Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit

We say that everything has a beginning. This is one side of the matter.

There is another according to which everything is without a

beginning—beginnings, and endings also, being, but as it were, steps cut

in a slope of ice without which we could not climb it. They are for

convenience and the hardness of the hearts of men who make an idol of

classification, but they do not exist apart from our sense of our own

convenience.

It was a favourite saying with William Sefton Moorhouse [in New Zealand]

that men cannot get rich by swopping knives. Nevertheless nature does

seem to go upon this principle. Everybody does eat everybody up. Man

eats birds, birds eat worms and worms eat man again. It is a vicious

circle, yet, somehow or other, there is an increment. I begin to doubt

the principle _ex nihilo nihil fit_.

We very much want a way of getting something out of nothing and back into

it again. Whether or no we ever shall get such a way, we see the clearly

perceptible arising out of and returning into the absolutely

imperceptible and, so far as we are concerned, this is much the same

thing. To assume an unknowable substratum as the source from which all

things proceed or are evolved is equivalent to assuming that they come up

out of nothing; for that which does not exist for us is for us nothing;

that which we do not know does not exist _qua_ us, and therefore it does

not exist. When I say “we,” I mean mankind generally, for things may

exist _qua_ one man and not _qua_ another. And when I say “nothing” I

postulate something of which we have no experience.

And yet we cannot say that a thing does not exist till it is known to

exist. The planet Neptune existed though, _qua_ us, it did not exist

before Adams and Leverrier discovered it, and we cannot hold that its

continued non-existence to my laundress and her husband makes it any the

less an entity. We cannot say that it did not exist at all till it was

discovered, that it exists only partially and vaguely to most of us, that

to many it still does not exist at all, that there are few to whom it

even exists in any force or fullness and none who can realise more than

the broad facts of its existence. Neptune has been disturbing the orbits

of the planets nearest to him for more centuries than we can reckon, and

whether or not he is known to have been doing so has nothing to do with

the matter. If A is robbed, he is robbed, whether he knows it or not.

In one sense, then, we cannot say that the planet Neptune did not exist

till he was discovered, but in another we can and ought to do so. _De

non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio_; as long,

therefore, as Neptune did not appear he did not exist _qua_ us. The only

way out of it is through the contradiction in terms of maintaining that a

thing exists and does not exist at one and the same time. So A may be

both robbed, and not robbed.

We consider, therefore, that things have assumed their present shape by

course of evolution from a something which, _qua_ us, is a nothing, from

a potential something but not an actual, from an actual nothing but a

potential not-nothing, from a nothing which might become a something to

us with any modification on our parts but which, till such modification

has arisen, does not exist in relation to us, though very conceivably

doing so in relation to other entities. But this Protean nothing,

capable of appearing as something, is not the absolute, eternal,

unchangeable nothing that we mean when we say _ex nihilo nihil fit_.

The alternative is that something should not have come out of nothing,

and this is saying that something has always existed. But the eternal

increateness of matter seems as troublesome to conceive as its having

been created out of nothing. I say “seems,” for I am not sure how far it

really is so. We never saw something come out of nothing, that is to

say, we never saw a beginning of anything except as the beginning of a

new phase of something pre-existent. We ought therefore to find the

notion of eternal being familiar, it ought to be the only conception of

matter which we are able to form: nevertheless, we are so carried away by

being accustomed to see phases have their beginnings and endings that we

forget that the matter, of which we see the phase begin and end, did not

begin or end with the phase.

Eternal matter permeated by eternal mind, matter and mind being functions

of one another, is the least uncomfortable way of looking at the

universe; but as it is beyond our comprehension, and cannot therefore be

comfortable, sensible persons will not look at the universe at all except

in such details as may concern them.

The Note-Books of Samuel Butler · 第 496 / 602 题