_Accession of Orodes I. Expedition of Crassus. His fate. Retaliatory
inroad of the Parthians into Syria under Pacorus, the son of Orodes.
Defeat of Pacorus by Cassius. His recall. End of the first War with
Rome._
The complete triumph of Orodes over Mithridates, and his full
establishment in his kingdom, cannot be placed earlier than B.C. 56, and
most probably fell in B.C. 55. In this latter year Crassus obtained the
consulship at Rome, and, being appointed at the same time to the command
of the East, made no secret of his intention to march the Roman legions
across the Euphrates, and engage in hostilities with the great Parthian
kingdom. According to some writers, his views extended even further. He
spoke of the wars which Lucullus had waged against Tigranes and Pompey
against Mithridates of Pontus as mere child’s play, and announced his
intention of carrying the Roman arms to Bactria, India, and the Eastern
Ocean. The Parthian king was thus warned betimes of the impending
danger, and enabled to make all such preparations against it as he
deemed necessary. More than a year elapsed between the assignment to
Crassus of Syria as his province, and his first overt act of hostility
against Orodes.
It cannot be doubted that this breathing-time was well spent by the
Parthian monarch. Besides forming his general plan of campaign at his
leisure, and collecting, arming, and exercising his native forces,
he was enabled to gain over certain chiefs upon his borders, who had
hitherto held a semi-dependent position, and might have been expected
to welcome the Romans. One of these, Abgarus, prince of Osrhoene, or the
tract east of the Euphrates about the city of Edessa, had been received
into the Roman alliance by Pompey, but, with the fickleness common among
Orientals, he now readily changed sides, and undertook to play a double
part for the advantage of the Parthians. Another, Alchaudonius, an Arab
sheikh of these parts, had made his submission to Rome even earlier; but
having become convinced that Parthia was the stronger power of the two,
he also went over to Orodes. The importance of these adhesions would
depend greatly on the line of march which Crassus might determine to
follow in making his attack. Three plans were open to him. He might
either throw himself on the support of Artavasdes, the Armenian monarch,
who had recently succeeded his father Tigranes, and entering Armenia,
take the safe but circuitous route through the mountains into Adiabene,
and so by the left bank of the Tigris to Ctesiphon; or he might, like
the younger Cyrus, follow the course of the Euphrates to the latitude of
Seleucia, and then cross the narrow tract of plain which there separates
the two rivers; or, finally, he might attempt the shortest but most
dangerous line across the Belik and Khabour, and directly through the
Mesopotamian desert. If the Armenian route were preferred, neither
Abgarus nor Alchaudonius would be able to do the Parthians much service;
but if Crassus resolved on following either of the others, their
alliance could not but be most valuable.
Crassus, however, on reaching his province, seemed in in haste to make
a decision. He must have arrived in Syria tolerably early in the spring
but his operations during the first year of his proconsulship were
unimportant. He seems at once to have made up his mind to attempt
nothing more than a reconnaissance. Crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma,
the modern Bir or Bireh-jik, he proceeded to ravage the open country,
and to receive the submission of the Greek cities, which were numerous
throughout the region between the Euphrates and the Belik. The country
was defended by the Parthian satrap with a small force; but this was
easily defeated, the satrap himself receiving a wound. One Greek city
only, Zenodotium, offered resistance to the invader; its inhabitants,
having requested and received a Roman garrison of one hundred men,
rose upon them and put them barbarously to the sword; whereupon Crassus
besieged and took the place, gave it up to his army to plunder, and
sold the entire population for slaves. He then, as winter drew near,
determined to withdraw into Syria, leaving garrisons in the various
towns. The entire force left behind is estimated at eight thousand men.
It is probable that Orodes had expected a more determined attack, and
had retained his army near his capital until it should become evident
by which route the enemy would advance against him. Acting on an inner
circle, he could readily have interposed his forces, on whichever
line the assailants threw themselves. But the tardy proceedings of his
antagonist made his caution superfluous. The first campaign was over,
and there had scarcely been a collision between the troops of the two
nations. Parthia had been insulted by a wanton attack, and had lost some
disaffected cities; but no attempt had been made to fulfil the grand
boasts with which the war had been undertaken.
It may be suspected that the Parthian monarch began now to despise his
enemy. He would compare him with Lucullus and Pompey, and understand
that a Roman army, like any other, was formidable, or the reverse,
according as it was ably or feebly commanded. He would know that Crassus
was a sexagenarian, and may have heard that he had never yet shown
himself a captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost doubted whether
the proconsul had any real intention of pressing the contest to a
decision, and might not rather be expected, when he had enriched himself
and his troops with Mesopotamian plunder, to withdraw his garrisons
across the Euphrates. Crassus was at this time showing the worst side
of his character in Syria, despoiling temples of their treasures, and
accepting money in lieu of contingents of troops from the dynasts of
Syria and Palestine. Orodes, under these circumstances, sent an embassy
to him, which was well calculated to stir to action the most sluggish
and poor-spirited of commanders. “If the war,” said his envoys, “was
really waged by Rome, it must be fought out to the bitter end. But if,
as they had good reason to believe, Crassus, against the wish of his
country, had attacked Parthia and seized her territory for his own
private gain, Arsaces would be moderate. He would have pity on the
advanced years of the proconsul, and would give the Romans back those
men of theirs, who were not so much keeping watch in Mesopotamia as
having watch kept on them.” Crassus, stung with the taunt, exclaimed,
“He would return the ambassadors an answer at Seleucia.” Wagises, the
chief ambassador, prepared for some such exhibition of feeling, and,
glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the palm of one hand with
the fingers’ of the other: “Hairs will grow here, Crassus, before you
see Seleucia.”
Still further to quicken the action of the Romans, before the winter
was well over, the offensive was taken against their adherents in
Mesopotamia. The towns which held Roman garrisons were attacked by the
Parthians in force; and, though we do not hear of any being captured,
all of them were menaced, and all suffered considerably.
If Crassus needed to be stimulated, these stimulants were effective; and
he entered on his second campaign with a full determination to compel
the Parthian monarch to an engagement, and, if possible, to dictate
peace to him at his capital. He had not, however, in his second
campaign, the same freedom with regard to his movements that he had
enjoyed the year previous. The occupation of Western Mesopotamia cramped
his choice. It had, in fact, compelled him before quitting Syria to
decline, definitely and decidedly, the overtures of Artavasdes, who
strongly urged on him to advance by way of Armenia, and promised him
in that case an important addition to his forces. Crassus felt himself
compelled to support his garrisons, and therefore to make Mesopotamia,
and not Armenia, the basis of his operations, He crossed the Euphrates a
second time at the same point as before, with an army composed of 35,000
heavy infantry, 4,000 light infantry, and 4,000 horse. There was still
open to him a certain choice of routes. The one preferred by his chief
officers was the line of the Euphrates, known as that which the Ten
Thousand had pursued in an expedition that would have been successful
but for the death of its commander. Along this line water would be
plentiful; forage and other supplies might be counted on to a certain
extent; and the advancing army, resting on the river, could not be
surrounded. Another, but one that does not appear to have been suggested
till too late, was that which Alexander had taken against Darius; the
line along the foot of the Mons Masius, by Edessa, and Nisibis,
to Nineveh. Here too waters and supplies would have been readily
procurable, and by clinging to the skirts of the hills the Roman
infantry would have set the Parthian cavalry at defiance. Between these
two extreme courses to the right and to the left were numerous slightly
divergent lines across the Mesopotamian plain, all shorter than either
of the two above-mentioned, and none offering any great advantage over
the remainder.
It is uncertain what choice the proconsul would have made, had the
decision been left simply to his own judgment. Probably the Romans had a
most dim and indistinct conception of the geographical character of the
Mesopotamian region, and were ignorant of its great difficulties.
They remained also, it must be remembered, up to this time, absolutely
unacquainted with the Parthian tactics and accustomed as they were to
triumph over every enemy against whom they fought, it would scarcely
occur to them that in an open field they could suffer defeat. They were
ready, like Alexander, to encounter any number of Asiatics, and only
asked to be led against the foe as quickly as possible. When, therefore,
Abgarus, the Osrhoene prince, soon after Crassus had crossed the
Euphrates, rode into his camp, and declared that the Parthians did not
intend to make a stand, but were quitting Mesopotamia and flying with
their treasure to the remote regions of Hyrcania and Scythia, leaving
only a rear guard under a couple of generals to cover the retreat, it is
not surprising that the resolution was taken to give up the circuitous
route of the Euphrates, and to march directly across Mesopotamia in the
hope of crushing the covering detachment, and coming upon the flying
multitude encumbered with baggage, which would furnish a rich spoil to
the victors. In after times it was said that C. Cassius Longinus and
some other officers were opposed to this movement, add foresaw its
danger; but it must be questioned whether the whole army did not readily
obey its leader’s order, and commence without any forebodings its march
through Upper Mesopotamia. That region has not really the character
which the apologists for Roman disaster in later times gave to it. It
is a region of swelling hills, and somewhat dry gravelly plains. It
possesses several streams and rivers, besides numerous springs. At
intervals of a few miles it was studded with cities and villages; nor
did the desert really begin until the Khabour was crossed. The army of
Crassus had traversed it throughout its whole extent during the summer
of the preceding year, and must have been well acquainted with both its
advantages and drawbacks. But it is time that we should consider what
preparations the Parthian monarch had made against the threatened
attack. He had, as already stated, come to terms with his outlying
vassals, the prince of Osrhoene, and the sheikh of the Scenite Arabs,
and had engaged especially the services of the former against his
assailant. He had further, on considering the various possibilities of
the campaign, come to the conclusion that it would be best to divide
his forces, and, while himself attacking Artavasdes in the mountain
fastnesses of his own country, to commit the task of meeting and coping
with the Romans to a general of approved talents. It was of the greatest
importance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a junction with the
Romans, and strengthening them in that arm in which they were especially
deficient, the cavalry. Perhaps nothing short of an invasion of his
country by the Parthian king in person would have prevented Artavasdes
from detaching a portion of his troops to act in Mesopotamia. And no
doubt it is also true that Orodes had great confidence in his general,
whom he may even have felt to be a better commander than himself.
Surenas, as we must call him, since his name has not been preserved to
us, was in all respects a person of the highest consideration. He was
the second man in the kingdom for birth, wealth, and reputation. In
courage and ability he excelled all his countrymen; and he had the
physical advantages of commanding height and great personal beauty. When
he went to battle, he was accompanied by a train of a thousand camels,
which carried his baggage; and the concubines in attendance on him
required for their conveyance two hundred chariots. A thousand horseman
clad in mail, and a still greater number of light-armed, formed
his bodyguard. At the coronation of a Parthian monarch, it was his
hereditary right to place the diadem on the brow of the new sovereign.
When Orodes was driven into banishment it was he who brought him back to
Parthia in triumph. When Seleucia revolted, it was he who at the assault
first mounted the breach and, striking terror into the defenders, took
the city. Though less than thirty years of age at the time when he was
appointed commander, he was believed to possess, besides these various
qualifications, consummate prudence and sagacity.
The force which Orodes committed to his brave and skillful lieutenant
consisted entirely of horse. This was not the ordinary character of a
Parthian army, which often comprised four or five times as many infantry
as cavalry. It was, perhaps, rather fortunate accident than profound
calculation that caused the sole employment against the Romans of this
arm. The foot soldiers were needed for the rough warfare of the Armenian
mountains; the horse would, it was known, act with fair effect in the
comparatively open and level Mesopotamia. As the king wanted the footmen
he took them, and left to his general the troops which were not required
for his own operations.
The Parthian horse, like the Persian, was of two kinds, standing in
strong contrast the one to the other. The bulk of their cavalry was of
the lightest and most agile description. Fleet and active coursers, with
scarcely any caparison but a headstall and a single rein, were mounted
by riders clad only in a tunic and trousers, and armed with nothing
but a strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training begun in early
boyhood made the rider almost one with his steed; and he could use his
weapons with equal ease and effect whether his horse was stationary
or at full gallop, and whether he was advancing towards or hurriedly
retreating from his enemy. His supply of missiles was almost
inexhaustible, for when he found his quiver empty, he had only to retire
a short distance and replenish his stock from magazines, borne on
the backs of camels, in the rear. It was his ordinary plan to keep
constantly in motion when in the presence of an enemy, to gallop
backwards and forwards, or round and round his square or column, never
charging it, but at a moderate interval plying it with his keen and
barbed shafts which were driven by a practised hand from a bow of
unusual strength. Clouds of this light cavalry enveloped the advancing
or the retreating foe, and inflicted grievous damage without, for the
most part, suffering anything in return.
But this was not the whole. In addition to these light troops, a
Parthian army comprised always a body of heavy cavalry, armed on an
entirely different system. The strong horses selected for this service
were clad almost wholly in mail. Their head, neck, chest, even their
sides and flanks, were protected by scale-armor of brass or iron, sewn,
probably, upon leather. Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of the
same materials, and helmets of burnished iron. For an offensive weapon
they carried a long and strong spear or pike. They formed a serried
line in battle, bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom they
charged, and standing firm as an iron wall against the charges that were
made upon them. A cavalry answering to this in some respects had been
employed by the later Persian monarchs, and was in use also among the
Armenians at this period; but the Parthian pike was apparently more
formidable than the corresponding weapons of those nations, and the
light spear carried at this time by the cavalry of a Roman army was no
match for it.
The force entrusted to Surenas comprised troops of both these
classes. No estimate is given us of their number, but it was probably
considerable. At any rate it was sufficient to induce him to make a
movement in advance--to cross the Sinjar range and the river Khabour,
and take up his position in the country between that stream and the
Belik--instead of merely seeking to cover the capital. The presence
of the traitor Abgarus in the camp of Crassus was now of the utmost
importance to the Parthian commander. Abgarus, fully trusted, and at the
head of a body of light horse, admirably adapted for outpost service,
was allowed, upon his own request, to scour the country in front of the
advancing Romans, and had thus the means of communicating freely with
the Parthian chief. He kept Surenas informed of all the movements and
intentions of Crassus, while at the same time he suggested to Crassus
such a line of route as suited the views and designs of his adversary.
Our chief authority for the details of the expedition tells us that he
led the Roman troops through an arid and trackless desert, across plains
without tree, or shrub, or even grass, where the soil was composed of a
light shifting sand, which the wind raised into a succession of hillocks
that resembled the waves of an interminable sea. The soldiers, he says,
fainted with the heat and with the drought, while the audacious Osrhoene
scoffed at their complaints and reproaches, asking them whether they
expected to find the border-tract between Arabia and Assyria a country
of cool streams and shady groves, of baths, and hostelries, like their
own delicious Campania. But our knowledge of the geographical character
of the region through which the march lay makes it impossible for us to
accept this account as true. The country between the Euphrates and the
Belik, as already observed, is one of alternate hill and plain, neither
destitute of trees nor ill-provided with water. The march through it
could have presented no great difficulties. All that Abgarus could do to
serve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce Crassus to trust himself
to the open country, without clinging either to a river or to the
mountains, and, secondly, to bring him, after a hasty march, and in the
full heat of the day, into the presence of the enemy. Both these things
he contrived to effect, and Surenas was, no doubt, so far beholden to
him. But the notion that he enticed the Roman army into a trackless
desert, and gave it over, when it was perishing through weariness,
hunger, and thirst, into the hands of its enraged enemy, is in
contradiction with the topographical facts, and is not even maintained
consistently by the classical writers.
It was probably on the third or fourth day after he had quitted the
Euphrates that Crassus found himself approaching his enemy. After a
hasty and hot march he had approached the banks of the Belik, when his
scouts brought him word that they had fallen in with the Parthian army,
which was advancing in force and seemingly full of confidence. Abgarus
had recently quitted him on the plea of doing him some undefined
service, but really to range himself on the side of his real friends,
the Parthians. His officers now advised Crassus to encamp upon the
river, and defer an engagement till the morrow; but he had no fears; his
son, Publius, who had lately joined him with a body of Gallic horse sent
by Julius Caesar, was anxious for the fray; and accordingly the Roman
commander gave the order to his troops to take some refreshment as they
stood, and then to push forward rapidly. Surenas, on his side, had taken
up a position on wooded and hilly ground, which concealed his numbers,
and had even, we are told, made his troops cover their arms with cloths
and skins, that the glitter might not betray them. But, as the Romans
drew near, all concealment was cast aside; the signal for battle was
given; the clang of the kettledrums arose on every side; the squadrons
came forward in their brilliant array; and it seemed at first as if the
heavy cavalry was about to charge the Roman host, which was formed in a
hollow square with the light-armed in the middle, and with supporters
of horse along the whole line, as well as upon the flanks. But, if this
intention was ever entertained, it was altered almost as soon as formed,
and the better plan was adopted of halting at a convenient distance and
assailing the legionaries with flight after flight of arrows, delivered
without a pause and with extraordinary force. The Roman endeavored to
meet this attack by throwing forward his own skirmishers; but they were
quite unable to cope with the numbers and the superior weapons of the
enemy, who forced them almost immediately to retreat, and take refuge
behind the line of the heavy-armed. These were then once more exposed to
the deadly missiles, which pierced alike through shield and breast-plate
and greaves, and inflicted the most fearful wounds. More than once the
legionaries dashed forward, and sought to close with their assailants,
but in vain. The Parthian squadrons retired as the Roman infantry
advanced, maintaining the distance which they thought best between
themselves and their foe, whom they plied with their shafts as
incessantly while they fell back as when they rode forward. For a while
the Romans entertained the hope that the missiles would at last be all
spent; but when they found that each archer constantly obtained a fresh
supply from the rear, this expectation deserted them. It became evident
to Crassus that some new movement must be attempted; and, as a last
resource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom the Parthians were
threatening to outflank, to take such troops as he thought proper,
and charge. The gallant youth was only too glad to receive the order.
Selecting his Gallic cavalry, who numbered 1000, and adding to them 500
other horsemen, 500 archers, and about 4000 legionaries, he advanced
at speed against the nearest squadrons of the enemy. The Parthians
pretended to be afraid, and beat a hasty retreat. Publius followed
with all the impetuosity of youth, and was soon out of the sight of his
friends, pressing the flying foe, whom he believed to be panic-stricken.
But when they had drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made a
stand, brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, and completely
enveloped him and his detachment with their light-armed. Publius made
a desperate resistance. His Gauls seized the Parthian pikes with their
hands and dragged the encumbered horsemen to the ground; or dismounting,
slipped beneath the horses of their opponents, and stabbing them in the
belly, brought steed and rider down upon themselves. His legionaries
occupied a slight hillock, and endeavored to make a wall of their
shields, but the Parthian archers closed around them, and slew them
almost to a man. Of the whole detachment, nearly six thousand strong, no
more than 500 were taken prisoners, and scarcely one escaped. The young
Crassus might, possibly, had he chosen to make the attempt, have forced
his way through the enemy to Ichnee, a Greek town not far distant; but
he preferred to share the fate of his men. Rather than fall into the
hands of the enemy, he caused his shield-bearer to dispatch him; and his
example was followed by his principal officers. The victors struck off
his head, and elevating it on a pike, returned to resume their attack on
the main body of the Roman army.
The main body, much relieved by the diminution of the pressure upon
them, had waited patiently for Publius to return in triumph, regarding
the battle as well-nigh over and success as certain. After a time the
prolonged absence of the young captain aroused suspicions, which grew
into alarms when messengers arrived telling of his extreme danger.
Crassus, almost beside himself with anxiety, had given the word to
advance, and the army had moved forward a short distance, when
the shouts of the returning enemy were heard, and the head of the
unfortunate officer was seen displayed aloft, while the Parthian
squadrons, closing in once more, renewed the assault on their remaining
foes with increased vigor. The mailed horsemen approached close to
the legionaries and thrust at them with the long pikes while the
light-armed, galloping across the Roman front, discharged their unerring
arrows over the heads of their own men. The Romans could neither
successfully defend themselves nor effectively retaliate. Still
time brought some relief. Bowstrings broke, spears were blunted or
splintered, arrows began to fail, thews and sinews to relax; and when
night closed in both parties were almost equally glad of the cessation
of arms which the darkness rendered compulsory.
It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the Persians, to bivouac at a
considerable distance from an enemy. Accordingly, at nightfall they
drew off, having first shouted to the Romans that they would grant the
general one night in which to bewail his son; on the morrow they would
come and take him prisoner, unless he preferred the better course of
surrendering himself to the mercy of Arsaces. A short breathing-space
was thus allowed the Romans, who took advantage of it to retire towards
Carrhae, leaving behind them the greater part of their wounded, to the
number of 4,000. A small body of horse reached Carrhae about midnight,
and gave the commandant such information as led him to put his men under
arms and issue forth to the succor of the proconsul. The Parthians,
though the cries of the wounded made them well aware of the Roman
retreat, adhered to their system of avoiding night combats, and
attempted no pursuit till morning. Even then they allowed themselves to
be delayed by comparatively trivial matters--the capture of the Roman
camp, the massacre of the wounded, and the slaughter of the numerous
stragglers scattered along the line of march--and made no haste to
overtake the retreating army. The bulk of the troops were thus enabled
to effect their retreat in safety to Carrhae, where, having the
protection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time secure.
It might have been expected that the Romans would here have made a
stand. The siege of a fortified place by cavalry is ridiculous, if we
understand by siege anything more than a very incomplete blockade. And
the Parthians were notoriously inefficient against walls. There was a
chance, moreover, that Artavasdes might have been more successful than
his ally, and, having repulsed the Parthian monarch, might march his
troops to the relief of the Romans. But the soldiers were thoroughly
dispirited, and would not listen to these suggestions. Provisions no
doubt ran short, since, as there had been no expectation of a
disaster, no preparations had been made for standing a siege. The Greek
inhabitants of the place could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to a
falling cause. Moreover, Armenia was near; and the Parthian system
of abstaining from action during the night seemed to render escape
tolerably easy. It was resolved, therefore, instead of clinging to the
protection of the walls, to issue forth once more, and to endeavor by a
rapid night march to reach the Armenian hills. The various officers seem
to have been allowed to arrange matters for themselves. Cassius took
his way towards the Euphrates, and succeeded in escaping with 500 horse.
Octavius, with a division which is estimated at 5,000 men, reached the
outskirts of the the hills at a place called Sinnaca, and found himself
in comparative security. Crassus, misled by his guides, made but poor
progress during the night; he had, however, arrived within little
more than a mile of Octavius before the enemy, who would not stir till
daybreak, overtook him. Pressed upon by their advancing squandrons, he,
with his small band of 2,000 legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied a
low hillock connected by a ridge of rising ground with the position of
Sinnaca. Here the Parthian host beset him; and he would infallibly have
been slain or captured at once, had not Octavius, deserting his place
of safety, descended to the aid of his commander. The united 7,000 held
their own against the enemy, having the advantage of the ground, and
having perhaps by the experience of some days learnt the weak points of
Parthian warfare.
Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure the person of the Roman
commander. In the East an excessive importance is attached to this
proof of success; and there were reasons which made Crassus particularly
obnoxious to his antagonists. He was believed to have originated, and
not merely conducted, the war, incited thereto by simple greed of gold.
He had refused with the utmost haughtiness all discussion of terms, and
had insulted the majesty of the Parthians by the declaration that he
would treat nowhere but at their capital. If he escaped, he would
be bound at some future time to repeat his attempt; if he were made
prisoner, his fate would be a terrible warning to others. But now, as
evening approached, it seemed to the Parthian that the prize which he
so much desired was about to elude his grasp. The highlands of Armenia
would be gained by the fugitives during the night, and further pursuit
of them would be hopeless. It remained that he should effect by craft
what he could no longer hope to gain by the employment of force; and to
this point all his efforts were now directed. He drew off his troops
and left the Romans without further molestation. He allowed some of his
prisoners to escape and rejoin their friends, having first contrived
that they should overhear a conversation among his men, of which the
theme was the Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes to come to terms
with the Romans. He then, having allowed time for the report of his
pacific intentions to spread, rode with a few chiefs towards the Roman
camp, carrying his bow unstrung and his right hand stretched out in
token of amity. “Let the Roman General,” he said, “come forward with an
equal number of attendants, and confer with me in the open space between
the armies on terms of peace.” The aged proconsul was disinclined to
trust these overtures; but his men clamored and threatened, upon which
he yielded, and went down into the plain, accompanied by Octavius and
a few others. Here he was received with apparent honor, and terms were
arranged; but Surenas required that they should at once be reduced to
writing, “since,” he said, with pointed allusion to the bad faith of
Pompey, “you Romans are not very apt to remember your engagements.” A
movement being requisite for the drawing up of the formal instruments,
Crassus and his officers were induced to mount upon horses furnished by
the Parthians, who had no sooner seated the proconsul on his steed,
than he proceeded to hurry him forward, with the evident intention of
carrying him off to their camp. The Roman officers took the alarm and
resisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a Parthian and killed one of
the grooms who was hurrying Crassus away. A blow from behind stretched
him on the ground lifeless. A general melee followed, and in the
confusion Crassus was killed, whether by one of his own side and with
his own consent, or by the hand of a Parthian is uncertain. The
army, learning the fate of their general, with but few exceptions,
surrendered. Such as sought to escape under cover of the approaching
night were hunted down by the Bedouins who served under the Parthian
standard, and killed almost to a man. Of the entire army which had
crossed the Euphrates, consisting of above 40,000 men, not more than one
fourth returned. One half of the whole number perished. Nearly 10,000
prisoners were settled by the victors in the fertile oasis of Margiana,
near the northern frontier of the empire, where they intermarried with
native wives, and became submissive Parthian subjects.
Such was the result of this great expedition, the first attempt of the
grasping and ambitious Romans, not so much to conquer Parthia, as to
strike terror into the heart of her people, and to degrade them to
the condition of obsequious dependants on the will and pleasure of the
“world’s lords.” The expedition failed so utterly, not from any want
of bravery on the part of the soldiers employed in it, nor from any
absolute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman tactics, but partly
from the incompetence of the commander, partly from the inexperience of
the Romans, up to this date, in the nature of the Parthian warfare and
in the best manner of meeting it. To attack an enemy whose main arm is
the cavalry with a body of foot-soldiers, supported by an insignificant
number of horse, must be at all times rash and dangerous. To direct
such an attack on the more open part of the country, where cavalry could
operate freely, was wantonly to aggravate the peril. After the first
disaster, to quit the protection of walls, when it had been obtained,
was a piece of reckless folly. Had Crassus taken care to obtain the
support of some of the desert tribes, if Armenia could not help him,
and had he then advanced either by the way of the Mons Masius and the
Tigris, or along the line of the Euphrates, the issue of his attack
might have been different. He might have fought his way to Seleucia and
Ctesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Septimius Severas, and
might have taken and plundered those cities. He would no doubt have
experienced difficulties in his retreat; but he might have come off no
worse than Trajan, whose Parthian expedition has been generally regarded
as rather augmenting than detracting from his reputation. But an
ignorant and inexperienced commander, venturing on a trial of arms
with an enemy of whom he knew little or nothing, in their own country,
without support or allies, and then neglecting every precaution
suggested by his officers, allowing himself to be deceived by a
pretended friend, and marching straight into a net prepared for him,
naturally suffered defeat. The credit of the Roman arms does not greatly
suffer by the disaster, nor is that of the Parthians greatly enhanced.
The latter showed, as they had shown in their wars against the
Syro-Macedonians, that there somewhat loose and irregular array was
capable of acting with effect against the solid masses and well-ordered
movements of disciplined troops. They acquired by their use of the bow a
fame like that which the English archers obtained for the employment of
the same weapon at Crecy and Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romans
to respect them, and to allow that there was at least one nation in the
world which could meet them on equal terms and not be worsted in the
encounter. They henceforth obtained recognition from Graeco-Roman
writers--albeit a grudging and covert recognition--as the second Power
in the world, the admitted rival of Rome, the only real counterpoise
upon the earth to the power which ruled from the Euphrates to the
Atlantic Ocean.
While the general of King Orodes was thus successful against the Romans
in Mesopotamia, the king himself had in Armenia obtained advantages of
almost equal value, though of a different kind. Instead of contending
with Artavasdes, he had come to terms with him, and had concluded a
close alliance, which he had sought to confirm and secure by uniting
his son, Pacorus, in marriage with a sister of the Armenian monarch. A
series of festivities was being held to celebrate this auspicious
event, when news came of Surenas’s triumph, and of the fate of Crassus.
According to the barbarous customs of the East, the head and hand of the
slain proconsul accompanied the intelligence. We are told that at
the moment of the messenger’s arrival the two sovereigns, with their
attendants, were amusing themselves with a dramatic entertainment. Both
monarchs had a good knowledge of the Greek literature and language, in
which Artavasdes had himself composed historical works and tragedies.
The actors were representing the famous scene in the “Bacchae” of
Euripides, where Agave and the Bacchanals come upon the stage with the
mutilated remains of the murdered Pentheus, when the head of Crassus was
thrown in among them. Instantly the player who personated Agave seized
the bloody trophy, and placing it on his thyrsus instead of the one
he was carrying, paraded it before the delighted spectators, while he
chanted the well-known lines:
From the mountain to the hall
New-cut tendril, see, we bring--
Blessed prey!
The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please an Eastern
audience: it was followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity and still
more thoroughly Oriental. The Parthians, in derision of the motive which
was supposed to have led Crassus to make his attack, had a quantity of
gold melted and poured it into his mouth.
Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious troops, and seeking to
annoy the disaffected Seleucians, by the performance of a farcical
ceremony. He spread the report that Crassus was not killed but captured;
and, selecting from among the prisoners the Roman most like him in
appearance, he dressed the man in woman’s clothes, mounted him upon
a horse, and requiring him to answer to the names of “Crassus” and
“Imperator,” conducted him in triumph to the Grecian city. Before him
went, mounted on camels, a band, arrayed as trumpeters and lictors, the
lictors’ rods having purses suspended to them, and the axes in their
midst being crowned with the bleeding heads of Romans. In the rear
followed a train of Seloucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive of
the effeminacy and cowardice of the proconsul. After this pretended
parade of his prisoner through the streets of the town, Surenas called
a meeting of the Seleucian senate, and indignantly denounced to them the
indecency of the literature which he had found in the Roman tents.
The charge, it is said, was true; but the Seleucians were not greatly
impressed by the moral lesson read to them, when they remarked the train
of concubines that had accompanied Surenas himself in the field, and
thought of the loose crowd of dancers, singers, and prostitutes, that
was commonly to be seen in the rear of a Parthian army.
The political consequences of the great triumph which the Parthians had
achieved were less than might have been anticipated. Mesopotamia was,
of course, recovered to its extremest limit, the Euphrates; Armenia
was lost to the Roman alliance, and thrown for the time into complete
dependence upon Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited;
and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and recently aggrieved
by the unprovoked spoliation of their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms.
But no general movement of the Oriental races took place. It might have
been expected that the Syrians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, Oappadocians,
Phrygians, and other Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogether
Oriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising against their
Western lords and driving the Romans back upon Europe. It might have
been thought that Parthia at least would have assumed the offensive in
force, and have made a determined effort to rid herself of neighbors who
had proved so troublesome. But though the conjuncture of circumstances
was most favorable, the man was wanting. Had Mithridates or Tigranes
been living, or had Surenas been king of Parthia, instead of a mere
general, advantage would probably have been taken of the occasion,
and Rome might have suffered seriously. But Orodes seems to have been
neither ambitious as a prince nor skilful as a commander; he lacked
at any rate the keen and all-embracing glance which could sweep
the political horizon and, comprehending the exact character of the
situation, see at the same time how to make the most of it. He allowed
the opportunity to slip by without putting forth his strength or making
any considerable effort; and the occasion once lost never returned.
In Parthia itself one immediate result of the expedition seems to have
been the ruin of Surenas. His services to his sovereign had exceeded
the measure which it is safe in the East for a subject to render to the
crown. The jealousy of his royal master was aroused, and he had to pay
the penalty of over-much success with his life. Parthia was thus left
without a general of approved merit, for Sillaces, the second in command
during the war with Crassus, had in no way distinguished himself through
the campaign. This condition of things may account for the feebleness of
the efforts made in B.C. 52 to retaliate on the Romans the damage done
by their invasion. A few weak bands only passed the Euphrates, and began
the work of plunder and ravage, in which they were speedily disturbed
by Cassius, who easily drove them back over the river. The next year,
however, a more determined attempt was made. Orodes sent his son,
Pacorus, the young bridegroom, to win his spurs in Syria, at the head of
a considerable force, and supported by the experience and authority of
an officer of ripe age, named Osaces. The army crossed the Euphrates
unresisted, for Cassius, the governor, had with him only the broken
remains of Crassus’s army, consisting of about two legions, and, deeming
himself too weak to meet the enemy in the open field, was content to
defend the towns. The open country was consequently overrun; and a
thrill of mingled alarm and excitement passed through all the Roman
provinces in Asia. The provinces were at the time most inadequately
supplied with Roman troops, through the desire of Csesar and Pompey to
maintain large armies about their own persons. The natives were for the
most part disaffected and inclined to hail the Parthians as brethren
and deliverers. Excepting Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes of
Cappadocia, Rome had, as Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) plaintively
declared, “not a friend on the Asiatic continent. And Cappadocia was
miserably weak,” and open to attack on the side of Armenia. Had Orodes
and Artavasdes acted in concert, and had the latter, while Orodes sent
his armies into Syria, poured the Armenian forces into Cappadocia and
then into Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do), there would
have been the greatest danger to the Roman possessions. As it was, the
excitement in Asia Minor was extreme. Cicero marched into Cappadocia
with the bulk of the Roman troops, and summoned to his aid Deiotarus
with his Galatians, at the same time writing to the Roman Senate to
implore reinforcements. Cassius shut himself up in Antioch, and allowed
the Parthian cavalry to pass him by, and even to proceed beyond the
bounds of Syria into Cilicia. But the Parthians seem scarcely to have
understood the situation of their adversaries, or to have been aware of
their own advantages. Instead of spreading themselves wide, raising the
natives, and leaving them to blockade the towns, while with their as
yet unconquered squandrons they defied the enemy in the open country, we
find them engaging in the siege and blockade of cities, for which they
were wholly unfit, and confining themselves almost entirely to the
narrow valley of the Orontes. Under these circumstances we are not
surprised to learn that Cassius, having first beat them back from
Antioch, contrived to lead them into an ambush on the banks of the
river, and severely handled their troops, even killing the general
Osaces. The Parthians withdrew from the neighborhood of the Syrian
capital after this defeat, which must have taken place about the end of
September, and soon afterwards went into winter quarters in Oyrrhestica,
or the part of Syria immediately east of Amanus. Here they remained
during the winter months under Pacorus, and it was expected that the war
would break out again with fresh fury in the spring; but Bibulus,
the new proconsul of Syria, conscious of his military deficiencies,
contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians themselves, and to
turn the thoughts of Pacorus in another direction. He suggested to
Ornodapantes, a Parthian noble, with whom he had managed to open a
correspondence, that Pacorus would be a more worthy occupant of the
Parthian throne than his father, and that he would consult well for his
own interests if he were to proclaim the young prince, and lead the army
of Syria against Orodes. These intrigues seem, to have first caused the
war to languish, and then produced the recall of the expedition. Orodes
summoned Pacorus to return to Parthia before the plot contrived between
him and the Romans was ripe for execution; and Pacorus felt that no
course was open to him but to obey. The Parthian legions recrossed the
Euphrates in July, B.C. 50; and the First Roman War, which had lasted a
little more than four years, terminated without any real recovery by the
Romans of the laurels that they had lost at Carrhae.