157. (1) Has the state a right to override this right in war? It must
be admitted that war is _not_ 'murder,' either on the part of those
who fight or of those who cause the war
158. Yet it may be a violation of the right of life. It does not
prove it not to be so, that _(a)_ those who kill do not intend to
kill anyone in particular
159. Or that _(b)_ those who are killed have incurred the risk
voluntarily. Even if they have, it does not follow that they had a
'right' to do so
160. It may be said that the right to physical life may be overridden
by a right arising from the exigencies of moral life
161. But this only shifts the blame of war to those who are
responsible for those exigencies; it remains a wrong all the same
162. But in truth most wars of the last 400 years have _not_ been
wars for political liberty, but have arisen from dynastic ambition or
national vanity
163. Admitting, then, that virtue may be called out by war and that
it may be a factor in human progress, the destruction of life in it
is always a wrong
164. 'But if it be admitted that war may do good, may not those who
originate it have the credit of this?'
165. If they really acted from desire to do good, their share in the
wrong is less; but in any case the fact that war was the only means
to the good was due to human agency and was a wrong
166. (2) (See sec. 157). Hence it follows that the state, so far as
it is true to its principle, cannot have to infringe the rights of
men as men by conflicts with other states
167. It is not because states exist, but because they do not fulfil
their functions as states in maintaining and harmonising general
rights, that such conflicts are necessary
168. This is equally true of conflicts arising from what are called
'religious' grounds
169. Thus no state, as such, is _absolutely_ justified in doing a
wrong to mankind, though a particular state may be conditionally
justified
170. It may be objected that such a 'cosmopolitan' view ignores the
individuality of states, and could only be realised if they wore all
absorbed in a universal empire
171. It is true that public spirit, to be real, must be national; but
the more a nation becomes a true state, the more does it find outlets
for its national spirit other than conflicts with other nations
172. In fact the identification of patriotism with military
aggressiveness is a survival from a time when states in the full
sense did not exist
173. And our great standing armies are due, not to the development
of a system of states, but to circumstances which witness to the
shortcomings of that system
174. The better the organisation of each state, the greater is the
freedom of communication with others, especially in trade, which,
beginning in self-interest, may lead to the consciousness of a higher
bond
175. As compared with individuals, any bonds between nations must
be weak; on the other hand, governments have less temptation than
individuals to deal unfairly with one another.