Convenience

i

We wonder at its being as hard often to discover convenience as it is to

discover truth. But surely convenience is truth.

ii

The use of truth is like the use of words; both truth and words depend

greatly upon custom.

iii

We do with truth much as we do with God. We create it according to our

own requirements and then say that it has created us, or requires that we

shall do or think so and so—whatever we find convenient.

iv

“What is Truth?” is often asked, as though it were harder to say what

truth is than what anything else is. But what is Justice? What is

anything? An eternal contradiction in terms meets us at the end of every

enquiry. We are not required to know what truth is, but to speak the

truth, and so with justice.

v

The search after truth is like the search after perpetual motion or the

attempt to square the circle. All we should aim at is the most

convenient way of looking at a thing—the way that most sensible people

are likely to find give them least trouble for some time to come. It is

not true that the sun used to go round the earth until Copernicus’s time,

but it is true that until Copernicus’s time it was most convenient to us

to hold this. Still, we had certain ideas which could only fit in

comfortably with our other ideas when we came to consider the sun as the

centre of the planetary system.

Obvious convenience often takes a long time before it is fully recognised

and acted upon, but there will be a _nisus_ towards it as long and as

widely spread as the desire of men to be saved trouble. If truth is not

trouble-saving in the long run it is not truth: truth is only that which

is most largely and permanently trouble-saving. The ultimate triumph,

therefore, of truth rests on a very tangible basis—much more so than when

it is made to depend upon the will of an unseen and unknowable agency.

If my views about the _Odyssey_, for example, will, in the long run, save

students from perplexity, the students will be sure to adopt them, and I

have no wish that they should adopt them otherwise.

It does not matter much what the truth is, but our knowing the truth—that

is to say our hitting on the most permanently convenient arrangement of

our ideas upon a subject whatever it may be—matters very much; at least

it matters, or may matter, very much in some relations. And however

little it matters, yet it matters, and however much it matters yet it

does not matter. In the utmost importance there is unimportance, and in

the utmost unimportance there is importance. So also it is with

certainty, life, matter, necessity, consciousness and, indeed, with

everything which can form an object of human sensation at all, or of

those after-reasonings which spring ultimately from sensations. This is

a round-about way of saying that every question has two sides.

vi

Our concern is with the views we shall choose to take and to let other

people take concerning things, and as to the way of expressing those

views which shall give least trouble. If we express ourselves in one way

we find our ideas in confusion and our action impotent: if in another our

ideas cohere harmoniously, and our action is edifying. The convenience

of least disturbing vested ideas, and at the same time rearranging our

views in accordance with new facts that come to our knowledge, this is

our proper care. But it is idle to say we do not know anything about

things—perhaps we do, perhaps we don’t—but we at any rate know what sane

people think and are likely to think about things, and this to all

intents and purposes is knowing the things themselves. For the things

only are what sensible people agree to say and think they are.

vii

The arrangement of our ideas is as much a matter of convenience as the

packing of goods in a druggist’s or draper’s store and leads to exactly

the same kind of difficulties in the matter of classifying them. We all

admit the arbitrariness of classifications in a languid way, but we do

not think of it more than we can help—I suppose because it is so

inconvenient to do so. The great advantage of classification is to

conceal the fact that subdivisions are as arbitrary as they are.

The Note-Books of Samuel Butler · 第 488 / 602 题