ESCAPE OF BANKS AND PORTER.
From my resting-place on the ground at Pleasant Hill, after the battle
of the 9th, I was aroused about 10 P.M. by General Kirby Smith, just
arrived from Shreveport. This officer disapproved of further pursuit of
Banks, except by a part of our mounted force, and ordered the infantry
back to Mansfield. He was apprehensive that the troops on the transports
above would reach Shreveport, or disembark below me and that place. In
addition, Steele's column from Arkansas caused him much uneasiness, and
made him unwilling for my troops to increase their distance from the
capital of the "Trans-Mississippi Department." It was pointed out that
the water in Red River was falling, and navigation becoming more and
more difficult; that I had a staff officer watching the progress of the
fleet, which was not accompanied by more than three thousand men, too
few to attempt a landing, and that they would certainly hear of Banks's
defeat and seek to rejoin him at Grand Ecore. As to Steele he was more
than a hundred miles distant from Shreveport, harassed by Price's force;
he must learn of Banks's misfortune, and, leading but a subsidiary
column, would retire to Little Rock. Banks, with the remains of his
beaten army, was before us, and the fleet of Porter, with barely water
enough to float upon. We had but to strike vigorously to capture or
destroy both. But it was written that the sacrifices of my little army
should be wasted, and, on the morning of the 10th, I was ordered to take
all the infantry and much of the horse to Mansfield.
The Bayou Pierre, three hundred feet wide and too deep to ford, leaves
the Red River a few miles below Shreveport, and after a long course, in
which it frequently expands into lakes, returns to its parent stream
three miles above Grand Ecore, dividing the pine-clad hills on the west
from the alluvion of the river on the east. Several roads lead from the
interior to landings on the river, crossing Bayou Pierre by ferries. One
from Pleasant Hill to Blair's Landing, sixteen miles, has been
mentioned. Another led from Mansfield to Grand Bayou Landing, eighteen
miles. Dispatches from Captain McCloskey informed me that the enemy's
fleet had passed this last place on the morning of the 9th, pushing
slowly up river, impeded by low water. Feeling assured that intelligence
of Banks's defeat would send the fleet back to Grand Ecore, and hoping
to cut off its communication, at dawn of the 11th I sent General Bagby,
with a brigade of horse and a battery, from Mansfield to Grand Bayou
Landing. Before reaching the ferry at Bayou Pierre, he ascertained that
the fleet had turned back on the afternoon of the 10th. There was a
pontoon train at Shreveport that I had in vain asked for, and Bagby
experienced great delay in crossing Bayou Pierre by means of one small
flat. The fleet, descending, passed Grand Bayou Landing at 10 o'clock
A.M. of the 11th, some hours before Bagby reached the river; and he
pushed on toward Blair's Landing, where he arrived on the night of the
12th, after the close of Green's operations of that day.
General Green, from Pleasant Hill, had been directing the movements of
our advanced horse, a part of which, under Bee, was in front of Grand
Ecore and Natchitoches. Advised of the movements of the enemy's fleet,
he, with seven hundred and fifty horse and two batteries, left Pleasant
Hill for Blair's Landing at 6 o'clock P.M. on the 11th. As in the case
of Bagby, he was delayed at Bayou Pierre, and, after hard work, only
succeeded in crossing three guns and a part of his horse before the
fleet came down on the 12th. Green attacked at once, and leading his men
in his accustomed fearless way, was killed by a discharge of grape from
one of the gunboats. Deprived of their leader, the men soon fell back,
and the fleet reached Grand Ecore without further molestation from the
west bank. The enemy's loss, supposed by our people to have been
immense, was officially reported at seven on the gunboats and fifty on
the transports. _Per contra_, the enemy believed that our loss was
stupendous; whereas we had scarcely a casualty except the death of
General Green, an irreparable one. No Confederate went aboard the fleet
and no Federal came ashore; so there was a fine field of slaughter in
which the imagination of both sides could disport itself.
With facilities for crossing the Pierre at hand, the fleet, during the
11th and 12th, would have been under the fire of two thousand riflemen
and eighteen guns and suffered heavily, especially the transports,
crowded with troops. As it was, we accomplished but little and lost
General Green.
Like Mouton, this officer had joined me at an early period of my service
in western Louisiana. Coming to me with the rank of colonel, his
conspicuous services made it my pleasant duty to recommend him for
promotion to brigadier and major-general. Upright, modest, and with the
simplicity of a child, danger seemed to be his element, and he rejoiced
in combat. His men adored him, and would follow wherever he led; but
they did not fear him, for, though he scolded at them in action, he was
too kind-hearted to punish breaches of discipline. In truth, he had no
conception of the value of discipline in war, believing that all must be
actuated by his own devotion to duty. His death was a public calamity,
and mourned as such by the people of Texas and Louisiana. To me he was a
tried and devoted friend, and our friendship was cemented by the fact
that, through his Virginia mother, we were related by blood. The great
Commonwealth, whose soil contains his remains, will never send forth a
bolder warrior, a better citizen, nor a more upright man than Thomas
Green.
The brigade of horse brought by General Green to Louisiana, and with
which he was so long associated, had some peculiar characteristics. The
officers such as Colonels Hardiman, Baylor, Lane, Herbert, McNeill, and
others, were bold and enterprising. The men, hardy frontiersmen,
excellent riders, and skilled riflemen, were fearless and self-reliant,
but discharged their duty as they liked and when they liked. On a march
they wandered about at will, as they did about camp, and could be kept
together only when a fight was impending. When their arms were injured
by service or neglect, they threw them away, expecting to be supplied
with others. Yet, with these faults, they were admirable fighters, and
in the end I became so much attached to them as to be incapable of
punishing them.
After the affair at Blair's Landing on the 12th, the horse returned to
Pleasant Hill, and thence joined Bee in front of Grand Ecore, where
Banks had his army concentrated behind works, with gunboats and
transports in the river, Bee occupying the town of Natchitoches, four
miles away. On the morning of the 13th General Kirby Smith visited me at
Mansfield. Relieved of apprehension about the fleet, now at Grand Ecore,
he expressed great anxiety for the destruction of Steele's column. I was
confident that Steele, who had less than ten thousand men and was more
than a hundred miles distant from Shreveport, would hear of Banks's
disaster and retreat; but General Kirby Smith's views differed from
mine. I then expressed my willingness to march, with the main body of
the infantry, to join Price in Arkansas, and serve under his command
until Steele's column was destroyed or driven back; insisting, however,
that in the event of Steele's retreat I should be permitted to turn on
Banks and Porter, to complete the work of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill.
The destruction of the Federal army and capture of the fleet, helpless
alone by reason of low and falling water in Red River, were the
legitimate fruits of those victories, and I protested with all possible
earnestness against a policy that would fail to reap them. After this
conversation General Kirby Smith returned to Shreveport, leaving me
under the impression that my last proposition was acceded to. The loss
of valuable time incurred by a wild-goose chase after Steele was most
annoying, but I was hopeful it might be recovered. To get the fleet down
to Alexandria and over the falls at that place would require much time
in the low condition of the water; and Banks's army was so much
demoralized by defeat that Bee found no difficulty in restraining its
movements with his horse.
At dawn of the 14th Walker's and Churchill's divisions of infantry, with
their artillery, prepared for an active campaign, marched for
Shreveport, forty miles. The same day Polignac's infantry division,
reduced to some twelve hundred muskets, was sent toward Grand Ecore to
strengthen the horse in front of the enemy. On the evening of the 15th I
reached Shreveport, and had a short interview with General Kirby Smith,
who informed me that Steele had begun his retreat from a point a hundred
and ten miles distant, but that he hoped to overtake him, and would
personally direct the pursuit. I was further informed that my presence
with the troops was not desired, and that I would remain in nominal
command of Shreveport, but might join the force near Grand Ecore if I
thought proper. All this with the curt manner of a superior to a
subordinate, as if fearing remonstrance. General Kirby Smith marched
north of Shreveport on the 16th, and three days thereafter I received a
dispatch from his "chief of staff" informing me that the pontoon train,
asked for in vain when it would have been of priceless value, would be
sent back from his army and placed at my disposition. Doubtless General
Kirby Smith thought that a pontoon train would supply the place of seven
thousand infantry and six batteries.
I remained at Shreveport three days, occupied with reports and sending
supplies to my little force near Grand Ecore, toward which I proceeded
on the 19th of April. Major-General Wharton, who had gained reputation
as a cavalry officer in the Confederate Army of Tennessee, accompanied
me. He had reported for duty at Shreveport on the 18th, and was assigned
to the command of the horse to replace the lamented Green. We reached
Polignac's camp, in the vicinity of Grand Ecore, ninety odd miles from
Shreveport, on the evening of the 21st, and learned that the enemy had
threatened an advance during the day. This convinced me of his intention
to retreat, and an officer was sent to General Bee to warn him.
Cane River leaves the main channel of the Red below Grand Ecore, and,
passing by Natchitoches, returns to the Red after a winding course of
sixty miles. Except at the season of floods, it is not navigable; but
the alluvion through which it flows is very productive, while the pine
forest immediately to the west is sterile. Bee, under instructions,
occupied the valley of Cane River with his horse, and had been ordered
to keep his pickets close to Grand Ecore and Natchitoches, draw his
forage from plantations along the river, and, when the enemy retreated
toward Alexandria, fall back before him to Monette's Ferry, which he was
expected to hold. Monette's Ferry, forty miles below Natchitoches, was
on the only practicable road to Alexandria. Here the river made a wide,
deep ford, and pine-clad hills rose abruptly from the southern bank. On
the left, looking toward Natchitoches, were hills and impassable lakes,
easily held against any force. On the right, hills, rugged and
pine-clad, extended eight miles to the point at which Cane River
reenters the Red. The distance from Monette's to Alexandria is
thirty-five miles, of which fourteen is through wooded hills. Roads led
west to Carroll Jones's and Beaseley's, twelve and thirty miles
respectively; and on these roads Bee was directed to keep his trains.
Concerning the position at Monette's General Banks reports: "The army
marched from Grand Ecore on the morning of the 22d of April. To prevent
the occupation of Monette's Bluff, on Cane River, a strong position
commanding the only road leading across the river to Alexandria, or to
prevent the concentration of the enemy's forces at that point, it became
necessary to accomplish the evacuation without his knowledge." As before
stated, the threatened advance of the 21st convinced me that the enemy's
retreat was imminent, and so I advised Bee; but there was not time to
send General Wharton to him after I reached Polignac's camp. Bee had two
thousand horse and four batteries, and, after several days to examine
and prepare his ground, might well be expected to hold it with tenacity.
Immediately after the battle of Pleasant Hill I had sent Vincent, with
his own and Bush's regiments of Louisiana horse, to threaten Alexandria
and drive out small parties of the enemy from the Attakapas and Teche
regions. Subsequently, a brigade of Texas horse, seven hundred strong,
under Brigadier William Steele, joined me, and was now with Polignac.
As anticipated, the enemy left Grand Ecore during the night of the 21st
and marched without halting to Cloutierville, thirty-two miles. With
Steele's brigade, Wharton drove his rear guard from Natchitoches on the
morning of the 22d, capturing some prisoners, and continued the pursuit
to the twenty-four-mile ferry. On the 23d, after a sharp action, he
pushed the enemy's rear below Cloutierville, taking some score of
prisoners. Polignac's infantry joined that evening, and covered a road
leading through the hills from Cloutierville to Beaseley's. If Bee stood
firm at Monette's, we were in position to make Banks unhappy on the
morrow, separated as he was from the fleet, on which he relied to aid
his demoralized forces. But Bee gave way on the afternoon of the 23d,
permitting his strong position to be forced at the small cost to the
enemy of less than four hundred men, and suffering no loss himself.
Then, instead of attacking the great trains, during their fourteen
miles' march through the forest, and occupying with artillery McNutt's
Hill, a high bluff twenty miles from Alexandria and commanding the road
thither in the valley, he fell back at once to Beaseley's, thirty miles.
Before this mistake could be rectified, the enemy crossed at Monette's,
burning many wagons at the ford, and passed below McNutt's Hill. General
Bee had exhibited much personal gallantry in the charge at Pleasant
Hill, but he was without experience in war, and had neglected to study
the ground or strengthen his position at Monette's. Leaving Mansfield
for Shreveport on the 15th, under orders from General Kirby Smith, I
only got back to the front on the night of the 21st, too late to reach
Monette's or send Wharton there.
It was very disheartening, but, persuaded that the enemy could not pass
the falls at Alexandria with his fleet, I determined to stick to him
with my little force of less than forty-five hundred of all arms. It was
impossible to believe that General Kirby Smith would continue to persist
in his inexplicable policy, and fail to come, ere long, to my
assistance.
On the 26th Bee's horse, from Beaseley's, joined Steele's at McNutt's
Hill; and together, under Wharton, they attacked the enemy in the valley
and drove him, with loss of killed and prisoners, to the immediate
vicinity of Alexandria.
When General Banks retreated so hastily from Grand Ecore, Admiral Porter
was laboring to get his fleet down to Alexandria. In a communication to
the Secretary of the Navy from his flag-ship below Grand Ecore, he says
("Report on the Conduct of the War," vol. ii., pages 234-5):
"I soon saw that the army would go to Alexandria again, and we would be
left above the bars in a helpless condition. The vessels are mostly at
Alexandria, above the falls, excepting this one and two others I kept to
protect the Eastport. The Red River is falling at the rate of two inches
a day. If General Banks should determine to evacuate this country, the
gunboats will be cut off from all communication with the Mississippi. It
cannot be possible that the country would be willing to have eight
iron-clads, three or four other gunboats, and many transports sacrificed
without an effort to save them. It would be the worst thing that has
happened this war."
The Eastport, the most formidable iron-clad of the Mississippi squadron,
grounded on a bar below Grand Ecore. Three tin-clad gunboats and two
transports remained near to assist in getting her off; and, to prevent
this, some mounted riflemen were sent, on the morning of the 26th, to
cooeperate with Liddell's raw levies on the north bank of the river.
These forced the enemy to destroy the Eastport, and drove away the
gunboats and transports. Our loss in the affair was two killed and four
wounded. Meantime, to intercept the gunboats and transports on their way
down, Colonel Caudle of Polignac's division, with two hundred riflemen
and Cornay's four-gun battery, had been posted at the junction of Cane
and Red Rivers, twenty miles below. At 6 o'clock P.M. of the 26th the
leading gunboat and one transport came down. Our fire speedily crippled
and silenced the gunboat, and a shot exploded the boiler of the
transport. Under cover of escaping steam the gunboat drifted out of
fire, but the loss of life on the transport was fearful. One hundred
dead and eighty-seven severely scalded, most of whom subsequently died,
were brought on shore. These unfortunate creatures were negroes, taken
from plantations on the river above. The object of the Federals was to
remove negroes from their owners; but for the lives of these poor people
they cared nothing, or, assuredly, they would not have forced them, on
an unprotected river steamer, to pass riflemen and artillery, against
which gunboats were powerless. On the following day, the 27th, the two
remaining gunboats and transport attempted to pass Caudle's position;
and the former, much cut up, succeeded, but the transport was captured.
Colonel Caudle had one man wounded, and the battery one killed--its
commander, Captain Cornay, who, with Mouton, Armand, and many other
creoles, proved by distinguished gallantry that the fighting qualities
of the old French breed had suffered no deterioration on the soil of
Louisiana.
The following extracts from the report of Admiral Porter well exhibit
the efficiency of Caudle and Cornay in this affair:
"FLAG-SHIP CRICKET, OFF ALEXANDRIA, _April 28, 1864_.
"When rounding the point, the vessels in close order and ready for
action, we descried a party of the enemy with artillery on the right
bank, and we immediately opened fire with our bow guns. The enemy
immediately returned it with a _large number of cannon, eighteen in
all_, every shot of which struck this vessel. The captain gave orders to
stop the engines. I corrected this mistake, and got headway on the
vessel again, but not soon enough to avoid the pelting showers of shot
and shell which the enemy poured into us, every shot going through and
through us, clearing all our decks in a moment. I took charge of the
vessel, and, _as the battery was a very heavy one_, I determined to pass
it, which was done under the heaviest fire I ever witnessed. Seeing that
the Hindman did not pass the batteries, the Juliet disabled, and that
one of the pump boats (transport) had her boiler exploded by a shot, I
ran down to a point three or four miles below. Lieutenant-Commander
Phelps had two vessels in charge, the Juliet and Champion (transport),
which he wished to get through safely. He kept them out of range until
he could partially repair the Juliet, and then, starting under a heavy
fire, he make a push by. Unfortunately the pump boat (Champion) was
disabled and set fire to. The Hindman had her wheel ropes cut away, and
drifted past, turning round and round, and getting well cut up in going
by. The Juliet was cut to pieces in hull and machinery; had fifteen
killed and wounded. I inclose the report of Lieutenant-Commander Phelps,
from the time of his first misfortune until his arrival at this place
(Alexandria), where I now am with all the fleet, but very much surprised
that I have any left, considering all the difficulties encountered. I
came up here with the river on the rise, and water enough for our
largest vessels; and even on my way up to Shreveport from Grand Ecore
the water rose, while it commenced falling where I left the largest
gunboats. Falling or not, I could not go back while in charge of the
transports and material on which _an army of thirty thousand men
depended_."
This is high testimony to the fighting capacity of two hundred riflemen
and four guns, two twelve-pounder smooth-bores and two howitzers, all
that Admiral Porter's three gunboats had to contend with. It proves the
utter helplessness of gunboats in narrow streams, when deprived of the
protection of troops on the banks. Even the iron-clads, with armor
impenetrable by field guns, were readily driven off by sharp-shooters,
who, under cover, closed their ports or killed every exposed man.
On the 24th Liddell, from the north bank of Red River, dashed into
Pineville, opposite Alexandria, killed and captured a score of the
enemy's party, and drove the remainder over the river.
On the 27th Admiral Porter's fleet was lying above the falls, now
impassable, and Banks's army, over twenty thousand strong, was in and
around Alexandria behind earthworks. Such was the condition to which
this large force had been reduced by repeated defeat, that we not only
confined it to its works, driving back many attacks on our advanced
positions, but I felt justified in dividing my little command in order
to blockade the river below, and cut off communication with the
Mississippi. Wharton's horse was divided into three parts, each a
thousand strong, and accompanied by artillery. The first, under Steele,
held the river and Rapides roads, above and west of Alexandria; the
second, under Bagby, the Boeuf road to the south of that place; while
Major, with the third, was sent to Davide's Ferry, on the river,
twenty-five miles below. Polignac's infantry, twelve hundred muskets,
was posted on the Boeuf within supporting distance of the two last.
Liddell's seven hundred newly-organized horse, with four guns, was of
little service beyond making feints to distract the enemy.
Major reached his position on the 30th, and on the following day, the
1st of May, captured and sunk the transport Emma. On the 3d he captured
the transport City Belle, on her way up to Alexandria, with the 120th
Ohio regiment on board. All the officers and two hundred and seventy-six
men were taken, with many killed and wounded. On the evening of the 4th
the gunboats Covington and Signal, each mounting eight heavy guns, with
the transport Warner, attempted to pass. The Covington was blown up by
her crew to escape capture, but the Signal and Warner surrendered. Four
guns, two three-inch rifled and two howitzers, were engaged in this
action with the Covington and Signal. They were run up to the river's
bank by hand, the howitzers above, the three-inch rifles below the
gunboats, which, overpowered by the rapid fire, moved back and forth
until one surrendered and the other was destroyed, affording a complete
illustration of the superiority of field guns to gunboats in narrow
streams. There was no further attempt to pass Major's position, and
Federal communication with the Mississippi was closed for fifteen days.
During these operations the enemy was engaged night and day in the
construction of a dam across the Red River, to enable him to pass his
fleet over the falls; and the following extracts from the report of
Admiral Porter to the Secretary of the Navy well exhibit the condition
of affairs in and around Alexandria ("Report on the Conduct of the War,"
vol. ii., page 250):
"FLAG-SHIP CRICKET, ALEXANDRIA, _April 28, 1864_.
"SIR: I have written you an account of the operations of the fleet in
these waters, but take the liberty of writing to you confidentially the
true state of affairs. I find myself blockaded by a fall of three feet
of water, three feet four inches being the amount now on the falls.
Seven feet being required to get over, no amount of lightening will
accomplish the object. I have already written to you how the whole state
of things has been changed by a too blind carelessness on the part of
our military leader, and our retreat back to Alexandria from place to
place has so demoralized General Banks's army that the troops have no
confidence in anybody or anything. Our army is now all here, with the
best general (Franklin) wounded and unfit for duty in the field. General
Banks seems to hold no communication with any one, and it is impossible
for me to say what he will do. I have no confidence in his promises, as
he asserted in a letter, herein inclosed, that he had no intention of
leaving Grand Ecore, when he had actually already made all his
preparations to leave. The river is crowded with transports, and every
gunboat I have is required to convoy them. I have to withdraw many
light-draughts from other points on the Mississippi to supply demands
here. In the mean time the enemy are splitting up into parties of two
thousand, and bringing in the artillery (with which we have supplied
them) to blockade points below here; and what will be the upshot of it
all I can not foretell. I know that it will be disastrous in the
extreme, for this is a country in which a retreating army is completely
at the mercy of an enemy. Notwithstanding that the rebels are reported
as coming in from Washita, with heavy artillery to plant on the hills
opposite Alexandria, no movement is being made to occupy the position,
and I am in momentary expectation of hearing the rebel guns open on the
transports on the town side; or if they go down or come up the river, it
will be at the risk of destruction. Our light-clads can do nothing
against hill batteries. I am in momentary expectation of seeing this
army retreat, when the result will be disastrous. Unless instructed by
the Government, I do not think that General Banks will make the least
effort to save the navy here. The following vessels are above the falls
and command the right of the town: Mound City, Louisville, Pittsburgh,
Carondelet, Chillicothe, Osage, Neosho, Ozark, Lexington, and Fort
Hindman. At this moment the enemy have attacked our outposts, and driven
in our indifferent cavalry, which came up numbering six thousand, and
have brought nothing but calamity in their train. Our whole army is
cooped up in this town, while a much inferior force is going rampant
about the country, making preparations to assail our helpless
transports, which, if caught filled with men, would be perfect
slaughter-houses. Quick remedies are required, and I deem it my duty to
lay the true state of affairs before you. If left here by the army, I
will be obliged to destroy this fleet to prevent it falling into the
enemy's hands. I can not conceive that the nation will permit such a
sacrifice to be made, when men and money can prevent it. We have fought
hard for the opening of the Mississippi, and have reduced the naval
forces of the rebels in this quarter to two vessels. If we have to
destroy what we have here, there will be material enough to build half a
dozen iron-clads, and the Red River, which is now of no further dread to
us, will require half the Mississippi squadron to watch it. I am
apprehensive that the turrets of the monitors will defy any efforts we
can make to destroy them. Our prestige will receive a shock from which
it will be long in recovering; and if the calamities I dread should
overtake us, the annals of this war will not present so dire a one as
will have befallen us."
Thus Admiral Porter, who even understates the facts.
In vain had all this been pointed out to General Kirby Smith, when he
came to me at Pleasant Hill in the night after the battle. Granted that
he was alarmed for Shreveport, sacred to him and his huge staff as
Benares, dwelling-place of many gods, to the Hindoo; yet, when he
marched from that place on the 16th of April against Steele, the latter,
already discomfited by Price's horse, was retreating, and, with less
than a third of Banks's force at Grand Ecore, was then further from
Shreveport than was Banks. To pursue a retreating foe, numbering six
thousand men, he took over seven thousand infantry, and left me twelve
hundred to operate against twenty odd thousand and a powerful fleet.
From the evening of the 21st of April, when I returned to the front near
Grand Ecore, to the 13th of May, the day on which Porter and Banks
escaped from Alexandria, I kept him advised of the enemy's movements and
condition. Couriers and staff officers were sent to implore him to
return and reap the fruits of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, whose price
had been paid in blood. Not a man was sent me; even the four-gun battery
with Liddell on the north of the river was, without my knowledge,
withdrawn toward Arkansas. From first to last, General Kirby Smith
seemed determined to throw a protecting shield around the Federal army
and fleet.
In all the ages since the establishment of the Assyrian monarchy no
commander has possessed equal power to destroy a cause. Far away from
the great centers of conflict in Virginia and Georgia, on a remote
theatre, the opportunity of striking a blow decisive of the war was
afforded. An army that included the strength of every garrison from
Memphis to the Gulf had been routed, and, by the incompetency of its
commander, was utterly demoralized and ripe for destruction. But this
army was permitted to escape, and its 19th corps reached Chesapeake Bay
in time to save Washington from General Early's attack, while the 13th,
16th, and 17th corps reenforced Sherman in Georgia. More than all, we
lost Porter's fleet, which the falling river had delivered into our
hands; for the protection of an army was necessary to its liberation, as
without the army a dam at the falls could not have been constructed.
With this fleet, or even a portion of it, we would have at once
recovered possession of the Mississippi, from the Ohio to the sea, and
undone all the work of the Federals since the winter of 1861. Instead of
Sherman, Johnston would have been reenforced from west of the
Mississippi, and thousands of absent men, with fresh hope, would have
rejoined Lee. The Southern people might have been spared the humiliation
of defeat, and the countless woes and wrongs inflicted on them by their
conquerors.
It was for this that Green and Mouton and other gallant spirits fell! It
was for this that the men of Missouri and Arkansas made a forced march
to die at Pleasant Hill! It was for this that the divisions of Walker
and Polignac had held every position intrusted to them, carried every
position in their front, and displayed a constancy and valor worthy of
the Guards at Inkermann or Lee's veterans in the Wilderness! For this,
too, did the handful left, after our brethren had been taken from us,
follow hard on the enemy, attack him constantly at any odds, beat off
and sink his gunboats, close the Red River below him and shut up his
army in Alexandria for fifteen days! Like "Sister Ann" from her watch
tower, day after day we strained our eyes to see the dust of our
approaching comrades arise from the north bank of the Red. Not a camp
follower among us but knew that the arrival of our men from the North
would give us the great prize in sight. Vain, indeed, were our hopes.
The commander of the "Trans-Mississippi Department" had the power to
destroy the last hope of the Confederate cause, and exercised it with
all the success of Bazaine at Metz.
"The affairs of mice and men aft gang aglee," from sheer stupidity and
pig-headed obstinacy. General Kirby Smith had publicly announced that
Banks's army was too strong to be fought, and that the proper policy was
either to defend the works protecting Shreveport, or retreat into Texas.
People do not like to lose their reputations as prophets or sons of
prophets. Subsequently, it was given out that General Kirby Smith had a
wonderful plan for the destruction of the enemy, which I had disturbed
by rashly beating his army at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill; but this
plan, like Trochu's for the defense of Paris, was never
disclosed--undoubtedly, because _c'etait le secret de Polichinelle_.
After many days of energetic labor, the enemy on the 13th of May
succeeded in passing his fleet over the falls at Alexandria, evacuated
the place, and retreated down the river, the army, on the south bank,
keeping pace with the fleet. Admiral Porter, in his report to the
Secretary of the Navy, gives a graphic account of the passage of the
falls, and under date of May 19th, says: "In my report in relation to
the release of the gunboats from their unpleasant position above the
falls, I did not think it prudent to mention that I was obliged to
destroy eleven thirty-two-pounders, not having time to haul them from
above the falls to Alexandria, the army having moved and drawn in all
their pickets. For the same reason I also omitted to mention that I was
obliged to take off the iron from the sides of the Pook gunboats and
from the Ozark, to enable them to get over."
To harass the retreat, the horse and artillery, on the river above
Alexandria, were directed to press the enemy's rear, and the remaining
horse and Polignac's infantry to intercept his route at Avoyelles
Prairie. During the 14th, 15th, and 16th he was constantly attacked in
front, rear, and right flank; and on the 17th Wharton charged his rear
near Mansura, capturing many prisoners, while Colonel Yager, with two
regiments of horse, cut in on the wagon train at Yellow Bayou, killed
and drove off the guard, and destroyed much property. Meanwhile Liddell,
on the north bank of the Red, followed the fleet and kept up a constant
fire on the transports. But for the unfortunate withdrawal of his
battery, before alluded to, he could have destroyed many of these
vessels. On the 18th we attacked the enemy at Yellow Bayou, near
Simmsport, and a severe engagement ensued, lasting until night. We held
the field, on which the enemy left his dead, but our loss was heavy,
four hundred and fifty-two in killed and wounded; among the former,
Colonel Stone, commanding Polignac's old brigade. Polignac, in charge of
division, was conspicuous in this action. The following day, May 19,
1864, the enemy crossed the Atchafalaya and was beyond our reach. Here,
at the place where it had opened more than two months before, the
campaign closed.
The army I had the honor to command in this campaign numbered, at its
greatest strength, about thirteen thousand of all arms, including
Liddell's force on the north bank of Red River; but immediately after
the battle of Pleasant Hill it was reduced to fifty-two hundred by the
withdrawal of Walker's and Churchill's divisions. Many of the troops
marched quite four hundred miles, and from the 5th of April to the 18th
of May not a day passed without some engagement with the enemy, either
on land or river. Our total loss in killed, wounded, and missing was
three thousand nine hundred and seventy-six; that of the enemy, nearly
three times this number.
From the action at Yellow Bayou on the 18th of May, 1864, to the close
of the war in the following year, not a shot was fired in the
"Trans-Mississippi Department." Johnston was forced back to Atlanta and
relieved from command, and Atlanta fell. Not even an effective
demonstration was made toward Arkansas and Missouri to prevent troops
from being sent to reenforce Thomas at Nashville, and Hood was
overthrown. Sherman marched unopposed through Georgia and South
Carolina, while Lee's gallant army wasted away from cold and hunger in
the trenches at Petersburg. Like Augustus in the agony of his spirit,
the sorely pressed Confederates on the east of the Mississippi asked,
and asked in vain: "Varus! Varus! Where are our legions?"
The enemy's advance, fleet and army, reached Alexandria on the 16th of
March, but he delayed sixteen days there and at Grand Ecore. My first
reenforcements, two small regiments of horse, joined at Natchitoches on
the 31st; but the larger part of Green's force came in at Mansfield on
the 6th of April, Churchill's infantry reaching Keachi the same day. Had
Banks pushed to Mansfield on the 5th instead of the 8th of April, he
would have met but little opposition; and, once at Mansfield, he had the
choice of three roads to Shreveport, where Steele could have joined him.
Judging from the testimony given to the Congressional Committee on the
Conduct of the War, cotton and elections seem to have been the chief
causes of delay. In the second volume of "Report" may be found much
crimination and recrimination between the Navy and Army concerning the
seizure of cotton. Without attempting to decide the question, I may
observe that Admiral Porter informs the Secretary of the Navy of "the
capture from the rebels of three thousand bales of cotton on the Washita
river, and two thousand on the Red, all of which I have sent to Cairo";
while General Banks testifies that he "took from western Louisiana ten
thousand bales of cotton and twenty thousand beef cattle, horses, and
mules." From this, the Army appears to have surpassed the navy to the
extent of five thousand bales of cotton and the above-mentioned number
of beef cattle, etc. Whether Admiral Porter or General Banks was the
more virtuous, the unhappy people of Louisiana were deprived of "cakes
and ale."
In his enthusiasm for art the classic cobbler forgot his last; but "all
quality, pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war" could not make
General Banks forget his politics, and he held elections at Alexandria
and Grand Ecore. The General describes with some unction the devotion of
the people to the "Union," which was and was to be, to them, "the fount
of every blessing."
Says General Banks in his report: "It became necessary to accomplish the
evacuation [of Grand Ecore] without the enemy's knowledge. The
conflagration of a portion of the town at the hour appointed for the
movement partially frustrated the object." And further on: "Rumors were
circulated freely throughout the camp at Alexandria, that upon the
evacuation of the town it would be burned, and a considerable portion of
the town was destroyed." Evidently, these burnings were against the
orders of General Banks, who appears to have lost authority over some of
his troops. Moreover, in their rapid flight from Grand Ecore to
Monette's Ferry, a distance of forty miles, the Federals burned nearly
every house on the road. In pursuit, we passed the smoking ruins of
homesteads, by which stood weeping women and children. Time for the
removal of the most necessary articles of furniture had been refused. It
was difficult to restrain one's inclination to punish the ruffians
engaged in this work, a number of whom were captured; but they asserted,
and doubtless with truth, that they were acting under orders.
From the universal testimony of citizens, I learned that General Banks
and the officers and men of the 19th corps, Eastern troops, exerted
themselves to prevent these outrages, and that the perpetrators were the
men of General A.J. Smith's command from Sherman's army. Educated at
West Point, this General Smith had long served in the regular army of
the United States, and his men were from the West, whose brave sons
might well afford kindness to women and babes. A key to their conduct
can be found in the "Memoirs" of General W.T. Sherman, the commander who
formed them, and whose views are best expressed in his own words.
The city of Atlanta, from which the Confederates had withdrawn, was
occupied by Slocum's corps of Sherman's army on the 2d of September,
1864. In vol. ii. of his "Memoirs," page 111, General Sherman says: "I
was resolved to make Atlanta a pure military garrison or depot, with no
civil population to influence military measures. I gave notice of this
purpose as early as the 4th of September, to General Halleck, in a
letter concluding with these words: 'If the people raise a howl against
my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not
popularity-seeking. If they want peace, they and their relations must
stop the war.'" On pages 124-6 appears the correspondence of General
Sherman with the mayor and councilmen of Atlanta concerning the removal
of citizens, in which the latter write: "We petition you to reconsider
the order requiring them to leave Atlanta. It will involve in the
aggregate consequences appalling and heartrending. Many poor women are
in an advanced state of pregnancy, others now having young children, and
whose husbands for the greater part are either in the army, prisoners,
or dead. Some say, 'I have such a one sick at my house; who will wait on
them when I am gone?' Others say, 'What are we to do? we have no house
to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents,
relatives, or friends to go to.' This being so, how is it possible for
the people still here, mostly women and children, to find shelter? And
how can they live through the winter in the woods?" To this General
Sherman replies: "I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a
petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta.
I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the
distress that will be occasioned, and yet shall not revoke my orders,
because _they were not intended to meet the humanities of the case_. You
might as well appeal against the thunderstorm as against these terrible
hardships of war. They are inevitable; and the only way the people of
Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop
the war, which can only be done by admitting that it began in error and
is perpetuated in pride." Again, on page 152 is Sherman's telegram to
General Grant: "Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to
occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people
will cripple their military resources. I can make this march, and make
Georgia howl." It could hardly be expected that troops trained by this
commander would respect _the humanities_.