MOVEMENT TO THE RED RIVER--CAMPAIGN AGAINST BANKS.
Recent events on the Mississippi made it necessary to concentrate my
small force in the immediate valley of Red River. Indeed, when we lost
Vicksburg and Port Hudson, we lost not only control of the river but of
the valley from the Washita and Atchafalaya on the west to Pearl River
on the east. An army of forty odd thousand men, with all its material,
was surrendered in the two places, and the fatal consequences were felt
to the end of the struggle. The policy of shutting up large bodies of
troops in fortifications, without a relieving army near at hand, can not
be too strongly reprobated. Vicksburg should have been garrisoned by not
more than twenty-five hundred men, and Port Hudson by a thousand. These
would have been ample to protect the batteries against a sudden _coup_,
and forty thousand men added to General Joseph Johnston's force would
have prevented the investment of the places, or at least made their loss
of small moment.
After wasting three months in ineffectual attempts to divert the channel
of the Mississippi, General Grant ran gunboats and transports by the
batteries, and crossed the river below. Instead of meeting this movement
with every available man, Pemberton detached General Bowen with a weak
division, who successfully resisted the Federal advance for many hours,
vainly calling the while for reenforcements. Pemberton then illustrated
the art of war by committing every possible blunder. He fought a series
of actions with fractions against the enemy's masses, and finished by
taking his defeated fragments into the Vicksburg trap. It may be stated,
however, that, had he acted wisely and kept out of Vicksburg, he would
have been quite as much hounded as he subsequently was.
Grant's error in undertaking an impossible work cost him three months'
time and the loss by disease of many thousands of his men. The event
showed that he could as readily have crossed the river below Vicksburg
at first as at last; but, once over, he is entitled to credit for
promptly availing himself of his adversary's mistakes and vigorously
following him. The same may be said of his first success at Fort
Donelson on the Cumberland. The terror inspired by gunboats in the first
year of the war has been alluded to; and at Fort Donelson General Grant
had another potent ally. The two senior Confederate generals,
politicians rather than warriors, retired from command on the approach
of the enemy. One can imagine the effect of such conduct, unique in war,
on the raw troops left behind. General Buckner, an educated soldier, was
too heavily handicapped by his worthy superiors to make a successful
defense, and General Grant secured an easy victory. "Among the blind,
the one-eyed are kings."
General Grant's first essay at Belmont failed, and at Shiloh he was
out-manoeuvred and out-fought by Sidney Johnston, and, indeed, he was
saved from destruction by Johnston's death. Before he moved against
Bragg at Missionary Ridge, the latter had detached Longstreet with a
third of his force, while he (Grant) reenforced Thomas with most of the
Vicksburg army and two strong corps under Hooker from the east. The
historian of the Federal Army of the Potomac states that, in reply to a
question of General Meade, Grant said: "I never manoeuvre"; and one
has but to study the Virginia campaign of 1864, and imagine an exchange
of resources by Grant and Lee, to find the true place of the former
among the world's commanders. He will fall into the class represented by
Marshal Villars and the Duke of Cumberland.
Genius is God-given, but men are responsible for their acts; and it
should be said of General Grant that, as far as I am aware, he made war
in the true spirit of a soldier, never by deed or word inflicting wrong
on non-combatants. It would be to the credit of the United States army
if similar statements could be made of Generals Sherman and Sheridan.
Released at length from the swamps of the Tensas, where it had suffered
from sickness, Walker's division of Texas infantry joined me in the
early autumn, and was posted to the north of Opelousas. Major-General
J.G. Walker served as a captain of mounted rifles in the war with
Mexico. Resigning from the United States army to join the Confederacy,
he commanded a division at the capture of Harper's Ferry in 1862, and in
the subsequent battle of Antietam; after which he was transferred to
Arkansas. Seconded by good brigade and regimental officers, he had
thoroughly disciplined his men, and made them in every sense soldiers;
and their efficiency in action was soon established.
On the 29th of September Green, with his horse and a part of Mouton's
brigade of Louisiana infantry, crossed the Atchafalaya at Morgan's
Ferry, and attacked and routed the enemy on the Fordoche, capturing four
hundred and fifty prisoners and two guns. Green lost a hundred in killed
and wounded; the enemy, who fought under cover, less than half that
number.
In October the Federals moved a large force of all arms up the Teche,
their advance reaching the Courtableau. I concentrated for a fight, but
they suddenly retired to the Bayou Bourbeau, three miles south of
Opelousas, where they left a considerable body under General Burbridge.
On the 3d of November Green, reenforced by three regiments of Walker's
division, was ordered to attack them, and they were beaten with the loss
of six hundred prisoners. This was the first opportunity I had had of
observing the admirable conduct of Walker's men in action. Green's
pursuit was stopped by the approach of heavy masses of the enemy from
the south, who seemed content with the rescue of Burbridge, as they
retired at once to the vicinity of New Iberia, fifty miles away. Green
followed with a part of his horse, and kept his pickets close up; but
one of his regiments permitted itself to be surprised at night, on the
open prairie near New Iberia, and lost a hundred men out of a hundred
and twenty-five. So much for want of discipline and over-confidence.
General Banks's report mentions this capture, but is silent about
Bourbeau.
The prisoners taken at the Bourbeau were marched to the Red River, where
supplies could be had. The second day after the action, _en route_ for
Alexandria in an ambulance, I turned out of the road on to the prairie
to pass the column, when I observed an officer, in the uniform of a
colonel, limping along with his leg bandaged. Surprised at this, I
stopped to inquire the reason, and was told that the colonel refused to
separate from his men. Descending from the ambulance, I approached him,
and, as gently as possible, remonstrated against the folly of walking on
a wounded leg. He replied that his wound was not very painful, and he
could keep up with the column. His regiment was from Wisconsin,
recruited among his neighbors and friends, and he was very unwilling to
leave it. I insisted on his riding with me, for a time at least, as we
would remain on the road his men were following. With much reluctance he
got into the ambulance, and we drove on. For some miles he was silent,
but, avoiding subjects connected with the war, I put him at ease, and
before Alexandria was reached we were conversing pleasantly. Impressed
by his bearing and demeanor, I asked him in what way I could serve him,
and learned that he desired to send a letter to his wife in Wisconsin,
who was in delicate health and expecting to be confined. She would hear
of the capture of his regiment, and be uncertain as to his fate. "You
shall go to the river to-night," I replied, "catch one of your steamers,
and take home the assurance of your safety. Remain on parole until you
can send me an officer of equal rank, and I will look to the comfort of
your men and have them exchanged at the earliest moment." His manly
heart was so affected by this as to incapacitate him from expressing his
thanks.
During the administration of Andrew Johnson a convention met in the city
of Philadelphia which, at the earnest instance of the President, I
attended. The gallant Wisconsin colonel was also there to lend his
assistance in healing the wounds of civil strife. My presence in the
city of _brotherly love_ furnished an occasion to a newspaper to
denounce me as "a rebel who, with hands dripping with loyal blood, had
the audacity to show myself in a loyal community." Whereupon my
Wisconsin friend, accompanied by a number of persons from his State,
called on me to express condemnation of the article in question, and was
ready, with the slightest encouragement, to make the newspaper office a
hot place. This was the difference between brave soldiers and
non-fighting politicians, who grew fat by inflaming the passions of
sectional hate.
The ensuing winter of 1863-4 was without notable events. Control of the
Mississippi enabled the enemy to throw his forces upon me from above and
below Red River, and by gunboats interfere with my movements along this
stream; and as soon as the Lafourche campaign ended, steps were taken to
provide against these contingencies. Twenty miles south of Alexandria a
road leaves the Boeuf, an effluent of Red River, and passes through
pine forest to Burr's Ferry on the Sabine. Twenty odd miles from the
Boeuf this road intersects another from Opelousas to Fort Jesup, an
abandoned military post, thence to Pleasant Hill, Mansfield, and
Shreveport. At varying distances of twelve to thirty miles the valley of
the Red River is an arc, of which this last-mentioned road is the chord,
and several routes from the valley cross to ferries on the Sabine above
Burr's. But the country between the Boeuf and Pleasant Hill, ninety
miles, was utterly barren, and depots of forage, etc., were necessary
before troops could march through it. With great expenditure of time and
labor depots were established, with small detachments to guard them; and
events proved that the time and labor were well bestowed.
Movements of the Federals along the west coast of Texas in November
induced General Kirby Smith to withdraw from me Green's command of Texas
horse, and send it to Galveston. This left me with but one mounted
regiment, Vincent's 2d Louisiana, and some independent companies, which
last were organized into two regiments--one, on the Washita, by Colonel
Harrison, the other, on the Teche, by Colonel Bush; but they were too
raw to be effective in the approaching campaign. Mouton's brigade of
Louisiana infantry could be recruited to some extent; but the Texas
infantry received no recruits, and was weakened by the ordinary
casualties of camp life, as well as by the action of the Shreveport
authorities. The commander of the "Trans-Mississippi Department"
displayed much ardor in the establishment of bureaux, and on a scale
proportioned rather to the extent of his territory than to the smallness
of his force. His staff surpassed in numbers that of Von Moltke during
the war with France; and, to supply the demands of bureaux and staff,
constant details from the infantry were called for, to the great
discontent of the officers in the field. Hydrocephalus at Shreveport
produced atrophy elsewhere. Extensive works for defense were constructed
there, and heavy guns mounted; and, as it was known that I objected to
fortifications beyond mere water batteries, for reasons already stated,
the chief engineer of the "department" was sent to Fort De Russy to
build an iron-casemated battery and other works. We shall see what
became of De Russy.
In the winter there joined me from Arkansas a brigade of Texas infantry,
numbering seven hundred muskets. The men had been recently dismounted,
and were much discontented thereat. Prince Charles Polignac, a French
gentleman of ancient lineage, and a brigadier in the Confederate army,
reported for duty about the same time, and was assigned to command this
brigade. The Texans swore that a Frenchman, whose very name they could
not pronounce, should never command them, and mutiny was threatened. I
went to their camp, assembled the officers, and pointed out the
consequences of disobedience, for which I should hold them accountable;
but promised that if they remained dissatisfied with their new commander
_after an action_, I would then remove him. Order was restored, but it
was up-hill work for General Polignac for some time, notwithstanding his
patience and good temper. The incongruity of the relation struck me, and
I thought of sending my monte-dealing Texas colonel to Paris, to command
a brigade of the Imperial Guard.
In the first weeks of 1864 the enemy sent a gunboat expedition up the
Washita, and Polignac's brigade, with a battery, was moved to Trinity
to meet it. The gunboats were driven off, and Polignac, by his coolness
under fire, gained the confidence of his men, as he soon gained their
affections by his care and attention. They got on famously, and he made
capital soldiers out of them. General Polignac returned to Europe in
1865, and as he had shown great gallantry and talent for war while
serving with me, I hoped that he might come to the front during the
struggle with Germany; but he belonged to that race of historic gentry
whose ancestors rallied to the white plume of Henry at Ivry, and
followed the charge of Conde at Rocroy. Had he been a shopkeeper or
scribbling attorney, he might have found favor with the dictator who
ruled France.
All the information received during the months of January and February,
1864, indicated a movement against me in the early spring; and in the
latter month it was ascertained that Porter's fleet and a part of
Sherman's army from Vicksburg would join Banks's forces in the movement,
while Steele would cooeperate from Little Rock, Arkansas. This
information was communicated to department headquarters, and I asked
that prompt measures should be taken to reenforce me; but it was "a far
cry" to Shreveport as to "Lochow," and the emergency seemed less
pressing in the rear than at the front.
The end of February found my forces distributed as follows: Harrison's
mounted regiment (just organized), with a four-gun battery, was in the
north, toward Monroe; Mouton's brigade near Alexandria; Polignac's at
Trinity on the Washita, fifty-five miles distant; Walker's division at
Marksville and toward Simmsport on the Atchafalaya, with two hundred men
under Colonel Byrd detached to assist the gunners at De Russy, which,
yet unfinished, contained eight heavy guns and two field pieces. Walker
had three companies of Vincent's horse on the east side of the
Atchafalaya, watching the Mississippi. The remainder of Vincent's
regiment was on the Teche.
Increased activity and concentration at Berwick's Bay, and a visit of
Sherman to New Orleans to confer with Banks, warned me of the impending
blow; and on the 7th of March Polignac was ordered to move at once to
Alexandria, and thence, with Mouton's brigade, to the Boeuf,
twenty-five miles south. Harrison was directed to get his regiment and
battery to the west bank of the Washita, gather to him several
independent local companies of horse, and report to General Liddell,
sent to command on the north bank of Red River, whence he was to harass
the enemy's advance up that stream. Vincent was ordered to leave flying
scouts on the Teche and move his regiment, with such men as Bush had
recruited, to Opelousas, whence he afterward joined me on the Burr's
Ferry road. At Alexandria steamers were loaded with stores and sent
above the falls, and everything made ready to evacuate the place. These
arrangements were not completed a moment too soon.
On March 12th Admiral Porter, with nineteen gunboats, followed by ten
thousand men of Sherman's army, entered the mouth of Red River. (These
numbers are from Federal official reports.) On the 13th, under cover of
a part of the fleet, the troops debarked at Simmsport, on the
Atchafalaya near the Red, other vessels ascending the latter stream, and
on the 14th, under command of General A.J. Smith, marched to De Russy,
thirty miles, which they reached about 5 P.M. As stated, the work was
incomplete, and had time been given me would have been abandoned.
Attacked in the rear, the garrison surrendered after losing ten killed
and wounded. Byrd's two hundred men were in rifle pits on the river
below, where gunboats, under Commander Phelps, were removing
obstructions in the channel. A number of Byrd's men and a few gunners
escaped to the swamps and rejoined their commands; but we lost a hundred
and eighty-five prisoners, eight heavy guns, and two field pieces. Thus
much for our Red River Gibraltar.
Cut off from direct communication by the sudden appearance of the enemy
on the 12th, the three mounted companies east of the Atchafalaya were
forced to cross at Morgan's Ferry, below Simmsport, and did not rejoin
Walker until the 15th. This officer was thereby left without means of
information; but, judging correctly of the numbers of the enemy by a
personal observation of his transports and fleet, he fell back from his
advanced position to the Boeuf, forty miles, where he was united with
Mouton and Polignac. His division at this time was reduced to some
thirty-three hundred muskets, too weak to make head against A.J. Smith's
column.
On the afternoon of the 15th of March the advanced boats of Porter's
fleet reached Alexandria, whence all stores had been removed; but, by
the mismanagement of a pilot, one steamer was grounded on the falls and
had to be burned.
In the "Report on the Conduct of the War," vol. ii., page 192, Colonel
J.S. Clarke, aide-de-camp to General Banks, states that Banks's army in
this campaign was twenty-eight thousand strong, eighteen thousand under
Franklin, ten thousand under A.J. Smith. General Steele, operating from
Arkansas, reports his force at seven thousand; and the number of
gunboats given is taken from the reports of Admiral Porter to the
Secretary of the Navy.
To meet Porter and A.J. Smith, Major-General Franklin had left the lower
Teche on the 13th for Alexandria, with eighteen thousand men. My entire
force on the south side of Red River consisted of fifty-three hundred
infantry, five hundred horse, and three hundred artillerymen; and
Liddell, on the north, had about the same number of horse and a four-gun
battery. From Texas, if at all, the delayed reenforcements must come,
and it was vital to cover the roads from the Sabine.
From the Boeuf, on the 16th, I marched on the Burr's Ferry road to
Carroll Jones's, which was reached on the evening of the 18th. Here,
where the Burr's Ferry and Natchitoches roads separated, was a depot of
forage, and I camped.
Polignac's and the Louisiana brigade, under Colonel Gray, were united in
a division for General Mouton. Vincent's horse, from Opelousas, joined
on the 19th, and on the following day was sent forward to the Bayou
Rapides, twelve miles, where it skirmished with the enemy's horse from
Alexandria, twenty miles below. At dawn of the 21st Edgar's battery,
four guns, was sent to strengthen Vincent, and posted in a strong
position near James's Store, where it overlooked and commanded the
valley.
Meanwhile, couriers were dispatched to the Sabine to inform approaching
reenforcements of my position, and direct them on to the Fort Jesup
road. The 21st proved to be a cold, rainy day, with gusts of wind.
Toward evening the sound of Edgar's guns was heard. Fearing a surprise
during the night, Captain Elgee of my staff was sent to withdraw the
battery and warn Vincent of the necessity of vigilance; but the enemy
had been too prompt. Vincent's pickets found their fires more agreeable
than outposts. At nightfall the battery and a number of the horse were
captured, as was Captain Elgee, who rode up just after the event. We
lost the four guns, with their caissons, and two hundred men. Vincent,
with the remainder of his command escaped. In truth, my horse was too
ill disciplined for close work. On the 22d we marched to Beaseley's,
twelve miles, and remained until the 29th, hoping that reenforcements
would reach us. Beaseley's was a depot of forage, and covered roads to
Fort Jesup and Natchitoches; and a cross road reached the Red River
valley at a point twenty-five miles below the latter place, by which
some supplies were obtained. As no reenforcements arrived, and the enemy
was moving up the river, the troops were ordered to Pleasant Hill via
Fort Jesup, forty miles, and I went to Natchitoches, thirty miles. Here,
on the night of the 30th, I met Colonel McNeill's regiment of Texas
horse, numbering two hundred and fifty men, of whom fifty were without
arms; and the following morning Colonel Herbert came in, with a hundred
and twenty-five of his three hundred and fifty men unarmed. These were a
part of Green's command, and the first reenforcements received.
The enemy's advance reached Natchitoches, by the river road, on the
31st, and McNeill and Herbert were directed to fall back slowly toward
Pleasant Hill, thirty-six miles. I remained in the town until the enemy
entered, then rode four miles to Grand Ecore, where, in the main channel
of Red River, a steamer was awaiting me. Embarking, I went up river to
Blair's Landing, forty miles by the windings of the stream, whence was a
road, sixteen miles, to Pleasant Hill. Four miles from Blair's was Bayou
Pierre, a large arm of the river, crossed by a ferry. At Pleasant Hill,
on the 1st of April, Walker and Mouton, with their infantry divisions,
artillery, and trains joined me, as did Green with his staff. From the
latter I learned that De Bray's regiment of cavalry, with two batteries
and trains, was in march from Fort Jesup. As the enemy was moving from
Natchitoches, and could strike the Jesup road across country, De Bray
was ordered to push forward his artillery and wagons, and look well to
his right. He reached Pleasant Hill after dark. The enemy attempted to
impede the march, but was driven off, with a loss of five wounded to De
Bray. During the day our horse, toward Natchitoches, had some
skirmishing.
It appeared that General Major, with the remainder of Green's horse,
could not get up before the 6th, and he was directed to cross the Sabine
at Logansport and march to Mansfield, twenty miles in my rear. This
insured his march against disturbance; and, to give him time, I halted
two days at Pleasant Hill, prepared for action. But the enemy showed no
disposition to advance seriously, and on the 4th and 5th the infantry
moved to Mansfield, where on the following day Major, with his horse and
Buchell's regiment of cavalry, joined. General Major was sent to
Pleasant Hill to take charge of the advance.
De Bray's and Buchell's regiments have been spoken of as _cavalry_ to
distinguish them from mounted infantry, herein called _horse_. They had
never before left their State (Texas), were drilled and disciplined, and
armed with sabers. Buchell's regiment was organized in the German
settlement of New Braunfels. The men had a distinct idea that they were
fighting for their adopted country, and their conduct in battle was in
marked contrast to that of the Germans whom I had encountered in the
Federal army in Virginia. Colonel Buchell had served in the Prussian
army, and was an instructed soldier. Three days after he joined me, he
was mortally wounded in action, and survived but a few hours. I sat
beside him as his brave spirit passed away. The old "Fatherland" sent no
bolder horseman to battle at Rossbach or Gravelotte.
During this long retreat of two hundred miles from the banks of the
Atchafalaya to Mansfield, I had been in correspondence with General
Kirby Smith at Shreveport, and always expressed my intention to fight as
soon as reenforcements reached me. General Kirby Smith thought that I
would be too weak to meet the enemy, even with all possible
reenforcements, and suggested two courses: one, to hold the works at
Shreveport until he could concentrate a force to relieve me; the other,
to retire into Texas and induce the enemy to follow us.
My objection to the first suggestion was, that it would result in the
surrender of the troops and Shreveport, as it would be impossible to
raise a new force for their relief; and to the second, that its
consequences would be quite as disastrous as a defeat, as it would be an
abandonment of Louisiana and southern Arkansas. The men from these
States might be expected to leave us, and small blame to them; while
from the interior of Texas we could give no more aid to our brethren on
the east of the Mississippi than from the Sandwich Islands. General
Kirby Smith did not insist on the adoption of either of his own
suggestions, nor express an approval of mine; but when Mansfield was
reached, a decision became necessary.
Three roads lead from this place to Shreveport, the Kingston, Middle,
and Keachi. The distance by the first, the one nearest to the valley of
Red River, is thirty-eight miles; by the second, forty; and by the
third, forty-five. From Keachi, five and twenty miles from Mansfield and
twenty from Shreveport, roads cross the Sabine into Texas. Past
Mansfield, then, the enemy would have three roads, one of which would be
near his fleet on the river, and could avail himself of his great
superiority in numbers. This was pointed out to the "Aulic Council" at
Shreveport, but failed to elicit any definite response.
On the 21st of March there had reached Shreveport, from Price's command
in Arkansas, two brigades of Missouri infantry and two of Arkansas,
numbering together forty-four hundred muskets. These troops I had
repeatedly asked for, but they were retained at Shreveport until the
afternoon of the 4th of April, when they marched to Keachi, and reported
to me from that place on the morning of the 6th. Supplies were far from
abundant in the vicinity of Mansfield; and as I might at any moment
receive an order to retire to Keachi, they were directed to remain there
for the present. Green, now promoted to major-general, was placed in
command of all the horse, with Brigadiers Bee, Major, and Bagby under
him.
On the morning of the 7th of April, Major, from Pleasant Hill, reported
the enemy advancing in force; whereupon Green went to the front. Later
in the day the southerly wind brought such distinct sounds of firing to
Mansfield as to induce me to join Green. Riding hard, I suddenly met
some fifty men from the front, and reined up to speak to them; but,
before I could open my mouth, received the following rebuke from one of
the party for a bad habit: "General! if you won't curse us, we will go
back with you." I bowed to the implied homily, rode on, followed by the
men, and found Green fighting a superior force of horse. Putting in my
little reenforcement, I joined him, and enjoyed his method of managing
his wild horsemen; and he certainly accomplished more with them than any
one else could have done. After some severe work, the enemy's progress
was arrested, and it became evident that Green could camp that night at
a mill stream seven miles from Pleasant Hill, a matter of importance.
The roads in this region follow the high ridge dividing the drainage of
Red River from that of the Sabine, and water is very scarce. Between
Pleasant Hill and Mansfield but two streams are found, the one above
mentioned, and a smaller, seven miles nearer to the latter place. For
twenty miles from Pleasant Hill toward Natchitoches there was little or
no water; and at Pleasant Hill itself we had exhausted the wells and
reduced the store in cisterns during our stay. This, as it affected
movements and positions of troops, should be borne in mind.
Leaving Green, I returned to Mansfield, stopping on the road to select
my ground for the morrow. This was in the edge of a wood, fronting an
open field eight hundred yards in width by twelve hundred in length,
through the center of which the road to Pleasant Hill passed. On the
opposite side of the field was a fence separating it from the pine
forest, which, open on the higher ground and filled with underwood on
the lower, spread over the country. The position was three miles in
front of Mansfield, and covered a cross-road leading to the Sabine. On
either side of the main Mansfield-Pleasant Hill road, at two miles'
distance, was a road parallel to it and connected by this Sabine
cross-road.
General Churchill, commanding the Missouri-Arkansas troops at Keachi,
was ordered to march for Mansfield at dawn of the 8th, and advised that
a battle was impending. My medical director was instructed to prepare
houses in the village for hospitals, and quartermasters were told to
collect supplies and park surplus wagons. An officer with a small guard
was selected to preserve order in the town, and especially among the
wagoners, always disposed to "stampede." Walker and Mouton were ordered
to move their divisions in the morning, ready for action, to the
position selected; and a staff officer was sent to Green, with
instructions to leave a small force in front of the enemy, and before
dawn withdraw to the appointed ground. These arrangements made, a
dispatch was sent to General Kirby Smith at Shreveport, informing him
that I had returned from the front, found the enemy advancing in force,
and would give battle on the following day, April 8, 1864, unless
positive orders to the contrary were sent to me. This was about 9 P.M.
of the 7th.
My confidence of success in the impending engagement was inspired by
accurate knowledge of the Federal movements, as well as the character of
their commander, General Banks, whose measure had been taken in the
Virginia campaigns of 1862 and since.
On the morning of the 7th of April Admiral Porter left Grand Ecore with
six gunboats and twenty transports, on which last were embarked some
twenty-five hundred troops. The progress of these vessels up the river
was closely watched by an officer of my staff, who was also in
communication with General Liddell on the north side. Banks began his
movement from Grand Ecore to Pleasant Hill on the 6th, with an estimated
force of twenty-five thousand. Though lateral roads existed, his column
marched by the main one, and in the following order: Five thousand
mounted men led the advance, followed by a large wagon train and much
artillery. Infantry succeeded, then more wagons and artillery, then
infantry again. In the afternoon of the 7th I knew that the front and
rear of his column were separated by a distance of twenty miles.
My troops reached the position in front of Sabine cross-road at an early
hour on the 8th, and were disposed as follows: On the right of the road
to Pleasant Hill, Walker's infantry division of three brigades, with two
batteries; on the left, Mouton's, of two brigades and two batteries. As
Green's men came in from the front, they took position, dismounted, on
Mouton's left. A regiment of horse was posted on each of the parallel
roads mentioned, and De Bray's cavalry, with McMahon's battery, held in
reserve on the main road. Dense forest prevented the employment of much
artillery, and, with the exception of McMahon's, which rendered
excellent service, none was used in the action.
I had on the field fifty-three hundred infantry; three thousand horse,
and five hundred artillerymen--in all, eight thousand eight hundred men,
a very full estimate. But the vicious dispositions of the enemy made me
confident of beating all the force he could concentrate during the day;
and on the morrow Churchill, with forty-four hundred muskets, would be
up.
The forenoon of the 8th wore on as the troops got into position. Riding
along the line, I stopped in front of the Louisiana brigade of Mouton's
division, and made what proved to be an unfortunate remark to the men:
"As they were fighting in defense of their own soil I wished the
Louisiana troops to draw the first blood." But they were already
inflamed by many outrages on their homes, as well as by camp rumors that
it was intended to abandon their State without a fight. At this moment
our advanced horse came rushing in, hard followed by the enemy. A shower
of bullets reached Mouton's line, one of which struck my horse, and a
body of mounted men charged up to the front of the 18th Louisiana. A
volley from this regiment sent them back with heavy loss. Infantry was
reported in the wood opposite my left. This was a new disposition of
the enemy, for on the 6th and 7th his advance consisted of horse alone;
and to meet it, Mouton was strengthened by moving Randall's brigade of
Walker's from the right to the left of the road. To cover this change,
skirmishers were thrown forward and De Bray's regiment deployed in the
field.
The enemy showing no disposition to advance, at 4 P.M. I ordered a
forward movement of my whole line. The ardor of Mouton's troops,
especially the Louisianians, could not be restrained by their officers.
Crossing the field under a heavy fire of artillery and small arms, the
division reached the fence, paused for a moment to draw breath, then
rushed into the wood on the enemy. Here our loss was severe. General
Mouton was killed, as were Colonels Armand, Beard, and Walker,
commanding the 18th, Crescent, and 28th Louisiana regiments of Gray's
brigade. Major Canfield of the Crescent also fell, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Clack of the same regiment was mortally wounded. As these officers went
down, others, among whom Adjutant Blackman was conspicuous, seized the
colors and led on the men. Polignac's brigade, on the left of Gray's,
also suffered heavily. Colonel Noble, 17th Texas, with many others, was
killed. Polignac, left in command by the death of Mouton, displayed
ability and pressed the shattered division steadily forward. Randall,
with his fine brigade, supported him on the right; while Major's
dismounted men, retarded by dense wood, much to the impatience of
General Green, gradually turned the enemy's right, which was forced
back with loss of prisoners and guns.
On the right of the main road General Walker, with Waul's and Scurry's
brigades, encountered but little resistance until he had crossed the
open field and entered the wood. Finding that he outflanked the enemy's
left, he kept his right brigade, Scurry's, advanced, and swept
everything before him.
The first Federal line, consisting of all the mounted force and one
division of the 13th army corps, was in full flight, leaving prisoners,
guns, and wagons in our hands. Two miles to the rear of the first
position, the 2d division of the 13th corps brought up, but was speedily
routed, losing guns and prisoners; and our advance continued. Near
sunset, four miles from our original position, the 19th army corps was
found, drawn up on a ridge overlooking a small stream. Fatigued, and
disordered by their long advance through dense wood, my men made no
impression for a time on this fresh body of troops; but possession of
the water was all-important, for there was none other between this and
Mansfield. Walker, Green, and Polignac led on their weary men, and I
rode down to the stream. There was some sharp work, but we persisted,
the enemy fell back, and the stream was held, just as twilight faded
into darkness.
Twenty-five hundred prisoners, twenty pieces of artillery, several
stands of colors, many thousands of small arms, and two hundred and
fifty wagons were the fruits of victory in the battle of Mansfield.
Eight thousand of the enemy, his horse and two divisions of infantry,
had been utterly routed, and over five thousand of the 19th corps driven
back at sunset. With a much smaller force on the field, we invariably
outnumbered the enemy at the fighting point; and foreseeing the
possibility of this, I was justified in my confidence of success. The
defeat of the Federal army was largely due to the ignorance and
arrogance of its commander, General Banks, who attributed my long
retreat to his own wonderful strategy.
Night put an end to the struggle along the little stream, and my troops
camped by the water.
A dispatch was sent to General Kirby Smith, at Shreveport, to inform him
of the result of the day's fighting, and of my intention to push the
enemy on the following morning. Leaving instructions for Green, with all
the mounted force, to pursue at dawn, I rode to Mansfield to look after
our wounded and meet Churchill. The precautions taken had preserved
order in the village throughout the day. Hospitals had been prepared,
the wounded brought in and cared for, prisoners and captured property
disposed of. Churchill came and reported his command in camp, four miles
from Mansfield, on the Keachi road; and he was directed to prepare two
days' rations, and march toward Pleasant Hill at 3 A.M.
Sitting by my camp fire to await the movement of Churchill's column, I
was saddened by recollection of the many dead, and the pleasure of
victory was turned to grief as I counted the fearful cost at which it
had been won. Of the Louisianians fallen, most were acquaintances, many
had been neighbors and friends; and they were gone. Above all, the death
of gallant Mouton affected me. He had joined me soon after I reached
western Louisiana, and had ever proved faithful to duty. Modest,
unselfish, and patriotic, he showed best in action, always leading his
men. I thought of his wife and children, and of his father, Governor
Mouton, whose noble character I have attempted to portray.
Churchill's march disturbed these solemn reveries, and I returned to the
front, where Walker and Green were awaiting the approaching day. The
horse, with a battery, moved early to Pleasant Hill, fourteen miles,
leaving Walker and Polignac to follow Churchill's column as soon as it
had passed. I rode with Green, and we found many stragglers, scattered
arms, and burning wagons, showing the haste of the enemy's retreat. The
mill stream, seven miles distant, was reached, then the vicinity of
Pleasant Hill, before a shot was fired. A short mile in front of the
latter place the enemy was found; and as our rapid advance had left the
infantry far to the rear, feints were made to the right and left to
develop his position and strength.
The village of Pleasant Hill occupies part of a plateau, a mile wide
from east to west, along the Mansfield and Fort Jesup road. The highest
ground, called College Hill, is on the west, and here enters a road from
the Sabine, which, sixteen miles to the east, strikes the Red River at
Blair's Landing; while, from the necessity of turning Spanish Lake, the
distance to Natchitoches and Grand Ecore is thirty-six miles. The
Federal fleet, with accompanying troops, was now many miles above
Blair's, which by river is forty-five miles above Grand Ecore. Driven
from Pleasant Hill to the latter place, the Federal forces would be
widely separated, and might be destroyed in detail. Though it appeared
to be the enemy's intention to continue his retreat, as he was known to
be moving back his trains, yet if undisturbed he might find courage to
attempt a junction with his fleet at Blair's Landing; and I did not wish
to lose the advantage of the _morale_ gained by success on the previous
day.
Our reconnoissance showed that the Federal lines extended across the
open plateau, from College Hill on their left to a wooded height on the
right of the road to Mansfield. Winding along in front of this position
was a gully cut by winter rains, but now dry, and bordered by a thick
growth of young pines, with fallen timber interspersed. This was held by
the enemy's advanced infantry, with his main line and guns on the
plateau. Separating the gully and thicket from the forest toward
Mansfield was an open field, several hundred yards wide near the road,
but diminishing in width toward the west. Here the Federal commander had
concentrated some eighteen thousand, including A.J. Smith's force, not
engaged on the previous day.
My plan of attack was speedily determined. Orders were sent to the
infantry to fill canteens at the mill stream, and to the trains to park
there. Shortly after midday the infantry appeared, Churchill in advance;
but a glance showed that his men were too much exhausted to attack. They
had marched forty-five miles, and were thoroughly jaded. Walker's and
Polignac's divisions had been heavily engaged on the previous day, and
all were suffering from heat and thirst. Accordingly, two hours were
given to the troops to lie down and rest.
At 3 P.M. Churchill, with two batteries and three regiments of horse,
was directed to move to the right and turn the enemy's left. His route
was through the forest for two miles to the road coming from the Sabine.
The enemy's left outflanked, he was to attack from the south and west,
keeping his regiments of horse well to his right, and Walker would
attack on his left. This was explained to Churchill, and Mr. T.J.
Williams, formerly sheriff of De Soto parish, and acquainted with every
road in the vicinity, was sent with him as a guide. On Walker's left,
near the road from Mansfield, Major Brent had twelve guns in the wood,
with four on the road, where were posted Buchell's and De Bray's
cavalry, under General Bee, and Polignac's division, the last in
reserve. In the wood on the left of the road from Mansfield, Major, with
two brigades of horse dismounted, was to drive back the enemy's
skirmishers, turn his right, and gain the road to Blair's Landing. As no
offensive movement by the enemy was anticipated, he would be turned on
both flanks, subjected to a concentric fire, and overwhelmed. Though I
had but twelve thousand five hundred men against eighteen thousand in
position, the _morale_ was greatly in our favor, and intelligent
execution of orders was alone necessary to insure success.
At 4.30 P.M. Churchill was reported to be near the position whence he
would attack; and, to call off attention, Major Brent advanced his
twelve guns into the field, within seven hundred yards of the enemy's
line, and opened fire. Soon thereafter the sound of Churchill's attack
was heard, which the cheers of his men proved to be successful. Walker
at once led forward his division by echelons of brigades from his right,
Brent advanced his guns, and Major turned the enemy's right and gained
possession of the road to Blair's. Complete victory seemed assured when
Churchill's troops suddenly gave way, and for a time arrested the
advance of Walker and Major.
The road from the Sabine reached, Churchill formed his line with the two
Missouri brigades, General Parsons on the right, and the two Arkansas,
General Tappan, on the left. Advancing three fourths of a mile through
the forest, he approached the enemy's line, and found that he had not
gained ground enough to outflank it. Throwing forward skirmishers, he
moved by the right flank until the Missouri brigades were on the right
of the Sabine road, the regiments of horse being farther to the right.
Churchill should have placed his whole command on the right of the
Sabine road, and he would have found no difficulty in successfully
executing his orders. In his official report he states "that had my
[his] line extended a half mile more to the right, a brilliant success
would have been achieved"; and he gives as the reason for not so
disposing his force that he judged, from information furnished by his
guides, the enemy's left to be already outflanked.
The attack ordered, the Missourians threw themselves on the enemy, drove
him from the gully and thicket, mounted the plateau, broke an opposing
line, captured and sent to the rear three hundred prisoners, got
possession of two batteries, the horses of which had been killed, and
reached the village. Here a Federal brigade, left by Churchill's error
on his right, attacked them in flank and rear, while their rapid charge
had put three hundred yards between them and the Arkansas brigades,
delayed by the gully. The enemy's reserve was thrust into this opening
and advanced in front. Finding themselves assaulted on all sides, the
Missourians retreated hastily, and in repassing the gully and thicket
fell into much confusion. Colonel Hardiman, commanding the horse,
checked the enemy, and Parsons rallied his men on the line first formed
by Churchill. The Arkansas brigades had forced the gully and mounted the
plateau as the Missourians retreated, whereupon they fell back, their
left brigade (Gause's) running into Walker's right (Scurry's) and
impeding its advance. Gause imagined that Scurry had fired on him; but
as his entire loss in the action amounted to but fifteen killed and
fifty-nine wounded, out of eleven hundred men, there appears little
ground for this belief. Churchill's two batteries followed the
Missourians, and with much difficulty reached the plateau, where they
opened an effective fire. When the infantry retreated three carriages
broke down in the attempt to get through the thicket and fallen timber,
and the guns were lost. Night ended the conflict on this part of the
field, and both sides occupied their original positions. We brought off
three hundred prisoners, but lost three guns and one hundred and
seventy-nine prisoners from Churchill's command. Out of two thousand
men, the Missourians lost three hundred and thirty-one in killed and
wounded, and the Arkansas brigades, of equal strength, one hundred and
forty-two.
Within a few minutes of the time when our whole line became engaged, an
officer came to inform me that General Walker was wounded. Directing
Polignac to move up his division and hold it in readiness, I left
General Green in charge of the center and hastened to Walker, whose
division was now fully engaged in the wood. I found him suffering from
a contusion in the groin, and ordered him to retire, which he
unwillingly did. Here it was that our right gave way in the manner
described. Scurry's brigade of Walker's, disordered by the sudden
retreat upon it of Gause, was heavily pressed by the enemy. Scurry and
his men struggled gallantly, but required immediate relief; and to give
it, Waul and Randall on their left were ordered to drive back the line
fronting them. Never was order more thoroughly executed. Leading on
their fine brigades with skill and energy, these officers forced back
the Federals and relieved Scurry.
Meanwhile, the fire of Brent's guns had overpowered a Federal battery
posted on the plateau in front of the road from Mansfield. The confusion
attending the withdrawal of this battery, coupled with the fierce attack
of Waul and Randall, led General Green to believe that the enemy was
retreating, and he ordered Bee to charge with his two regiments of
cavalry, Buchell's and De Bray's. Bee reached the plateau, where he was
stopped by a heavy fire from infantry, in the wood on both sides of the
road. Some men and horses went down, Buchell was mortally wounded, and
Bee and De Bray slightly. The charge was premature and cost valuable
lives, but was of use in moral effect. I returned to the road as Bee,
with coolness and pluck, withdrew. Brent advanced his guns close up to
the opposing line, Polignac attacked on Randall's left with his reduced
but stubborn division, and Green urged on his dismounted horsemen,
cleared the wood from the Mansfield to the Blair's Landing road, and at
nightfall held the position previously occupied by the Federal battery.
Severe fighting continued in the dense thicket, where Polignac, Randall,
Waul, and Scurry were steadily driving back the enemy. Approaching
twilight obscured the wood, but resistance in front was becoming feeble,
and, anxious to reach the village, I urged on our men. As Randall and
Waul gained ground to the front, they became separated by a ravine in
which was concealed a brigade of Federals. Isolated by the retreat of
their friends, these troops attempted to get out. Fired on from both
sides of the ravine, a part of them appeared on the field in front of
Brent's guns, to be driven back by grape. With heavy loss they at length
succeeded in escaping through the thicket. A letter from the commander
was subsequently captured, wherein he denounces the conduct of his
superiors who abandoned him to his fate. However true the allegation, it
is doubtful if his brigade could have rendered more service elsewhere.
The suddenness of its appearance stopped our forward movement, and a cry
arose that we were firing on our own people. The thickening gloom made
it impossible to disabuse the troops of this belief, and I ordered them
to withdraw to the open field. The movement was made slowly and in
perfect order, the men forming in the field as they emerged from the
thicket. The last light of day was fading as I rode along the line, and
the noise of battle had ceased.
Churchill came to report the result of his attack, and seemed much
depressed. I gave such consolation as I could, and directed him to move
his command to the mill stream, seven miles to the rear, where he would
find his trains and water. A worthy, gallant gentleman, General
Churchill, but not fortunate in war.
The mill stream was the nearest water to be had, and I was compelled to
send the troops back to it. The enemy made no attempt to recover the
ground from which his center and right had been driven. Bee picketed the
field with his cavalry, his forage wagons were ordered up from the mill
stream, and it was hoped that water for his two regiments could be found
in the wells and cisterns of the village. Sounds of retreat could be
heard in the stillness of the night. Parties were sent on the field to
care for the wounded, and Bee was ordered to take up the pursuit toward
Grand Ecore at dawn, to be followed by the horse from the mill stream as
soon as water and forage had been supplied. These dispositions for the
morning made, worn out by fatigue and loss of sleep, I threw myself on
the ground, within two hundred yards of the battle field, and sought
rest. The enemy retreated during the night, leaving four hundred
wounded, and his many dead unburied. On the morning of the 10th Bee
pursued for twenty miles before he overtook his rear guard, finding
stragglers and burning wagons and stores, evidences of haste.
In the two actions of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill my loss in killed and
wounded was twenty-two hundred. At Pleasant Hill we lost three guns and
four hundred and twenty-six prisoners, one hundred and seventy-nine from
Churchill's, and two hundred and forty-seven from Scurry's brigade at
the time it was so nearly overwhelmed. The Federal loss in killed and
wounded exceeded mine, and we captured twenty guns and twenty-eight
hundred prisoners, not including stragglers picked up after the battle.
The enemy's campaign for conquest was defeated by an inferior force, and
it was doubtful if his army and fleet could escape destruction.
These were creditable results, yet of much less importance than those
that would have been accomplished but for my blunder at Pleasant Hill.
Instead of intrusting the important attack by my right to a subordinate,
I should have conducted it myself and taken Polignac's division to
sustain it. True, this would have removed my reserve from the center and
line of retreat, and placed it on a flank; but I was confident that the
enemy had no intention of resuming the offensive, and should have acted
on that conviction. All this flashed upon me the instant I learned of
the disorder of my right. Herein lies the vast difference between genius
and commonplace: one anticipates errors, the other discovers them too
late.
The foregoing account of Churchill's attack at Pleasant Hill, hidden
from me by intervening wood, is taken from his official report and the
reports of his subordinates; and I will now supplement it by some
extracts from the testimony given by General Francis Fessenden of the
Federal army. On pages 94 and 95 of the second volume of the "Report on
the Conduct of the War," the following appears:
"In the afternoon we were changed, from a position in the woods in front
of Pleasant Hill, to a position in rear of a deep ditch near the town.
We were placed behind this ditch, in open ground, and practically held
the left of the front line; and my regiment was on the left. I think it
was not expected that an attack would be made by the enemy in that
direction. The attack was expected by the road which led in by the right
center of the army. Instead of that, however, the enemy came around
through the woods, and about half-past 5 o'clock drove in our
skirmishers, and made a very fierce attack on the brigade I was
in--Colonel Benedict's brigade. The brigade fell back under the attack a
great deal broken up, and my regiment was separated from the other three
regiments which went off in another direction. I had fallen back still
further to the left, as I knew there was a brigade of troops in there to
protect our left flank and rear from attack in that direction. My
regiment being the last of the brigade to fall back, the enemy had
already advanced so far after the other three regiments that I could not
fall back where they did. I therefore fell back in another direction,
rallying my regiment and forming on the right of the brigade referred
to; and that brigade, my regiment, and another brigade, which I think
had been brought up under General Emory, made an attack upon the enemy's
column, which had advanced some distance, and drove them back with great
loss. We continued to advance, and drove them a mile or more, so
completely off the field that there was no other attack made by the
enemy in that direction.
"That night we fell back again, marching all night and all the next
morning, until we reached the camping ground at the end of our first
day's march from Grand Ecore. I ought to state here that in that attack
of the enemy on our left the brigade commander, Colonel Benedict, was
killed, and I then assumed command of the brigade. We remained at Grand
Ecore some eight or nine days, where we built intrenchments to a certain
extent--rifle pits. I think the whole army threw up a kind of temporary
work in front."
General Fessenden's statements accord with the reports of Churchill and
his officers, and in other respects are accurate.
On page 62 of the volume quoted from, General A.L. Lee, commanding
mounted division of Banks's army, testifies:
"The next morning (9th of April) I was ordered by General Banks to
detach one thousand cavalry to act as scouts and skirmishers, and to
take the remainder of my division, and take whatever was left of the
detachment of the 13th army corps and some negro troops that were there,
and take the trains and the majority of the artillery of the army to
Grand Ecore. It was thought that the enemy would get between us and
Grand Ecore. I started about 11 o'clock with this train, and with six or
eight batteries of artillery, and reached Grand Ecore the next day. The
battle of the 9th of April commenced just as I was leaving. The next day
at night the main army had reached Grand Ecore and joined me there.
General Banks impressed on me very strongly that, in sending me back
from Pleasant Hill just as the fight was commencing, it was of the
greatest importance to save what material we had left. Early the next
morning, when I was distant from Pleasant Hill eighteen miles, I
received a dispatch from General Banks. I have not the dispatch with me,
but it was to this effect: that they had whipped the enemy terribly;
that Price was killed, also two or three other rebel generals whom he
named, but who have since recovered; and that I was to send back the
subsistence trains for such and such troops. I was very much puzzled by
that order, and immediately sent a staff officer back for more specific
instructions. But he had not been gone more than half an hour when a
staff officer of General Banks arrived with an order to me, with which
he had left in the night, for me to continue pressing on with the whole
train to Grand Ecore, and with instructions if any wagons broke down to
burn them, not stop to fix anything, but get everything into Grand Ecore
as quickly as I could, and look out very carefully on the flanks."
There can be no question of the correctness of these statements of
General A.L. Lee.
The following quotations from the reports of Admiral Porter to the
Secretary of the Navy are taken from page 239, and succeeding pages of
the same volume:
"FLAG-SHIP CRICKET, GRAND ECORE, _April 14, 1864_.
"The army here has met with a great defeat, no matter what the generals
try to make ofit. With the defeat has come demoralization, and it will
take some time to reorganize and make up the deficiencies in killed and
prisoners. The whole affair has been seriously mismanaged. It was well
we came up, for I am convinced the rebels would have attacked this
broken army at Grand Ecore had we not been here to cover them. I do not
think our army would be in a condition to resist them. I must confess
that I feel a little uncertain how to act. I could not leave this army
now without disgracing myself forever; and, when running a risk in their
cause, I do not want to be deserted. One of my officers has already been
asked 'If we would not burn our gunboats as soon as the army left?'
speaking as if a gunboat was a very ordinary affair, and could be burned
with indifference. I inclose two notes I received from Generals Banks
and Stone. There is a faint attempt to make a victory out of this, but
two or three such victories would cost us our existence."
Again, on page 166 of the same volume appears this dispatch from
Lieutenant-General Grant, at Culpepper, Virginia, to General Halleck,
Chief of Staff, at Washington:
"You can see from General Brayman's dispatch to me something of General
Banks's disaster."
Concerning the battle of Pleasant Hill General Banks reports (page 326):
"The whole of the reserves were now ordered up, and in turn we drove the
enemy, continuing the pursuit until night compelled us to halt. The
battle of the 9th was desperate and sanguinary. The defeat of the enemy
was complete, and his loss in officers and men more than double that
sustained by our forces. There was nothing in the immediate position and
condition of the two armies to prevent a forward movement the next
morning, and orders were given to prepare for an advance. But
representations subsequently received from General Franklin and all the
general officers of the 19th corps, as to the condition of their
respective commands for immediate active operations against the enemy,
caused a suspension of this order, and a conference of the general
officers was held in the evening, in which it was determined to retire
upon Grand Ecore the following day. The reasons urged for this course
were: 1. That the absence of water made it absolutely necessary to
advance or retire without delay. General Emory's command had been
without rations for two days, and the train, which had been turned to
the rear during the battle, could not be put in condition to move
forward upon the single road through dense woods, in which it stood,
without great difficulty and much loss of time."
Again, on page 13, General Banks states:
"The enemy was driven from the field. It was as clear a rout as it was
possible for any army to suffer. After consulting with my officers, I
concluded, against my own judgment, to fall back to Grand Ecore and
reorganize. We held the field of battle. Our dead were buried. The
wounded men were brought in and placed in the best hospitals we could
organize, and surgeons were left with them, with provisions, medicines,
and supplies; and at daybreak we fell back to Grand Ecore."
Here the proportion of fiction to fact surpasses that of sack to bread
in Sir John's tavern bill; and it may be doubted if a mandarin from the
remotest province of the Celestial Empire ever ventured to send such a
report to Peking. General Fessenden's testimony, given above, shows that
the army marched during the night of the 9th, and continued to Grand
Ecore, where it intrenched; and General A.L. Lee's, that the main army
joined him at that place on the evening of the 10th. Twenty of the
thirty-six miles between Pleasant Hill and Grand Ecore were passed on
the 10th by my cavalry before the rear of the enemy's column was seen;
yet General Banks officially reports that his army left Pleasant Hill at
daybreak of the 10th. Homeric must have been the laughter of his troops
when this report was published.