118. And _both_ imply the twofold conception, _(a)_ 'I _must_ though
I do not like,' _(b)_ 'I must _because_ it is for the common good
which is also my good'
119. It is a farther and difficult question, how far the sense
of common interest can be kept alive either in the government or
subjects, unless the people participates directly in legislation
120. And this suggests the objection, Is it not trifling with words
to speak of political subjection in modern states as based on the
_will_ of the subjects?
121. We must admit _(a)_ that the idea of the state as serving a
common interest is only _partially_ realised, even by the most
enlightened subject, though so far as realised it is what makes him a
loyal subject
122. _(b)_ That if he is to be an intelligent patriot as well as a
loyal subject, he must take a personal part in the work of the state
123. And _(c)_ that even then his patriotism will not be a passion
unless it includes a feeling for the state analogous to that which he
has for his family and home
124. But are we not again assuming what was disputed, viz. that a
sense of its serving a common interest is necessary to the existence
of the state?
125. Observe that the idea of an end or function, realised by
agencies unconscious of it and into which it cannot be resolved, is
already implicit even if the state be treated as a 'natural organism'
126. Such a treatment, however, would ignore the distinction between
the 'natural' and the 'human' or 'moral' agencies which have operated
in the production of states
127. It may be objected that these 'human' agencies are not
necessarily 'moral,' but on the contrary are often selfish
128. But though human motives are never unalloyed, they only produce
good results so far as they are fused with and guided by some
unselfish element
129. If e.g. we would form a _complete_ estimate of Napoleon, we must
consider not only his ambition but the _particular form_ in which his
ambition worked
130. And further reflect that the _idiosyncrasy_ of such men plays
but a small part in the result, which is mainly due to agencies of
which they are only the most conspicuous instruments
131. Thus an ideal motive may co-operate with the motives of selfish
men, and only through such co-operation are they instrumental for good
132. The fact that the state implies a supreme coercive power gives
colour to the view that it is based on coercion; whereas the coercive
power is only supreme because it is exercised in a state, i.e.
according to some system of law, written or customary
133. In the absence of any other name, 'state' is the best for a
society in which there is such a system of law and a power to enforce
it
134. A state, then, is not an aggregate of individuals under
a sovereign, but a society in which the rights of men already
associated in families and tribes are defined and harmonised
135. It developes as the absorption of fresh societies or the
extended intercourse between its members widens the range of common
interests and rights
136. The point to be insisted on is that force has only formed states
so far as it has operated in and through a pre-existing medium of
political, tribal, or family 'rights'.