Great Britain, A.D. 1792—War with France, Feb. 1, 1793—Commercial
panic—Government lends assistance—High price of corn—Bounties
granted on its importation—Declaration of Russia, 1780—Confederacy
renewed when Bonaparte had risen to power—Capture of merchant
vessels—Do “free ships make free goods?”—Neutral nations repudiate
the English views—Their views respecting blockades—Right of
search—Chief doctrines of the neutrals—Mr. Pitt stands firm, and
is supported by Mr. Fox—Defence of the English principles—Nelson
sent to the Sound, 1801—Bombardment of Copenhagen—Peace of Amiens,
and its terms—Bonaparte’s opinion of free trade—Sequestration
of English property in France not raised—All claims remain
unanswered—Restraint on commerce—French spies sent to England to
examine her ports, &c.—Aggrandisement of Bonaparte—Irritation
in England—Bonaparte’s interview with Lord Whitworth—The
English ministers try to gain time—Excitement in England—The
King’s message—The invasion of England determined on—War
declared, May 18, 1803—Joy of the shipowners—Preparations in
England for defence—Captures of French merchantmen—Effect of
the war on shipping—Complaints of English shipowners—Hardships
of the pressing system—Apprentices—Suggestions to secure the
Mediterranean trade, and to encourage emigration to Canada—Value
of the Canadian trade.
[Sidenote: Great Britain, A.D. 1792.]
[Sidenote: War with France, Feb. 1, 1793.]
Notwithstanding numerous predictions that the merchant shipping of
Great Britain would be, to a great extent, supplanted by her now
formidable rivals on the other side of the Atlantic, England possessed,
in 1792, six hundred thousand tons of shipping, more than she had
at the commencement of the American war, while at the same time
her exports had risen to 5,457,733_l._; and when the great war with
France broke out, early in 1793, she owned 16,079 merchant vessels of
1,540,145 tons, under the management of 118,286 seamen.[238]
[Sidenote: Commercial panic.]
[Sidenote: Government lends assistance.]
Yet though comparatively ready for war, its actual declaration
caused a serious monetary convulsion, nor have we any record of so
many commercial failures on the declaration of any previous war. The
struggle for the retention of the American colonies had produced, as
war invariably does, numerous evils; and the South Sea Bubble, many
years earlier, had spread general ruin among those of her trading
community who had rushed wildly into the field of speculation; but now
commercial houses of the highest standing gave way under the shock.
Indeed the sufferings of the people became so intense that Parliament,
after much discussion, resolved to issue 5,000,000_l._ of exchequer
bills as a temporary loan to such of the merchants of London, Bristol,
Hull, Liverpool, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Leith as could furnish
property equal to double the extent of the loan they requested.
The announcement of the intention of the government to support the
mercantile interests went so far towards dispelling the wide-prevailing
alarm, that the entire amount applied for did not, after all, exceed
3,855,624_l._; and in spite of this panic and of the calamities of war,
English merchant shipping continued to prosper. Indeed war generally
offers a large remunerative employment to her shipowners; moreover, in
this instance, the dread of famine served to increase the demand for
ships, and thereby enhanced their prosperity.
[Sidenote: High price of corn.]
As the winter of 1794-95 set in remarkably early, and proved to be of
extraordinary length and severity, many apprehensions were entertained
that the growing crops might suffer also. Nor were these fears
groundless; the price of wheat, which was 55_s._ 7_d._ on the 1st of
January, 1795, rose to 77_s._ 2_d._ on the 1st of July, and to no less
than 108_s._ 4_d._ per quarter in August of the same year. Government
had, early in 1795,[239] noticed with considerable anxiety the
indications of impending dearth. To check or modify these extraordinary
prices all neutral corn vessels bound to France were brought into
English ports, their cargoes being, however, paid for with a very ample
margin of profit to the owners.
[Sidenote: Bounties granted on its importation.]
Various remedies were proposed to counteract the evils of such high
prices, and Parliament ultimately enacted that a bounty of from 16_s._
to 20_s._ per quarter (according to the quality of the corn), and of
6_s._ per barrel on flour from the south of Europe, should be paid
till the quantity in store amounted to four hundred thousand quarters.
This law was to be in force till the 30th of September, 1796. Indeed
such was the state of alarm at the probable scarcity of food that
the members of both Houses of Parliament bound themselves[240] to
reduce the consumption of bread in their houses by one third, and to
recommend, as far as possible, a similar reduction in the daily food of
their friends and neighbours. By great exertions eight hundred thousand
quarters of foreign wheat were brought into the kingdom during 1796;
but even this extra quantity would have been insufficient to meet the
wants of the people had not an abundant harvest at home during that
year happily restored the balance of supply and demand, so that prices
once more declined to their ordinary range.
[Sidenote: Declaration of Russia, A.D. 1780.]
But though saved from the calamities of famine at home, England had
still to contend against the leading European powers. In 1780 Russia,
roused from the lethargy of ages by an unusually energetic monarch,
made great efforts to extend her power and commerce, not without a
manifest desire to grasp as much as she could of that more justly
belonging to other nations. With this view the Empress Catherine issued
her famous “Declaration to the Courts of St. James, Versailles, and
Madrid,” which is well worthy of consideration. In this celebrated
document, which however remained for some years in abeyance, the
Empress asserted that she had “fully manifested her sentiments of
moderation, and, further, that she had supported against the Ottoman
Empire the rights of neutrality and the liberty of universal commerce.”
She also expressed her surprise that her subjects were not permitted
“peaceably to enjoy the fruits of their industry, and the rights
belonging to a neutral nation;” and as she considered these principles
to be coincident with the primitive law of nations which every people
may claim, and even the belligerent powers cannot invalidate without
violating the laws of neutrality, she had declared:—
1. That all neutral ships may freely navigate from port to port and
along the coasts of nations at war.
2. That effects belonging to the subjects of the said warring powers
shall be free in all neutral vessels, not carrying goods contraband of
war.
3. That all such merchandise be included as is mentioned in the 10th
and 11th articles of her treaty of commerce with Great Britain, and
similar obligations extended to all the powers at war.
4. That a blockaded port means one so well watched by the ships of the
attacking power, that it is dangerous either to enter or leave it.[241]
[Sidenote: Confederacy renewed when Bonaparte had risen to power.]
Such were the principles then hurled at England by Catherine of Russia,
who placed herself at the head of an armed neutrality, consisting
of Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. Lord North, for a while, evaded any
direct reply to them; but the northern powers naturally found zealous
supporters in the nations now at war with Great Britain. Thus the
contemporary declarations of France, Spain, and the United States
lauded the moderation and public spirit which Catherine had displayed,
while England maintained her principles inviolate. But it was only
at the close of the century that the northern confederacy attempted
to enforce their principles. Bonaparte had then concluded peace with
Germany and Naples, had compelled Spain to coerce the Portuguese so
as to destroy all English trade on the coast of Portugal, and had
stimulated the action of the northern powers, by inspiring the Emperor
Paul with an infatuation which could only succeed in men of weak minds
like himself. The avowed aim of Bonaparte was to close every port in
Europe against the merchant shipping of England, to combine the naval
forces of Spain, Holland and France so as to make them act in concert,
and, thus, if possible, to rescue the army he had left in Egypt.
[Sidenote: Capture of merchant vessels.]
England’s position had already become sufficiently perilous, owing to
the order of the National Convention of France, issued in May 1793, to
their ships of war and privateers not to respect British property in
neutral vessels—an exception, however, being promptly made in favour
of American vessels: a resolution which continued in force till the
seizure by the English of the fleet of United States vessels, laden
with provisions for France, forced the Convention to rescind their
order.
American vessels thus became liable to capture on both sides, and
continued so till the French government, hearing that Mr. Jay had been
sent to London to remonstrate against the capture by English cruisers
of American vessels, renewed the order in favour of the United States’
ships. When, however, the National Convention found that Mr. Jay’s
remonstrances, so far from producing the effect anticipated, had led
to the conclusion of a treaty of amity and commerce between the two
countries adverse to France, they again decreed that their conduct to
neutral flags would be regulated by that of their enemies. The French
did not conceal their displeasure against the Americans, whom they
accused of base ingratitude; although it was evident to the whole world
that the assistance France had previously rendered to the revolted
colonists was simply prompted by a desire to check the power of
England, and not from any real sympathy with the American cause.
[Sidenote: Do “free ships make free goods?”]
In this instance the enforcement of the paper treaties pre-existing
between France and America threatened a rupture between the two
countries. The French ambassador to the United States presented a
remonstrance in September 1795 wherein he insisted upon the mutual
duties of neutrality. Not having received any answer, he made further
applications in the ensuing year, which were equally disregarded. In
his last note (27th of October, 1796) he observed, “that neutrality
no longer exists when, in the course of war, the neutral nation
grants to one of the belligerent powers advantages not stipulated by
treaties anterior to the war, or suffers that power to seize upon
them.” Mr. Pickering, the United States Secretary of State, replied
(3rd of November, 1796), that by the treaty of 1778 with France it was
expressly stipulated _that free ships should make free goods_;[242]
that the Americans, being now at peace, have the right of carrying
the property of the enemies of France; and that the French could
not expect them to renounce that privilege because it happened to
operate to the disadvantage of one of the parties engaged in the war.
He maintained _that the captures made by the British of American
vessels having French property on board were warranted by the law of
nations_; that the operation of this law was contemplated by France
and the United States when they formed their treaty of commerce, and
that their special stipulation on this point was meant as an exception
to an universal rule.[243] The Americans, moreover, saw the advantage
of preserving amicable commercial relations with Great Britain, and
this “_perfidious condescension_,” as the French stigmatised it, “to
the tyrannical and homicidal rage of the English government concurred
to plunge the people of France into the horrors of famine.”[244] This
violent correspondence thus threatened to embroil France and the
United States, and in about three weeks afterwards (15th of November,
1796) M. Adet, the French Minister at Philadelphia, gave notice that
his diplomatic functions were suspended, and, at the same time, the
Directory of France refused to receive Mr. Pinckney, the accredited
ambassador from the United States.
It was at this period, while French armies, under the generals of the
Republic, were pursuing their victorious career by land, that England,
on her natural element, the sea, sought to secure a compensating
balance by the monopoly of the carrying trade of the world. Desperate
measures were considered necessary to counteract the sweeping conquests
of the French and to save herself from what then appeared to be
impending annihilation. In 1794 and 1795 the conquest of Belgium and
Holland had been achieved by the arms of France; and in the following
year Napoleon began his victorious campaign in Italy, his first battle
having been gained at Montenotte on the 11th of April, 1796.[245]
But while the French were triumphant by land, the English soon became
equally predominant on the ocean. Their fleets swept the seas of all
their enemies. Through their vigilance, and the indomitable courage of
their crews, the merchant vessels of England had never in any former
war been so thoroughly protected. The premium of insurance which
had, in 1782, been fifteen guineas per cent. on those of her ships
engaged in the trade with India and China, did not exceed half that
rate at any period between the spring of 1793 and the close of this
terrible struggle. Nelson and his brave fellow-commanders were the
only, but they were a complete, barrier to Napoleon’s conquests. The
fleets of France were either destroyed or shut up in her ports, and,
to use Napoleon’s own expression, he could not send a cockle boat to
sea without the risk of its being captured. The loyalty and courage
of the English nation had, amid all their sufferings, risen with the
emergency. In Mr. Pitt the merchants, shipowners, and agriculturists
had found a most able and truly loyal, though a cold, proud, disdainful
champion; his extraordinary administrative talents and unswerving love
of his country rendering him the idol of the mercantile and shipping
classes. But though he had weathered the storm during seventeen years,
he now felt it prudent to withdraw for a while from office; his
retirement being, no doubt, greatly induced by the differences between
him and the King respecting Catholic Emancipation. His influence,
however, and the policy he had unflinchingly pursued, continued to
guide the councils of the Addington administration which succeeded him.
[Sidenote: Neutral nations repudiate the English views.]
It was then that the question of neutral rights, originally promulgated
by Catherine of Russia in 1780, first seriously attracted the attention
of those nations of Europe who were not directly involved in the war,
and especially of the United States of America, now fast becoming a
power of no mean importance, and one, even then, prepared to assert her
rights. These powers indignantly repudiated the claims which England,
under Pitt, had enforced. They alleged that the accidents of war ought
not to interfere with the trade of those not engaged in it; and that
they were justified in possessing themselves of such carrying trade
as the belligerents had been obliged to relinquish. Holding these
views, they claimed the right of frequenting freely all the ports of
the world, and of passing to and fro between those of the belligerent
nations; thus traversing from France and Spain to England, from England
to Spain and France, and (what was still more disputable) of going from
the colonies to the mother-countries, as for instance, from Mexico to
Spain. They resolutely maintained the principle that “the flag covers
the merchandise;” that the flag of neutrals sheltered from search
the merchandise transported in their vessels; that in such vessels
French merchandise could not be seized by the English, nor English
merchandise by the French; in short, that the ships of neutrals were as
sacred as the soil of the country to which they belonged. On the other
hand, they admitted that they ought not to carry goods unquestionably
contraband of war, it being incompatible with any notion of neutrality
that the neutral should supply one of the belligerent nations with
arms against the other. They, however, sought to limit their admission
solely to articles fabricated for war, such as muskets, cannon, powder,
projectiles, and materials for accoutrements of every kind; nor did
they consider provisions interdicted, except such as were prepared for
military and naval armaments, as, for example, biscuits.
[Sidenote: Their views respecting blockades.]
They made a second admission as to the ports which might be entered,
but only on the express condition that these should be accurately
defined; and, further, that it could be shown that such ports were
_bonâ fide_ blockaded by a naval force capable of laying siege to them,
or of reducing them to famine. In such cases they allowed that running
the blockade was an attempt to thwart one of the belligerents in the
exercise of its legitimate right, while at the same time it afforded
succour to one of the powers against the other. They insisted further,
that the blockade should be preceded by formal declarations, that it
should not be a mere paper blockade, and that it should be carried out
by a force that it would be impossible to pass through without great
danger.
[Sidenote: Right of search.]
[Sidenote: Chief doctrines of the neutrals.]
Lastly, as it was necessary to ascertain whether a vessel really
belonged to the nation whose flag she hoisted, and whether she had,
or had not, on board goods contraband of war, the neutrals admitted
the right of search if carried out with certain courtesies to be
agreed upon, and if rigorously observed. Above all, they insisted that
merchant vessels, regularly convoyed by a ship of war, should not be
exposed to search, the naval, or royal flag, in their opinion, enjoying
the privilege of being at once believed when it was affirmed, upon the
honour of its nation, that the vessels so convoyed were of its own
nation, and were not carrying interdicted articles.[246]
The doctrines asserted by the neutrals being similar in most
respects to the declaration issued by Catherine of Russia, are
therefore reducible to four principal points: (1) The flag covers
the merchandise, that is to say, no neutral ship is to be searched
for an enemy’s goods. (2) No merchandise is to be interdicted except
contraband of war. This contraband to be confined solely to articles
made for the use of armies or navies, corn and naval stores not being
included under this head. (3) Access not to be interdicted to any
port unless it is _bonâ fide_ blockaded. (4) No ships under regular
convoy to be subjected to search. Such were the principles maintained
by France, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and the United States
of America: they were, however, but loosely observed when their own
interests were involved.
[Sidenote: Mr. Pitt stands firm, and is supported by Mr. Fox.]
Notwithstanding this mighty confederacy, leagued together to overthrow
the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, Mr. Pitt stood forward as the
undaunted champion of her shipping interests, and asked the House of
Commons whether they would tamely suffer the country to be borne down
by the hostility of the northern powers, or “would submissively allow
those powers to abuse and kick it out of its rights?” He declared that
the four northern nations had leagued together to produce a code of
maritime laws in defiance of the established law of nations, at the
same time strenuously denying that “free bottoms make free goods,” an
opinion in which he was supported by Mr. Fox.
[Sidenote: Defence of the English principles.]
England accordingly insisted upon seizing enemy’s merchandise wherever
it could be found, maintaining the principle that contraband of war
included naval and military stores, indeed everything which could give
succour to an enemy; and, though she admitted that ports ought to be
considered in a state of blockade only when it was unsafe to enter
them, she repudiated utterly the pretended right claimed by the neutral
powers, that no vessel under convoy could be searched. “If,” exclaimed
Mr. Pitt, “we subscribe to the doctrines laid down by the neutral
powers, a small armed sloop would suffice to convoy the trade of the
whole world. England would lose her own trade, and could not take any
steps against the trade of her enemies. She could no longer prevent
Spain from receiving the precious metals of the New World, nor preclude
France from obtaining the naval munitions of war supplied by the North.
Rather than thus sacrifice our naval greatness at the shrine of Russia,
it were better to envelop ourselves in our own flag, and proudly find
our grave in the deep, than admit the validity of such principles in
the maritime code of civilised nations.”[247]
[Sidenote: Nelson sent to the Sound, 1801.]
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Copenhagen.]
Although Mr. Pitt had retired about ten days from office when he
delivered those opinions, his successors made prodigious efforts to
maintain the policy he had so long pursued. Nelson, who had already
gained immortal fame by the battle of the Nile (August 1st, 1798), was
despatched, second in command to Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, to the Sound,
with the double object of overawing Denmark and of preventing the
junction of the fleets of the coalitionists. The details of Nelson’s
extraordinary exploit are too well known to be here recapitulated.
Practically assuming the chief command, he, amid the difficult
navigation of the shoals which protect Copenhagen, bombarded the three
Crown batteries of the Danes (April 2nd, 1801), attacked their fleet
with signal success, and, when their determined resistance placed his
squadron in the extremity of danger, and Admiral Sir Hyde Parker made
the signal to discontinue the action, placing the glass to his blind
eye, he exclaimed, “I really do not see Parker’s signal for leaving off
action.”
After a terrible bombardment the Danes, who had suffered most severely,
allowed their fire to slacken, and at length to cease. The captured
vessels would not, however, yield up possession, so that an irregular
firing was still partially kept up; and, in spite of their heavy
losses, the Danes declined to withdraw from the confederacy of the
neutral powers, or to open their ports to English merchant shipping,
until that great confederacy[248] was broken up by the death of Paul
I. of Russia. When his successor, Alexander I., ascended the throne,
the 24th of March, 1801, his first step was to remove the embargo on
merchant shipping, which had been so unjustifiably imposed by his
predecessor; he had, indeed, no desire to wage a war of principles
against France, and still less against England. The effects of this
wise policy were soon apparent throughout Europe. England at once made
peace with Russia[249] and the northern powers, and secretly entered
into negotiations for the settlement of preliminaries of peace with
France.
[Sidenote: Peace of Amiens, and its terms.]
Both nations were indeed by this time anxious for peace, Napoleon
having in view the consolidation of his own personal power, while the
English ministry sought repose for the country after a ten years’ war;
and the people themselves were equally anxious with their rulers that
war should cease. By the treaty it was agreed that England should
restore to France, and to the other powers of Europe, all the maritime
conquests she had made, with the exception of those parts of India
which she had definitively acquired, embracing Ceylon, captured from
the Dutch, and Trinidad, wrested from the Spaniards. She proposed,
however, to restore the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo
and Surinam to the Dutch; Martinique to the French; Minorca to the
Spaniards; and to assign Malta to the still surviving members of the
order of St. John of Jerusalem. England also evacuated Porto Ferrajo,
which, with the island of Elba, was to be given back to the French. As
an equivalent, the French were to evacuate the territory of Naples,
that is, the gulf of Otranto, and Egypt, which France has ever been
anxious to obtain, was restored to the Porte.
The preliminaries of this important treaty were signed on the night of
the 1st of October, and a courier was despatched to Paris, with a view
to make the public announcement simultaneously to the people on both
sides of the Channel. The public joy both in France and England was
of the most exciting character, as the negotiations, which had been
carried on during nine months, had been kept profoundly secret up to
the last moment. Napoleon and his colleagues, the other two consuls,
Cambacérès and Lebrun, received the news at a cabinet council, and
they embraced each other with undisguised delight. In this moment of
satisfaction Cambacérès remarked, “Now that we have made peace with
England, we have only to conclude a treaty of commerce, and all cause
for future dissension between the two countries will be removed.”
[Sidenote: Bonaparte’s opinion of free-trade.]
“Not quite so fast,” rejoined the First Consul, with some energy. “A
political peace is concluded; so much the better, let us enjoy it. As
regards a commercial peace, we will make one if we can. But I will not
on any consideration whatever sacrifice French industry. I remember the
distress of 1786.”[250]
Treaties of peace were now formed between all the nations of the
continent, and peace caused deeper public emotion in all ranks of
people throughout Europe than perhaps any event which had happened for
many centuries.
But this peace, in which so many millions of people rejoiced, was of
short duration. Having by the treaties of Luneville and Amiens[251]
raised himself and France to the highest power and influence in
Europe, Napoleon had now constituted himself consul for life; had
restored the national religion to France, established tranquillity and
good government in all the departments of the state, reorganised the
finances, previously in a deplorable confusion; and had finally, with
Prussia, secularised the ecclesiastical states of Germany, mediatised
a number of smaller German princes, and parcelled out a large portion
of Europe in the most arbitrary, though in some respects judicious
manner. In a word, he had raised himself and France to the highest
pitch of political influence, and only wanted the name of emperor,
which in a year or two afterwards he assumed to be, in every sense the
most powerful potentate in Europe. The world was dazzled with a success
which, until that period, had been combined with many acts of profound
wisdom. But this remarkable man, who could so well govern the unquiet
spirit of France, could not govern himself—
“Oh! happy he who wisely can
Govern that little empire, man.”
Ere long his rage for power and distinction again involved all
Europe in one of the most sanguinary wars recorded in the history of
the world, a war which only terminated after the final struggle at
Waterloo, and in the exile for ever of the Emperor from the scene of
his glory.
[Sidenote: Sequestrations of English property in France not raised.]
[Sidenote: All claims remain unanswered.]
By the fourteenth article of the treaty of Amiens it was provided that
all sequestrations[252] imposed in France and England on the property
of their respective subjects during the war should be abolished, on the
ratification of the peace; and, acting in the spirit of good faith,
the English government, to prove their desire of living on terms of
amicable intercourse with France, at once and punctually performed
their part of this agreement. Indeed as early as the 25th of May,
1802, Mr. Merry, the English diplomatic agent at Paris, notified to
the French minister that His Majesty had, in conformity with this
article, taken off the sequestration on the property of all French
citizens in his dominions, at the same time adding his belief that the
French government would perform the same act of justice towards such
Englishmen as might have property in France. The reasonable request
contained in the latter part of this notification was urged more than
once by Mr. Merry, but Lord Whitworth’s despatch from Paris to Lord
Hawkesbury, dated the 10th of May, 1803, explains with how little
success these applications were entertained by the French government.
“With regard,” said his lordship, “to the numerous memorials and
representations which I have had to make to this government in behalf
of those of His Majesty’s subjects who have suffered by the detention
and confiscation of their vessels and property in French ports, I have
only to observe that they have, with one or two exceptions, remained
unanswered.” Under circumstances so studiously insulting, the British
government, to the surprise of its own people, persisted in a pacific,
if not submissive, demeanour. Instead of resenting such conduct, the
English ministers were content with making new efforts at conciliation.
They removed all the prohibitions on French trade imposed during the
war, placing her shipping in all respects on the same footing as the
vessels of other states in amity with Great Britain, a course involving
much injustice to many British subjects whose interests were thus
postponed to the paramount exigencies of state necessity.
[Sidenote: Restraint on commerce.]
[Sidenote: French spies sent to England to examine her ports, etc.]
As every step of the First Consul indicated a desire to embarrass
English commerce, it was impossible that friendly relations could
be long maintained between France and England. Under the pretext
of a renewal of arrangements formerly subsisting between the two
countries, Napoleon despatched to England a number of agents whose
ostensible occupation was to watch over the interests of French trade
and navigation, their real business and most important commission being
to make inquiries into the commercial value of each port; the course
of exchange; the state of the neighbouring manufactures and fairs;
together with every detail necessary for establishing a rivalry in
trade. These in themselves were legitimate and perhaps not unfriendly
objects, but each agent was further required “to furnish a plan of the
ports of his district,” with “a specification of the soundings for
mooring vessels.” If no plan could be procured, then he was enjoined to
point out, “with what wind vessels could come in and go out, and what
was the greatest draught of water with which they could enter therein
deeply laden.”
From the earliest moment of his assumption of power Napoleon had
conceived the idea that England, “a mere nation of shopkeepers,” could
be most effectually injured by directing his hostility against her
trade, and certain it is that, with unintermitting pertinacity, he
tried to carry out this design. It happened, however, that military
men and engineers were selected to act as “commercial agents,” the two
most able and active of whom having actually commenced their duties in
Guernsey and Dublin, while others arrived in London to receive final
instructions from leaders who had been recognised by Lord Hawkesbury,
the English Commissary-general of the commercial relations with the
French republic in London. The English government could hardly fail to
notice these suspicious circumstances, revealing as they did but too
plainly the object of these pseudo-commercial agents. Lord Hawkesbury
consequently made a verbal representation to the French ambassador of
the facts; but his reply was so flimsy and unsatisfactory, that the
French agents were detained in London, with a further intimation that
if they left it they would at once receive orders to quit the country.
[Sidenote: Aggrandisement of Bonaparte.]
[Sidenote: Irritation in England.]
It is unnecessary to recapitulate at length the various acts by which
Bonaparte, during a presumed period of peace, endeavoured to aggrandise
his power. Suffice it to say that he despatched an enormous military
force to the island of San Domingo with a view of placing the colonial
power of France in the West Indies on a level with that of Great
Britain: an expedition which, however, proved most disastrous, many
thousands of his soldiers finding their graves in a climate singularly
dangerous to European constitutions.[253] But when Bonaparte sent Ney
with thirty thousand men “to give,” in the phraseology of the day,
“a constitution” to Switzerland, the war party in England roused the
entire nation to energetic action, and, though the public language
of ministers still breathed a spirit of peace, it was resolved that
effectual steps should be taken to curb Napoleon’s further progress.
Italy, Holland, and Liguria (as the Genoese republic was called at that
time) had fallen under his iron rule. Spain he had likewise overawed,
while exercising a predominating influence over Austria, whose power
he had humbled; and, in the opinion of the French people, the insular
position of England alone “prevented her from being absorbed into a
French province,” thus sinking beneath the domineering power of the
French Dictator. The very thought of such humiliating conditions was
totally incompatible with the independent spirit of Englishmen. The
newspaper press, though at that time swayed by a spirit of party, yet
still free, sounded the alarm, and attacked the ruler of France with
an undaunted spirit, which Bonaparte could not endure. He lost all
temper when complaining of the unmistakable opinions expressed of his
conduct and intentions by the English press; though the too complaisant
English ministers prosecuted the offending parties.[254] In the midst
of this excitement the question of the surrender of Malta arose, only
to intensify the suspicions of the English people, the more so as
Bonaparte was making prodigious preparations of a military and naval
character in Holland.
[Sidenote: Bonaparte’s interview with Lord Whitworth.]
Although Talleyrand on the 18th of February, 1803, in a conference,
told Lord Whitworth that Sebastiani’s mission was “purely commercial,”
his lordship on the same day received a message from the First Consul,
appointing a personal interview to be held at the Tuileries three days
afterwards, which revealed a very different state of things. This
celebrated interview, which lasted two hours, had been previously
carefully rehearsed by Bonaparte, with the idea of either deceiving or
intimidating England. “Every wind which blows from England,” exclaimed
the petulant ruler of France, as he stood at one end of his table with
Lord Whitworth at the other, “is charged with hatred and outrage;”
and in this strain he harangued the ambassador throughout, inveighing
with bitterness against England, though drawing the veil carefully to
conceal his own acts of territorial ambition; and, in the midst of
his tirades, throwing out broad hints that if England and France were
but united they might share the whole world between them.[255] “As
for Malta,” he exclaimed, after he had worked himself into a frenzy,
“my mind is made up; I would rather see the English in possession of
the heights of Montmartre[256] than that they should continue to hold
Malta.” Lord Whitworth stared in calm, imperturbable silence at this
outbreak of well-feigned passion; but, on that same evening, made his
government acquainted with the extraordinary conversation to which he
had listened, the most startling matter of which was the First Consul’s
declaration “that Egypt must _sooner or later_ belong to France;” and
that in the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire France would take care
to have her share. A few days later, conscious of the folly of his
previous speech, he caused it to be notified to Lord Whitworth that “a
project was in contemplation, by which the integrity of the Turkish
Empire would be effectually secured,” Napoleon having evidently
perceived that he had overshot his mark, and, therefore, that he must
endeavour to obliterate the impression he had made on the mind of the
English ambassador.
[Sidenote: The English ministers try to gain time.]
The bolt was however shot, and to retrieve his indiscretion was beyond
his power. The English ministry, although they saw that war was
inevitable, were desirous of protracting the issue; they, therefore,
desired Lord Whitworth to state that His Majesty could not evacuate
Malta till substantial security was provided for those objects which
might be materially endangered by the removal of his troops. While
England was firm, Bonaparte, on the other hand, as was often his habit
whenever his schemes were thwarted, rashly published an extravagant
paper in the _Moniteur_, as an exposition of the powerful state of
France, and of his own glory. The whole of the past policy of France,
together with his intentions, were disclosed in this ostentatious
instrument. The other powers on the continent were plainly told how
impossible it would be for any of them to obstruct or interfere with
the prosecution of French designs; while they were reminded of the
advantages to be derived from the protection of France, and of the
destructive consequences of her enmity.
[Sidenote: Excitement in England.]
The public mind in England was wound up to the highest pitch of
excitement by the publication, in the official _Moniteur_, of the
“Acts of the Republic.” Nor did the love of peace, the desire of a
commercial people to preserve an uninterrupted intercourse with the
continent, or the dread of fresh burthens, allay their indignation. All
the independent portion of the English press poured forth a ceaseless
torrent of abuse of the French despot, thereby accelerating the crisis;
nay, even the government journals, which had previously observed
a guarded silence, now joined the chorus of national indignation.
The English ministers had sent orders to the Cape of Good Hope to
surrender that colony; and some of its forts had been actually given
up to the Dutch government. The commander-in-chief, however, learning
from England the critical state of affairs, repossessed himself with
adroitness of the places given up, relanded his troops, and held
possession of the settlement until counter-orders arrived.
In the meantime Bonaparte was with the utmost secresy preparing the
most formidable preparations in Holland, and had already conceived and
partly matured his grand design for the invasion of England. Yet even
then, so completely were ministers unprepared or unconscious of his
proceedings, that one of the Lords of the Admiralty said, in the course
of a debate in Parliament, that only a few miserable fishing-boats
existed in the Dutch ports; while, so late as the 23rd of February, the
Prime Minister declared the country to be in a state of profound peace.
[Sidenote: The King’s message.]
[Sidenote: The invasion of England determined upon.]
[Sidenote: War declared, 18 May, 1803.]
However, on the 8th of March, 1803, the King sent a message to the
House of Commons, acquainting them that he had judged it expedient
to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his
dominions, and, only two days later, the whole of the militia of the
United Kingdom were called out and embodied. The energy and spirit of
the monarch obtained an enthusiastic support from all ranks of his
people; and Bonaparte, not yet quite prepared, launched forth one of
his manifestoes in the form of a despatch to his ambassador at the
English court, in which he disclaimed having any prepared armament
except one at Helvoetsluys; adding, further, that this, though destined
solely for purposes of colonisation, and ready to sail, should, in
consequence of the king’s message, at once be countermanded. Very
soon afterwards, however, he despatched staff-officers to Holland,
Cherbourg, St. Malo, Granville, and Brest, with orders to repair all
the gun-boats of his former Boulogne flotilla, and to collect in every
port all craft available for the transportation of troops. He further
ordered the construction of a vast number of flat-bottomed boats to
carry heavy guns, and made the most formidable preparations for his
cherished scheme of invading England. He also made arrangements for the
occupation of Hanover, Portugal, and the gulf of Otranto (Tarentum),
so as to control the Mediterranean, with the view of having thus
under his command the whole continent of Europe from Denmark to the
Adriatic.[257] With a similar object he collected a vast force at
Bayonne to march into the Peninsula, and a second army at Faenza of ten
thousand men and eighty guns to fall upon Naples; while he, at the same
time, relanded the troops at Helvoetsluys, which, he had declared, were
destined for Louisiana, and despatched them to Flushing. All the ports
of the north of France were fortified in the strongest manner, and
when, a few weeks later, he formed the celebrated camp at Boulogne,
war was declared on the 18th of May, 1803, after a peace of only a year
and a half.[258]
[Sidenote: Joy of the shipowners.]
[Sidenote: Preparations in England for defence.]
[Sidenote: Captures of French merchantmen.]
The shipowners and merchants of London, after what had taken place,
heard the news of the formal declaration of war with tumultuous
exultation; indeed war seemed then more acceptable than peace had
been eighteen months before. Nelson was appointed to take charge of
the Channel fleet, and a force of volunteers was speedily embodied,
sufficient to convince Bonaparte that the invasion of England was
not so easy as he had anticipated, even “although all France rallied
around the hero which it admired.”[259] The English government, not
waiting for the formal declaration of war, seized upon all the French
merchant vessels they could meet with. Indeed, the news reached
Paris, just after Lord Whitworth left that capital, that two English
frigates had captured in the bay of Audierne some French merchantmen
which were endeavouring to get into Brest. The intelligence of other
captures soon followed. There had been an agreement between France and
the United States on the subject of such captures (30th of September,
1800); but, strangely enough, the treaty of Amiens was silent upon
this subject; hence the English government, viewing the prodigious
military preparations of Bonaparte on land, retaliated in the only way
they could retaliate effectively, by claiming the supremacy of the
ocean. In seizing the French merchantmen before war had been formally
declared, England adhered to her invariable practice when war, though
unproclaimed, existed de facto. But the ruler of France was unprepared
for this blow, and, in the first impulse of his resentment, he issued
a decree arresting as prisoners of war all Englishmen then travelling
in France. Nor was he induced till after long solicitation to limit the
action of this decree to persons holding the king’s commission.[260]
[Sidenote: Effect of the war on shipping.]
The first effect of hostilities on England’s maritime commerce and
shipping seems to have been to reduce the nominal value of the cargoes
exported from 41,411,966_l._ in 1802 to 31,438,985_l._ in 1803. The
next effect was to introduce into the carrying trade of Great Britain
an extra supply of one hundred and twelve thousand eight hundred and
nineteen tons of foreign vessels, whilst the third was to lessen,
by one hundred and seventy-three thousand nine hundred tons, her
own mercantile shipping; so that the success which had attended
the business of the shipowner during the previous war no longer
accompanied him, especially during the earlier period of the renewal
of hostilities, the majority of this class suffering heavy losses. The
owners of neutral vessels, while enjoying many other privileges, had
likewise the advantage of obtaining from the Baltic and elsewhere the
materials necessary for the construction of their vessels, at less cost
than the British shipowners. The English government also levied a heavy
tax on timber, hemp, canvas, and other articles requisite for the
conduct of their business, and insisted on licenses being taken out,
and bonds given to the commissioners of customs for the construction
and navigation of their ships.
[Sidenote: Complaints of English shipowners.]
Against these and other special burdens British shipowners now loudly,
and not without cause, complained. They remarked, with much force,
that it was of the last importance that their vessels should trade on
equal terms with those of other nations, but that “so long as they
continued to be burthened with tonnage, convoy, port-duties, extra
insurance, heavy taxes for docks, canals, tunnels, and _a thousand
other water-brain schemes_, they will continue to drag on a miserable
existence, till even the profitable concerns of _ship-breaking_ shall
be seen no more.”[261] Had their complaints been confined to the
special burdens with which they were afflicted, the sympathy of the
country would have gone with them; but when they formed an association,
which had for its object the maintenance of the old navigation laws in
their original integrity, they received no support even from Mr. Pitt,
a leading member of whose Administration declared “that however wise
and salutary the navigation laws might have been in the infancy of our
commerce, he did not perceive the efficacy of them at present, and the
necessity of strictly adhering to their original provisions.” This
truth was, indeed, at last beginning to break forth upon the world; but
it still required many years to convert the shipowners to what they not
unnaturally regarded as a heretical doctrine.
Thus they contended, with redoubled force, that if, in the infancy
of commerce, the navigation laws had been wise and salutary, their
rigorous enforcement now was more than ever imperative, not only from
the amazing increase of foreign shipping, but from the heavy duties
to which British shipping was liable. British ships, they said, stood
charged with duties not merely on every article necessary for their
equipment, amounting to upwards of seven per cent. on their whole
value, but double duty was levied on their gross tonnage, denominated a
_war tax_, though really the offspring of what was termed “a profound
peace.”[262] The ships of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Prussia, they
went on to state, could be built and navigated at much lower rates than
those of Britain, while many naval stores were the original produce
of countries whose ships were not burthened with heavy duties, and
where, too, provisions were cheap and wages low. Hence foreigners, it
was alleged, “were able to take freight at a lower rate; and, as the
smallest difference in that respect determined the preference of the
merchant, the carrying-trade of Europe was almost entirely wrested from
us.”
Whatever may have been the cause that led to this result, it was
stated publicly at the end of March 1804, that there was then scarcely
a single offer of trade for a British bottom, except such as were
employed in the coasting or colonial trades, which were held secure by
the strict enforcement of the Navigation Act. The shipowners pointed
with dismay to the mooring places in the river Thames, which were
crowded with foreign ships in full employ; while British vessels
covered the banks or filled the wet docks in a state of inactivity and
decay.
[Sidenote: Hardships of the pressing-system.]
[Sidenote: Apprentices.]
Nor did their complaint stop here. The arbitrary system of impressing
sea-apprentices, a system which acted with especial injury in the case
of those of the watermen on the river who, being liable to be impressed
in the fourth year of their apprenticeship, were lost to their masters
when their services were becoming remunerative, was severely and
justly criticised; indeed it is on record that, before this period,
there had been no fewer than thirty thousand watermen, etc., at
work on the river Thames, between Westminster-bridge and Gravesend,
exclusive of the British and foreign seamen on board the shipping;
but that in 1804 there was not a sixth part of that number. The new
dock regulations and the employment of carts instead of lighters to
carry goods to the merchants’ inland warehouses swelled the general
catalogue of grievances, while the erection of the East India Docks,
then in progress, was looked on as the crowning act of mischief, and
was therefore viewed by the forlorn shipowners with unmitigated horror.
[Sidenote: Suggestions to secure the Mediterranean trade,]
Amid this numerous body of complainers, some of whose grievances were
real, some insignificant, and others imaginary, there were happily
men who had more enlarged views, and who were able to urge on the
government[263] to take effectual steps to extend the foreign trade,
and to devote more attention than heretofore to the colonial and
especially to the West India business, in which large commercial
fortunes were soon afterwards realised. The trade of the Mediterranean
was proposed by them to be cultivated and re-established, as a course
of business likely to give vast employment to her shipping, and to
secure for England a predominating power and influence over other
nations. With this view the establishment of well-qualified agents,
versed in commercial affairs, in various ports of that sea was strongly
advocated.
[Sidenote: and to encourage emigration to Canada.]
[Sidenote: Value of the Canadian trade.]
But perhaps the most important point of policy pressed upon the
attention of the government in connection with shipping was the
expediency of encouraging emigration to Canada, with a view to the
cultivation of hemp, timber, and other naval stores, so as thus to
render England independent of Russia and of the other Northern powers.
Far-seeing politicians, and especially Mr. Pitt, had already perceived
that the ultimate objects of Russia were to unite the Baltic and the
Mediterranean, to secure the trade of the south by the naval stores
of the north, and eventually to dispossess England of the trade of
the Levant; and this judgment was confirmed by the fact that at this
juncture Russia held back and allowed Napoleon to prosecute his
schemes of conquest unchecked. It was, therefore, deemed sound policy
on the part of England to take every means in her power to enlarge
her shipping business with her own colonies. The timber trade alone
sufficed to tempt many enterprising Englishmen to strain every effort
to open out the vast regions comprised under the names of Upper and
Lower Canada. They soon discovered that in those colonies there were
nine or ten different indigenous species of oak; that among these the
live oak, a very superior description of timber, was of most use for
ship-building; that firs and pines abounded in great variety; that the
uncultivated parts of the country contained the most extensive forests
in the world; and that the white Canadian pine was better adapted than
any wood to be found in the Baltic for masts of the largest and best
description.
They were also aware that when Canada was under the dominion of the
French a sixty-gun ship had been constructed of the red pine of that
country, which was found very suitable for the purpose. Besides various
descriptions of timber well adapted for ship-building purposes,
Canada produced the pitch-pine tree, which yields abundance of pitch,
tar, resin, and turpentine, so that English shipowners had resources
within their own colonies which would render them in a great measure
independent of Russia if they were only developed. The great importance
of these and other articles of naval stores, and their prodigious
abundance in Canada, caused much more attention to be directed to the
trade of that country than had hitherto been the case; but it was only
after the perseverance of many years in these judicious efforts to
develop the agricultural riches of her North American colonies, that
English shipowners reaped the benefits of the extensive trade now
carried on between them and the mother-country.
FOOTNOTES:
[238] Abundant evidence on the elasticity of the commerce of England
in spite of all the odds against her may be seen in Macpherson, vol.
iv. _passim_; in Lord Sheffield’s ‘Observations on the Treaty with
America;’ and Chalmers’ ‘Comparative Estimate of the Strength of Great
Britain,’ 1794.
[239] The sufferings of the French, especially in Paris, in March,
1795, from famine and the severity of the weather, was even greater
than any experienced in England (Alison, ii. p. 604).
[240] ‘Parliamentary History,’ Dec. 11, 1795.
[241] _Vide_ ‘Annual Register,’ 1780, p. 348, where the declarations of
Great Britain and the other Powers will be found. Denmark and Sweden
replied in July 1780, assenting to Catherine’s doctrines.
[242] See further details on this subject, and on the duties of
neutrals, together with an examination of the Orders of Council,
_infra_ ch. viii.
[243] _Vide_ ‘Annual Register,’ 1796, p. 308.
[244] _Vide_ the American despatch quoting the French minister’s
despatch of the 29th of Sept., 1795. This famine was subsequently
noticed by Bonaparte in his speech to Cambacérès on receiving the news
of the Peace of Amiens.
[245] Alison, iii. p. 28.
[246] See various details on these matters in the correspondence
between Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Rufus King, quoted in Mr. Alex.
Baring’s pamphlet, pp. 39, 41, 53; and ‘Rights of War as to Neutrals,’
in Wheaton’s ‘Elements of International Law,’ vol. II. ch. iii. pp.
132-260; and in Furneaux, ‘Treaties of Peace since that of Westphalia,’
8vo, Lond., 1817.
[247] On the 18th January, 1798, the French Directory issued a decree
declaring: “that all ships having for their cargoes, in whole or in
part, any English merchandise shall be held good prize, whoever is
the proprietor of such merchandise, which should be held contraband
from the single circumstance of its coming from England, or any of its
foreign settlements; that the harbours of France shall be shut against
all ships having touched at England except in cases of distress; and
that neutral sailors found on board English vessels should be put to
death”!—Ann. Reg. 1800, 54, 55.
[248] The fleets of the Confederacy were as follows: Spain and Holland
united possessed eighty ships fully equipped. Sweden had twenty-eight,
Russia thirty-five, Denmark twenty-three, making a total of one
hundred and sixty-six ships of the line: a force that would have been
infinitely superior to the British navy, but that the efficiency of her
vessels and armaments far surpassed those of the Confederacy. Austria
alone was then in amity with Great Britain.
[249] Alison, iv. p. 529.
[250] M. Thiers, in his ‘Consulate and the Empire,’ book xi. vol. iii.,
relates this remarkable anecdote, and adds that “Cambacérès, with his
usual sagacity, had touched upon the difficulty which at a subsequent
period was again to embroil the two nations.” And see _ante_, p. 294.
[251] The preliminaries of peace were signed at Amiens October 1, 1801,
and the definite Treaty March 27, 1802. See also Alison, iv., pp.
604-624.
[252] See excellent remarks on the ‘Rights of war as against Enemies’
in Wheaton, vol. ii. ch. ii. pp. 75-131.
[253] It is said that of thirty-five thousand men (including
reinforcements) scarcely seven thousand reached France again (Alison,
v. p. 43).
[254] The most striking instance was the prosecution of M. Peltier for
an alleged libel on the First Consul. In this Peltier was condemned,
though defended with extraordinary power and eloquence by Sir James
Mackintosh (see ‘Trial of Peltier,’ etc., Lond. 1801).
[255] Perhaps the most graphic description of this remarkable scene is
that by M. Thiers, in his ‘History of the Consulate and the Empire.’
[256] “_Effroyable parole!_” (“Frightful expression!”) ejaculates M.
Thiers, “which was afterwards but too truly realised for the misfortune
of our country” (France).
[257] M. Thiers dwells on all these aggressive schemes with a certain
national pride. The lives of millions were to be sacrificed to carry
out these mad freaks of ambition!
[258] The English Legislature was nearly unanimous in supporting the
Declaration of War; the numbers in the House of Commons being three
hundred and ninety-eight for, sixty-seven against; and in the House of
Lords, one hundred and forty-two to ten (Alison, v. p. 126).
[259] Speech of M. de Fontanes in his reply to the _Corps d’ l’Etat_,
when war was announced by Bonaparte.
[260] Others who had not held the King’s commission were occasionally
thus detained. Thus the Rev. Mr. Lee, then a Fellow of New College
Oxford, was kept a prisoner at Verdun till 1814. The number altogether
arrested is said to have been ten thousand (Alison, v. 114).
[261] Extracted from two letters which appeared in the _Morning
Chronicle_ in the early part of 1804, and which attracted considerable
attention at the time.
[262] Tonnage Duties Acts, 42 Geo. IV. c. 43; 43 Geo. IV. c. 70, United
Kingdom.
[263] See sensible remarks in Mr. Baring’s pamphlet (p. 7) on Mr.
Pitt’s firmness in not giving way to the popular clamour on this
occasion.