_Relations of Orodes with Pompey, and with Brutus and Cassius. Second
War with Rome. Great Parthian Expedition against Syria, Palestine,
and Asia Minor. Defeat of Saxa. Occupation of Antioch and Jerusalem.
Parthians driven out of Syria by Ventidius. Death of Pacorus. Death of
Orodes._
The civil troubles that had seemed to threaten Parthia from the ambition
of the youthful Pacorus passed away without any explosion. The son
showed his obedience by returning home submissively when he might
have flown to arms; and the father accepted the act of obedience as a
sufficient indication that no rebellion had been seriously meant. We
find Pacorus not only allowed to live, but again entrusted a few years
later with high office by the Parthian monarch; and on this occasion we
find him showing no signs of disaffection or discontent.
Nine years, however, elapsed between the recall of the young prince
and his reappointment to the supreme command against the Romans. Of the
internal condition of Parthia during this interval we have no account.
Apparently, Orodes ruled quietly and peaceably, contenting himself
with the glory which he had gained, and not anxious to tempt fortune by
engaging in any fresh enterprise. It was no doubt a satisfaction to
him to see the arms of the Romans, instead of being directed upon Asia,
employed in intestine strife; and we can well understand that he might
even deem it for his interest to foment and encourage the quarrels
which, at any rate for the time, secured his own empire from attack. It
appears that communications took place in the year B.C. 49 or 48 between
him and Pompey, a request for alliance being made by the latter, and an
answer being sent by Orodes, containing the terms upon which he would
consent to give Pompey effective aid in the war. If the Roman leader
would deliver into his hands the province of Syria and make it wholly
over to the Parthians, Orodes would conclude an alliance with him and
send help; but not otherwise. It is to the credit of Pompey that he
rejected these terms, and declined to secure his own private gain by
depriving his country of a province. Notwithstanding the failure of
these negotiations and the imprisonment of his envoy Hirrus, when a few
months later, having lost the battle of Pharsalia, the unhappy Roman was
in need of a refuge from his great enemy, he is said to have proposed
throwing himself on the friendship, or mercy, of Orodes. He had hopes,
perhaps, of enlisting the Parthian battalions in his cause, and of
recovering power by means of this foreign aid. But his friends combated
his design, and persuaded him that the risk, both to himself and to his
wife, Cornelia, was too great to be compatible with prudence. Pompey
yielded to their representations; and Orodes escaped the difficulty
of having to elect between repulsing a suppliant, and provoking the
hostility of the most powerful chieftain and the greatest general of the
age.
Caesar quitted the East in B.C. 47 without entering into any
communication with Orodes. He had plenty of work upon his hands; and
whatever designs he may have even then entertained of punishing the
Parthian inroad into Syria, or avenging the defeat of Carrhae, he was
wise enough to keep his projects to himself and to leave Asia without
exasperating by threats or hostile movements the Power on which the
peace of the East principally depended. It was not until he had brought
the African and Spanish wars to an end that he allowed his intention of
leading an expedition against Parthia to be openly talked about. In
B.C. 34, four years after Pharsalia, having put down all his domestic
enemies, and arranged matters, as he thought, satisfactorily at Rome, he
let a decree be passed formally assigning to him “the Parthian War,” and
sent the legions across the Adriatic on their way to Asia. What plan of
campaign he may have contemplated is uncertain; but there cannot be
a doubt that an expedition under his auspices would have been a most
serious danger to Parthia, and might have terminated in her subjection.
The military talents of the Great Dictator were of the most splendid
description; his powers of organization and consolidation enormous;
his prudence and caution equal to his ambition and his courage. Once
launched on a career of conquest in the East, it is impossible to say
whither he might not have carried the Roman eagles, or what countries
he might not have added to the Empire. But Parthia was saved from
the imminent peril without any effort of her own. The daggers of “the
Liberators” struck down on the 15th of March, B.C. 44, the only man whom
she had seriously to fear; and with the removal of Julius passed
away even from Roman thought for many a years the design which he had
entertained, and which he alone could have accomplished.
In the civil war that followed on the murder of Julius the Parthians
are declared to have actually taken a part. It appears that--about
B.C. 46--a small body of Parthian horse-archers had been sent to the
assistance of a certain Bassus, a Roman who amid the troubles of the
times was seeking to obtain for himself something like an independent
principality in Syria. The soldiers of Bassus, after a while (B.C. 43),
went over in a body to Cassius, who was in the East collecting troops
for his great struggle with Antony and Octavian; and thus a handful of
Parthians came into his power. Of this circumstance he determined to
take advantage, in order to obtain, if possible, a considerable body of
troops from Orodes. He presented each of the Parthian soldiers with a
sum of money, and dismissed them all to their homes, at the same
time seizing the opportunity to send some of his own officers, as
ambassadors, to Orodes, with a request for substantial aid. On receiving
this application the Parthian monarch appears to have come to the
conclusion that it was to his interest to comply with it. Whether he
made conditions, or no, is uncertain; but he seems to have sent a pretty
numerous body of horse to the support of the “Liberators” against their
antagonists. Perhaps he trusted to obtain from the gratitude of Cassius
what he had failed to extort from the fears of Pompey. Or, perhaps, he
was only anxious to prolong the period of civil disturbance in the Roman
State, which secured his own territory from attack, and might ultimately
give him an opportunity of helping himself to some portion of the Roman
dominions in Asia.
The opportunity seemed to him to have arrived in B.C. 40. Philippi
had been fought and lost. The “Liberators” were crushed. The struggle
between the Republicans and the Monarchists had come to an end. But,
instead of being united, the Roman world was more than ever divided; and
the chance of making an actual territorial gain at the expense of the
tryant power appeared fairer than it had ever been before. Three rivals
now held divided sway in the Roman State; each of them jealous of
the other two, and anxious for his own aggrandizement. The two chief
pretenders to the first place were bitterly hostile; and while the one
was detained in Italy by insurrection against his authority, the other
was plunged in luxury and dissipation, enjoying the first delights of a
lawless passion, at the Egyptian capital. The nations of the East were,
moreover, alienated by the recent exactions of the profligate Triumvir,
who, to reward his parasites and favorites, had laid upon them a burden
that they were scarcely able to bear. Further, the Parthians enjoyed at
this time the advantage of having a Roman officer of good position in
their service, whose knowledge of the Roman tactics, and influence in
Roman provinces, might be expected to turn to their advantage. Under
these circumstances, when the spring of the year arrived, Antony being
still in Egypt, and Octavian (as far as was known) occupied in the siege
of Perusia, the Parthian hordes, under Labienus and Pacorus, burst upon
Syria in greater force than on any previous occasion. Overrunning with
their numerous cavalry the country between the Euphrates and Antioch,
and thence the valley of the Orontes, they had (as usual) some
difficulty with the towns. From Apamaea, placed (like Durham) on a rocky
peninsula almost surrounded by the river, they were at first repulsed;
but, having shortly afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa, the governor of
Syria, in the open field, they received the submission of Apamaea and
Antioch, which latter city Saxa abandoned at their approach, flying
precipitately into Cilicia. Encouraged by these successes, Labienus and
Pacorus agreed to divide their troops, and to engage simultaneously in
two great expeditions. Pacorus undertook to carry the Parthian standard
throughout the entire extent of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, while
Labienus determined to invade Asia Minor, and to see if he could not
wrest some of its more fertile regions from the Romans. Both expeditions
were crowned with success. Pacorus reduced all Syria, and all Phoenicia,
except the single city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want
of a naval force. He then advanced into Palestine, which he found in
its normal condition of intestine commotion. Hyrcanus and Antigonus, two
princes of the Asmonsean house, were rivals for the Jewish crown; and
the latter, whom Hyrcanus had expelled, was content to make common
cause with the invader, and to be indebted to a rude foreigner for
the possession of the kingdom whereto he aspired. He offered Pacorus a
thousand talents, and five hundred Jewish women, if he would espouse
his cause and seat him upon his uncle’s throne. The offer was readily
embraced, and by the irresistible help of the Parthians a revolution
was effected at Jerusalem. Hyrcanus was deposed and mutilated. A new
priest-king was set up in the person of Antigonus, the last Asmonsean
prince, who held the capital for three years--B.C. 40-37--as a Parthian
satrap, the creature and dependant of the great monarchy on the further
side of the Euphrates. Meanwhile in Asia Minor Labienus carried all
before him. Decidius Saxa, having once more (in Cilicia) ventured upon
a battle, was not only defeated, but slain. Pamphylia, Lycia, and Caria
were overrun. Stratonicea was besieged; Mylasa and Alabanda were taken.
According to some writers the Parthians even pillaged Lydia and Ionia,
and were in possession of Asia to the shores of the Hellespont. It may
be said that for a full year Western Asia changed masters; the rule and
authority of Rome disappeared; and the Parthians were recognized as the
dominant power. But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the autumn
of B.C. 39 Antony, having set out from Italy to resume his command in
the East, despatched his lieutenant, Publius Ventidius, into Asia, with
orders to act against Labienus and the triumphant Parthians. Ventidius
landed unexpectedly on the coast of Asia Minor, and so alarmed Labienus,
who had no Parthian troops with him, that the latter fell back hurriedly
towards Cilicia, evacuating all the more western provinces, and at the
same time sending urgent messages to Pacorus to implore succor. Pacorus
sent a body of horse to his aid; but these troops, instead of putting
themselves under his command, acted independently, and, in a rash
attempt to surprise the Roman camp, were defeated by Ventidius,
whereupon they fled hastily into Cilicia, leaving Labienus to his fate.
The self-styled “Imperator,” upon this, deserted his men, and sought
safety in flight; but his retreat was soon discovered, and he was
pursued, captured, and put to death.
The Parthians, meanwhile, alarmed at the turn which affairs had
taken, left Antigonus to maintain their interests in Palestine, and
concentrated themselves in Northern Syria and Commagene, where
they awaited the advance of the Romans. A strong detachment, under
Pharnapates, was appointed to guard the Syrian Gates, or narrow pass
over Mount Amanus, leading from Cilicia into Syria. Here Ventidius
gained another victory. He had sent forward an officer named Pompsedius
Silo with some cavalry to endeavor to seize this post, and Pompaedius
had found himself compelled to an engagement with Pharnapates, in which
he was on the point of suffering defeat, when Ventidius himself, who had
probably feared for his subordinate’s safety, appeared on the scene,
and turned the scale in favor of the Romans. The detachment under
Pharnapates was overpowered, and Pharnapates himself was among the
slain. When news of this defeat reached Pacorus, he resolved to retreat,
and withdrew his troops across the Euphrates. This movement he appears
to have executed without being molested by Ventidius, who thus recovered
Syria to the Romans towards the close of B.C. 39, or early in B.C. 38.
But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish the contest. He
had made himself popular among the Syrians by his mild and just
administration, and knew that they preferred his government to that of
the Romans. He had many allies among the petty princes and dynasts, who
occupied a semi-independent position on the borders of the Parthian and
Roman empires. Antigonus, whom he had established as king of the Jews,
still maintained himself in Judaea against the efforts of Herod, to whom
Augustus and Antony had assigned the throne. Pacorus therefore arranged
during the remainder of the winter for a fresh invasion of Syria in the
spring, and, taking the field earlier than his adversary expected, made
ready to recross the Euphrates. We are told that if he had crossed at
the usual point, he would have found the Romans unprepared, the legions
being still in their winter quarters, some north and some south of the
range of Taurus. Ventidius, however, contrived by a stratagem to induce
him to effect the passage at a different point, considerably lower
down the stream, and in this way to waste some valuable time, which
he himself employed in collecting his scattered forces. Thus, when the
Parthians appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, the Roman general
was prepared to engage them, and was not even loath to decide the fate
of the war by a single battle. He had taken care to provide himself with
a strong force of slingers, and had entrenched himself in a position
on high ground at some distance from the river. The Parthians, finding
their passage of the Euphrates unopposed, and, when they fell in with
the enemy, seeing him entrenched, as though resolved to act only on the
defensive, became overbold; they thought the force opposed to them must
be weak or cowardly, and might yield its position without a blow, if
briskly attacked. Accordingly, as on a former occasion, they charged up
the hill on which the Roman camp was placed, hoping to take it by sheer
audacity. But the troops inside were held ready, and at the proper
moment issued forth; the assailants found themselves in their turn
assailed, and, fighting at a disadvantage on the slope, were soon driven
down the declivity. The battle was renewed in plain below, where the
mailed horse of the Parthians made a brave resistance; but the slingers
galled them severely, and in the midst of the struggle it happened that
by ill-fortune Pacorus was slain. The result followed which is almost
invariable with an Oriental army: having lost their leader, the soldiers
everywhere gave way; flight became universal, and the Romans gained a
complete victory. The Parthian army fled in two directions. Part made
for the bridge of boats by which it had crossed the Euphrates, but was
intercepted by the Romans and destroyed. Part turned northwards into
Commagene, and there took refuge with the king, Antiochus, who refused
to surrender them to the demand of Ventidius, and no doubt allowed them
to return to their own country.
Thus ended the great Parthian invasion of Syria, and with it ended the
prospect of any further spread of the Arsacid dominion towards the
west. When the two great powers, Rome and Parthia, first came into
collision--when the first blow struck by the latter, the destruction of
the army of Crassus, was followed up by the advance of their clouds of
horse into Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor--when Apamsea, Antioch, and
Jerusalem fell into their hands, when Decidius Saxa was defeated and
slain, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Caria, Lydia, and Ionia occupied--it seemed
as if Rome had found, not so much an equal as a superior; it looked as
if the power heretofore predominant would be compelled to contract
her frontier, and as if Parthia would advance hers to the Egean or the
Mediterranean. The history of the contest between the East and the West,
between Asia and Europe, is a history of reactions. At one time one of
the continents, at another time the other, is in the ascendant. The time
appeared to have come when the Asiatics were once more to recover their
own, and to beat back the European aggressor to his proper shores
and islands. The triumphs achieved by the Seljukian Turks between
the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries would in that case have been
anticipated by above a thousand years through the efforts of a kindred,
and not dissimilar people. But it turned out that the effort made was
premature. While the Parthian warfare was admirably adapted for the
national defence on the broad plains of inner Asia, it was ill
suited for conquest, and, comparatively speaking, ineffective in more
contracted and difficult regions. The Parthian military system had not
the elasticity of the Roman--it did not in the same way adapt itself to
circumstances, or admit of the addition of new arms, or the indefinite
expansion of an old one. However loose and seemingly flexible, it
was rigid in its uniformity; it never altered; it remained under the
thirtieth Arsaces such as it had been under the first, improved in
details, perhaps, but essentially the same system. The Romans, on
the contrary, were ever modifying their system, ever learning new
combinations or new manoeuvres or new modes of warfare from their
enemies. They met the Parthian tactics of loose array, continuous
distant missiles, and almost exclusive employment of cavalry, with
an increase in the number of their own horse, a larger employment of
auxiliary irregulars, and a greater use of the sling. At the same time
they learnt to take full advantage of the Parthian inefficiency against
walls, and to practice against them the arts of pretended retreat and
ambush. The result was, that Parthia found she could make no impression
upon the dominions of Rome, and, having become persuaded of this by the
experience of a decade of years, thenceforth laid aside for ever the
idea of attempting Western conquests. She took up, in fact, from this
time, a new attitude, Hitherto she had been consistently aggressive. She
had labored constantly to extend herself at the expense successively of
the Bactrians, the Scythians, the Syro-Macedonians, and the Armenians.
She had proceeded from one aggression to another, leaving only short
intervals between her wars, and had always been looking out for some
fresh enemy. Henceforth she became, comparatively speaking, pacific. She
was content for the most part, to maintain her limits. She sought no
new foe. Her contest with Rome degenerated into a struggle for influence
over the kingdom of Armenia; and her hopes were limited to the reduction
of that kingdom into a subject position.
The death of Pacorus is said to have caused Orodes intense grief. For
many days he would neither eat nor speak; then his sorrow took another
turn. He imagined that his son had returned; he thought continually that
he heard or saw him; he could do nothing but repeat his name. Every now
and then, however, he awoke to a sense of the actual fact, and mourned
the death of his favorite with tears. After a while this extreme grief
wore itself out, and the aged king began to direct his attention once
more to public affairs. He grew anxious about the succession. Of the
thirty sons who still remained to him there was not one who had made
himself a name, or was in any way distinguished above the remainder. In
the absence of any personal ground of preference, Orodes--who seems
to have regarded himself as possessing a right to nominate the son who
should succeed him--thought the claims of primogeniture deserved to be
considered, and selected as his successor, Phraa-tes, the eldest of the
thirty. Not content with nominating him, or perhaps doubtful whether the
nomination would be accepted by the Megistanes, he proceeded further to
abdicate in his favor, whereupon Phraates became king. The transaction
proved a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of his brothers,
who were the sons of a princess married to Orodes, whereas his own
mother was only a concubine, removed them by assassination, and when the
ex-monarch ventured to express disapproval of the act added the crime
of parricide to fratricide by putting to death his aged father. Thus
perished Orodes, after a reign of eighteen years--the most memorable in
the Parthian annals.