LXXV.--THE DEVIL, LIKE RELIGION, WAS INVENTED TO ENRICH THE PRIESTS.

We are told a story of the simple-heartedness of an Italian monk, which

does him honor. This good man preaching one day felt obliged to announce

to his auditory that, thanks to Heaven, he had at last discovered a sure

means of rendering all men happy. "The devil," said he, "tempts men but

to have them as comrades of his misery in hell. Let us address

ourselves, then, to the Pope, who possesses the keys of paradise and of

hell; let us ask him to beseech God, at the head of the whole Church, to

reconcile Himself with the devil; to take him back into His favor; to

re-establish him in His first rank. This can not fail to put an end to

his sinister projects against mankind." The good monk did not see,

perhaps, that the devil is at least fully as useful as God to the

ministers of religion. These reap too many benefits from their

differences to lend themselves willingly to a reconciliation between the

two enemies ties, upon whose contests their existence and their revenues

depend. If men would cease to be tempted and to sin, the ministry of

priests would become useless to them. Manicheism is evidently the

support of all religions; but unfortunately the devil, being invented to

remove all suspicion of malice from Divinity, proves to us at every

moment the powerlessness or the awkwardness of his celestial Adversary.

LXXVI.--IF GOD COULD NOT RENDER HUMAN NATURE SINLESS, HE HAS NO RIGHT TO

PUNISH MAN.

Man's nature, it is said, must necessarily become corrupt. God could not

endow him with sinlessness, which is an inalienable portion of Divine

perfection. But if God could not render him sinless, why did He take the

trouble of creating man, whose nature was to become corrupt, and which,

consequently, had to offend God? On the other side, if God Himself was

not able to render human nature sinless, what right had He to punish men

for not being sinless? It is but by the right of might. But the right of

the strongest is violence; and violence is not suited to the most Just

of Beings. God would be supremely unjust if He punished men for not

having a portion of the Divine perfections, or for not being able to be

Gods like Himself.

Could not God have at least endowed men with that sort of perfection of

which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good or render

themselves agreeable to their God, why did not this God bestow the same

favor or give the same dispositions to all beings of our kind? Why does

the number of wicked exceed so greatly the number of good people? Why,

for every friend, does God find ten thousand enemies in a world which

depended upon Him alone to people with honest men? If it is true that

God intends to form in heaven a court of saints, of chosen ones, or of

men who have lived in this world according to His views, would He not

have had a court more numerous, more brilliant, and more honorable to

Him, if it were composed of all the men to whom, in creating them, He

could have granted the degree of goodness necessary to obtain eternal

happiness? Finally, were it not easier not to take man from nothingness

than to create him full of defects, rebellious to his Creator,

perpetually exposed to lose himself by a fatal abuse of his liberty?

Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only docile

and submissive angels. The angels, it is said, are free; a few among

them have sinned; but all of them have not sinned; all have not abused

their liberty by revolting against their Master. Could not God have

created only angels of the good kind? If God could create angels who

have not sinned, could He not create men sinless, or those who would

never abuse their liberty by doing evil. If the chosen ones are

incapable of sinning in heaven, could not God have made sinless men upon

the earth?

LXXVII.--IT IS ABSURD TO SAY THAT GOD'S CONDUCT MUST BE A MYSTERY TO MAN,

AND THAT HE HAS NO RIGHT TO EXAMINE AND JUDGE IT.

We are told that the enormous distance which separates God from men,

makes God's conduct necessarily a mystery for us, and that we have no

right to interrogate our Master. Is this statement satisfactory? But

according to you, when my eternal happiness is involved, have I not the

right to examine God's own conduct? It is but with the hope of happiness

that men submit to the empire of a God. A despot to whom men are

subjected but through fear, a master whom they can not interrogate, a

totally inaccessible sovereign, can not merit the homage of intelligent

beings. If God's conduct is a mystery to me, it is not made for me. Man

can not adore, admire, respect, or imitate a conduct of which everything

is impossible to conceive, or of which he can not form any but revolting

ideas; unless it is pretended that he should worship all the things of

which he is forced to be ignorant, and then all that he does not

understand becomes admirable.

Priests! you teach us that the designs of God are impenetrable; that His

ways are not our ways; that His thoughts are not our thoughts; that it

is folly to complain of His administration, whose motives and secret

ways are entirely unknown to us; that there is temerity in accusing Him

of unjust judgments, because they are incomprehensible to us. But do you

not see that by speaking in this manner, you destroy with your own hands

all your profound systems which have no design but to explain the ways

of Divinity that you call impenetrable? These judgments, these ways, and

these designs, have you penetrated them? You dare not say so; and,

although you season incessantly, you do not understand them more than we

do. If by chance you know the plan of God, which you tell us to admire,

while there are many people who find it so little worthy of a just,

good, intelligent, and rational being; do not say that this plan is

impenetrable. If you are as ignorant as we, have some indulgence for

those who ingenuously confess that they comprehend nothing of it, or

that they see nothing in it Divine. Cease to persecute for opinions

which you do not understand yourselves; cease to slander each other for

dreams and conjectures which are altogether contradictory; speak to us

of intelligible and truly useful things; and no longer tell us of the

impenetrable ways of a God, about which you do nothing but stammer and

contradict yourselves.

In speaking to us incessantly of the immense depths of Divine wisdom, in

forbidding us to fathom these depths by telling us that it is insolence

to call God to the tribunal of our humble reason, in making it a crime

to judge our Master, the theologians only confess the embarrassment in

which they find themselves as soon as they have to render account of the

conduct of a God, which they tell us is marvelous, only because it is

totally impossible for them to understand it themselves.

LXXVIII.--IT IS ABSURD TO CALL HIM A GOD OF JUSTICE AND GOODNESS, WHO

INFLICTS EVIL INDISCRIMINATELY ON THE GOOD AND THE WICKED, UPON THE

INNOCENT AND THE GUILTY; IT IS IDLE TO DEMAND THAT THE UNFORTUNATE

SHOULD CONSOLE THEMSELVES FOR THEIR MISFORTUNES, IN THE VERY ARMS OF THE

ONE WHO ALONE IS THE AUTHOR OF THEM.

Physical evil commonly passes as the punishment of sin. Calamities,

diseases, famines, wars, earthquakes, are the means which God employs to

chastise perverse men. Therefore, they have no difficulty in attributing

these evils to the severity of a just and good God. However, do we not

see these plagues fall indiscriminately upon the good and the wicked,

upon the impious and the pious, upon the innocent and the guilty? How

can we be made to admire, in this proceeding, the justice and the

goodness of a being, the idea of whom appears so consoling to the

unfortunate? Doubtless the brain of these unfortunate ones has been

disturbed by their misfortunes, since they forget that God is the

arbiter of things, the sole dispenser of the events of this world. In

this case ought they not to blame Him for the evils for which they would

find consolation in His arms? Unfortunate father! you console yourself

in the bosom of Providence for the loss of a cherished child or of a

wife, who made your happiness! Alas! do you not see that your God has

killed them? Your God has rendered you miserable; and you want Him to

console you for the fearful blows He has inflicted upon you.

The fantastic and supernatural notions of theology have succeeded so

thoroughly in overcoming the simplest, the clearest, the most natural

ideas of the human spirit, that the pious, incapable of accusing God of

malice, accustom themselves to look upon these sad afflictions as

indubitable proofs of celestial goodness. Are they in affliction, they

are told to believe that God loves them, that God visits them, that God

wishes to try them. Thus it is that religion changes evil into good!

Some one has said profanely, but with reason: "If the good God treats

thus those whom He loves, I beseech Him very earnestly not to think of

me." Men must have formed very sinister and very cruel ideas of their

God whom they call so good, in order to persuade themselves that the

most frightful calamities and the most painful afflictions are signs of

His favor! Would a wicked Genii or a Devil be more ingenious in

tormenting his enemies, than sometimes is this God of goodness, who is

so often occupied with inflicting His chastisements upon His dearest

friends?

LXXIX.--A GOD WHO PUNISHES THE FAULTS WHICH HE COULD HAVE PREVENTED, IS A

FOOL, WHO ADDS INJUSTICE TO FOOLISHNESS.

What would we say or a father who, we are assured, watches without

relaxation over the welfare of his feeble and unforeseeing children, and

who, however, would leave them at liberty to go astray in the midst of

rocks, precipices, and waters; who would prevent them but rarely from

following their disordered appetites; who would permit them to handle,

without precaution, deadly arms, at the risk of wounding themselves

severely? What would we think of this same father, if, instead of

blaming himself for the harm which would have happened to his poor

children, he should punish them for their faults in the most cruel way?

We would say, with reason, that this father is a fool, who joins

injustice to foolishness. A God who punishes the faults which He could

have prevented, is a being who lacks wisdom, goodness, and equity. A God

of foresight would prevent evil, and in this way would be saved the

trouble of punishing it. A good God would not punish weaknesses which He

knows to be inherent in human nature. A just God, if He has made man,

would not punish him for not being strong enough to resist his desires.

To punish weakness, is the most unjust tyranny. Is it not calumniating a

just God, to say that He punishes men for their faults, even in the

present life? How would He punish beings whom He alone could correct,

and who, as long as they had not received grace, can not act otherwise

than they do?

According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his

actual state of corruption, can do nothing but evil, for without Divine

grace he has not the strength to do good. Moreover, if man's nature,

abandoned to itself, of destitute of Divine help, inclines him

necessarily to evil, or renders him incapable of doing good, what

becomes of his free will? According to such principles, man can merit

neither reward nor punishment; in rewarding man for the good he does,

God would but recompense Himself; in punishing man for the evil he does,

God punishes him for not having been given the grace, without which it

was impossible for him to do better.

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