44. He uses 'person,' as in Roman law, for either (1) a complex of
rights, or (2) the subject of those rights
45. Though by his theory the sovereign may be one or many, and
sovereignty is transferable by the act of a majority, he tacitly
vindicates the absolute right of a _de facto_ monarchy
46. The radical fiction in his theory is that there can be any
'right' _after_ the institution of sovereignty, if (as he holds)
there is none before it
47. To justify his doctrine of absolute submission he has to assume a
'law of nature' which binds men to keep covenant, while yet he holds
the 'law of nature' to be mere 'power' and covenants to be only valid
under an _imperium,_
48. His 'contract' can confer none but natural right, and that is
either not a right at all, or (if it is) it belongs to all men,
subject and sovereign alike
49. The real flaw in the theory of contract is not that it is
unhistorical, but that it implies the possibility of rights and
obligations independently of society
50. Though it has not been popularly accepted as regards the rights
of sovereigns over subjects, the behaviour of individuals to society
is to a groat extent practically determined by it.