So far as the strength and weakness of the arguments for mental
telegraphy depend upon the perspective of value attached to the
various data and to the conditions under which these have been
gathered, I have presented my estimate and indicated the burden of
my conclusions. But I am aware that I may have laid myself open to
the charge--which will be brought not by the advocates of telepathy,
but by its most emphatic opponents--of a neglect of consideration of
the general logical status of telepathy as a germane and legitimate
hypothesis. That the hypothesis of telepathy when carefully
interpreted is capable, if not of explaining the data, at least of
being fitted without undue straining to a large portion of the data,
may be claimed with some plausibility; that I regard the hypothesis
as unwarranted and unnecessary has been made sufficiently clear. But
what if the hypothesis is not a legitimate one, not one which the
methods and spirit of science can properly or profitably consider? If
this be the case, it would seem superfluous to consider whether the
hypothesis is warranted by the data or capable of explaining them.
That it is the policy of science to allow the utmost latitude of
opinion and theory and to interpret the possible in an unprejudiced
and liberal spirit will readily be conceded. That it is equally
the policy of science to demand of all claimants for recognition
authentic credentials framed in accordance with the laws of logic and
the principles of evidence and probability, is sometimes overlooked.
Science cannot possibly consider all hypotheses, but only legitimate
ones. To explain coincidences and the success of experiments in
thought-transference by assuming that there is a demon, whose
special business it is to make people have uncanny feelings when
their relatives in distant places are dying or in danger, and to
suggest to the guesser what is in the mind of the party of the second
part in the experiment, is certainly not an hypothesis worthy of
consideration by science; and incidentally be it noted that this
hypothesis may be successfully shaped to fit the facts, and cannot
be definitely disproved. Some absurd hypotheses may be readily
disproved and others not; but are scientists really called upon to
disprove them? There recently fell under my observation a claim for
the theory that when persons felt an unaccountable aversion for one
another, either at once or after a time of friendship, it was due to
their opposite horoscopic natures, and it would be found that their
birthdays were not far from six months apart, that is, nearly as
far apart as they possibly could be. Divorces, breaches of promise,
family feuds, and antipathies at first sight could thus be accounted
for. Now, it would involve no very burdensome undertaking to disprove
this theory; but I should not expect a cordial approval of my efforts
on the part of my colleagues if I carried through the investigation.
The hypothesis is unscientific, or even anti-scientific, and its
examination unnecessary and unprofitable. Yet it is not always
possible to render so decisive a verdict; and in the present case,
while I incline to the belief that the hypothesis of telepathy is,
as usually advanced and in essence, an illegitimate one, I still
regard it as possible that in the future some modification of this
hypothesis may be framed, which will bring it within the scope of a
liberal conception of the scientific. It is important to make this
attitude perfectly clear: if telepathy means the hypothesis of a
new force, that is, the assumption of an as yet uncomprehended mode
of the output of energy, subject rigorously to the physical bonds
of material causation which make possible a rational conception of
psycho-physiological processes; and if, further, some one will put
forth a rational conception of how this assumed action can take place
apart from the exercise of the senses, I am prepared to admit that
this hypothesis is (not sound, or strong, or in accordance with the
facts, or capable of explaining the facts, or warranted by the facts,
but) one which it is legitimate, though perhaps not profitable, to
consider. If, however, telepathy is put forward as a totally new and
peculiar kind of action, which is quite unrelated to the ordinary
forces with which our senses and scientific observation acquaint
us, and which is not subject to the limitations of the material
world of causation; if telepathy is supposed to reveal to us a world
beyond or behind or mysteriously intertwined with the phenomena of
this world,--a world in which events happen not in accordance with
the established physical laws, but for their personal significance
even in defiance of those laws,--then it becomes impossible for
the scientist to consider this hypothesis without abandoning his
fundamental conceptions of law and science.
My defense, therefore, for not beginning and possibly confining
this discussion to the question of the scientific legitimacy
of the telepathic hypothesis is that, in the present status of
opinion, it does not seem to me hopeful to influence belief by
such a presentation. It seems to me a far more practical step to
present the unwarranted character of the hypothesis and its logical
insufficiencies as a means of influencing those who had been, or were
likely to be, impressed by coincidences and death-warning experiences
and guessing experiments. And, moreover, it is necessary, so long
as such experiences have a strong hold on the popular imagination
and shape the popular conceptions of the nature both of mental
processes and of the field of psychology, to portray as well as
may be the natural explanation and significance of the phenomena,
and to indicate the general trend of the conceptions under which
they may be profitably viewed; and this, even though it be but
measurably possible to apply general principles to special cases.
This step is an essential part of the logical task here attempted.
Under other circumstances it would have been advisable, as it always
would be proper, to determine the legitimacy of an hypothesis before
considering it as worthy of detailed examination on other counts. But
here, as is frequently the case, it is a condition and not one of our
own choosing that confronts us.