VI

I therefore regard the inclination towards a telepathic hypothesis

as the result of a defective logical attitude, which in turn may be

regarded as the outcome of a natural but unfortunate psychological

tendency. In considering the question, "What is the proper inference

to be drawn from the accumulated data apparently suggestive of

'communication between mind and mind otherwise than through the

known channels of the senses'?" we are considering a logical

problem--a problem of considerable difficulty, not one to be entered

upon without deliberation and preparation. In considering the

question, "How is it that such evidence is readily accepted as proof

of telepathy? How is it that this hypothesis is favored above others

intrinsically no less improbable?" we are likewise entering upon a

complex problem, but one that is psychological in scope and nature.

It is to a more fundamental consideration of these questions that we

now turn.

I have based my discussion of mental telegraphy almost wholly upon

the occurrence of coincidences (using that term not as the equivalent

wholly of chance occurrences, but including suggestive or interesting

conjunctions of circumstances in general), for the reason that

coincidences--both those of a commonplace character and those that

seem to possess a striking personal significance--have prepared the

popular mind for the acceptance of the telepathic hypothesis, and

still constitute the most formidable array of evidence presented

for that hypothesis. The other class of evidence to be considered

is the experimental, which may be said to include as its most

distinctive type the results of tests in which intentional attempts

at mental telegraphy were made under definite conditions and usually

with specially selected subjects; and as another type, the precise

verification and registration of presentiments and peculiar and

startling "psychic experiences" with reference to their coincidence

with death, accidents, and other serious events in life. It may be

admitted that the experimental data are equally worthy with the

others of a logical analysis, and indeed that they present in some

respects different and more favorable conditions for the application

of such an analysis. In general, however (and I desire to confine

this discussion to the general principles involved and not to the

analysis of special cases), the considerations that determine the

logical value, or the lack of it, of the one type of evidence are

applicable without undue modification to the other. Nor do I consider

that the experimental data have seriously modified the logical status

of the problem as a whole; nor that they have, except in relatively

few cases, been of themselves sufficient to make converts to a

belief in telepathy. They have undoubtedly very much strengthened

and disseminated that belief; but this implies that a favorable

disposition to the belief was already present. It is because it

seems to me that the presence of this favorable disposition, albeit

in suppressed or half-acknowledged form, is in most cases due to

some phase of the argument from coincidences, that I have made it

central in my discussion. I must not fail to point out, however,

that experiments in thought-transference have one important, and

that a logical, advantage over observations of coincidences; this is

the possibility which they present of quite accurately allowing for

the effect of chance. In coincidences the estimate of chance as the

source of the conjunction of events is frequently, if not always, a

matter of complex judgment over which serious differences of opinion

will occur. Some of the published quantitative estimates made by

serious and able students of such problems, of the probabilities

that certain coincidences have been due to chance have been

pronounced altogether wide of the mark and even absurd by others. In

experiments arranged with due precautions there can be no uncertainty

on this point; the proportion of successes, that is, of striking

coincidences, may be calculated. If the actual number of chance

coincidences appreciably exceeds the calculated proportion, and if

the theory on which the calculation was based corresponds to the

actual conditions, then the results were not due to chance alone. But

whether they were due to fraud, or to some unconscious transference

of indications, or to telepathy, or to spirit influence, or to

interference of the devil, or to the fact that the participants in

the experiment were born when the stars and planets presented certain

conjunctions, or to the existence of a totally unrecognized form of

mental vibrations,--all these are mere hypotheses which may be strong

or weak or absurd, according to their power to really account for

the results, to their concordance with the sum total of scientific

knowledge in this field and with the logical principles guiding the

formation of scientific hypotheses. To jump from the conclusion that

the results are not due to chance to the conclusion that they are

due to telepathy, is no whit more absurd than the position of the

astrologer, or the spiritualistic explanation of conjuring tricks.

That there is something in these results to be explained is admitted;

whether the results have been obtained and recorded in such a way

as to contain the clue to their explanation cannot be affirmed;

whether our present state of knowledge enables us to explain them may

be argued pro and con; whether they are worth serious attention is

also a debatable question; but none of these conditions warrants a

resort to the telepathic hypothesis. That hypothesis as all others

must be weighed in the logical balance without prepossession, and

with full realization of the possibility, that "general appearances

suspicious," or "not proven," or a complete suspension of judgment,

may be among the present verdicts.