According to theologians, the afflictions and evils of this life are
chastisements which culpable men receive from Divinity. But why are men
culpable? If God is Almighty, does it cost Him any more to say, "Let
everything remain in order!"--"let all my subjects be good, innocent,
fortunate!"--than to say, "Let everything exist?" Was it more difficult
for this God to do His work well than to do it so badly? Was it any
farther from the nonexistence of beings to their wise and happy
existence, than from their non-existence to their insensate and
miserable existence? Religion speaks to us of a hell--that is, of a
fearful place where, notwithstanding His goodness, God reserves eternal
torments for the majority of men. Thus, after having rendered mortals
very miserable in this world, religion teaches them that God can make
them much more wretched in another. They meet our objections by saying,
that otherwise the goodness of God would take the place of His justice.
But goodness which takes the place of the most terrible cruelty, is not
infinite kindness. Besides, a God who, after having been infinitely
good, becomes infinitely wicked, can He be regarded as an immutable
being? A God filled with implacable fury, is He a God in whom we can
find a shadow of charity or goodness?
LXII.--THEOLOGY MAKES OF ITS GOD A MONSTER OF NONSENSE, OF INJUSTICE, OF
MALICE, AND ATROCITY--A BEING ABSOLUTELY HATEFUL.
Divine justice, such as our theologians paint it, is, without doubt, a
quality intended to make us love Divinity. According to the notions of
modern theology, it appears evident that God has created the majority of
men with the view only of punishing them eternally. Would it not have
been more in conformity with kindness, with reason, with equity, to
create but stones or plants, and not sentient beings, than to create men
whose conduct in this world would cause them eternal chastisements in
another? A God so perfidious and wicked as to create a single man and
leave him exposed to the perils of damnation, can not be regarded as a
perfect being, but as a monster of nonsense, injustice, malice, and
atrocity. Far from forming a perfect God, the theologians have made the
most imperfect of beings. According to theological ideas, God resembles
a tyrant who, having deprived the majority of his slaves of their
eyesight, would confine them in a cell where, in order to amuse himself
he could observe incognito their conduct through a trap-door, in order
to have occasion to cruelly punish all those who in walking should hurt
each other; but who would reward splendidly the small number of those to
whom the sight was spared, for having the skill to avoid an encounter
with their comrades. Such are the ideas which the dogma of gratuitous
predestination gives of Divinity!
Although men repeat to us that their God is infinitely good, it is
evident that in the bottom of their hearts they can believe nothing of
it. How can we love anything we do not know? How can we love a being,
the idea of whom is but liable to keep us in anxiety and trouble? How
can we love a being of whom all that is told conspires to render him
supremely hateful?
LXIII.--ALL RELIGION INSPIRES BUT A COWARDLY AND INORDINATE FEAR OF THE
DIVINITY.
Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and
superstition; they tell us that the latter is but a cowardly and
inordinate fear of Divinity, that the truly religious man has confidence
in his God, and loves Him sincerely; while the superstitious man sees in
Him but an enemy, has no confidence in Him, and represents Him as a
suspicious and cruel tyrant, avaricious of His benefactions and prodigal
of His chastisements. But does not all religion in reality give us these
same ideas of God? While we are told that God is infinitely good, is it
not constantly repeated to us that He is very easily offended, that He
bestows His favors but upon a few, that He chastises with fury those to
whom He has not been pleased to grant them?
LXIV.--THERE IS IN REALITY NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE MOST
SOMBRE AND SERVILE SUPERSTITION.
If we take our ideas of God from the nature of the things where we find
a mixture of good and evil, this God, according to the good and evil
which we experience, does naturally appear to us capricious, inconstant,
sometimes good, sometimes wicked, and in this way, instead of exciting
our love, He must produce suspicion, fear, and uncertainty in our
hearts. There is no real difference between natural religion and the
most sombre and servile superstition. If the Theist sees God but on the
beautiful side, the superstitious man looks upon Him from the most
hideous side. The folly of the one is gay of the other is lugubrious;
but both are equally delirious.
LXV.--ACCORDING TO THE IDEAS WHICH THEOLOGY GIVES OF DIVINITY, TO LOVE
GOD IS IMPOSSIBLE.
If I take my ideas of God from theology, God shows Himself to me in such
a light as to repel love. The devotees who tell us that they love their
God sincerely, are either liars or fools who see their God but in
profile; it is impossible to love a being, the thought of whom tends to
excite terror, and whose judgments make us tremble. How can we face
without fear, a God whom we suppose sufficiently barbarous to wish to
damn us forever? Let them not speak to us of a filial or respectful fear
mingled with love, which men should have for their God. A son can not
love his father when he knows he is cruel enough to inflict exquisite
torments upon him; in short, to punish him for the least faults. No man
upon earth can have the least spark of love for a God who holds in
reserve eternal, hard, and violent chastisements for ninety-nine
hundredths of His children.
LXVI.--BY THE INVENTION OF THE DOGMA OF THE ETERNAL TORMENTS OF HELL,
THEOLOGIANS HAVE MADE OF THEIR GOD A DETESTABLE BEING, MORE WICKED THAN
THE MOST WICKED OF MEN, A PERVERSE AND CRUEL TYRANT WITHOUT AIM.
The inventors of the dogma of eternal torments in hell, have made of the
God whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in
man is the last term of corruption. There is no sensitive soul but is
moved and revolts at the recital alone of the torments which the
greatest criminal endures; but cruelty merits the greater indignation
when we consider it gratuitous or without motive. The most sanguinary
tyrants, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, had at least some motive in
tormenting their victims and insulting their sufferings; these motives
were, either their own safety, the fury of revenge, the design to
frighten by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity to make parade of
their power, and the desire to satisfy a barbarous curiosity. Can a God
have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims of His wrath, He
would punish beings who could not really endanger His immovable power,
nor trouble His felicity, which nothing can change. On the other hand,
the sufferings of the other life would be useless to the living, who can
not witness them; these torments would be useless to the damned, because
in hell is no more conversion, and the hour of mercy is passed; from
which it follows, that God, in the exercise of His eternal vengeance,
would have no other aim than to amuse Himself and insult the weakness of
His creatures. I appeal to the whole human race! Is there in nature a
man so cruel as to wish in cold blood to torment, I do not say his
fellow-beings, but any sentient being whatever, without fee, without
profit, without curiosity, without having anything to fear? Conclude,
then, O theologians! that according to your own principles, your God is
infinitely more wicked than the most wicked of men. You will tell me,
perhaps, that infinite offenses deserve infinite chastisements, and I
will tell you that we can not offend a God whose happiness is infinite.
I will tell you further, that offenses of finite beings can not be
infinite; that a God who does not want to be offended, can not consent
to make His creatures' offenses last for eternity; I will tell you that
a God infinitely good, can not be infinitely cruel, nor grant His
creatures infinite existence solely for the pleasure of tormenting them
forever.
It could have been but the most cruel barbarity, the most notorious
imposition, but the blindest ambition which could have created the dogma
of eternal damnation. If there exists a God who could be offended or
blasphemed, there would not be upon earth any greater blasphemers than
those who dare to say that this God is perverse enough to take pleasure
in dooming His feeble creatures to useless torments for all eternity.