THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ANALOGY

I

The origin of human endowment lies hidden in an obscure and

unrecorded past; the fact of development, of the gradual unfoldment

of capacity, stands out conspicuously throughout the historical

record of human achievement, and is equally recognizable in the

extensive remains of prehistoric humanity. The story of the mental

development of man is constructed from travelers' accounts of

primitive peoples, from the records of early civilizations, from the

sequences of thought and belief that are considered in the history

of culture, from the study of the intellectual growth of childhood,

from the observation of the less progressive elements of current

civilizations. The present essay attempts to portray the status

of one form of intellectual process, or of mental attitude, which

characterizes undeveloped stages of human thought, and has played

an important and variable part in the drama of mental evolution. I

propose to present the "Natural History of Analogy,"--meaning thereby

the treatment, according to the methods of natural science, of a type

of mental action, interesting at once as a psychological process, and

again from its practical results as a factor in the anthropological

history of the race.

An analogy is a type of reasoning, and as such is referred to the

logician for more precise definition. His briefest explanation of

the term may be stated as the inference of a further degree of

resemblance from an observed degree of resemblance; the argument

that because the Earth and Mars agree in the common possession of a

solid crust, an atmosphere, presence of water, changes of season,

the possibilities of rain and snow, and other observed qualities,

they will also agree in the further respect of being inhabited.

This may serve as an exemplar of the analogical argument in its

purest and most developed form; but in the survey of the varieties

and distribution of this natural product of rationality, it will

be necessary to include many forms of thought diverging more or

less from, though always retaining, a recognizable relation to this

type. The analogical inference, indeed, goes back to an inarticulate

form, in which it merges into a feeling rather than an argument, a

susceptibility to an influence supported by undefined plausibility,

rather than a conclusion from tangible evidence. But however lacking

in definiteness or formulation, however unconsciously realized

and barely expressible, the tendency or disposition to believe is

communicated to others and becomes an influential factor in the

ultimate fixation of belief and in the guidance of conduct. Logically

considered, analogy is always a weak argument; and becomes weaker,

as the range of observed resemblance is more and more limited, as

the resemblances belong to accidental, unessential traits, and

as the underlying basis of the inference is removed from direct

verification. Psychologically, its power to influence belief may be

very strong, and when this is not the case, there still may exist

a disposition to be influenced by analogical considerations, even

when these are successfully resisted or suppressed. The instinctive

proclivity towards the use of analogies, whether it be logical or

anti-logical in effect, forms an interesting psychological trait.

Logic counsels how we may think most profitably and correctly;

psychology describes how we actually do think or tend to think. The

logician is the gardener bent upon training certain selected flowers

according to an ideal standard, and eradicating all others as weeds;

while the psychologist is the botanist to whom all plants, weeds, and

flowers alike are worthy objects of study, and who, indeed, traces

significant resemblances between the despised weed and the choice

flower.

The natural history account of analogy will consider the status in

less advanced stages of human development, and the evolution of

this form of thought, which scientists to-day use only with the

greatest caution, and to which they at best assign but a limited

and corroborative value. It will appear that analogy is dominant

in primitive types of thought; that it has an important cultural

history; and has left an unmistakable impress upon many beliefs of

our civilization, marked as obsolete, perhaps, in the dictionary

of the cultured, but current still in the parlance of average and

untutored humanity.

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