We are told of a pretended scale for human beings; it is supposed that
God has divided His creatures into different classes, each one enjoying
the degree of happiness of which he is susceptible. According to this
romantic arrangement, all beings, from the oyster to the angel, enjoy
the happiness which belongs to them. Experience contradicts this sublime
revery. In the world where we are, we see all sentient beings living and
suffering in the midst of dangers. Man can not step without wounding,
tormenting, crushing a multitude of sentient beings which he finds in
his path, while he himself, at every step, is exposed to a throng of
evils seen or unseen, which may lead to his destruction. Is not the very
thought of death sufficient to mar his greatest enjoyment? During the
whole course of his life he is subject to sufferings; there is not a
moment when he feels sure of preserving his existence, to which he is so
strongly attached, and which he regards as the greatest gift of
Divinity.
LIX.--IN VAIN DOES THEOLOGY EXERT ITSELF TO ACQUIT GOD OF MAN'S DEFECTS.
EITHER THIS GOD IS NOT FREE, OR HE IS MORE WICKED THAN GOOD.
The world, it will be said, has all the perfection of which it was
susceptible; by the very reason that the world was not the God who made
it, it was necessary that it should have great qualities and great
defects. But we will answer, that the world necessarily having great
defects, it would have been better suited to the nature of a good God
not to create a world which He could not render completely happy. If
God, who was, according to you, supremely happy before the world was
created, had continued to be supremely happy in the created world, why
did He not remain in peace? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist What
is his existence to God? Nothing or something. If his existence is not
useful or necessary to God, why did He not leave him in nothingness? If
man's existence is necessary to His glory, He then needed man, He lacked
something before this man existed!
We can forgive an unskillful workman for doing imperfect work, because
he must work, well or ill, or starve; this workman is excusable; but
your God is not. According to you, He is self-sufficient; in this case,
why does He create men? He has, according to you, all that is necessary
to render man happy; why, then, does He not do it? You must conclude
that your God has more malice than goodness, or you must admit that God
was compelled to do what He has done, without being able to do
otherwise. However, you assure us that your God is free; you say also
that He is immutable, although beginning in time and ceasing in time to
exercise His power, like all the inconstant beings of this world. Oh,
theologians! you have made vain efforts to acquit your God of all the
defects of man; there is always visible in this God so perfect, "a tip
of the [human] ear."
LX.--WE CAN NOT BELIEVE IN A DIVINE PROVIDENCE, IN AN INFINITELY GOOD AND
POWERFUL GOD.
Is not God the master of His favors? Has He not the right to dispense
His benefits? Can He not take them back again? His creature has no right
to ask the reason of His conduct; He can dispose at will of the works of
His hands. Absolute sovereign of mortals, He distributes happiness or
unhappiness, according to His pleasure. These are the solutions which
theologians give in order to console us for the evils which God inflicts
upon us. We would tell them that a God who was infinitely good, would
not be the master of His favors, but would be by His own nature obliged
to distribute them among His creatures; we would tell them that a truly
benevolent being would not believe he had the right to abstain from
doing good; we would tell them that a truly generous being does not take
back what he has given, and any man who does it, forfeits gratitude, and
has no right to complain of ingratitude. How can the arbitrary and
whimsical conduct which theologians ascribe to God, be reconciled with
the religion which supposes a compact or mutual agreement between this
God and men? If God owes nothing to His creatures, they, on their part,
can not owe anything to their God. All religion is founded upon the
happiness which men believe they have a right to expect from the
Divinity, who is supposed to tell them: "Love, adore, obey me, and I
will render you happy!" Men on their side say to Him: "Make us happy, be
faithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you, we
will obey your laws!" In neglecting the happiness of His creatures, in
distributing His favors and His graces according to His caprice, and
taking back His gifts, does not God violate the contract which serves as
a base for all religion?
Cicero has said with reason that if God does not make Himself agreeable
to man, He can not be his God. [Nisi Deus homini placuerit, Deus non
erit.] Goodness constitutes Divinity; this Goodness can manifest itself
to man only by the advantages he derives from it. As soon as he is
unfortunate, this Goodness disappears and ceases to be Divinity. An
infinite Goodness can be neither partial nor exclusive. If God is
infinitely good, He owes happiness to all His creatures; one unfortunate
being alone would be sufficient to annihilate an unlimited goodness.
Under an infinitely good and powerful God, is it possible to conceive
that a single man could suffer? An animal, a mite, which suffers,
furnishes invincible arguments against Divine Providence and its
infinite benefactions.