II

One of the most deplorable attitudes towards the borderland phenomena

of which mental telegraphy or telepathy forms a type, is that which

insists upon an exact and detailed explanation of concrete personal

experiences, and regards these as so essentially peculiar that it

refuses to consider them in connection with the many other instances

of the same class, without reference to which a rational explanation

is unattainable. This tendency, to insist that the laws of science

shall be precisely and in detail applicable to individual experiences

possessing a personal interest for us, has wrought much havoc; it has

contributed to superstition, fostered pseudo-science, and encouraged

charlatanism. To antagonize this tendency it is necessary to insist

upon the statistical nature of the inquiry. We should certainly be

familiar in this statistic-filled age with the law-abiding character

of individual happenings when considered in large groups. So many

types of facts depending upon individual and heterogeneous motives

shoot together and form curves of surprising regularity; the number

of marriages or of misdirected letters, the falsification of ages or

the distribution of heights of individuals, and countless other items

that in individual cases seem accidental, or capricious, or due to

a host of minute and unaccountable factors, none the less present

a striking statistical regularity. The owners of a gaming-table,

counting upon the statistical regularity of the accidental, are

assured of a steady income; they are interested long enough to obtain

an extensive view of the fluctuations, and to see the law that guides

the whole. Not so the individual player; he is interested only in

that particular portion of the game in which his money is at stake.

He detects mysterious laws of fortune and freaks of luck; sees in a

series of coincidences or momentary successes the proofs of his pet

schemes, and dismisses the general doctrine of chances with disdain,

because it is not obviously applicable to his case. This influences

the losers as well as the winners; both are absorbed in their own

minute portions of the game, and forget that the law makes distinct

provision for temporary losses and gains, great and small, but is

as indifferent to the times and order of such occurrences as to the

personality of those affected.

The distinction between the individual and the statistical aspect of

a problem may be further illustrated in the much-discussed question

of the differences in brain characteristics of men and women.

When the claimants for woman's equality point to the acknowledged

inability of an anatomist to determine whether a particular brain

belonged to a man or a woman as conclusive evidence of their

contention, they unconsciously assume that the problem is capable

of determination in the individual specimen. A sounder logic would

insure greater caution. The differences in question may be certainly

established and typical, and yet depend upon statistical, not upon

individual data. Give the anatomist a goodly number of fairly

selected brains and tell him that all the women's brains are in

one group, and all the men's brains in another, and he will tell

you which group is feminine, which masculine; and this more than

offsets his failure in the former test. It establishes a statistical

regularity. Individually we may argue that many women of our

acquaintance have larger heads than the men; that the English, are

not taller than the French, because the Frenchmen we have chanced to

meet have been quite as tall as the Englishmen of our acquaintance;

that the laws of chance do not apply to the gaming-table, because

on that basis we should have come out even and not as losers; and

that coincidences cannot explain our strange mental experiences,

because they are altogether too peculiar and too frequent. It is only

in the most complete stages and in the more definite realms that

knowledge becomes applicable accurately and definitely to individual

cases. For the present it is well if, with such abstruse or rather

indefinite material, we can glimpse the statistical regularity of

the entire group of phenomena, trace here and there the possible or

probable application of general principles, and refuse to allow our

opinions to be disarranged by rather startling individual cases. The

explanation of these, however interesting they may be to ourselves

or entertaining to others, is not the test of our knowledge of the

subject.

I pick up a stone, and with a peculiar turn of the hand throw it from

me; probably no student of mechanics can exactly calculate the course

of that projectile,--nor is it worth while. What he can do is to show

what laws are obeyed by ideal projectiles, ideally thrown under ideal

conditions, and how far the more important practical cases tend to

agree with or diverge from these conditions. It is unfair to test his

science by its minute applicability to our special experiences.

When the problems involved in mental telegraphy come to be generally

viewed under the guidance of a sound logic, the outlook will be

hopeful that the whole domain will gradually acquire definite order;

and that its devotees, after appreciating the statistical regularity

of the phenomena, will come to the conclusion that much of the

energy and ability now expended in a search for the explanation of

complex and necessarily indefinite individual cases, is on the whole

unprofitable. With an infinite time and an infinite capacity it might

be profitable to study all things; but, at present, sanity consists

in the maintenance of a proper perspective of the relative importance

of the affairs of the intellectual and the practical life. It may

be that the man who puzzles day and night over some trivial mystery

expends as much brain energy as a great intellectual benefactor of

mankind; but the world does not equally cherish the two.

Fact and Fable in Psychology · 第 63 / 119 题