51. The development of this latter side of it is peculiarly due to
Rousseau, but Locke, Hooker, and Grotius have essentially the same
conception: Spinoza alone differs
52. Ambiguity of their phrase 'state of nature.' They agree in
treating it as the negation of the 'political state.' But if so,
contract would be impossible in it
53. Nor could it be a state of 'freedom and equality,' as most of
them assume it to be
54. And if this state of nature implies consciousness of obligation,
it must imply recognition of social claims, and must therefore be
virtually a political state
55. In fact the theory of a state of nature governed by a law of
nature, as preceding civil society, must be untrue either to the
conception of _law_ or to that of _nature_
56. Locke differs from Hobbes (1) in distinguishing the 'state of
nature' from the 'state of war'
57. He implies (more consistently than Hobbes) that the 'state of
nature' is one in which the 'law of nature' is observed
58. (2) He limits the supreme power in the state by the legislature,
which holds its functions in trust from the community
59. And this distinction between the supreme community and the
supreme executive enables him to distinguish between dissolution of
the political society and dissolution of the government, which Hobbes
had confused
60. He invests the community with the right of resuming the powers
which they have delegated, and thus justifies revolution when it is
the act of the whole community
61. The difficulty is to determine when it _is_ the act of the whole
community, and on this Locke's theory gives no help
62. The difficulty indeed is not so great as that of conceiving the
act of original devolution of power, and is inherent in the theory of
contract
63. In the particular case of the reform of the English
representative system, Locke does not contemplate the carrying out of
his own theory.