137. As long as power of compulsion is made the essence of the state,
political obligation cannot be explained either by the theory of
'consent,' or by that which derives all right from the sovereign
138. The state presupposes rights, rights which may be said to belong
to the 'individual' if this mean 'one of a society of individuals'
139. A right may be _analysed_ into a claim of the individual upon
society and a power conceded to him by society, but really the claim
and the concession are sides of one and the same common consciousness
140. Such common consciousness of interests is the ground of the
'natural right' of slaves and of the members of other states
141. But though in this way there may be rights outside the state,
the members of a state derive the rights which they have as members
of other associations from the state, and have no rights against it
142. i.e. as they derive their rights from their membership in the
state, they have no right to disobey the law unless it be for the
interest of the state
143. And even then only if the law violates some interest which is
_implicitly acknowledged_ by the conscience of the community
144. It is a farther question when the attempt to get a law repealed
should be exchanged for active resistance to it
145. e.g. should a slave be befriended against the law? The slave has
as a man certain rights which the state cannot extinguish, and by
denying which it forfeits its claim upon him
146. And it may be held that the claim of the slave upon the citizen,
as a man, overrides the claim of the state upon him, as a citizen
147. Even here, however, the law ought to be obeyed, supposing that
its violation tended to bring about general anarchy.