SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
VALUE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.--It may perhaps be felt that our
protracted excursion has not advanced us far beyond the position at
which we stood in the opening chapter. Indeed, the history of philosophy
may seem not to establish any very definite conclusions; and those who
study the subject in the hope that it will supply them with material for
dogmatising are likely to be disappointed. We have to reconcile
ourselves to the fact that the riddle of the universe has as yet
received no final solution at the hands of the metaphysicians. It is
only too evident that, as the poet says:
"Our little systems have their day,
They have their day, and cease to be."
And yet it would be an error to suppose that this lack of finality about
philosophical opinion, or the want of unanimity among philosophers,
indicates that no progress has been made. There are certain landmarks in
the history of philosophy--such as Kant's _Critique of Pure
Reason_--which mark a point behind which we shall not again regress
(assuming that our culture and civilisation is preserved). Even if we
have not grasped the whole truth about things yet, we are still
justified in assuming that we are gradually, if painfully, getting
nearer to the goal.
But surely we are entitled to believe that it is not the crude appetite
for metaphysical dogma that attracts men to the history of philosophy.
Its fascination rather resembles that of the history of religion: both
are, as it were, Odysseys of the human spirit; nor is there any activity
of man that has not its appeal to the human heart: for _cor ad cor
loquitur_.
And, again, we should reflect that those who ask for final conclusions,
forget that the _search_ for truth may be, in and for itself, of the
highest spiritual value. The best starting-point for the history of
philosophy is a famous passage from Lessing.
"Not the truth which is at the disposal of every man, but the honest
pains he has taken to come at the truth make the worth of a man. For not
through the possession, but through the pursuit of truth do his powers
increase, and in this alone consists his ever-increasing perfection.
Possession makes us quiet, indolent, proud.... If God with all truth in
His right hand, and in His left the single, unceasing striving after
truth, even though coupled with the condition that I should ever and
always err, came to me and said, 'Choose!' I would in all humility clasp
this left hand and say, 'Father, give me this! Is not pure truth for
Thee alone?'"[76]
But there is another respect in which some knowledge of the history of
thought may be an important advantage. It may not bestow upon us the
liberty of dogmatising ourselves, but it does bestow upon us a certain
imperturbability in the face of the dogmatisms of others. Airs of
systematic omniscience, "the pride of a pretended knowledge," will leave
us unimpressed and undismayed. The latest pretentious product of
popular philosophy will, in the majority of cases, be recognised as an
old heresy in a new garb; "new" thought will not impress (at least, by
its novelty) those who know that it is old.
But it is against the crudities of materialistic naturalism that even a
slight acquaintance with the history of ideas will form an antidote. The
various exposures of it, from Hume and Kant to Bergson, will be to some
extent familiar; and it will be a recognised fact that its chief popular
attraction is at the same time its chief philosophic weakness; and this
is that it is nothing more or less than a systematisation of the
prejudices of common sense. "As a theory of first principles, the best
that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous."[77]
SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM HISTORY.--But, it may be asked, what definite
conclusions have the foregoing chapters to offer? Some, if we are not
mistaken, of a genuinely positive character. It will be necessary to
recall certain facts and reflections to the minds of our readers.
In the early chapters we noted the rise of an independent science, and
the collapse of the medieval world view with which popular religious
notions were associated so closely, that many conservative thinkers
expected to see both involved in a common ruin. Science seemed to
threaten the existence of a religion bound up with conceptions of space
and of force which were being brought into discredit.
These misgivings turned out, however, to be ill-founded. Certain
advantages, no doubt, of simplicity and definiteness, which had
belonged to the old notions, had been irrecoverably lost; but thinkers
like Giordano Bruno showed that the conception of an infinite universe
was by no means hostile to religion; but that, on the contrary, it might
be a conception of the highest spiritual value. Such are the sentiments
expressed in some sonnets which precede Bruno's dialogue "On the
Infinite Universe."
"It seemed to Bruno as if he had never breathed freely until the limits
of the universe had been extended to infinity, and the fixed spheres had
disappeared. No longer now was there a limit to the flight of the
spirit, no 'so far and no further'; the narrow prison in which the old
beliefs had confined men's spirits had now to open its gates and let in
the pure air of a new life."[78]
The scientific did not seem to him incompatible with a fundamentally
religious conception of the world, at least for those who were not
afraid "to take ship upon the seas of the infinite."
DANGERS OF THE "MECHANICAL VIEW."--Thus it was not _science_ that was
hostile to religion. This was not the case until science began to be
associated with a certain fairly definite philosophy of a mechanistic,
and later of a materialist, description. Religion could not have
survived the final establishment of such a philosophy as this, for the
indispensable element in a religious attitude of life is the idea that
_somehow there lies behind things a power or essence that has something
in common with our own natures_--something that can, without an abuse of
language, be called personal. Any philosophy that rules out this idea
creates an atmosphere in which religion cannot breathe.
And it was just this atmosphere that the mechanistic view, unless
amplified by considerations of another kind (as it was e.g. in the case
of Spinoza) tended to create.
THE "MECHANICAL VIEW" NEVER UNCHALLENGED.--And with regard to this
mechanistic philosophy, we have to observe that it never seems to have
commended itself, as a final and complete solution, to the best minds.
In the seventeenth century, it will be remembered, the mechanical
conception was transcended (though in entirely different ways) by
Spinoza and by Leibniz, and the religious consciousness of the age, in
the person of Pascal, protested against it.
And although, during the eighteenth century, this philosophy persisted,
and was considerably reinforced (with the help of further discoveries in
the realm of physics) by the school of Holbach and Diderot, yet it had
still to face the radical criticism of Kant. This criticism, as we shall
remember, indicated that the mechanical view is a way in which the human
mind--owing to its constitution--regards phenomena. If it is to
understand them, the human mind cannot help viewing them in that
fashion; it must subject things to the mould in which all its thought is
cast. Mechanism is the _medium_ through which the mind understands
phenomena. It belongs not to the things in themselves, but to our way of
understanding them. And attached to this radical criticism of mechanical
notions, was an idealistic philosophy of the most genuinely religious
and spiritual character. Kantian idealism is one of those contributions
to human thought behind which we shall not again regress. It is a
phenomenon of incalculable value and importance.
The immediate results of Kant's critical idealism was a luxuriant
growth of a spiritual type of philosophy upon the ground he had cleared
and prepared. Romanticism may be regarded as a revolt of those sides of
human nature upon which the tyranny of mechanism pressed
hardest--religion, speculation, poetry, music, art. "You may expel
nature with a pitchfork, but she persists in returning." The Horatian
remark is true also of the human mind; you may try to weed out religion
and poetry, but your success will only be temporary; for nature herself
is more persistent than the most earnest of materialists and (what is
more) she outlives him.
And with regard to the materialist or mechanistic view, it is highly
interesting to note that its greatest attraction has consisted in
something which, strictly speaking, is not its own property. In the
eighteenth century in France, and in the nineteenth century in Germany
and England, the popularity of this view was derived from its altogether
illegitimate association with a high moral and social idealism, which
(it is only too evident) had been borrowed--without sufficient
acknowledgment--from the Christian tradition. The rather self-conscious
atheism (for instance) of Shelley or Byron--which they had presumably
derived from Diderot and his contemporaries--was less a denial of God
than an affirmation of the rights of humanity. This generous philosophy
of revolt from contemporary tyranny and pharisaism is atheistic only in
name. The callous and cynical powers, both political and ecclesiastical,
that were the object of their bitter attacks were the embodiments of
atheism, for "He alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the
Divine Being, e.g. love, wisdom, justice, are nothing."[79]
THE PRESENT SITUATION.--During the nineteenth century the mechanical
view received some accession of strength owing to the reduction of
biology to what seemed like subjection. But, at the same time, an
idealistic philosophy had taken a strong hold in England, and towards
the end of the century critical students of scientific method cast doubt
upon the _finality_ of the mechanical view. They regarded it as
artificial, abstract, and symbolic only of reality. This critical
movement may be associated with the names of Mach, Boutroux, and
(perhaps above all) of Bergson.
Moreover, towards the end of the century, a number of new facts in
physics, biology, and psychology came to light and tended to discredit
the mechanical view as a final explanation of reality. The
indestructibility of matter, even the conservation of energy and of mass
(corner stones of the mechanico-materialist view) began openly to be
questioned, not by metaphysicians, but by men of science themselves. The
foes of materialism were those of its own household.[80]
Thus assailed from without by the philosophers, and from within by the
scientists themselves, the mechanical view, after a reign of three
centuries (disturbed though these may have been by successive
rebellions) seems destined to disappear. It may indeed subsist as an
approximate and convenient way of regarding reality, of which it will no
longer pretend to give an absolute and complete account. It will
continue to reign as a constitutional monarch, but the days of its
tyranny are at an end. And it is not unlikely that future generations
will look with surprise upon our respect for a theory which to them will
wear something of the same aspect as medieval astrology now presents to
ourselves.
SOME DEDUCTIONS.--If the history of thought showed no other results than
the impaired prestige of naturalism, it would be worth attention and
study. The facts undoubtedly compromise that prestige, for history
indicates that at no period has naturalism been able to impose itself
permanently. If there has been a movement in that direction, it has
elicited a corresponding reaction. The human mind seems unable to remain
satisfied with the negations which systematised common sense seeks to
impose upon it. There is an instinctive appetite in humanity for a
spiritual view of things, and Sabatier was undoubtedly right in
observing that mankind is "incurably religious." Neither Hobbes, nor
Holbach, nor Buechner, with the best will in the world, can exorcise from
the human heart that instinct which seeks for itself personal relations
with the universe--which sees a mind behind phenomena. This is one of
those instincts of which it is true that the more you repress them the
more insurgent they become--they will have their way in the end.
Thus naturalism, blind to the mutilation of our nature of which it is
guilty, is psychologically unsound. And yet, our nature is not so easily
mutilated after all. Naturalistic dogmatism has it in its power to
create an atmosphere which is unhealthy for religion, but that growth
has its roots too deep for it to be easily destroyed. Springing as it
does from the depths of our nature, it will prove as permanent as
humanity itself.
This is not to deny that this type of dogmatism may do, as it actually
has done, a great deal of harm. A plant may be strong and vigorous, but
under unceasing bitter weather, it will tend to become discouraged.
Otherwise it would not be worth while to write criticisms of naturalism.
FREEDOM.--Perhaps the best service we can do is to protest against
indulging an appetite for negative dogmatism. Such an attitude is a
negation of the freedom of thought. And it is in an atmosphere of
freedom that both religion and science flourish best. A hard and fast
naturalistic outlook may prove, and actually has proved, an incubus from
which even scientists themselves may pray to be delivered.
Nor has religion always enjoyed that full measure of freedom which is
indispensable to its vigorous life. The curious and sad fact is that the
human mind seems to delight in creating prisons for itself. The
scientific spirit created a mechanico-materialistic scheme which has
ended by becoming the enemy of scientific research, and which (besides
this) asks, as a sacrifice, the mutilation of our spiritual instincts.
And so with religion. The religious instinct (like the scientific) tends
to create its prisons. The pride of, a pretended knowledge reduces to a
mechanical scheme the mysteries of life and death; it provides
superficial standardised solutions for the problems of existence.
Of course, it is clear enough, that in religion as in science, we
cannot, even if we would, start each of us from the beginning. We have
to accept and to revere the riches of knowledge and experience
accumulated by those who have gone before. And yet, in religion as in
science, life consists in movement; we must go forward. The past may be
an inspiration, but it must not be the limit of our thought, or it
becomes an incubus. The glance must be forward not backward; the stream
flows, and we are borne on its bosom. Humanity, like an explorer, has
its face set towards the unknown. Both science and religion are children
of freedom, without which the creative spirit in man is crushed.
And here, with this note of warning (though perhaps rather of
encouragement) we may close.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _The Grammar of Science_, pp. 12, 13.
[2] Ptolemy of Alexandria: 127-151 A.D.
[3] J. M. Heald in art. "Aquinas" in _Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics_.
[4] Monks and theologians were betrayed into some controversial
asperities. "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven"
formed the appropriate text for a sermon by a Dominican.
[5] In spite of this, however, Descartes' works, in 1663, appeared in
the Index of forbidden books: and his doctrines were banned by Royal
decree from the French universities. Jesuit influences, which were not
at all favourable to _native_ religion in France (or elsewhere!), may
have been responsible for this obscurantist policy.
[6] Merz, _History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century_, Vol.
I, p. 384.
[7] Quoted by Ward, _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, p. 4.
[8] Hoeffding, _History of Modern Philosophy_, Vol. I, p. 315.
It may set the scruples of some at rest to be reminded that Aquinas
himself applied the term _Natura Naturans_ to God as the cause of all
existence. Eckhart and Bruno had made a similar application of it (cf.
Martineau, _Study of Spinoza_, p. 226).
[9] Here we may note, by way of an anticipation, a truth that Kant
afterwards was the first to grasp clearly: that it is only when the
mechanism of phenomena is proved, that religion can be purged of
materialism.
[10] Cf. letter to Arnauld, quoted by Hoeffding, I, p. 347: "The
substantial unity presupposes a complete, indivisible being. Nothing of
this kind is to be found in figure or motion ... but only in a soul or a
substantial form similar to that which we call an 'I.'"
[11] The _Monadology_ (quoted by Pattison, _Idea of God_, p. 180).
[12] Inge, _Christian Mysticism_, p. 19.
[13] Cf. "With space the universe encloses me and engulfs me like an
atom, but with thought I enclose the universe." A great saying.
[14] Novalis called him "the God-intoxicated": a bold phrase.
[15] We refer, of course, to the promulgation of the Bull _Unigenitus_,
procured from Pope Clement XI by the Jesuits; when their opponents, the
Jansenists "of all professions and classes, were subjected to
imprisonment, confiscation, and every species of oppression" (Jervis,
_Student's History of France_, p. 415).
The manoeuvre is characterised by another historian as a "struggle of
narrow-minded fanaticism, allied to absolutely unscrupulous political
ambition, against all the learning and virtue which the French clergy
still possessed" (Chamberlain, _Foundations of the Nineteenth Century_,
Vol. II, p. 379).
[16] Even before the age of the Revolution, Paris possessed many great
schools. The _College de France_ was founded in 1530; there was the
_College et Ecole de Chirurgie_, the _Jardin des Plantes_, the _Ecole
royale des Mines_, etc. (cf. Merz, _History of European Thought_, Vol.
I, p. 107).
[17] Merz says of Newton: "In his own country that fruitful
co-operation which can only be secured by an academic organisation and
by endowment of research was wanting" (I, p. 99). As late as 1740 the
whole revenue of the Royal Society was only L232 _per annum_.
[18] Morley, _Voltaire_, p. 41.
[19] He published his _Elemens de la Philosophie de Newton_ in 1738.
[20] Hoeffding, Vol. I, p. 481.
[21] See note in Merz, Vol. I, p. 145.
[22] Merz, Vol. I, p. 143.
[23] The receipt and perusal of Rousseau's _Emile_, are said to have
interrupted the walk on one occasion, to the great astonishment of the
Koenigsbergers.
[24] Pringle Pattison, _Idea of God_, p. 26.
[25] "Atheism is aristocratic," was the reply of Robespierre to one who
mocked at his _Etre Supreme_.
[26] _Confessions_, Book XII.
[27] Hoeffding, Vol. II, p. 9.
[28] Fichte's word is _Anschauung_, for which the English language
possesses no exact equivalent. It "implies something akin, though
perhaps superior to, seeing or perceiving by means of the senses," and
it approaches less closely to "inspiration" than does the English word
"intuition." The term acquired a meaning somewhat akin to the _amor
intellectualis Dei_ of Spinoza, which we have met before. (See note in
Merz, III, p. 445.)
[29] William James, _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 92.
[30] Here again a certain ambiguity surrounds the German word. _Geist_
is inadequately translated by either "mind" or "spirit": it comprises
the meaning of both words (cf. Merz, III, p. 466).
[31] This does not mean that what is not good enough for philosophy is
good enough for religion. The idea behind Schleiermacher is that what
philosophy cannot sanction, religious experience _can_ sanction. And it
has to be remembered that, as a follower of Kant, he assigned very
definite limits to the powers of philosophy. He was not an
Hegelian--Hegel's and Schleiermacher's views of the religious problem
are quite incompatible--the one believed, the other did not believe,
that reason could solve that problem.
[32] Kopp, _Geschichte der Chemie_, Vol. I, p. 442 (quoted by Merz, Vol.
I, p. 191).
[33] Merz, Vol. I, p. 218.
[34] According to one authority (Judd, in his _Coming of Evolution_) the
number of known species of plants and animals must be placed at 600,000
(p. 10).
[35] _Vestiges of Creation_, published anonymously in 1844, passed
through nine large editions by 1853. The author was Robert Chambers
(1802-71), a geologist.
[36] _Life and Letters_, Vol. I, p. 168 (_vide_ Judd, _Coming of
Evolution_, p. 89).
[37] As a matter of fact, biologists soon demanded more than even
Lyell's geology could give them. Recent discoveries about the nature of
matter have, however, further extended the possible age of our planet.
[38] Darwin, _Life_, Vol. I, p. 93.
[39] "If we wish to fix a definite point to describe as the end of the
idealistic period in Germany, no such distinctive event offers itself as
the French Revolution of July, 1830" (Lange, _History of Materialism_,
E.T., Vol. II, p. 245).
[40] A famous book which, though negative in its conclusions, places its
author alongside Schleiermacher as one of the founders of the modern
science of Religious Psychology.
[41] Balfour, _Theism and Humanism_, p. 36.
[42] "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation
of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent
homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."
[43] Spencer confessed that of the _Synthetic Philosophy_ "two volumes
are missing," the two important volumes on Inorganic Evolution, leading
to the evolution of the living and of the non-living (cf. criticisms by
Professor James Ward in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, Lecture IX).
[44] For an instance of the masterly work turned out by this school and
of the attractiveness of their propaganda, read Huxley's lecture, "On a
Piece of Chalk," delivered to the working men of Norwich during the
meeting of the British Association in 1868.
[45] For this famous encounter, see _Life of Huxley_, Vol. I, pp.
179-89, and _Life of J. R. Green_, pp. 44, 45.
[46] As we shall subsequently find, this cosmic pessimism is less well
grounded than Huxley believed. Still, Spencer's own scientific
presuppositions were the same as Huxley's, so that the passage remains a
pertinent criticism of the Evolutionary Philosophy as elaborated by him.
[47] It is instructive to observe that a similar note of latent
pessimism is struck by the last notable survivor of the School we have
endeavoured to describe. Viscount Morley at the end of his
_Recollections_ (1917), questioned as to the outcome of those generous
hopes entertained with such confidence by his contemporaries, is
compelled to ejaculate with philosophic brevity, _circumspice_, as he
contemplates a spectacle of unparalleled horror.
[48] Storr, _Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century_,
p. 329. See which book for a valuable chapter upon Coleridge.
[49] _Foundations of Belief_, p. 98.
[50] _Foundations of Belief_, p. 309.
[51] For this summary of Lotze's doctrine, see Merz, Vol. III, p. 615
and ff.
[52] Quoted by Ward in _Pluralism and Theism_, p. 103. For a brief yet
adequate treatment of Mach's criticisms see Hoeffding's _Modern
Philosophers_, pp. 115-21.
[53] R. B. Perry, _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 351.
[54] It is impossible to go deeper into James' "theory of knowledge"
without using technical language. A few of his own phrases, however, may
help to elucidate things. "Abstract concepts ... are salient aspects of
our concrete experiences which we find it useful to single out"
(_Meaning of Truth_, p. 246).
Elsewhere he speaks of them as things we have learned to "cut out" from
experience, as "flowers gathered," and as "moments dipped out from the
stream of time" (_A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 235).
I owe these quotations to Perry, op. cit.
[55] _Creative Evolution_, p. 325.
[56] _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 237.
[57] _Creative Evolution_, p. 174.
[58] i.e. Intellect is not (as it is generally represented to be) a
developed form of instinct, nor instinct an embryonic form of intellect.
[59] The extraordinary and miraculous phenomena of instinct--especially
as celebrated by the distinguished French scientist Fabre--cannot be
rightly understood by trying to interpret them in terms of intellect.
This is to misread them completely.
[60] Bergson's characterisation of Spencerian Evolutionism (_Creative
Evolution_, p. 391).
[61] _Creative Evolution_, p. 286.
[62] Other notable pluralists in England are F. C. S. Schiller and Dr.
MacTaggart.
[63] The _logical_ conclusion, we say, though this may not be the
ultimate truth about the matter. The most attractive theories are often
the most superficial.
[64] Professor Cunningham in Pearson's _Grammar of Science_, Part I, p.
356.
[65] Quoted by W. C. D. Whetham in his _Recent Development of Physical
Science_, p. 280. No reference is given by him.
[66] One theory attributes the existence of matter to occasional misfits
among these grains.
[67] Quoted by Bishop Mercer. _Problem of Creation_, Appendix B.
[68] In _Theism and Humanism_.
[69] Mercer, op. cit., p. 106.
[70] _Mechanism, Life, and Personality_ (1913), p. 81.
[71] Op. cit. pp. 64, 66.
[72] Professor J. Arthur Thomson, in an article entitled, "Is there one
Science of Nature?" (_Hibbert Journal_, Oct., 1911).
[73] _The Science and Philosophy of the Organism_, Vol. II, p. 338.
[74] Op. cit. p. 101.
[75] Other names of distinguished scientists holding this view are: Sir
W. Crookes the Physicist and Sir W. F. Barrett, F.R.S., in England, Dr.
Hodgson and Prof. James Hyslop in America, Lombroso in Italy, Richet in
France.
[76] From his _Duplik_. Quoted by Hoeffding, _History of Philosophy_,
Vol. II, p. 21.
[77] F. H. Bradley on "Phenomenalism" (_Appearance and Reality_, p.
126).
[78] Hoeffding, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 129.
[79] Feuerbach, _Essence of Christianity_, p. 21.
[80] We now learn that conceptions of space of a highly unorthodox
character are entertained by physicists and mathematicians, as the
result of recent researches in the sphere of the gravitation of light.
INDEX
Agnosticism, 92
Anti-clericalism, 43
Aquinas, 9 f., 30 _n._
Aristotle, 8, 136
Atomic theory, the, 49
collapse of, 126
Bacon, Lord, 16 f.
Balfour, A. J., 105 f., 110, 128
Bergson, 115-121, 143
Berkeley, 55
Boutroux, 112 f., 143
Bradley, F. H., 104 f., 110, 122, 139
Bruno, 12, 25, 29 f., 140
Buechner, 86, 144
Buffon, 77
Carlyle, Thomas, 38, 99-102
Coleridge, S. T., 98 f.
Comte, 85, 89, 92
Copernicus, 11, 22, 25, 58
Cunningham, Prof., 127
Cusanus, 10
Dalton, 49, 83, 126
Darwin, 80-83, 87 f.
Descartes, 19-22, 26, 37, 43, 55, 74, 136
Design, Argument from, 87 f.
Diderot, 45 f., 48, 141, 144
Driesch, 130 f.
Eckhart, 30 _n._
Encyclopaedia, The, 45
Electrons, 126
Feuerbach, 85, 95
Fichte, 65-67
Galileo, 12-15, 22, 55, 79, 136
Goethe, 30, 65
Green, T. H., 103 f.
Haeckel, 88
Haldane, Prof. J. S., 129, 132
Harvey, William, 19, 22
Hegel, 67-70
Heine, 85
Helmholtz, 75
Hobbes, 22, 26, 43, 55, 144
Holbach, 46-48, 141, 144
Hume, 55 f., 58
Huxley, 92 f., 95
Inge, 38 _n._
James, William, 114 f., 123
Jansenists, the, 43 _n._
Jesuits, the, 22 _n._, 26, 37, 43 _n._
Johnson, Dr., 47
Kant, 53-61, 66, 70, 77, 85, 137, 141
and Hegel compared, 69
and Locke compared, 57
and Rousseau compared, 65
Kepler, 15
Lamarck, 77
La Mettrie, 45, 48, 74
Lange, 47, 84
Laplace, 48 f.
Larmor, Prof. J., 127
Lavoisier, 49 f.
Leibniz, 33-36, 41, 52 f., 122, 141
Leonardo da Vinci, 14, 16, 132
Lessing, 138
Locke, 52 f., 55 f.
Lodge, Sir O., 134
Lotze, 107-109
Lyell, 78-80
Mach, 110-114, 143
Malthus' _Essay on Population_, 80
Meyer, 75
McTaggart, 123 _n._
Modernism, 109
Monads, 35 f., 122
"Natural Selection," 81, 87
Newton, 23-26, 43, 44 _n._, 48, 82, 136
Nietzsche, 94, 96 f.
Paley, 87
Pascal, 22, 36-41
Pearson, Prof. Karl, 1
Pessimism, 95
Positivism, 85, 95
Ritschl, 109
Rousseau, 54 _n._, 62-65, 80
_Sartor Resartus_, 100
Schelling, 65
Schiller, 65
Schiller, F. C. S., 123 _n._
Schleider, 75
Schleiermacher, 70-72
Spencer, Herbert, 35, 77, 89-92, 122
Spinoza, 28-33, 41, 52 f., 67, 141
"Spiritualism," 133-136
Stephen, Leslie, 92
Tait, Prof., 128
Thomson, Prof. J. A., 130 _n._
Voltaire, 44 f.
Wallace, Alfred Russell, 81 f.
Ward, Prof. James, 26 _n._, 91 _n._, 123
Whoeler, 74
Zeno's paradox, 117
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_The Mayflower Press, Plymouth._ William Brandon & Son, Ltd.
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Page 68: "understand" changed to "understands"
Page 70: "fom" changed to "from"
Page 128: "subjectly" changed to "subjectively"
Page 138: "Odyssies" changed to "Odysseys"
Inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation have been retained from the
original.
End of Project Gutenberg's Religion and Science, by John Charlton Hardwick