
applied equally to other persons of a similar age, whether related
or otherwise. “‘Bawo,’ father,” he says, “means elder or older,
‘bawo-kulu’ means a big-father, one older than father.” Probably
“bawo,” as belonging to the type “pa,” was originally used as a
term of address, from which the sense of elder or older was derived;
but this does not interfere with the matter in question. The Rev. E.
Casalis, writing of the Basutos, states that “in addressing a person
older than one’s self, one says, ‘My father, my mother;’ to an equal,
‘My brother;’ and to inferiors, ‘My children.’”[479] The Finnish
“isä” and the Votyak “ai,” father, the Lappish “Aja,” and the
Esthonian “äi,” grandfather, are evidently related to, and probably
the roots of, the Finnish “iso” and “äijä” which mean big.[480] The
Chukchi use, besides “atta” for father and “mámang” for mother,
“empynátchyo” and “émpyngau” respectively, which obviously have the
same root as “émpytchin,” elder or older.[481] The Brazilian Uainumá
call a father “paii,” but also “pechyry,” _i.e._, old.[482] “Les
jeunes Australiens,” says Bishop Salvado, “ont coutume d’appeler
‘mama’ ou ‘maman’ (c’est-à-dire-père) tous les vieillards, comme
aussi ‘N-angan’ (ou mère) les femmes avancées en âge.”[483] According
to Nicolaus Damascenus, the Galactophagi denominated “all old men
fathers; young men, sons; and those of equal age, brothers.”[484] In
German, the parents are “die Eltern,” the older (“die Aelteren”),
and they are also called familiarly “die Alten;” the father, “der
Alte;” and the mother, “die Alte” or “Altsche.”[485] Again, among
the North American Indians, old people are very commonly named
grandfathers and grandmothers;[486] whilst the Finnish “ämmä” does
not signify grandmother only, but old woman in general.[487] Among the
Tsuishikari Ainos, the maternal grandfather and grandmother of a child
are called both by _him_, and his _father_, “henki” and “unarabe”
respectively.[488]
As to the collateral line, it should be observed that, in Ćagatai, an
elder sister is called “egeći,” which actually means old woman “ege,”
old, big; “eći,” woman, sister.[489] In Hungarian, where “bátya”
stands for elder brother, an uncle is “nagybátya,” _i.e._, a big elder
brother.[490] Among many Ural-Altaic peoples, the same term is applied
to an elder brother as to an uncle, to an elder sister as to an
aunt.[491] Were we to follow Mr. Morgan’s way of reasoning, we should,
from this nomenclature, come to very curious conclusions as to the
early marriage customs of the peoples in question.
Again, in the Galibi language of Brazil, “tigami” signifies young
brother, son, and little child indiscriminately;[492] and several
languages have no other words for son and daughter than those for lad
and girl.[493] Thus, in Hawaiian, a son is called male child, or more
properly, little male; and a daughter, female child or girl.[494] Mr.
George Bridgman states that, among the Mackay blacks of Queensland, the
word for daughter is used by a man for any young woman belonging to
the class which his daughter would belong to if he had one.[495] And,
speaking of the South Australians, Eyre says, “In their intercourse
with each other, natives of different tribes are exceedingly
punctilious and polite; ... almost everything that is said is prefaced
by the appellation of father, son, brother, mother, sister, or some
other similar term, corresponding to that degree of relationship
which would have been most in accordance with their relative ages and
circumstances.”[496]
All those names, refer, as previously mentioned, not to the absolute,
but to the relative, age of the person addressed. Often, too, there is
a certain relativity in the use of words denominating sex. Mr. Dall
remarks, for instance, that among the Eskimo, the form of the terms
of relationship “appears to depend in some cases more on the sex of
the speaker than on that of the person to whom the term refers.” In
Eastern Central Africa, “if a man have a brother and a sister, he is
called one thing by the brother, but quite a different thing by the
sister.”[497] And several other instances of the same kind are to be
found in Mr. Morgan’s tables.
As for the third factor influencing the terms of address—_i.e._, the
social relationship which exists between the addresser and the one
addressed,—it is obvious that different designations are applied to
enemies and friends, to strangers and members of the family-circle,
nay, generally, to persons to whom one stands in an altogether
different external relationship. The importance of this factor is
evident from several statements. Thus, among the Hovas, according to
Mr. Sibree, the words for brother and sister “are also used widely
for any person whom one meets and desires to act towards in a friendly
manner.”[498] The Fuegians says Mr. Bridges, form certain kinds of
friendships, and “speak of aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, cousins,
nieces and nephews, &c., which are only so through the friendships
established.”[499] Among the Waguha, strangers are called “ndugu,”
brother, if of the same tribe;[500] and Mr. Hartshorne tells us that
the Veddahs applied to him the term “hura,” or cousin.[501] We
can understand, then, why the same name, as a rule, is used by the
savage to denote just the persons of the same sex and of like age
who belong to his own family-circle; and why, as a consequence, the
nomenclature is rich or poor according as that circle is small or
large. The Yahgans, for instance, who live in families rather than in
tribes, have a very definite list of terms for kinsfolk. They have
different appellations for nephews and nieces on the brother’s side,
and nephews and nieces on the sister’s side, and their words for
uncle and aunt differ according as this relationship is paternal or
maternal. They have also special terms for father-, mother-, son-and
daughter-, brother-and sister-in-law.[502] On the other hand, the
larger, the body of kinsfolk that keep closely together, and the less
it is differentiated, as regards the functions of its various members,
the more comprehensive are generally the terms of address. The
“classificatory system of relationship” must, therefore, have emerged
at a time when the separate families had already united in larger
bodies.
The same principle explains how it happens that a maternal uncle is
almost always distinguished from a father by a separate term, whilst
this is not the case with an uncle on the father’s side, the former
generally living in another community from his nephew, and, besides,
very frequently standing to him in a quite peculiar relationship
through the rules of succession. It may be fairly assumed, too, that
a mother’s sister much oftener than a father’s sister is called a
mother, because sisters, among savages, keep as a rule, far more
closely together, when married, than brothers and sisters; sometimes
even, especially among the North American Indians, they are the wives
of the same man. If we add to this that a father’s brother’s son and
a mother’s sister’s son are more commonly addressed as brothers than
as father’s sister’s son and a mother’s brother’s son, it becomes
obvious to how great an extent the nomenclature is influenced by
external relations. But as a certain kind of external relationship is
invariably connected with a certain degree, or certain degrees, of
blood-relationship, the designations given with reference to the former
have been taken as terms for the latter.
The basis on which Mr. Morgan has built his hypothesis must be
considered, then, altogether untenable.[503] It cannot be proved
that, where the “classificatory system” prevails, the nomenclature
was intended to express the degree of consanguity so exactly as
he assumes, or that it had originally anything whatever to do with
descent. On the contrary, I have endeavoured to show that the case
was probably just the reverse; so that no inference regarding early
marriage customs is to be drawn from the terms for relationships. Even
now, in Spanish, a brother’s great-grandson is called grandson; in
Bulgarian, as also in Russian, a father’s father’s brother is termed a
grandfather, and a father’s father’s sister a grandmother; the Greek
“ἁνεψιός” appears to have been applied to a nephew, a grandson, and a
cousin; “neef,” in Dutch, still expresses these three relationships
indiscriminately; in Flemish and Platt Deutsch, “nichte” is applied
to a female cousin as well as to a niece; and Shakspeare, in his will,
describes his granddaughter, Susannah Hall, as “my niece.”[504]
Surely, nobody would look upon these designations as relics of ancient
times, when there really might have been some uncertainty as to kinship
in the direction which the terms indicate. Mr. Morgan himself admits
that, in Latin, “nepos” did not originally signify “either a nephew,
grandson or cousin, but that it was used promiscuously to designate a
class of persons next without the primary relationships.”[505]
* * * * *
Thirty years ago, in a work of prodigious learning,[506] the Swiss
jurist, Dr. Bachofen, drew attention to the remarkable fact that a
system of “kinship through mothers only” prevailed among several
ancient peoples. Moreover, partly from actual statements of old
writers, partly from traditions and myths, he came to the conclusion
that such a system everywhere preceded the rise of “kinship through
males.” A few years later, though quite independently of him, Mr.
McLennan set forth exactly the same hypothesis, being led to it
chiefly by extensive studies in modern ethnology. While, however,
Bachofen explained the phenomenon as a consequence of the supremacy
of women, Mr. McLennan regarded it as due to the uncertain paternity
which resulted from early promiscuity. “It is inconceivable,” he
says, “that anything but the want of certainty on that point could
have long prevented the acknowledgment of kinship through males; and
in such cases we shall be able to conclude that such certainty has
formerly been wanting—that more or less promiscuous intercourse between
the sexes has formerly prevailed. The connection between these two
things—uncertain paternity and kinship through females only, seems so
necessary—that of cause and effect—that we may confidently infer the
one where we find the other.”[507]
It must be observed that the facts adduced as examples of what Mr.
McLennan calls “kinship through females only” in most instances imply,
chiefly, that children are named after their mothers, not after their
fathers, and that property and rank succeed exclusively in the female
line. If these customs were to be explained as relics of ancient
promiscuity, we certainly should have to admit that such a state was
formerly very prevalent in the human race. Yet we could not be sure
that it prevailed universally. For, though the number of peoples among
whom descent and inheritance follow the mother’s side only, is very
considerable,[508] the number of those among whom the male line is
recognized, is scarcely less—even apart from the civilized nations
of Europe and Asia. At present, when anthropologists affirm with so
much assurance that a system of exclusive “kinship through females”
prevailed everywhere before the tie of blood between father and child
had found a place in systems of relationships, it seems appropriate to
give a list of peoples among whom such a system does _not_ prevail—a
list, however, which cannot pretend to completeness.
Starting, then, with North America, which is acknowledged to be, or to
have been, one of the chief centres of “mother-right,” or metrocracy,
we meet there with many aboriginal nations among whom a son, as a rule
takes the father’s name and becomes his heir.[509] Thus Cranz states
that, among the Eskimo of Greenland, “when a husband dies, his eldest
son inherits his house, tent, and woman’s boat, and besides must
maintain the mother and children, who share the furniture and clothes
amongst themselves.”[510] Among the Indians bordering on the south-east
coast of the river St. Lawrence, according to Heriot, the eldest son
took the name of his father with the addition of one syllable.[511] The
Californian tribes[512] and the Dacotahs[513] recognized chieftainship
as hereditary in the male line; and, with reference to the latter,
Mr. Prescott remarks that they cannot well forget relationships, as
the names of father and mother are both recollected for three or four
generations.[514] Among the Ahts, the eldest son takes all the property
left by his father, and the head-chiefs rank is hereditary in the male
line.[515] The paternal system prevails, moreover, in thirteen other
tribes mentioned by Mr. Frazer in his essay on “Totemism.”[516]
In Mexico, Yucatan, San Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, succession
ran from father to son; and in Vera Paz, according to Las Casas,
kinship was so exclusively recognized in the male line, that the people
there thought the most remote kin in their own lineage to be more
closely related than the daughter of their mother, provided she was
not of the same father. On the other hand, Piedrahita tells us that,
among the Chibchas, the sons of sisters, and, in default of such, the
brothers of the king, were the heirs to the crown of Bogota, but that
the sons had a right to the personal property of their father; whilst,
according to Herrera, the property was inherited by the brothers, and
if there were none living, by the _sons_ of those who were dead.[517]
Among the Caribs, kinship was reckoned in the female line, but the
authority of the chiefs was hereditary in the male line only, the
children of sisters being excluded from the succession.[518] Among
the Macas Indians in Ecuador, property descends from father to
son;[519] among the Guaycurûs, Abipones, and Araucanians, nobility, or
chieftainship, was hereditary in the male line;[520] and the Brazilian
aborigines, or at least some of them, laid particular stress upon
kinship through fathers.[521] Again, with reference to the Yahgans of
Tierra del Fuego, Mr. Bridges writes, “A child belongs equally to the
clan of its father and mother as regards duty of revenge, but is always
reckoned a member of the father’s clan only. Children are generally
named after their grandparents, paternal or maternal indifferently.
They are quite as much attached to their mother’s relatives and these
to them, as to their paternal relatives; the only difference is that
they are integral parts of the father’s clan, not of the mother’s.”
Speaking of the same people, M. Hyades remarks, “L’héritage se
transmet à l’époux survivant, ou à défaut, au fils aîné.”[522] In
short, the paternal system, so far as we know, predominates among the
aborigines of South America.
Passing to the Pacific Islands, we find that, though rank and clan
are commonly inherited there through the mother, property generally
goes in the male line. In Tonga, the son succeeds his father in homage
and title,[523] and here, as well as in Fiji, on the father’s death,
his possessions descend to his children.[524] Ellis tells us that, in
Tahiti, the child of a chief was invested, soon after its birth, with
the name and office of its father,[525] and in the case of there being
no children, the brother of the deceased assumed the government. In
other families property always went to the eldest son.[526] Among the
Hawaiians, the rank of the principal and inferior chiefs, the offices
of the priests, as also other situations of honour and influence,
descended from father to son,[527] although on the whole, the female
line predominated.[528] In the Hervey Islands, children belonged either
to the father’s or mother’s clan, according to arrangement; usually,
however, the father had the preference.[529] In New Caledonia, kinship
is reckoned in the male line,[530] and in Lifu, as Mr. Radfield informs
me, children belong to the paternal clan. In the Caroline Group, landed
property succeeds mostly from father to son, children are named after
their father’s father or mother’s father, and, apparently, the rank of
the father influences that of the son, at least if he be a chief.[531]
Among the Rejangs[532] and Bataks[533] of Sumatra, as also in several
other islands belonging to the Indian Archipelago,[534] and in New
Guinea,[535] the male line prevails. In the Kingsmill Islands, “if a
chief has several children by different wives, the son of the mother of
the highest rank is the successor.”[536] And, in New Zealand, nobility
was inherited both in the male and female line; but on the death of
a man, his eldest son took the family name which his father had held
before him.[537]
Australian children are generally named after their mother’s clan; but
this is not the case in every tribe.[538] Among the Gournditch-mara,
Turra, Moncalon, Torndirrup, and some other tribes, the male line
prevails.[539] With reference to the Narrinyeri, the Rev. G. Taplin
states that a man’s children belong to his tribe (_i.e._ clan), and
not to their mother’s; that property descends from father to son, and
that, in case of a man dying without issue of his own, his possessions
are always transmitted to the brother’s children.[540] Again, in the
Dieyerie tribe of South Australia, the sons take the father’s clan, the
daughters the mother’s.[541] Even where children are named after their
mother, inheritance may go from father to son. Thus, among the West
Australians, the hunting ground or landed property descends in the male
line, though “children of either sex always take the family name of
their mother.”[542]
Among the Todas, all children belong to the father’s family, and
inheritance runs through males only.[543] The same is the case with
most of the Indian Hill Tribes: either all the sons dividing their
father’s property equally, as among the Gonds, Bodo, and Dhimáls; or
the eldest son getting the largest share, as among the Kandhs, Karens,
and Nagas; or the youngest born male being the only heir, as among
the Hos; or the favourite son succeeding without reference to age,
as among the Mishmis.[544] Among the Pahárias, too, sons inherit,
and nephews by sisters get no share.[545] The law of succession
among the Singphos gives to the eldest son all the landed property
of the father, to the youngest all his personal property, while the
rest inherit nothing.[546] Among the Santals, children belong to the
father’s clan;[547] and the same is the case with the offspring of
intermarriages of Lepchas and Limbus and Butias.[548] Touching the
Karens, Dr. A. Bunker writes to me, “A child takes a name of its
own, and of neither of the parents; but usually the father, being the
stronger, takes the child in case of separation. It is regarded as
belonging to both parents, so far as blood goes.” If we add to this
that the male line prevails in Arabia,[549] Tibet,[550] throughout
Russian Asia,[551] and among the Ainos,[552] it must be admitted
that the system of “kinship through females only” is of very rare
occurrence in Asia, being restricted, so far as I know, to a few parts
of India, Ceylon, and the Malay Archipelago.[553]
It is much more prevalent among the African races. Yet, even among
them, there are many instances where succession runs in the male line.
A king or chief of the Somals[554] and Ba-kwileh[555] is succeeded by
his son. Among the Fulah, this dignity is transmitted to the brother,
while, in other instances, succession goes from father to son.[556]
Among the Negroes of the Gold Coast, according to Bosman, the eldest
son succeeded his father in office, though kinship was reckoned through
the mother all along this coast, except at Accra.[557] Dr. A. Sims
writes that, among the Bateke, “the child is considered as belonging
to the father and mother equally,” and takes the grandfather’s or
grandmother’s name. Among the Waguha, according to Mr. Swann, children
are generally named after the father. In Lánda, the eldest son inherits
all his father’s possessions, wives included.[558] Among the Damaras,
whose divisions into clans are derived from the mother, the eldest son
of the chief wife, nevertheless, is the successor of his father;[559]
and the same rule prevails among the Bechuanas.[560] The Rev. A.
Eyles states that all Zulu children belong to the father’s tribe, and
are called by his name or by the name of some of his ancestors.[561]
According to Mr. Cousins,[562] this is essentially true of various
Kafir tribes, the first son, however, never being named after the
grandfather, but always after the father. Warner, Brownlee, and E.
v. Weber assert also that, among the people, inheritance passes
from father to son.[563] Le Vaillant and Kolben state the same with
reference to the Hottentots and Bushmans;[564] and Andersson affirms
that, among the Namaquas, daughters take the father’s name, sons the
mother’s.[565] Finally, in the part of Madagascar where Drury was,
kinship does not seem to have been, in every case, reckoned through the
female, though in that island children generally follow the condition
of the mother.[566]
As for ancient peoples, Bachofen has adduced from the works of
classical writers evidence for the uterine line having prevailed among
several of them. But, to quote Sir Henry Maine, “the greatest races
of mankind, when they first appear to us, show themselves at or near
a stage of development in which relationship or kinship is reckoned
exclusively through males.”[567] Several writers have, it is true,
endeavoured to prove that, among the primitive Aryans, descent was
traced through females only;[568] but the evidence does not seem to be
conclusive. Much importance has been attributed to the specially close
connection which, according to Tacitus, existed between a sister’s
children and their mother’s brothers;[569] but Dr. Schrader observes
that, in spite of this prominent position of the maternal uncle in
the ancient Teutonic family, the _patruus_ distinctly came before
the _avunculus_, the agnates before the cognates, in testamentary
succession. He also suggests that, when the head of a household died,
the women of his family passed under the guardianship of the eldest
son, and that a woman’s children had therefore, quite naturally, a
peculiarly intimate relation to their maternal uncle.[570] It is safe
to say with Professor Max Müller, that we can neither assert nor deny
that in unknown times the Aryans ever passed through a metrocratic
stage.[571]
Even if it could be proved—which is doubtful—that, in former times, a
system of “kinship through females only,” fully developed, prevailed
among all the peoples whose children take the mother’s name and are
considered to belong to her clan, though succession runs in the male
line, we should still have to account for the fact that a large number
of peoples exhibit no traces of such a system.[572] And to them belong
many of the rudest races of the world—such as the aborigines of Brazil,
the Fuegians, Hottentots, Bushmans, and several very low tribes in
Australia and India. The inference that “kinship through females only”
has everywhere preceded the rise of “kinship through males,” would,
then, be warranted only on condition that the cause, or the causes, to
which the maternal system is owing, could be proved to have operated
universally in the past life of mankind. From Mr. McLennan’s point of
view, such an inference would be inadmissible, as he cannot prove the
former occurrence of a universal stage of promiscuity or polyandry,
leading to uncertain paternity—the cause to which he attributes that
system.
Yet it is far from being so inconceivable as Mr. McLennan assumes,
that “anything but the want of certainty on that point could have
long prevented the acknowledgment of kinship through males.”[573]
Paternity, as Sir Henry Maine remarks, is “matter of inference, as
opposed to maternity, which is matter of observation.”[574] Hence it
is almost beyond doubt that the father’s participation in parentage
was not recognized as soon as the mother’s.[575] Now, however, there
does not seem to be a single people which has not made the discovery
of fatherhood. In reply to my question whether the Fuegians consider
a child to descend exclusively or predominantly from either of the
parents, Mr. Bridges certainly writes that, according to his idea, they
“consider the maternal tie much more important than the paternal, and
the duties connected with it of mutual help, defence, and vengeance
are held very sacred.” But it is doubtful whether this refers to the
mere physiological connection between the child and its parents. Dr.
Sims informs me that, among the Bateke, the function of both parents in
generation is held alike important, and the Waguha of West Tanganyika,
as Mr. Swann states, also recognize the part taken by both. The same
is asserted by Archdeacon Hodgson concerning certain other tribes of
Eastern Central Africa, though, among them, children take the name of
the mother’s tribe. Again, the Naudowessies, according to Carver, had
the very curious idea that their offspring were indebted to their
father for their souls, the invisible part of their essence, and to the
mother for their corporeal and visible part; hence they considered it
“more rational that they should be distinguished by the name of the
latter, from whom they indubitably derive their being, than by that of
the father, to which a doubt might sometimes arise whether they are
justly entitled.”[576] Moreover, it seems as if the father’s share in
parentage, once discovered, was often exaggerated. Thus, referring to
some tribes of New South Wales, Mr. Cameron tells us that, although
the father has nothing to do with the disposal of his daughter, as she
belongs to the clan of her mother’s brother, they “believe that the
daughter emanates from her father solely, being only nutured by her
mother.”[577] Indeed, Mr. Howitt has found in every Australian tribe,
without exception, with which he has acquaintance, the idea that the
child is derived from the male parent only. As a black fellow once put
it to him, “The man gives the child to a woman to take care of for
him, and he can do whatever he likes with his own child.”[578] Again,
Mr. Cousins writes that, according to Kaffir ideas, a child descends
chiefly, though not exclusively, from the father; and the ancient
Greeks, as well as the Egyptians[579] and Hindus,[580] maintained a
similar view. Nay, Euripides states distinctly that, in his day, the
universally accepted physiological doctrine recognized only the share
taken by the father in procreation, and Hippocrates, in combating this
opinion, and contending that the child descended from both parents,
seems to admit that it was a prevalent heresy.[581] Finally, it seems
probable that the custom known under the name of “La Couvade”—that is,
the odd rule, prevalent among several peoples in different parts of
the world, requiring that the father, at the birth of his child, shall
retire to bed for some time, and fast or abstain from certain kinds of
food—implies some idea of relationship between the two.[582]
Admitting, however, that there was a time when fatherhood, in the
physiological sense of the term, was not discovered, I do not think
that the preference given to the female line is due to this fact. If
the denomination of children and the rules of succession really were
in the first place dependent on ideas of consanguinity, it might be
expected that a change with reference to the latter would be followed
by a change in the former respect also. But the ties of blood have
exercised a far less direct influence on the matter in question than
is generally supposed, the system of “kinship through females only”
being, properly speaking, quite different from what the words imply.
There may be several reasons for naming children after the mother
rather than after the father, apart from any consideration of
relationship. Especially among savages, the tie between a mother
and child is much stronger than that which binds a child to the
father.[583] Not only has she given birth to it, but she has also for
years been seen carrying it about at her breast. Moreover, in cases
of separation, occurring frequently at lower stages of civilization,
the infant children always follow the mother, and so, very often, do
the children more advanced in years. Is it not natural, then, that
they should keep the name of the mother rather than that of a father
whom they scarcely know? Mr. Belt tells us that the men and women even
of the christianised lower classes of Nicaragua often change their
mates, and the children, in such cases remaining with the mother, take
their surname from her.[584] According to Swann, the Creeks conferred
the honour of a chief on the issue of the female line, because it
was impossible to trace the right by the male issue, women only
exceptionally having more than two children by the same father.[585]
And touching the Khasias, one of the few tribes in India among whom
the female line prevails, Dr. Hooker states that they have a very
lax idea of marriage, divorce and exchange of wives being common and
attended with no disgrace; “the son therefore often forgets his
father’s name and person before he grows up, but becomes strongly
attached to his mother.”[586]
Speaking of certain negro tribes, Winterbottom suggested long ago that
the prevalence of the female line was to be explained by the practice
of polygyny,[587] and Dr. Starcke has recently called attention to
the same point.[588] The Rev. D. Macdonald likewise remarks, in
his account of the Efatese of the New Hebrides, that the idea that
children are more closely related to the mother than to the father
is an idea perfectly natural among a polygynous people.[589] It is
a customary arrangement in polygynous families that each wife has a
hut for herself, where she lives with her children; but even where
this is not the case, mother and children naturally keep together as
a little sub-family. No wonder, then, if a child takes its name after
the mother rather than after the father. This is the simplest way of
pointing out the distinction between the issue of different wives, a
distinction which is of special importance where it is accompanied
by different privileges as to succession. It is worth noticing that,
among the Negroes, who are probably the most polygynous race in the
world, the female line is extremely prevalent; whereas, among the Hill
Tribes of India, who are on the whole, monogamists, children, with
few exceptions, take the name of the father. With reference to the
Basutos, a Bechuana tribe, Mr. Casalis observes that the authority
of the eldest maternal uncle preponderates to excess, especially in
polygynous families, where the children have no strong affection for
their father.[590]
Further, among several peoples a man, on marrying, has to quit his
home, and go to live with his wife in the house of her father, of whose
family he becomes a member. This is a common practice among several of
the North American tribes,[591] and prevailed, in the southern part of
the New World, among the Caribs.[592] In some parts of Eastern Central
Africa, also, a man who marries a full grown girl “immediately leaves
his own village and proceeds to build a house in the village of his
wife.”[593] Among the Sengirese, according to Dr. Hickson, the man
always goes to his wife’s house, unless he be the son of a rajah, in
which case he may do as he pleases.[594] Dr. Hooker tells us that,
among the Khasias, “the husband does not take his wife home, but
enters her father’s household, and is entertained there.”[595] And in
Sumatra, in the mode of marriage called “ambel anak,” the father of
a virgin makes choice of some young man for her husband, who is taken
into his house to live there in a state between that of a son and that
of a debtor.[596]
According to Dr. Starcke, this custom is due to the great cohesive
power of the several families, which causes them to refuse to part
with any of their members. “Since men are more independent,” he says,
“they are also less stationary; they can no longer attract the women
to themselves, and are therefore attracted by them.[597] Under such
circumstances, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that children
are named after the mother’s tribe or clan, which is the case in
all the instances just given of peoples among whom the husband has
to settle down with his father-in-law. Indeed, Dr. Tylor has found
that, whilst the number of coincidences between peoples among whom
the husband lives with the wife’s family and peoples among whom the
maternal system prevails, is proportionally large, the full maternal
system never appears among peoples whose exclusive custom is for the
husband to take his wife to his own home.[598] And it is a remarkable
fact that where both customs—the woman receiving her husband in her own
hut, and the man taking his wife to his—occur side by side among the
same people, descent in the former cases is traced through the mother,
in the latter through the father.[599] In Japan, should there be only
daughters in the family, a husband is procured for the eldest, who
enters his wife’s family, and, at the same time, takes its name.[600]
Again, as to the rules of succession, Dr. Starcke has set forth the
hypothesis that they are dependent on local connections, those persons
being each other’s heirs who dwell together in one place. Among the
Iroquois, for instance, at the death of a man, his property is divided
among his brothers, sisters, and mother’s brothers, whilst the property
of a woman is transmitted to her children and sisters, but not to
her brothers. “Owing to the faculty of memory,” Dr. Starcke says,
“childhood and youth involve a young man in such a web of associations
that he afterwards finds it hard to detach himself from them. The man
who, when married, has lived as a stranger in the house of another,
clings to the impressions of his former home, and his earlier household
companions become his heirs. But the brother who has wandered elsewhere
stands in a more remote relation to his sister than do the sisters and
the children living with her in the parental home, and he is therefore
excluded from the inheritance.”[601]
Though agreeing, in the main, with Dr. Starcke’s hypothesis, I do not
think it affords a complete explanation of the matter. It certainly
accounts for the fact that, under the maternal system, it is just the
nearest relatives on the mother’s side who are a man’s heirs, to the
exclusion of other members of the clan. But, if succession really
depended upon local relations only, or upon the remembrance of such
relations in the past, it would be the most natural arrangement,
where father and children lived together till the latter were grown
up, for the father to be succeeded by his son. It seems probable that
the causes which make children take their mother’s name, have also
directly exercised some influence upon the rules of succession; but I
am inclined to believe that the power of the name itself has been of
the highest importance in that respect.
By means of family names former connections are kept up, and the past
is associated with the present. Even we ourselves are generally more
disposed to count kin with distant relatives having our own surname
than with those having another. And upon man in a savage state language
exercises, in this matter, a much greater influence than upon us. With
reference to the aborigines of Western Australia, Sir George Grey
observes, “Obligations of family names are much stronger than those
of blood;” and a “Saurian,” or a “Serpent,” from the East considers
himself related to a “Saurian,” or a “Serpent,” from the West, though
no such relationship may exist.[602] Among the Ossetes, according
to Baron von Haxthausen, a man is considered more nearly related to
a cousin a hundred times removed, who bears his name, than to his
mother’s brother; and he is bound to take blood revenge for the former,
while the latter is in fact not regarded as a relative at all.[603]
Speaking of certain Bantu tribes, Mr. McCall Theal remarks that their
aversion to incestuous marriages is so strong, that a man will not
marry a girl who belongs to another tribe, if she has the same family
name as himself, although the relationship cannot be traced.[604] Is
it not a justifiable presumption that a similar association of ideas
has influenced the rules of succession also,—all the more so, where
community of name implies community of worship as well? It should be
observed that in every case—at least so far as I know—where rank and
property are inherited through females only, children are named after
the mother,—but not _vice versa_, thanks to the direct influence of
local and other connections. In China, a man is even strictly forbidden
to nominate as his heir an individual of a different surname.[605]
It is a difficult, sometimes even a hopeless, task to try to find out
the origin of savage laws and customs, and I do not pretend to have
given an exhaustive explanation of those in question. But it seems to
be sufficiently clear, from what has been said, that we have no right
to ascribe them to uncertain paternity; nay, that such an assumption
is not even probably true. No one has yet exhibited any general
coincidence of what we consider moral and immoral habits with the
prevalence of the male and female line among existing savages. Among
the Barea, for instance, as among the Negroes of Loango, inheritance
goes through mothers only, though adultery is said to be extremely
rare;[606] whilst, on the other hand, among the wanton natives of
Tahiti, possessions always descend to the eldest son. With the Todas
and Tibetans, among whom paternity is often actually uncertain on
account of their polyandrous marriage customs, succession runs through
the male line only. “If one or more women,” Mr. Marshall says with
reference to the former, “are in common to several men, each husband
considers all the children as his—though each woman is mother only
to her own—and each male child is an heir to the property of all of
the fathers.”[607] Among the Reddies, a son—although it often happens
that he does not know his real father—is the heir of his mother’s
husband.[608] And, in India and Ceylon, female kinship is associated
with polyandry of the _beena_ type—where the husbands come to live
with the wife in or near the house of her birth; and male kinship with
that of the _deega_ type—where the wife goes to live in the house and
village of her husband.[609]
Lastly, as Mr. Spencer remarks, avowed recognition of kinship in the
female line only, shows by no means an unconsciousness of male kinship.
As a proof of this may be adduced the converse custom which the early
Romans had of recognizing no legal relationship between children of the
same mother and of different fathers. For, if it cannot be supposed
that an actual unconsciousness of motherhood was associated with this
system, neither is there any adequate warrant for the supposition that
actual unconsciousness of fatherhood was associated with the system of
“kinship through females only” among savages.[610]
The prevalence of the female line would not presuppose general
promiscuity even if, in some cases, it were dependent on uncertainty as
to fathers.[611] The separation of husband and wife, adultery on the
woman’s side, and the practice of lending wives to visitors occurring
very frequently among many savage nations, the proverb which says, “It
is a wise child that knows his own father,” holds true for a large
number of them. According to Mr. Ingham, the Bakongo, who trace their
descent through the mother only, assert as a reason for this custom
uncertain paternity; but nevertheless, as we have already seen, they
would be horrified at the idea of promiscuous intercourse.
* * * * *
Having now examined all the groups of social phenomena adduced as
evidence for the hypothesis of promiscuity, we have found that, in
point of fact, they are no evidence. Not one of the customs alleged as
relics of an ancient state of indiscriminate cohabitation of the sexes,
or “communal marriage,” presupposes the former existence of that
state. The numerous facts put forward in support of the hypothesis do
not entitle us to assume that promiscuity has ever been the prevailing
form of sexual relations among a single people, far less that it has
constituted a general stage in the social development of man, and,
least of all, that such a stage formed the starting-point of all human
history.
It may seem to the reader that this question has received more
attention than it deserves. But I have discussed it so fully not only
because of the importance of the subject, but because of the insight
the customs mentioned give us into sexual and family relations very
different from our own, and because the unscientific character of the
conclusions we have tested shows most clearly that sociology is still a
science in its infancy.
Even now my criticism is not finished. Having shown that the hypothesis
of promiscuity has no foundation in fact, I shall endeavour, in the
next chapter, to demonstrate that it is opposed to all the correct
ideas we are able to form with regard to the early condition of man.