Mr. Fox tries to make peace with France, 1806—Napoleon’s
Proclamation—English Order in Council, April 8, 1806—Berlin
Decree, Nov. 10, 1806—Its terms, and the stringency of its
articles—Napoleon’s skill and duplicity—Russian campaign
conceived—Berlin decree enforced—Increased rates of
insurance—English Orders in Council, 1807—Preamble of third
Order in Council—Terms of this Order—Neutrals—The Orders
discussed—Embargo on British ships in Russia—Milan Decree,
Dec. 17, 1807—Preamble and articles—Bayonne Decree, April
17, 1808—Effect of the Decrees and Orders in Council in
England—Interests of the shipowners maintained—Napoleon infringes
his own decrees—_Moniteur_, Nov. 18, 1810—Rise in the price of
produce and freights, partly accounted for by the Orders in
Council—Ingenuity of merchants in shipping goods—Smuggling—Licence
system in England—Cost of English licences—Their marketable
value—Working of the licensing system in England—Simulated
papers—Agencies for the purpose of fabricating them.
[Sidenote: Mr. Fox tries to make peace with France, 1806.]
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s proclamation.]
On the death of Mr. Pitt, January the 23rd, 1806, his great political
and rival successor, Mr. Fox, endeavoured to make peace with France,
but in vain. Indeed before his own death, which took place the 13th of
September the same year, he had become satisfied that any lasting peace
with Napoleon was impossible. Having vanquished and humbled two of the
greatest powers of Europe, the ambition of the ruler of France grew
in proportion to his conquests; his arrogance being only qualified by
the reflection that he could not reach England by land, and could not
therefore crush her, as he had done so many other European states;
in fact, she had proved to be the one stumbling-block between him and
universal empire. Unable to reach her with his armies, and frustrated
in every attempt to overcome her fleets at sea, he attempted her
ruin by means which appeared at the moment more within the reach of
one who had overrun Europe with his armies. Thus, he declared to the
European Powers that he would not restore any of their territories till
England had restored the colonies she had taken during the previous
war from France and other countries. Allowing only a brief armistice
to the Prussians, and having arranged everything in his own mind,
he proclaimed the whole of their ports to be blockaded, and closed
those of Hanover against the ships of England and her manufacturers.
Defeated by this country in every action at sea, he resolved, if an
alliance with all the leading European powers could be secured, to
destroy her commerce by a gigantic but impracticable scheme, known as
his “continental system,” the one object of which was the exclusion of
British ships from every port in Europe.
[Sidenote: English Order in Council, April 8, 1806.]
Conduct so outrageous was not to be endured by even the mild government
of Mr. Fox, which, on receipt of the intelligence of the exclusion of
the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, recalled the British
ambassador from Berlin, declared the rivers Ems, Weser, Elbe, and
Trave, and all Prussian harbours to be in a state of blockade; laid an
embargo on every ship of that nation then in British ports, and issued
an Order in Council [April 8, 1806] authorizing the seizure of all
vessels navigating under Prussian colours, so that before many weeks
had elapsed four hundred of its merchant vessels were laid up in the
harbours of Great Britain.
[Sidenote: Berlin Decree, Nov. 10;]
These stringent measures were the forerunners of Napoleon’s famous
decrees.[264] The redoubtable Berlin decree issued at that city on
the 10th of November, 1806, was meant, we must presume, to be only
applicable to the countries actually occupied by his armies, including
France, Holland, Spain, Italy, and the whole of Germany, although it
declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade.
[Sidenote: Its terms.]
This extraordinary document set forth that England did not admit the
right of nations as universally acknowledged by all civilised peoples;
that she declared as an enemy every individual belonging to an enemy’s
state, and in consequence made prisoners of war, not only of the crews
of armed but also of merchant vessels, and of even their supercargoes;
that she applied to merchant vessels and to articles of commerce,
the property of private individuals, the right of capture; that she
declared ports unfortified, and harbours and mouths of rivers to which
she had not sent a single vessel of war, to be blockaded, although
a place ought not to be considered blockaded excepting when it is so
closely invested that no approach can be made to it without imminent
hazard, and that she even declared places blockaded which her united
forces would be incapable of blockading, such as entire coasts and a
whole empire. It further stated that this unequalled abuse of the right
of blockade had no other object than to interrupt the communication
of different nations, and to extend the commerce and industry of
England upon the ruin of those of the continent; that, this being
evidently the design of England, “whoever deals on the continent in
English merchandise favours that design and becomes an accomplice; that
this conduct of England (worthy of the first ages of barbarism) has
benefited her to the detriment of other nations; that it being right
to oppose to an enemy the same arms she makes use of, when all ideas
of justice, and every liberal sentiment (the result of civilisation
among men) are disregarded, we have resolved to enforce against England
the usages which she has adopted in her maritime code.”[265] Of course
every reader of history knows that many of these charges have no
foundation in fact. Nevertheless, Napoleon, then in the plenitude of
his power, decreed:—
[Sidenote: and the stringency of its articles.]
1. That the British Islands are in a state of blockade.
2. That all commerce and correspondence with them is prohibited,
consequently no letters or packets, written in England, or to an
Englishman, if written in the English language, shall be despatched
from the post-offices, but shall be seized.
3. That every individual, a subject of Great Britain, of whatever rank
or condition, who is found in countries occupied by French troops, or
those of her allies, shall be made prisoner of war.
4. That every warehouse, and all merchandise or property whatever,
belonging to an Englishman, are declared good prize.
5. That one half of the proceeds of merchandise declared to be good
prize, and forfeited as in the preceding articles, shall go to
indemnify merchants who have suffered losses by the English cruisers.
6. That no vessel coming directly from England, or her colonies, or
having been there since the publication of this decree, shall be
admitted into any port.
7. That every vessel which, by a false declaration, contravenes the
foregoing dispositions, shall be seized, and the ship and cargo
confiscated as English property; and that the councils of prizes at
Paris and at Milan are authorized to take cognisance of whatever cases
might arise in the empire and in Italy, under this article; the whole
instrument winding up with orders to communicate its provisions to the
kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, Etruria, and to all others the allies
of the French, whose subjects, as well as the subjects of France, “were
victims of the injuries and barbarity of the English maritime code.”
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s skill and duplicity.]
These extraordinary measures having been long conceived by Napoleon,
were now, in the full tide of his continental victories, launched
against the commerce of England. It will be seen by the calm perusal
of this famous but outrageous document, how well Napoleon knew how
to frame his edicts in a form to captivate the multitude, to mask
his ulterior objects under the appearance of liberty, and to assume
the character of a redresser of the wrongs of nations oppressed by
the alleged malignity of England. But his staunchest encomiasts have
scarcely dared to justify this atrocious decree, or to support his
pretence that it was merely issued to compel the English to renounce
the supremacy over the ocean, or to intimidate the agents connected
with English shipping, and principally the merchants of the Hanseatic
towns, whom he stigmatised as “smugglers by profession,” as they had
contrived, in spite of the raging of hostilities, as all merchants
will contrive, to pour into the continent every description of
merchandise.[266]
M. Thiers states[267] that Talleyrand knew nothing of this decree until
it was made public, although Napoleon had despatched extraordinary
couriers to the governments of Holland, Spain, and Italy with orders to
some, and a peremptory summons to others, to carry it into immediate
execution. Indeed Marshal Mortier, who had already invaded Hesse, was
ordered to proceed with all speed to the Hanseatic towns, Bremen,
Hamburg, and Lubeck, and to seize not only those towns but the ports of
Mecklenberg and of Swedish Pomerania, as far as the mouths of the Oder.
He was further instructed, by occupying the rich entrepôts of these
towns, to seize all goods of English origin, to arrest the English
merchants, to transport to Germany a certain number of seamen taken
from the flotilla of Boulogne, in order that they might cruise in boats
at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, and to sink at once every merchant
vessel suspected of attempting to run the blockade.
[Sidenote: Russian campaign conceived.]
While carrying into effect all over Europe “the continental system,”
shadowed forth in this decree, in retaliation, as Napoleon alleged, of
the English “paper blockade,” and fulminating his memorable manifesto
against England, its author, as is now confessed, was meditating a
march to the Vistula, to compel Russia, the only remaining friend
and ally of England, to turn against her, while he at the same time
attempted to turn the Poles against Russia, by amusing them with the
silly notion of the restoration of the kingdom of Poland under the
benign protection of France, and to work upon the Sultan of Turkey,
with a view to excluding England from the whole of Europe, and thus “to
achieve the command of the ocean by land.”
[Sidenote: Berlin decree enforced.]
The news of the Berlin decree did not, however, create at first so
much alarm as might have been anticipated. Its extreme rigour led the
majority of shipowners to believe it could not be enforced; though
more prudent parties waited to see the upshot of the affair before
they hazarded their cargoes on distant voyages. Matters, consequently,
remained in a very uncertain state until March 1807, when enterprising
shipowners resumed their shipments. These were carried on to a moderate
extent, till August 1807, when it was found to a certainty that the
Berlin decree had been put in force, and that, wherever the French
could send their custom and excise officers, a number of vessels and
cargoes had been seized, so that a virtual suspension of all shipping
to the continent took place from that date.
[Sidenote: Increased rates of insurance.]
The seizure of various vessels at Antwerp raised the rates of insurance
from England to Holland to fifteen, twenty, and thirty guineas per
cent., and, at even these exorbitant rates, the greatest difficulty was
experienced in effecting an insurance. It was then when her maritime
commerce had suffered severely, that the English government resolved to
put in force retaliatory measures of an equally stringent character.
[Sidenote: English Orders in Council, 1807.]
The first Order in Council[268] only contained certain regulations
under which the trade to and from the enemy’s country should thereafter
be carried on. The _second_ order,[269] 17th of January, 1807, set
forth that “whereas the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral
is considered by France to be illegal; and whereas a great part of the
shipping of France and of her allies has been protected from capture
during the present hostilities by transfers or pretended transfers to
neutrals; and whereas it is fully justifiable to adopt the same rule,
in this respect, towards the enemy which is applied by the enemy to
this country,” his Majesty in Council consequently orders “that in
future the sale to a neutral of any vessel belonging to the enemy
shall not be deemed to be legal, nor in any manner to transfer the
property, nor to alter the character of such vessel; and all vessels
now belonging, or which shall hereafter belong, to any enemies of his
Majesty, notwithstanding any sale or pretended sale to a neutral, after
a reasonable time shall have elapsed for receiving information of this
order, at the place where such sale or pretended sale was effected,
shall be captured and brought in, and shall be adjudged as lawful prize
to the captors.”
[Sidenote: Preamble of third Order in Council.]
[Sidenote: Terms of this Order.]
The _third_, and far the most important order, issued on the 11th
November, 1807, declared the absolute blockade of his Majesty’s
dominions, and of all countries under their control, with certain
exceptions which were specified. The much criticised preamble recited
that “whereas certain orders establishing an unprecedented system of
warfare against this kingdom, and aimed especially at the destruction
of its commerce and resources, were some time since issued by the
government of France, by which the British Islands were declared to be
in a state of blockade, thereby subjecting to capture and condemnation
all vessels, with their cargoes, which should continue to trade
with his Majesty’s dominions: and whereas by the same orders, all
trading in English merchandise is prohibited; and every article of
merchandise belonging to England, or coming from her colonies, or of
her manufacture, is declared lawful prize:” and whereas “the nations
in alliance with France, and under her control, were required to give,
and have given, and do give, effect to those orders: and whereas his
Majesty’s order of the _9th of January_ last,[270] has not answered
the desired purpose, either of compelling the enemy to recall those
orders, or of inducing neutral nations to interpose with effect to
obtain their revocation; but, on the contrary, the same have been
recently enforced with increased rigour: and whereas his Majesty, under
these circumstances, finds himself compelled to take further measures
for asserting and vindicating his just rights, and for supporting that
maritime power which the exertions and valour of his people have, under
the blessing of Providence, enabled him to establish and maintain;
and the maintenance of which is not more essential to the safety and
prosperity of his Majesty’s dominions, than it is to the protection
of such States as still retain their independence, and to the general
intercourse and happiness of mankind: his Majesty is therefore pleased”
to order “that all ports and places of France, their allies, or of
any other country at war with his Majesty, and all other ports and
places in Europe, from which, although not at war with his Majesty,
the British flag is excluded, and all ports and places in the colonies
belonging to the enemy, shall from henceforth be subject to the same
restrictions, in point of trade and navigation, with the exceptions
hereinafter mentioned, as if the same were actually blockaded by his
Majesty’s naval forces in the most strict and vigorous manner.”
[Sidenote: Neutrals.]
All trade in articles or manufactures of such countries was declared
unlawful; and “every vessel trading from or to the said countries or
colonies, together with all goods and manufactures and merchandise on
board, shall be captured and condemned as prize to the captors.[271]
His Majesty being desirous, nevertheless, not to subject neutrals to
any greater inconvenience than is absolutely inseparable from carrying
into effect a just determination to counteract the designs of his
enemies, and to retort upon them the consequences of their own violence
and injustice, and being yet willing to hope that it may be possible
(consistently with that object) still to allow neutrals the opportunity
of furnishing themselves with colonial produce for their _own_
consumption and supply; and even to leave open for the present such
trade with the enemy as shall be carried on directly with the ports of
his Majesty’s dominions, or of his allies,” makes exceptional certain
places and points which are there recited.
In this order the falsification of certificates of origin was specially
dealt with, and vessels carrying such simulated papers were declared
lawful prizes. On the 18th of November another Order in Council was
issued approving the draft of instructions to the commanders of H.M.
ships of war and privateers to carry out the previous order. On the
25th of November additional orders and instructions were issued,
containing supplemental provisions, and specifying the periods at
which the Orders in Council of the 11th of November should come into
operation at distant ports of the world; and, on the 18th of December,
1807, further supplemental orders were promulgated, all directed to
carry out the views of government in the West Indian colonies and in
the Mediterranean.[272]
The Order in Council[273] of the 11th of November is referred to
even in the present day as a justification of the Berlin Decree. It
ought, however, to be remembered, by those who desire to question the
character of England for uprightness, that the Prussian government had
previously in a forcible and hostile manner taken possession of the
electorate of Hanover, and had notified “that all British ships should
be excluded from the ports of the Prussian dominions, and from certain
other ports in the north of Europe, and not suffered to enter or trade
therein;” and had further declared (5th of April, 1806) “that no ship
or vessel belonging to any of his Majesty’s subjects be permitted to
enter or clear from any ports of Prussia, and that a general embargo or
stop be made of all ships and vessels, at that time, or which should
hereafter come into any of the ports, harbours, or roads of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and
effects on board the said ships and vessels.” Surely, considering the
circumstances of the King of Prussia’s perfidy,[274] this Order in
Council must be deemed justifiable.
The Order in Council of _the 16th May, 1806_, whereby all the ports
from the Elbe to Brest were declared to be strictly blockaded,
contained a proviso “that this blockade _shall not extend_ to _neutral
vessels_ having on board merchandise _not belonging to the enemies of
his Majesty_, and not contraband of war; except, however, the coast
from Ostend to the mouth of the river Seine, which is hereby declared
subject to a blockade of the strictest kind.” This Order in Council,
which the French pronounced “barbarous,” and “a paper blockade,” etc.,
was actually signed by Charles James Fox himself, nor can there be
any doubt that the coasts thus declared in a state of blockade were
in the strictest sense subject to such declaration, since the perils
of leaving the harbours embraced in it were such that hardly any one
of even the enemy’s armed vessels ventured to incur them. Considering
the circumstances of the times, and that Napoleon was then organising
a European confederacy in order to fall upon England with his whole
concentrated power, it must be admitted that the Whig Order in Council
was not only justifiable by the law of nations, but imperatively called
for by expediency. Orders providing for the blockade of harbours and
coasts which it was at the moment in the highest degree perilous to
enter, and for the interim detention of the Prussian cargoes, in
retaliation for the unprovoked invasion of Hanover by the Prussian
troops, and the exclusion of British commerce, all brought about by the
direct intrigues of Napoleon, were clearly within the law of nations,
and, moreover, seem now to have been, at the time and under the
circumstances, a very moderate exercise of the rights of a belligerent.
To attempt to palliate the Berlin Decrees on the grounds of the
“barbarous” character of the previous Orders in Council, was obviously
“a weak invention” of the enemy.[275]
[Sidenote: Embargo on British ships in Russia.]
[Sidenote: Milan Decree, Dec. 17, 1807.]
Russia having been bribed by the acquisition of Finland, Moldavia,
and Wallachia, followed the example of Prussia, and lost no time in
breaking off all intercourse with England. On the 28th of August the
Emperor Alexander laid an embargo on every English ship then in the
Russian ports. Napoleon returned for a short time to Paris, proceeding
thence to Italy, and, on the 17th of December, 1807, issued from Milan
the second celebrated Decree, a fitting supplement to the Berlin Decree
of the year previous: this Decree was couched in the following terms:—
[Sidenote: Preamble and articles.]
“Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of
the Rhenish Confederation(!): observing the measures adopted by
the British government, on the 11th of November last, by which
vessels belonging to neutral, friendly, or even Powers, the allies
of England, are made liable not only to be searched by English
cruisers, but to be compulsorily detained in England, and to have a
tax laid on them of so much per cent. on the cargo, to be regulated
by the English Legislature: observing further that by these acts
the British government denationalises the ships of every nation in
Europe; that it is not competent for any government to detract from
its own independence and rights, all the sovereigns in Europe having
in trust the sovereignties and independence of their flag; that if
by unpardonable weakness, which in the eyes of posterity would be an
indelible stain, such a tyranny was allowed to be established into
principles and consecrated by usage, the English would avail themselves
of it to assert it as a right, as they have availed themselves of the
tolerance of governments to establish the infamous principle that the
flag of a nation does not cover goods, and to give to their right of
blockade an arbitrary extension which infringes the sovereignty of
every State: we have decreed, and do decree as follows:
“1. Every ship, to whatever nation it may belong, which shall
have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or made a
voyage to England, or shall have paid any tax whatsoever to the
English government, is thereby, and for that alone, declared to be
denationalised, to have forfeited the protection of its own king, and
to have become English property.
“2. Whether the ships thus denationalised by the arbitrary measures of
the English government enter into our ports or those of our allies,
or whether they fall into the hands of our ships of war or of our
privateers, they are declared to be good and lawful prizes.
“3. The British Islands are declared to be in a state of blockade, both
by land and sea. Every ship, of whatever nation, or whatsoever the
nature of its cargo may be, that sails from the ports of England, or
those of the English colonies, and of the countries occupied by English
troops, is good and lawful prize as contrary to this decree, and may be
captured by our ships of war, or our privateers, and adjudged to the
captor.
“4. These measures, which are resorted to only in just retaliation
of the barbarous system adopted by England, which _assimilates its
legislation to that of Algiers_, shall cease to have any effect with
respect to all nations who shall have the firmness to compel the
English government to respect their flag. They shall continue to be
vigorously in force as long as that government does not return to
the principle of the law of nations, which regulates the relations
of civilised states in a state of war. The provisions of the present
decree shall be abrogated and null in fact as soon as the English abide
again by the principles of the law of nations, which are also the
principles of justice and honour.”
[Sidenote: Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808.]
It may here be conveniently added, that by a further decree of the
17th of April, 1808,[276] dated at Bayonne, all American vessels, then
in the ports of France, and such as should come in thereafter, were
ordered to be seized.
Such was the tenor of these extraordinary manifestoes; and the history
of the world furnishes no example of similar violations of the ordinary
rules which influence the conduct of civilised nations, even in the
fury of the most internecine hostilities.
[Sidenote: Effects of the Decrees and Orders in Council in England.]
The policy of these decrees became the battle-ground of party in
England during several successive years. In fact they affected so many
powerful classes in so many different ways, that it was natural that
in a parliamentary government, not then always acting from the most
disinterested motives, a great party clamour should be created. Nor,
indeed, can it be doubted that the Berlin Decrees, and still more
the Milan and Bayonne Decrees, struck a heavy blow at the American
neutral trade; while, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the
merchants of England carried on a profitable clandestine trade with
the continent through the intermediation of neutral ships, chiefly
American. This commerce Napoleon resolved to destroy at the hazard of
risking a war with the United States; and by the policy he pursued in
coercing the Americans to resist the English Orders in Council, he
achieved two objects: first, he discountenanced and did all he could to
suppress a trade which enriched his enemies, and secondly, he fomented
a feeling of hostility against England, whereby, as was proved in the
sequel, England found a new enemy ranged against her. The merchants
connected with America, who had employed their shipping in carrying on
a contraband trade with the continent, inveighed loudly against the
impolicy and “barbarous tyranny” of the English Orders in Council, and
asserted that these were the cause, _the original cause_, of all the
evils which ensued. Yet, in point of fact, those merchants who were
not shipowners cared little in what vessels their goods reached the
continent so long as the insurance effected secured them from loss, and
they could carry on the trade to a profit.
[Sidenote: Interests of the shipowners maintained.]
If such a system could have been allowed to prevail, it is obvious that
the shipowners of England would have been altogether shut out from
carrying on the ordinary trade of the country, and the whole business
of the transportation of commodities must have been monopolised by
neutral powers, who would reap incalculable benefit from the calamities
of the war. Napoleon, discerning clearly the usual practice of the
ports of Europe, and the enormous quantity of English goods shipped
from England and her colonies in American bottoms, at once struck
a blow at this commerce by seizing every vessel belonging to that
country then at Antwerp, Bordeaux, and Bayonne, and by burning those
in the port of St. Sebastian; nevertheless, the Americans, instead
of asserting openly and boldly the independence of their flag, as
they did in later years, secretly intrigued with Napoleon to obtain a
special immunity from his decrees for their shipping trade with England.
[Sidenote: Napoleon infringes his own decrees.]
But while Napoleon was vainly fulminating his decrees against England,
and putting into motion his whole power in Europe to carry them out,
he himself first set the example of their evasion, and for a temporary
profit established a system which tended to neutralise the very object
he was making so many efforts to accomplish. Scarcely had a few months
elapsed after the publication of the Berlin Decree, before it was
discovered that a large source of revenue might be opened by granting,
at exorbitant prices, licences to import British colonial produce and
manufactures.[277]
[Sidenote: _Moniteur_, Nov. 18, 1810.]
[Sidenote: Rise in the price of produce and freights,]
These licences were granted ostensibly to benefit French manufacture,
under the obligation of exporting French or continental produce to an
equal amount, a condition, however, which was easily and frequently
evaded. In this manner a most lucrative trade was carried on,
notwithstanding the exorbitant rates of the licences, and the great
additional charges to which the whole transaction was subjected.
British manufactures and colonial produce rose to an extravagant price
in France, while foreign produce realised almost as greatly enhanced
prices in England; so that, although the mass of the people on both
sides the Channel suffered deeply from the interruptions caused by
the Decrees on the one hand and the numerous Orders in Council on the
other, producing great obstructions to the ordinary course of commerce,
numerous classes amassed fortunes by these disturbing elements.
To add to the many sufferings the war created and to the confusion
these sweeping proclamations had entailed, the price of wheat rapidly
advanced in the spring of 1808. The scantiness of the crop of the
previous year was beginning to be seriously felt, while apprehension
daily increased that the exclusion of the British flag from the trade
of the Baltic would cut off from England her supplies of food from that
quarter of the world.[278]
[Sidenote: partly accounted for by the Orders in Council.]
But though British ships were to a great extent excluded from the trade
of the Baltic, the Orders in Council enabled them in the long run to
obtain almost a complete monopoly of the other portions of the carrying
trade of the world. England at this time had practically exclusive
possession of the East and West Indies; and the colonial produce
brought in her vessels was, in spite of the efforts of Bonaparte,
distributed at a great profit over the whole of the continent of
Europe. It is unnecessary here to enter into a dissertation as to
the general effect of a monopoly produced by war on prices or on
the interests of the consumer; nor is it necessary to lay down the
principle that, in the long run, a state of peace must, in these days
at least, prove far more profitable to the shipowner than a state of
war. But during the latter period of the great French war, whatever
diminution may have taken place in the building of ships, it is certain
that at no period was British shipping more prosperous, or employed
at higher freights. Scarcely a ship belonging to any other nation
could sail without a licence, which, following the example of France,
the British government had rendered imperative.[279] The whole of the
exportable produce of the East and West Indies, and a large portion
of that from South America, now came to the ports of Great Britain,
either for consumption or re-exportation; and any effort of Bonaparte
to exclude these necessary articles from the continent proved nearly,
if not altogether abortive. England now, to all intents and purposes,
obtained a monopoly, costly it is true, but she can never again hope to
carry on hostilities with any of the great powers of Europe and bring,
as it were, under her dominion at the same time all the material riches
of the world.[280]
But while the cost of articles imported from the continent of Europe
was enhanced by the difficulty of communication, and the circuitous
routes it often became necessary to adopt, similar causes raised
the price of colonial produce, and of some descriptions of British
manufactures, to a still greater proportionate height on the continent,
so that the severity with which the decrees of the enemy were enforced
operated more directly against imports from England than against
exports to that country, and many curious instances besides those we
have just mentioned are given of the extraordinary rates paid for
freight.[281]
[Sidenote: Ingenuity of merchants in shipping goods.]
Among the various means devised by the ingenuity and enterprise of
adventurers to elude and overcome the obstacles presented by the
decrees of the enemy, one in particular, which was resorted to on an
extensive scale, deserves mention. Several vessels laden with sugar,
coffee, tobacco, cotton-twist, and other valuable commodities were
despatched from England at very high rates of freight and insurance
to Saloniki, in European Turkey. Refined sugar and other goods were
packed in boxes made at a considerable additional expense, so that
each package should not exceed about two hundredweight. These, when
landed, were conveyed on mules and pack-horses through Servia and
Hungary to Vienna, for the purpose of being distributed over Germany,
and sometimes even into France. The articles sold at enormously high
prices. Sugar fetched 5_s._ to 6_s._ per lb.; coffee 7_s._ per lb.;
indigo 18_s._; and cotton 7_s._ and 8_s._ per lb.[282]
[Sidenote: Smuggling.]
On the 5th September, 1807, the English made themselves masters of the
small island of Heligoland (which was confirmed to them by the Treaty
of Kiel, January 14th, 1814), and thence enormous quantities of British
goods were smuggled into Holstein, and thence again were conveyed at
a charge of 33 to 40 per cent. within the French custom-house line.
This regular traffic, being well known to the imperial authorities, and
sometimes connived at on account of its enormous profits, was alleged
as a justification for the sale of licences, especially as Bourrienne,
who at that time was resident at Hamburg, had represented to Napoleon
that he had much better at once authorize the trade on these terms,
and realise for himself this contraband profit. Napoleon adopted the
proposal, and in consequence sixty millions of francs (2,400,000_l._)
worth of English produce was in one year openly imported into that
town alone. The same system was adopted in Prussia; while legions
of custom-house officers and coastguards were employed to put down
contraband trade with the English.
[Sidenote: Licence system in England.]
The English government having been unable to resist the importunities
of the manufacturing and mercantile interests, could not therefore
forbear from following the pernicious example thus set by Napoleon.
When the system, though different in many respects, had been fully
established in Great Britain, the number of licences issued rose
from four thousand nine hundred and ten in 1808, to no fewer than
fifteen thousand two hundred and twenty-six in 1809, and eighteen
thousand three hundred and fifty-six in the year 1810. Though these
licences were professedly regulated upon fixed principles, they were
nevertheless a source of jobbery and fraud, and great peculation and
corruption prevailed, “a fruitful source,” as Lord Stowell observed,
“of simulation and dissimulation from beginning to end.”
[Sidenote: Cost of English licences.]
Such licences were payable on a graduated scale on imports and exports
not transferable, as well as upon transferable exports and imports. The
fees received at the Admiralty were for licences to merchant vessels to
carry guns; on granting Mediterranean papers; on ships’ fines for loss
of papers; on ships’ protection for three months; on protection granted
to barges and boats for a similar period; on commissions, warrants,
and appointments; on granting letters of marque; and on licences to
join convoy; the Privy Council Office charging for licences to trade
4_l._ 16_s._ each, besides gratuities, which were divided amongst the
clerks.[283] The amount of the fees during the height of the licence
system was calculated to yield annually about 100,000_l._[284] beyond
the public stamp of 1_l._ 10_s._ which was added before delivery of the
licence.
But the whole system of licences proved utterly indefensible, and,
being granted to foreign vessels to the prejudice of English shipping,
it grew at last to be altogether intolerable. Beyond the mere amount of
fees claimed by the Council Office, the Secretary of State’s fees for
the sign-manual were as much again, and even this aggregate amount was
frequently exceeded. For instance, it is reported in the ‘Parliamentary
Proceedings’ that there was paid by a certain John Lubock for the
certificate of one cargo, imported or exported, 15_l._ 0_s._ 6_d._,
and for each duplicate, if required, 3_l._ 12_s._; part of this was,
however, admitted to be for agency. The charge for a ship going out
in ballast to import a cargo of timber from Wilmington, in the United
States, was 17_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ A licence for St. Domingo (special) to
trade to and from that island, cost 25_l._ 1_s._ 6_d._ For an order
allowing small vessels to trade to and from Holland for six months, the
charge for one licence amounted to 15_l._ 0_s._ 6_d._; but an order
for six ships could be obtained for 44_l._ 5_s._ 6_d._ One agent is
reported to have paid no less than 3,952_l._ 7_s._ 6_d._ in the course
of a year for licences alone.[285]
[Sidenote: Their marketable value.]
Sometimes, however, they were estimated at an even extravagant value.
Mr. A. Baring said, in the course of a debate in Parliament on the
subject, that he would have given 15,000_l._ for one of the licences
issued, which, owing to a clerical error in the substitution of one
word for another, became of that marketable value. No wonder that the
merchants importuned the government for these licences, when they not
only served as a protection to their property, but might, by a lucky
error, become the means of making a man’s fortune. In this point of
view the licences were wholly and entirely unjustifiable. It seems
further that where applications were made, a considerable amount
of control and interference were exercised in framing them before
they were granted. Mr. Brougham drew a picture of the President and
Vice-President of the Board of Trade laying their heads together, and
passing a whole morning in determining with the utmost gravity “whether
one cargo should consist of cotton or of wool, whether scissors should
be added, whether nails should be added to the scissors; whether the
nails or the scissors should be left out, or whether the commerce of
the country might or might not be ruined by throwing in a little hemp
with the nails and the scissors to make up the cargo.”[286] But this
was not all.
[Sidenote: Working of the licensing system in England.]
[Sidenote: Simulated papers.]
The licence to sail from port to port, for example, contained
the following clause: “_The vessel shall be allowed to proceed,
notwithstanding all the documents which accompany the ship and cargo
may represent the same to be destined to any neutral or hostile port,
or to whomsoever such property may belong._” With this licence, the
ship which carried it, foreign or British, was enabled to pass through
the British fleet; every vessel thus authorized being permitted to
take on board another set of papers, which were, in point of fact,
a forgery from beginning to end. Should the vessel be overhauled by
English cruisers, she nevertheless continued her voyage unmolested. If,
for example, she had actually cleared out from London, it was stated in
the simulated papers that she had cleared out from Rotterdam. With this
view, the proper description was made out as nearly as possible in the
handwriting of the Custom-house officer at Rotterdam; and, if it were
necessary that the signature of the French minister of state should
be affixed, as in the case of Holland, this was skilfully forged,
and even the fantastic signature of Napoleon himself was sometimes
attached to these forged documents![287] These forgeries were not done
perfunctorily or by halves, for not only were the names forged, but the
seal was admirably engraved, and the wax closely imitated. Indeed a
regular set of letters were frequently also forged, containing a good
deal of fictitious private anecdote, with a mixture of such news from
Rotterdam as might be supposed to be interesting to mercantile people,
together with an imaginary letter from a merchant in Rotterdam to the
shipowner.
[Sidenote: Agencies for the purpose of fabricating them.]
Thus provided, the vessel set forth from London to encounter the
manifold perils of the sea. The most respectable houses in London
made application for similar licences, and every merchant who, with
the privity of his clerks, sailed a vessel under such circumstances
was compelled to become conversant with the humiliating mysteries of
this fraudulent trade. But to make matters still worse, the forgeries
were confirmed by the solemn oaths of the captain and the crew when
they arrived at their destined port. Indeed it had become so common
a practice that perjury under such circumstances was not dealt with
as a crime, nor was it considered a crime on their part, as their
owners compelled them to swear that all their letters and documents
were genuine. Every sort of interrogatory was put to the captain and
the crew calculated to discover the real port whence the vessel had
sailed, and these questions the captain and crew were obliged to evade
by numerous false oaths. The feeling that they were doing no wrong
could alone have induced them thus to act. They were even obliged
to declare from what quarter the wind blew when they left Rotterdam
and took a pilot on board, although they were never near the place,
together with many other particulars, all confirmed by oath, perjuring
themselves at every stage. To such an extent did these frauds prevail
that at last they were reduced to a regular system. Individuals formed
themselves into established mercantile agencies, in order to facilitate
the simulation of these papers. Indeed they openly issued circulars
avowing their object. One of these extraordinary productions has been
enshrined in a parliamentary debate, Mr. Brougham having published to
the world the following “atrocious circular.”[288]
“Liverpool, ——
“GENTLEMEN,
“We take the liberty herewith to inform you that we have
established ourselves in this town for the sole purpose of making
simulated papers, which we are enabled to do in a way which will
give ample satisfaction to our employers, not only being in
possession of the original documents of the ships’ papers and
clearances to various ports, a list of which we annex, but our Mr.
G. B. having worked with his brother, Mr. I. B., in the same line
for the last two years, understands all the necessary languages,
and knows what is required.
“Of any changes that may occur in the different places on the
continent in the various custom-houses and other offices, which
may render a change of signatures necessary, we are careful to
have the earliest information, not only from our own connections,
but from Mr. I. B., who has proffered his assistance in every way,
and who has for some time past made simulated papers for Messrs.
B. and P. of this town, to whom we beg leave to refer you for
further information.
“We remain,” etc.
This singular document was accompanied by a list of about a score of
places, for which these agents had clearances all ready at the instant
for disposal to those merchants who, from the exigencies of the times,
found themselves compelled to resort to such practices. Indeed these
knaves knew perfectly well that if the merchants of England refused to
participate in this “filthy commerce,” the traders in Boston would not
have any such scruples, still less those of Pappenburg, or some of the
ports of Danish Holstein.
FOOTNOTES:
[264] France asserted, and America seems to have admitted that the
first departure from the Law of Nations was this Act of Mr. Fox’s
Administration, and that this Act led to the Berlin Decree; but this is
a pretence (see ‘Key to Orders in Council,’ p. 1). It is worth while
to give briefly here the dates and order of these different decrees,
etc. (1.) Mr. Fox’s Order for blockade of French coast, April 8, 1806.
(2.) Berlin Decree, Nov. 10, 1806 (recapitulated, Nov. 24, 1806). (3.)
Lord Grey’s Order in Council, Jan. 7, 1807. (4.) Orders in Council of
Nov. 11, 1807, by the Portland administration. (5.) Milan Decree, Dec.
17, 1807. (6.) Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808. (7.) Rambouillet Decree,
March 23, 1810. (8.) Fontainebleau Decree, March 23, 1810. The Bayonne
and Rambouillet Decrees were those most directly issued against the
Americans.
[265] We cannot read with patience such denouncements of barbarism,
and such professions of liberty and justice from one who about this
period ordered a poor bookseller of Nuremburg, by name of Palm, to be
arbitrarily arrested, and brought before a military tribunal at Bremen,
where he was condemned to be unceremoniously shot, because he had
published and distributed a pamphlet, which questioned the “justice”
of Napoleon’s acts, as the conqueror of Germany. If ever there was
a martyr in the cause of “liberty” it was this poor man, whose most
unjustifiable execution in August 1806, was regarded with horror
throughout Europe.
[266] Alison, vol. xi., p. 105, in a note, mentions a striking instance
of how the Berlin decree was opposed even to Napoleon’s own interests.
Shortly after its issue there arrived at Hamburg an urgent order for
the immediate delivery of a very large amount of clothing for his army;
but the resources of the Hanse Towns were so totally unable to provide
within the specified time the requisite supply, that Bourrienne, the
French diplomatic agent, after trying in vain every other expedient,
was obliged to contract for it with English houses. Thus while the
Emperor was boasting that by the continental system he had excluded
British goods from the continent, 50,000 to 60,000 of his half-naked
soldiers were, in the depth of winter, clothed by the manufacturers of
Halifax, Leeds, and other English towns.
[267] M. Thiers’ ‘Consulat et l’Empire,’ vii. 222.
[268] This is Mr. Fox’s Order of April 8, 1806.
[269] This is Lord Grey’s Order. The _Morning Chronicle_ of Jan.
4, 1808, in commenting on the above order, remarks that Lord Grey
“distinctly stated to the United States of America that their
acquiescence in a code which violated the rights of independent States
would compel this country to take steps for its own protection.... The
Decree is certainly directed against the Americans—it is a menace to
her; ... she must choose her party.”
[270] By the Portland Administration, of which Canning and Perceval
were members: two orders would seem to have been issued on the same
day. Key to ‘Orders,’ p. 5.
[271] These Orders in Council are dispersed through a multitude of
works. In 1808 they were laid before Parliament, and will be found _in
extenso_ in vol. x. ‘Parl. Papers’ of that year.
[272] Such was the effect in England of these proclamations, that in
the months of September and October 1807, when these or similar orders
were anticipated, no fewer than sixty-five applications were made to
the Commissioners of Customs at the port of London for permission to
re-land cargoes, already shipped in the Thames for exportation to the
continent of Europe, the impression being that goods arriving there in
English vessels would be confiscated (‘Parl. Papers,’ vol. x., 1808, p.
11).
[273] The Orders in Council were fully examined by Mr. Alex. Baring
in his pamphlet. Mr. Baring’s sympathies were strongly American, but,
on the whole, fair to this country (see ‘Enquiry into Causes and
Consequences of the Orders in Council,’ Lond. 8, 1808).
[274] Alison, ch. xlii. (1806).
[275] _Vide_ Martin’s ‘Law of Nations,’ Sup. 5, 437, 435, and ‘Annual
Register,’ 1806, p. 677, for the Order in Council detaining Prussian
ships. In discussing “the rights of war as to neutrals,” Wheaton
remarks that “during the wars of the French Revolution the United
States, being neutral, admitted that the immunity of their flag did
not extend to cover enemy’s property, as a principle founded on the
customary law and established usage of nations, though they sought
every opportunity of substituting for it the opposite maxim of _free
ships_, _free goods_, by conventional arrangements with such nations as
were disposed to adopt that modification of the universal law” (vol.
ii. pp. 176, 177).
[276] There is a further Decree of March 23, 1810, known as the
‘Rambouillet Decree’ on this subject (see ‘Key to Orders in Council,’
No. 13).
[277] _Moniteur_, 18th Nov., 1810. At Hamburg, in 1811, under the
bloody government of Davoust, an unhappy father was shot for having
introduced into his house a small sugar-loaf, of which his family
stood in need: yet at that very moment Napoleon was probably signing a
licence for the importation of a million of such loaves. Smuggling on a
small scale was punished with death; but the government carried it on
upon the greatest scale. The same regulations filled the prisons with
victims and the imperial coffers with revenue. Note by Alison, vol. xi.
p. 173, from Bourrienne, vol. vii. p. 233.
[278] The freight on wheat from the Baltic rose to 50_s._ per quarter.
The price of linseed advanced from 43_s._ to 150_s._ Hemp rose in price
from 58_l._ to 108_l._ per ton; flax from 58_l._ per ton in 1807, to
118_l._ per ton in the following year. Memel timber, which, during 1806
and 1807, had varied from the extremes of 73_s._ to 170_s._ per load,
advanced to 340_s._ per load; while deals rose in a similar proportion.
Russian tallow rose from 53_s._ to 112_s._ per cwt. Freights on all
these articles ranged exceedingly high. For instance, timber was
charged at 10_l._ per load; tallow at 20_l._ and hemp at 30_l._ per
ton; in fact, at ten to twenty times greater than the current rates of
the present period (Tooke’s ‘History of Prices,’ vol. i. pp. 309-343).
[279] A copy of these warrants will be found in ‘Parl. Papers,’ 1808,
vol. xi. p. 117. They were signed by the Lords of the Treasury.
[280] Many remarkable cases occurred of goods being sent by a
circuitous route. On one occasion two parcels of silk were despatched
from Bergamo, in Italy, to England at the same time. One was sent by
the way of Smyrna, and the other by the way of Archangel. The former
was a twelvemonth, and the latter two years on its passage. The
expenses attending the importation of silk which was brought by these
and similar routes through the north of Europe were enormous. Some silk
likewise came through France, and the charges of conveyance from Italy
to Havre, and duty of transit, amounted to nearly 100_l._ per bale of
240 lbs. net weight, exclusive of freight and insurance from Havre
hither.
[281] For instance, the charge of freight and French licence on a
vessel of very little more than fifty tons burthen have been known to
amount to 50,000_l._ for the voyage, merely from London to Calais and
back. In another instance a vessel, the whole cost of which, including
the outfit, did not exceed 4,000_l._, earned a gross freight of
80,000_l._ on a voyage from Bordeaux to London and back (see Tooke’s
‘History of Prices,’ vol. i. p. 310).
[282] As an instance in our own experience of the effect of blockades
in more recent times, it may be mentioned that England obtained, during
the whole of the late war with Russia, her supplies of hemp, tallow,
and other Russian produce in almost as great abundance from that
country as she did during peace, _but_ at greatly enhanced prices to
the British consumer. These articles, instead of being shipped in the
ordinary course of commerce direct from the Baltic ports, were carried
across the frontiers into Germany, or Belgium, or France, and by
railway rapidly found their way to the ports of neutral countries, and
thence were exported to England, so that the modern means of transit
would seem not only to render in a great measure nugatory the effect
of blockades, but to greatly enhance the price of all articles to the
nation which establishes them. Thus, while England was very heavily
taxed to maintain an effective blockade of the Russian ports, her
people paid at least one hundred per cent. more for numerous articles
produced in that country, articles, too, be it remembered, necessary
for their existence. Would it not be advisable for English statesmen to
consider if, in the interests of this country, the right of blockade,
as well as the capture of private property at sea, could not now be
erased from the ancient laws of nations?
[283] The amount received in 1807 was 12,609_l._ 12_s._
[284] ‘Parl. Papers,’ 27, 1808, vol. x. p. 359.
[285] _Vide_ ‘Proceedings in the Privy Council on Licences to Trade and
Navigate,’ vol. x. p. 1808.
[286] _Vide_ Speeches of Mr. Brougham and Mr. Canning (‘Parl. Debates,’
vol. xxi. p. 1108, et seq.).
[287] Mr. Brougham said in the House of Commons that he had himself
seen the forged signature of Napoleon (_Nap_).
[288] Mr. Brougham’s speech on the Licence Trade (‘Parl. Debates,’
vol. xxi. p. 1114).