STRAFFORD'S ARMY
[Sidenote: Plan to reduce the Scots. Lord Antrim.]
[Sidenote: Antrim's plan of invasion.]
[Sidenote: Wentworth disapproves of his schemes.]
As soon as the troubles in Scotland began it was natural that Charles
should expect help from Ireland. The first proposals came from Tyrone's
grandson, Randal MacDonnell, second Earl of Antrim, whose handsome
person had recommended him to the widowed Duchess of Buckingham.
Having conformed to the State Church to please her first husband, she
reverted to her original faith to please her second. The marriage of
his friend's wife was displeasing to Charles, and perhaps this made
her second husband the more anxious to do some signal service, or at
least to have the credit of intending it. Antrim was a man of much
ambition and some cunning, but his practical abilities were small, and
neither Strafford, Ormonde, nor Clarendon rated him highly. He had
been 'bred in the Highland way, and wore neither hat, cap, shoes, nor
stockings till seven or eight years old,' and a Highlander he remained
to the end. His extravagance at Court had involved him in debt to the
enormous amount of 80,000_l._, and Wentworth believed that the sale of
his whole estate would not fetch such a sum. Hatred of the Campbells
was his strongest passion. In July 1638 he asked Wentworth to supply
him with arms to be kept in a magazine in Coleraine ready to use in
case of an invasion by the dreaded clan, and six months later he
credited Argyle with the intention of getting a law passed 'that to
the end of the world no MacDonnell should be allowed to enjoy a foot
of land in Scotland.' Charles was doubtful how far it would be wise
to entrust a magazine of arms to one of Antrim's creed, but desired
the Lord Deputy and Council to 'favour him as much as anyone of his
profession in religion.' In February Wentworth told the King that the
demand for arms had not been pressed, 'my lord of Antrim perceiving
I am not ignorant of his great want of money, his credit to be so
low, as not able at this very instant to take up in Dublin poor three
hundred pounds.' Charles, however, wrote to Antrim, encouraging him to
fit out an expedition against the Scottish isles by way of making a
diversion in his favour. Windebank prudently sent a copy of the letter
to Wentworth, who was thus prepared for a sudden visit from Antrim on
March 9. The Lord Deputy's caustic criticism had taken some effect,
and the proposed 20,000 men were reduced to 5400, but the conditions
of even this modified plan might have displeased a much more patient
man than Wentworth. Among Antrim's demands were the right to appoint
his own officers, power to cut timber in the royal woods, a loan of
20,000_l._, and four of the King's ships under his own command. Twelve
field pieces, bows and arrows, muskets, carbines, pistols, swords,
armour, and buff coats were all to be provided by Government, and more
barrels of powder than the royal stores contained. One hundred old
soldiers were to be detached to drill the new levies, and Antrim talked
of bringing Irish officers over from Spain.[246]
[Sidenote: Antrim's plan is abandoned.]
[Sidenote: A primitive commissariat.]
[Sidenote: Danger of a Celtic army.]
Wentworth knew that the raw material of an army was plentiful in
Ireland, and that 40,000 'bodies of men,' to use an old phrase of Sir
Henry Sidney's--might easily be had. But to pay, feed, and train them
was another matter, and no one knew better the difference between an
army and a mob. Neither money, arms, material, nor drill-sergeants
could be spared to such a projector as Antrim. 'I desired,' said
Wentworth, 'to know what provision of victual his lordship had thought
of, which for so great a number of men would require a great sum of
money. His lordship said he had not made any at all, in regard he
conceived they should find sufficient in the enemy's country to sustain
them, only his lordship proposed to transport over with him ten
thousand live cows to furnish them with milk, which he affirmed had
been his grandfather's (Tyrone's) play.' It was suggested that Argyle
might drive off his cattle, and that Cantire and the Hebrides were
barren tracts. Antrim said his men could 'feed their horses with leaves
of trees, and themselves with shamrocks.' Wentworth doubted whether
there were any trees in the Western Islands, and was at all events sure
that they would not be in full foliage in the early spring, so that
there would be no hurry. The end of it all was that Antrim found he
could not have the whole resources of the Government at his disposal.
Having no money or credit, he could do nothing of himself, though the
King gave him a commission of lieutenancy over the western Highlands
and islands. Wentworth saw clearly the danger of raising a force in
Ireland which it would be impossible to pay. 'What sudden outrage,' he
wrote prophetically, 'may be apprehended from so great a number of the
native Irish, children of habituated rebels, brought together without
pay or victual, armed with our own weapons, ourselves left naked the
whilst? What scandal of his Majesty's service it might be in a time
thus conditioned to employ a general and a whole army in a manner Roman
Catholics? What affright or pretence this might give for the Scottish,
who are at least fourscore thousand in those parts, to arm also,
under colour of their own defence?' With a general and soldiers alike
ignorant the whole scheme would be much more likely to draw a Scotch
invasion upon Ireland than to strengthen the King in Scotland. Antrim
had not even decided in his own mind which island to land on--any one
of eighty, he thought, would do.[247]
[Sidenote: Plans for a diversion in Scotland.]
[Sidenote: A garrison for Carlisle. Sir F. Willoughby.]
The idea of using the Irish army in Great Britain originated with
Charles himself. In July 1638 he inquired what help he might expect in
the event of an outbreak in Scotland. Wentworth answered that he had
only 2000 foot and 600 horse, and that it would not be safe to send
away any, especially since the Ulster Scots undoubtedly sympathised
with their countrymen. He would have Charles trust his English
subjects, but could only recommend the most ruthless repression for
Scotland. Leith might be permanently fortified and garrisoned at the
expense of the Scots 'till they had received our common prayer-book
used in our churches of England without any alteration, the bishops
settled peaceably in their jurisdiction,' and English law substituted
for Scotch. For his own part he could only propose to concentrate
a large part of his small army in north-east Ulster. At the King's
suggestion he raised 400 additional horse, a troop of 110 cuirassiers
being given to Ormonde as the man in Ireland most able and willing
to maintain them effectively. Money was sent to Holland to provide
arms for the new men, and the equipment of the foot was also much
improved. On October 22 Charles wrote to propose that Wentworth should
provide a garrison of 500 men for Carlisle, and also some cannon if
they could be spared from Ireland. The business was taken in hand at
once, Sir Francis Willoughby, governor of Galway, being selected to
command the expedition. The pay in Ireland was sixpence a day, in
England eightpence, and Wentworth asked that they might be paid on the
higher scale after crossing the channel. Charles promised, but could
not perform this, though he did give some money by way of bounty, and
in June 1641 the regiment was back in Ireland, and their pay heavily
in arrear. Willoughby had been forty years a soldier, twenty-five in
the Netherlands, and his experience at Carlisle confirmed him in the
opinion that the discipline of great garrisons was best maintained by
paying the men well and punishing their misdemeanours.[248]
[Sidenote: Nucleus of the new Irish army.]
Each captain of foot was ordered to pick thirteen of the best unmarried
men out of the ranks, and the number was thus made up. Scots were
carefully weeded out, lest they should be tempted to correspond with
their own countrymen. The drafts were ordered to Ulster on pretence of
garrisons being required for Carrickfergus, Londonderry, and Coleraine.
'For keeping a place,' said Wentworth, 'shot is of more use than pike,
and without controversy muskets of more execution than calivers.' Three
hundred and fifty were therefore musketeers and the residue pikemen.
Willoughby landed at Whitehaven on April 1, 1639, and was at Carlisle
a few days later, where he remained until all idea of fighting the
Scots had been given up. His regiment was the admiration of the whole
country, and commanding officers begged eagerly 'for the loan of some
of our soldiers to come and learn their soldiers to exercise.' No
glory was to be gained in that war, but the excellence of Willoughby's
men was so evident, that Charles determined to raise a new Irish army
of 8000 men, expressly 'to reduce those in Scotland to their due
obedience.' Wentworth had conceived this idea long before, but he
intended all the men to be Protestants, and of British extraction as
far as possible. By the middle of 1639 he had not only his standing
army of 3000 men in perfect order, but had provided 8000 spare arms
with twelve field pieces and eight heavy guns.[249]
[Sidenote: 9000 men to be raised.]
[Sidenote: Strafford sees the danger.]
Wentworth was in England from September to March 1639-40, and as the
result of this visit steps were taken to levy 8000 foot and 1000 horse
in Ireland. This was the germ of the policy which ruined both Charles
I. and James II., and which has never succeeded with any statesman. To
lean upon Irish Roman Catholic support in order to crush opposition in
Protestant England was plainly the idea of Charles himself much more
than of Strafford; for the latter saw the danger clearly enough, though
he wilfully neglected it in pursuit of his 'thorough' ideal. It may
be said that Strafford would have succeeded if his King had seconded
him properly, but then no really able sovereign would have adopted
such a scheme. Lady Carlisle has recorded that in addition to that
which Charles consulted there was 'another little junto, that is much
apprehended,' consisting of Strafford, Laud, and Hamilton only. 'They
have met twice, and the world is full of guesses for the occasion of
it.'[250]
[Sidenote: The sinews of war.]
[Sidenote: Charles promises to find money,]
[Sidenote: but fails to do so.]
The King's order to raise the new army was issued on March 2, and
Strafford hurried over to provide funds in Ireland; he seems really
to have believed that love and not fear made the Irish Parliament so
subservient as to vote what he asked for. The raising of the new men
was taken in hand at once, and he hoped to have them all ready at
Carrickfergus by the middle of May, and in Scotland by the end of June.
He would keep them together and pay them for eighteen months, provided
the King did his part. The conditions were that 10,000_l._ should be
at once given to buy necessaries in Holland, and 40,000_l._ more at
short intervals. 'We are resolved,' Strafford told Windebank, 'to bring
as much as possible to Ireland in specie, which will give a life even
to the payment of our subsidies here, by the passing of so much ready
money from hand to hand, than which I assure you nothing is so much
wanting in this kingdom.' The rents of Londonderry and Coleraine were
to be remitted from the English to the Irish Exchequer. All powder was
to be provided in England without payment. The King's ships were to
keep the channel clear, two thousand foot and five hundred horse were
to join the Irish army in Cumberland, and Ireland was to be relieved
from payment of the garrison at Carlisle. Orders were sent to London to
draw the 10,000_l._ at once, but when Strafford, suffering agony and
borne in a litter, reached Coventry in the middle of April, he was told
that there was no money in the Exchequer. Strafford had done his part,
but the King could give him no help, and the Irish army never crossed
the channel. The mere fact that it had been raised cost them both their
heads.[251]
[Sidenote: Danger of enrolling native Irish soldiers.]
[Sidenote: Command given to Ormonde.]
[Sidenote: Most of the men Roman Catholics.]
[Sidenote: The Irish army is kept up after Newburn.]
No one saw possible danger more clearly than Strafford, but his
political position forced him into courses which in his cooler moments
he knew to be desperate. To enlist no Scots was an obvious precaution,
but there were other dangers not less real though more remote. The
Irish, he told the King, might do good service, for they hated the
Scots and their religion; 'yet it is not safe to train them up more
than needs must in the military way, which, the present occasion past,
might arm their old affections to do us more mischief, and put new
and dangerous thoughts into them after they are returned home (as of
necessity they must) without further employment or provision than what
they had of their own before.' Nevertheless, his first and much safer
plan of a Protestant army was forgotten, and he proceeded to impress
large numbers of Irish Roman Catholics. The dreaded result followed,
but before that time he had perished on the scaffold, and the evil
that he had done lived after him. The command of the new army was
given to Ormonde, the enrolment and preliminary drill being left to
St. Leger with the title of Sergeant-Major-General. The commissioners
for raising the subsidies were entrusted with the levy, and officers
were appointed at once. The old army consisted entirely, or almost
entirely, of Protestants, and one thousand men, drafted proportionally
from each company, became the nucleus of the new force. Carte would
have us believe that in consequence of these veterans 'being invested
with authority or in a state of superiority over the rest of the new
army, had it absolutely in their power; and it was of little or no
consequence what religion the other private sentinels which composed
it professed.' This might have held good if the army had been kept
together with regular pay and under a stable Government. But it was
the day of disbandment that Strafford feared, and it was the disbanded
soldiers who made the greatest difficulty when the struggle between
King and Parliament had almost paralysed the Irish Government. The bulk
of the men who were raised to put down the Scotch Covenanters were
Irish Roman Catholics, and would be sure to take sides against England
when occasion offered. Even the officers were to some extent open to
the same objection. In the regiment raised by Colonel John Butler in
Leinster Rory Maguire and Arthur Fox, both well-known in the subsequent
rebellion, had companies. Theobald Taaffe was lieutenant-colonel of the
regiment raised by Coote in Connaught, and Sir John Netterville had
a company in that levied by Bruce in Connaught, and there were many
Roman Catholics among the junior officers. The headquarters staff were
all English Protestants, but their influence ceased with disbandment.
There were many delays, but the whole force was at Carrickfergus by
the middle of July, and a month later St. Leger was able to say that
no prince in Christendom had a better or more orderly army. The rout
at Newburn took place a few days later, and after the treaty of Ripon
there could be no real chance of using the Irish army against the
Scots. They were, however, kept together, and when the Long Parliament
met in November this was not unnaturally regarded as a threatening
cloud.[252]
[Sidenote: The Irish army disbanded.]
[Sidenote: One regiment goes to France.]
[Sidenote: Those engaged for Spain are stopped.]
[Sidenote: Sir B. Rudyard's speech.]
Strafford was beheaded on May 12, 1641. Four days before Charles
ordered Ormonde to disband the new army, adding that to prevent
disturbance he had licensed certain officers to transport 8000 foot
'for the service of any prince or state at amity with us.' These
officers were Colonels James Dillon, Theobald Taaffe, John and Garret
Barry, Richard Plunket, John Butler, John Bermingham, George Porter,
and Christopher Bellings. Of these the first seven at least were
afterwards active confederates. Bellings alone sought to secure a
regiment for the French service, and, as became one who worked for
Richelieu, he lost no time, but slipped away 'very quietly' with a
thousand picked men before the end of June, in spite of the efforts of
priests and friars. Lieutenant Flower, who understood Irish, heard a
priest tell the soldiers at Drogheda that they ought to stay, though
they got only bread and water. Flower said the King allowed them to
go, to which he answered that the King was but one man. The other
colonels, having to deal with Spain, were of course late, and did
not appear until Bellings had gone. Then, yielding to parliamentary
pressure on both sides of the channel, Charles changed his mind in
August and would only give leave to the two Barrys, Porter, and Taaffe
to transport a thousand men each. In the end no shipping could be
had, for the English House of Commons passed a resolution against the
transportation of soldiers by merchants from any port in the King's
dominions. The Spaniards had no ships of their own, and so the men
remained in Ireland. Colonel John Barry did manage to embark some
400 men, but his vessel never left the Liffey. There can be no doubt
that the disbanded soldiers were more dangerous in Ireland than they
would have been in Spain, but it is unnecessary to suppose that the
parliamentary leaders had any wish to make mischief in this way.
Rudyard probably expressed the ideas of the majority when he objected
to strengthen France by recruiting her armies, or Spain in order to
enable her to crush Portugal. 'It was never fit,' he said, 'to suffer
the Irish to be promiscuously made soldiers abroad, because it may make
them abler to trouble the State when they come home. Their intelligence
and practice with the princes whom they shall serve may prove dangerous
to that kingdom of Ireland.' He thought work could be found for them as
harvesters in England.[253]
[Sidenote: The disbandment quietly effected, May 1641.]
The new army of which St. Leger had been so proud had become somewhat
disorderly when their pay began to be irregular. But the actual
disbandment was quietly effected. Pay ceased on May 25, but the Council
managed to scrape up 8000_l._, out of the 18,000_l._ due. Each soldier
was persuaded to take seven shillings as a donative and three shillings
on account of pay, while 50_l._ was assigned to each company for the
officers, many of whom got nothing more until the Restoration. The men
gave up their arms quietly, and dispersed, having been reminded that
they were amenable to the law and not privileged in any way. There were
no outrages, and sheriffs of counties were specially charged to keep
the peace.[254]
[Sidenote: French and Spanish crimps.]
[Sidenote: English settlers pressed.]
The disbanded soldiers in Ireland constituted a grave danger, as every
one could see when the rebellion had actually broken out, and which
some saw at the time of disbanding. But the other danger from great
bodies of Irishmen in the pay of foreign powers seemed to many greater
at the time, and was certainly not small. Antrim had failed, but
Lord Barrymore had succeeded in raising men for service in England,
most of whom must have drifted back to Ireland after the treaty of
Ripon. Barrymore complained bitterly of a 'swarm of interloping French
mountebanks who wander on their levies with titles and commissions
of their own stamp and coinage, with which they are so prided up, as
some of them have dared to contest for pressed men with my employed
servants.' Three hundred volunteers, collected for him by an O'Sullivan
were thus enticed away, and he believed that Strafford's enemy Sir
Piers Crosbie was at the bottom of it all. Barrymore landed in
Lancashire before the middle of June 1639, but with much less than the
thousand men whom he was authorised to raise. He had no money to tempt
recruits, and when his agents visited Kinsale the common people ran
away as from an enemy. They took bribes from the better sort. These
crimps even seized men actually engaged by the Government and employed
in the public service, and appear to have taken a malicious pleasure
in pouncing on English settlers whenever possible. Strafford observed
that this was not the way to encourage English enterprise, nor to make
intended plantations a success. If the King wanted Irish soldiers let
him send over money to the regular officials, and they would do the
work much better and cheaper than these Irish lords, 'who always either
out of too much love to their own, or out of over little knowledge
of the customs of England in these cases, express some Irish manner
or other, either very unseemly in itself, or pretending their own
greatness, further than well consists with the modesty of subjects.'
Barrymore, however, proved a brave and loyal soldier in spite of this
bad beginning.[255]
[Sidenote: Recruiting for Spain allowed.]
[Sidenote: Owen Roe O'Neill and Preston.]
[Sidenote: The French service found better than the Spanish.]
The Spaniards were allowed to recruit in Ireland during the whole of
Strafford's reign, though he had his misgivings from the first, and
though he warned Charles even before he crossed the channel for the
first time. 'It had been the safer for your Majesty to have given
liberty for the raising five times as many here in England; because
these could not have been debauched in their faith, where those were
not free of suspicion, especially being put under command of O'Neill
and O'Donnell, the sons of two infamous and arch-traitors, and so
likely not only to be trained up in the discipline of war, but in the
art of rebellion also. Secondly, as your Majesty's deputy I must tell
him, if the state of this kingdom were the same as in Queen Elizabeth's
time, I should more apprehend the travel and disturbance which two
hundred of these men might give us here, being natives, and experienced
in their own faculty as soldiers, being sent to mutiny and discipline
their own countrymen against the Crown, than of as many more Spaniards,
as they sent in those days to Kinsale for relief of the rebels.'
This opinion he retained to the end. He was allowed to appoint two
officers, and he selected men who could be trusted to give him a true
account of what went on in the Spanish Netherlands. Owen Roe O'Neill
became the favourite leader of the Irish in Belgium, but Wentworth
preferred Preston. Nevertheless men who were engaged for the latter's
regiment very often went over to the former. The French also got no
small number of Irish recruits, though they were less favoured by the
Government of Charles I. Intercepted letters in 1635 showed that Paris
was 'pestered with Irish of all sorts, from all parts,' while whole
companies raised for the Spanish Netherlands 'suffered themselves to
be debauched by the French ambassador, and now serve under the French
colours.' Irish officers deserted the Spanish for the French service to
get better and more regular pay, and Secretary Coke was clear-sighted
enough to see that the Irish troops of both powers would probably turn
against England in the end, 'and join together to replant themselves at
home.'[256]
FOOTNOTES:
[246] _Strafford Letters_, ii. 184, 211, 266-306. For personal details
see Hill's _Macdonnells of Antrim_. Lord Deputy and Council to Coke,
_Melbourne Hall MSS._ calendared by Hist. MSS. Comm. under July 1637,
but apparently belonging to 1639.
[247] Wentworth to Windebank, March 20, 1638-9, enclosing Antrim's
written proposals, _Strafford Letters_. Charles's informal commission
to Antrim, dated June 5, 1639, is printed in Hill's Macdonnells of
Antrim, Appx. 12, _Melbourne Hall MSS._, _ut sup._
[248] Willoughby to Wentworth, six letters in May and June 1639
in _Strafford Letters_; to Vane, June 18, 1641, in State Papers,
_Ireland_; to Coke, July 23, 1639, in _Melbourne Hall Papers_.
[249] _Strafford Letters_, ii. 187, 228, 244, etc. There are six
letters from Willoughby to Wentworth during April and May 1639, and
see his letter to Vane of June 18, 1641, in State Papers, _Ireland_;
Wentworth to Cottington, February 10, 1638-9, in vol. ix. of _Camden
Miscellany_.
[250] Lady Carlisle to Leicester, October 17, 1639, Collins's _Sidney
Papers_.
[251] Northumberland to Leicester, December 12, 1639, Collins's _Sidney
Papers_, ii. 624; Strafford to Coke, March 16, 1639-40; to the King,
March 23; to Windebank and Hamilton, March 24; to the King, April 16,
1640, _Strafford Letters_.
[252] Wentworth to the King, July 28, 1638, _Strafford Letters_;
Carte's _Ormonde_, book ii. Army List among _Carte transcripts_, vol.
i., to which is appended a note that 'this army was the 10,000 men
raised for the expedition into Scotland.'
[253] The King to Ormonde, May 8, 1641, and Vane to same, August
20, Carte's _Ormonde_, vol. iii.; Council of Ireland to Vane, June
30; Petition of Irish Colonels to the King, August 8, State Papers,
_Ireland_. Rudyard's speech, August 28, in _Rushworth_. Resolution of
embargo in _Nalson_, ii. 477.
[254] An unsigned paper of May 7, 1641, as to pledging private credit
for the money; Lords Justices and Council to the Sheriffs, May 21, and
to Vane, June 1; Ormonde to Vane, May 21 and June 9, State Papers,
_Ireland_.
[255] Barrymore to Cork, May 26, 1639, _Lismore Papers_, 2nd series,
vol. iv.; Wentworth to Coke, May 18, 1639, _Strafford Letters_, ii.
342; letters of Sir Adam Loftus in State Papers, _Ireland_, April 26
and 29, 1641.
[256] Wentworth to the King, July 16, 1633; to Preston, October 1,
1635; Coke to Wentworth, January 21, 1634-5; Colonel Thomas Preston to
Wentworth, July 6, 1635, _Strafford Letters_.