SOME RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.--In the last chapter we heard A. J. Balfour
complaining of the absence of "a full and systematic attempt, first to
enumerate, and then to justify, the presuppositions on which all science
finally rests." And Mr. F. H. Bradley also drew attention to the absence
of any critical philosophy of science in England. The need was for
scientific standpoints to be investigated _de novo_; and the process
had, as a matter of fact, already been begun on the Continent.
MACH.--Ernst Mach, Professor of Physics at Prague, and subsequently
Professor of Physics at Vienna (thus combining the roles of scientist
and metaphysician--always a highly instructive and fruitful combination)
had as early as 1863 laid it down as the task of science to give "an
economic presentation of the facts." By which phrase he meant that
science takes account only of the salient features of phenomena,
selecting only those which seem strictly serviceable to its own purpose.
SCIENCE "ABSTRACT" OR "SELECTIVE."--Mathematical science (which is the
"pure" science _par excellence_) deals not--as is generally
supposed--with "things," but with _certain selected aspects_ of things.
For example, for purposes of arithmetic, every leaf on a tree is an
"unit" (i.e. all are "identical"); but, in point of fact, there exist no
two leaves that are alike, as Leibniz, long ago, pointed out. Again, for
geometrical purposes two fields may be regarded as of like area; but no
two fields are, or ever have been, so.
Thus mathematics--where scientific method is seen at its
purest--proceeds by deliberately disregarding individuality; it regards
the differences between individuals as non-essential, and irrelevant to
its purpose.
ECONOMY OF THOUGHT.--And mathematical science is justified in acting in
this way. This method, highly abstract as it is--in fact, just because
it is highly abstract--leads to invaluable results. It's justification
is that it is _economical of thought_; disregarding all irrelevant
considerations, it is able, by using a short-cut, to reach its goal. Did
the mathematician have to take into consideration all the manifold and
complex aspects of each concrete "thing" (whether it be leaf, or field,
or lever, or what not) with which he deals, he would never be able to
cut his way through the jungle. His method of abstraction carries him at
once to his goal.
MACH ON THE "MECHANICAL VIEW."--Mach's criticism of the mechanical view
of nature proceeded upon similar lines. He termed that view
"analogical," by which he meant that mechanical "laws of nature" serve
us as formal patterns to which the processes of nature may (for
convenience sake) be represented as conforming. A clear account, though
not a _complete_ account, of all physical processes may be given in
terms of mechanical "law."
And in fact it remains a question, Mach observed, "whether the
mechanical view of things, instead of being the profoundest, is not in
point of fact, the shallowest of all."[52]
SCIENCE NOT INVALID BUT INCOMPLETE.--This line of criticism of
scientific method--i.e. that it deals with abstractions and analogies
rather than with _things_, for the sake of economy and convenience of
thought--does not deprive science of validity, but only invalidates that
superficial dogmatism which had crept into so many investigations. A
critical estimate of scientific methods makes it evident how much and
how little we have the right to expect from them. They will enable us to
give a simple description of _phenomena_ as they are seen when reduced
to their simplest terms of matter and motion; but of ultimate and final
causes they will tell us nothing.
"The system of conceptions by which the exact sciences try to describe
the phenomena of nature ... is symbolic, a kind of shorthand,
unconsciously invented and perfected for the sake of convenience and for
practical use ... the leading principle is that of Economy of Thought"
(Merz, Vol. III, p. 579).
BOUTROUX.--This criticism of the mechanical method of dealing with
reality was seconded by Boutroux's criticism of the principle of Natural
Law. Emile Boutroux (1845-1918)--Professor at the Sorbonne--in two
important treatises, examines with great minuteness this aspect of the
scientific method. In the earlier of these works, _The Contingency of
the Laws of Nature_ (1879) he suggests that these laws only give, so to
speak, the _habits_ which things display. They constitute, as it were,
"the bed in which the stream of occurrence flows, which the stream
itself had hollowed out, although its course has come to be determined
by this bed" (Hoeffding, _Modern Philosophers_, p. 101).
In his _Natural Law in Science and Philosophy_ (1895), Boutroux lays it
down that the laws of nature, as science describes them, may indeed
represent, but are by no means identical with, the laws of nature as
they really are. The laws of science are true, not absolutely but
relatively, i.e. are not elements in, but symbols of, reality. The
notion that everything is "determined" (i.e. the opposite of
"contingent"), though absolutely indispensable to the mechanical theory,
is nevertheless a way of looking at things rather than a faithful
picture of reality--a way in which we see things rather than the way
things exist in themselves.
As Boutroux himself puts it in his final chapter: "That which we call
the 'laws of nature' is the sum total of the methods we have discovered
for adapting things to the mind, and subjecting them to be moulded by
the will."
RESULTS.--Here we have Boutroux approaching very closely to the
standpoint of Mach; indeed the theories of the two men are complementary
to one another. For Mach, the mechanical view is a way of looking at
things, distinctly useful for understanding and using them--an "economy
of thought." For Boutroux, the determinist view is also a way of looking
at things that is useful for the same purposes.
Thus the interpretation of reality in terms of mathematics and
"unalterable law," is artificial; an abstract way of thinking which
deals not with reality itself but with certain deliberately selected
aspects of it.
RISE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY.--This examination of the principles of natural
science was the beginning of what afterwards proved to be a revolution
in thought. What had been more or less negative criticism in Mach and
Boutroux, became the basis of a new philosophy in the hands of William
James and Bergson. The names, and even the ideas, of these two original
thinkers are familiar far outside strictly philosophical circles, and it
will almost be possible to presume upon a certain acquaintance with them
on the part of our readers.
WILLIAM JAMES.--James himself, like Mach, was led to philosophy by the
road of scientific investigation. He was a psychologist, and it is as
the author of his _Principles of Psychology_ that his name will be
remembered. This work is notable as containing the first complete
application of the Darwinian theory to the evolution of mind. Mental
action is there represented as a capacity developed by the organism to
enable it to deal with its environment. As an exponent of James puts it:
"The mind, like an antenna, feels its way for the organism. It gropes
about, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and many
failures; always urged into taking the initiative and doomed to success
or failure in some hour of trial."[53]
The corollary which attaches to propositions of this kind is that
knowledge in all its varieties and developments arises from _practical
needs_. And the mind (here is an echo of Mach) _selects_ those aspects
of reality which concern it, and out of that selected material makes up
a new (mental) world of its own. Which world is far from being a
"picture" of reality, but which is "symbolic" of it (here is another
memory of Mach).[54]
This view obviously cuts the ground from under dogmatic materialism. The
world which that philosophy regards as _reality_, is, to the critical
eye, a collection of abstractions, a mental creation arising out of the
practical needs of life.
HENRI BERGSON.--This line of criticism, that of the evolutionary
psychologist, opened up by James, has been carried to extreme lengths by
the French philosopher Bergson. "Dig to the very roots of nature and of
mind" is his advice. He begins by asking, How, as a matter of history,
has human intellect developed? He then, and then only, proceeds to put
the question (which uncritical thinkers always put _first_), What can
the intellect do for us?
His theory of the origin of intellect is the same as that of William
James. Life (through the evolutionary process) has produced it. But the
conclusion that he draws from this hypothesis is that _the intellect,
being itself a product of life, or a form of life, cannot understand the
whole of life_. This thesis is elaborated with a wealth of illustration
and erudition, both scientific and philosophic, and with a literary
grace and charm possible only for a Frenchman, in the famous work
_Evolution Creatrice_ (1907).
BERGSON'S ADVANCE ON MACH AND JAMES.--Those thinkers who had made a
serious attempt at a philosophy of science, had demonstrated that the
"mechanical view" of nature was a mental abstraction, and not a complete
representation of reality. Such is the debt of philosophy to the
researches of Mach, Boutroux, James, and others who worked along their
lines.
But it remained for Bergson to demonstrate that the mechanical view was
_the inevitable product of the mental processes which we describe by the
word "intellect."_
The path which led Bergson to this goal will have to be briefly
indicated by us.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTELLECT.--What is the "intellect," to which we
look in vain for any _complete_ explanation of existence? This is the
preliminary question.
Our intellect is, as James had taught, a faculty developed by the
evolutionary process in our species to enable it to deal with its
_material_ environment. And Bergson was the first to point out that as a
consequence of its having been developed for this particular purpose
(i.e., dealing with a _material_ environment), intellect is "never quite
at its ease, never entirely at home, except when it is working upon
inert matter." If it has to deal with "living" matter, it "treats it as
inert, without troubling about the life that animated it."
Such is the first characteristic of the intellect: it feels at home in
dealing with dead matter, and living matter it prefers to treat "as
inert."
Another characteristic of intellect is that, just as it treats the
living as if it were non-living, so it prefers to treat the mobile as
though it were motionless. Motion is a thing which the intellect simply
cannot grasp; it has to treat it artificially, and represent a process
which in reality is continuous and indivisible, as discontinuous and
divisible--a succession of points, out of which no magic can conjure
motion. Philosophy became aware of this as soon as it opened its eyes.
Hence the paradox of Zeno, that Achilles will never overtake the
tortoise, if the latter once gets a start. For if space and time are
infinitely divisible (as intellect holds them to be), by the time
Achilles has reached the tortoise's starting point, the tortoise has
already got ahead of _that_ starting point, and so on _ad infinitum_;
the interval between them being endlessly diminished, but never
disappearing.
Zeno's paradox arises because of an innate fault in the "intellectual"
method of dealing with motion; a method which Bergson calls
"cinematographical," because it regards a single movement as a
succession of infinitely small motions. That method is hopeless; and if
we expect to understand motion by its means,
"You will always experience the disappointment of the child, who tries,
by clapping its hands together to crush the smoke. The movement slips
through the interval, because every attempt to reconstitute change out
of states implies the absurd proposition that movement is made up of
immobilities."[55]
So that the intellect is best fitted to deal, not with living and
moving, but with dead and motionless matter. Of the latter it can form a
clear idea; but in dealing with the former, it finds itself at a loss;
it has to abstract the life and the motion from what lives or moves, and
what it cannot grasp, it must treat as non-existent.
BERGSON'S ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM.--A penetrating remark of James' will
help us, at this point, to understand the significance for philosophy
of these new theories.
"In spite of sceptics and empiricists, in spite of Protagoras, Hume, and
James Mill, rationalism has never been seriously questioned, for its
sharpest critics have always had a tender place for it in their hearts,
and have obeyed some of its mandates. They have not been consistent,
they have played fast and loose with the enemy, and Bergson alone has
been radical."[56]
Bergson's philosophy is, in fact, a reaction against intellectualism or
rationalism; by which is meant the theory that pure reason is competent
by its nature to give a complete and exhaustive account of reality.
But according to Bergson, intellect, which is a faculty developed to
enable men to subdue and turn to advantage their material environment,
and which is, as it were, "fascinated by the contemplation of inert
matter," will not reveal the true meaning and nature of existence; it
gives us "a translation of life in terms of inertia," and can do no
more.
This criticism of the intellect (if it be sound), though it does not
invalidate the work of that faculty in its own proper sphere,
necessarily involves its discredit as a key to the unlocking of the
final mysteries of life and of being. These things lie outside its
province. "Whether it wants to treat of the life of the body, or the
life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigour, the stiffness, and the
brutality of an instrument not designed for such use."[57]
INTELLECT AND INSTINCT.--Since intellect, by its methods, has induced
men to turn their backs on reality, and to look on abstractions
instead, the only hope of reaching reality is through an entire change
of method and direction. There is, according to Bergson, a
non-intellectual variety of knowledge, which (from his point of view) it
was a kind of original sin ever to depart from; an original sin which
has vitiated all our philosophic thinking from the days of Plato.
This variety of knowledge is more original and fundamental than any
which the processes of the intellect, vitiated as these are by certain
inherent perversions, can give us. Intellect cannot correct itself; we
must call in the aid of some other faculty if we would understand
reality.
Bergson finds this faculty in what he calls "instinct." According to
him, consciousness has developed in two divergent directions--instinct
and intellect; and the difference between these is not one of intensity
or degree, but of _kind_.[58]
They are two divergent developments of the same original consciousness,
of which common origin they both retain traces, for they are not
entirely dissimilar, nor is either of them ever found in a pure state.
Intellect is characteristic of man. Instinct is most highly developed
among certain insects, notably the _hymenopterae_ (i.e., bees and
ants).[59]
BLINDNESS OF INTELLECT.--And the difficulty of the philosophical problem
for man arises from the anomalies of his own constitution (as
interpreted by Bergson in the light of his theory of instinct and
intellect). As he puts it:
"There are things that Intelligence (or intellect) alone is able to
seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct
alone could find; but it will never seek them." (_Creative Evolution_,
p. 159).
"If the consciousness which slumbers in instinct were to wake up ... if
we knew how to question it, and if it knew how to reply, it would
deliver to our keeping the most intimate secrets of life."
Thus Bergson regards it as impossible that intellect should ever supply
us with the complete truth about reality; there are things, e.g. life
itself--which altogether elude its grasp.
INTUITION.--The situation, however, is not entirely hopeless. Man
possesses some measure of instinct, which, when it has "become
disinterested, self-conscious, and capable of reflecting upon its
object," Bergson calls intuition. By means of this faculty, man is able,
darkly perhaps but not ineffectually, to grope his way towards an
understanding of reality.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.--Just as the criticisms of
Cusanus and others freed thought from an incubus which seemed likely to
prevent its further development, so the movement initiated by Mach and
culminating (for the present) in Bergson, has done much to discredit "a
certain new scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of
the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo, as the old
scholasticism grew up around Aristotle."[60]
Mechanical determinism was characteristic of much nineteenth-century
thought in Europe, not only amongst materialists, but also, in certain
cases, amongst idealists as well. Against this aspect of contemporary
philosophy, the work of James and Bergson has been a revolt.
"Indeterminism," i.e. a belief in the reality of freedom and
spontaneity, is an essential part of their system. Their indeterminism
is indeed the necessary and logical accompaniment of their
anti-intellectualism. For determinism is "a fabrication of the
_intellect_," a device which makes reality more manageable, more
amenable to logic, more easily systematised. Freedom, like life and
motion, eludes the categories of the intellect.
THE MECHANICAL VIEW ASSAILED.--Such are the lines upon which the new
criticism of the mechanical view (the most radical criticism it has had
to meet since Kant) proceeds. That view, and the idea of predetermined
human action which it involves, is an inevitable product of an intellect
naturally incapable of understanding freedom and spontaneity. These, as
they destroy its scheme of thought, it casts out as an illusion.
"Incorrigibly presumptuous," it insists on interpreting freedom by means
of those notions which suit inert matter alone, and therefore always
perceives it as necessity. So that all life, far from being subjected to
mechanical necessity, as had seemed the inevitable conclusion of
naturalistic philosophy, was spontaneity (so to speak) materialised and
embodied:
"All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous
push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality,
and the whole of humanity ... is one immense army galloping beside and
before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge, able to beat
down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps
even death."[61]
We have indeed travelled a long way from the austere abstractions of Mr.
Herbert Spencer. The new evolutionism is very different from the old. It
substitutes for "mechanism" another conception--that of "dynamism,"
according to which the process of evolution is something undetermined
and impredictable--"creative," in fact. The world of organic life is
embodied "creative activity," and what this "creative activity" is, we
ourselves experience every time we act freely.
PLURALISM.--The philosophy of Bergson is a reaction against the
mechanical evolutionism (i.e. naturalism) of the nineteenth century.
Closely allied with it is another movement of thought, known as
_pluralism_. This, too, is a reaction, not so much against naturalism,
as against certain forms of idealism.
Idealism, it will be remembered, seeks to interpret reality in terms of
mind or spirit. And it does this in certain cases--notably in the case
of F. H. Bradley--by regarding all _phenomena_ as forms or aspects of
the one absolute mind or spirit.
This has seemed to many thinkers a philosophy too abstract and too
remote from the world of experience. Hence the question arose whether it
might not be possible to interpret nature in terms of mind without being
compelled to take refuge in the abstractions of "absolutism." And
pluralism is an attempt to solve the problem.
LEIBNIZ REVIVED.--Leibniz' system of "monads," the nature of which will
hardly have been forgotten, has been the model to which philosophers
have looked in constructing their new system. And the "Monadology" may
be taken as the type to which all modern attempts to construct a
"pluralistic" philosophy more or less conform.
The essence of "pluralism"--whether Leibnizian or other--lies in the
proposition that there exists an indefinite variety of beings, some
higher, some lower than ourselves. The pluralist agrees with the
idealist in declaring that the essence of reality is _spirit_, but
differs from him in declining to allow independent spirits to be
absorbed by an "all-devouring Absolute."
PLURALISM AND THEISM.--William James himself, in a work _A Pluralistic
Universe_ (1909) outlined a philosophy of spirit radically opposed to
"Absolute Idealism," which he subjects to a good deal of criticism.
Another important work, written from a similar point of view, is
Professor James Ward's _Pluralism and Theism_ (1911).[62]
With regard to modern pluralism, the notable features are two. In the
first place, it is a philosophy of _personality_, which it regards as
the most fundamental form of reality; and also, that it is _theistic_ in
a sense peculiar to itself. It believes in a God who may be termed the
supreme monad, i.e. the head of a system of monads; but whose power may
be said, in certain respects, to be limited. And indeed some such
position seems to be the _logical_ conclusion that follows from the
premises with which pluralists start, and also (we may add) from the
facts of experience.[63]
Pluralists unite in affirming that their God is (what they deny the
idealistic Absolute to be) the God of the religious consciousness. James
elaborates this thesis with his usual resourcefulness and skill. The
controversy, however, is one into which it does not seem necessary for
us to enter. Pluralism and idealism are or may be both definitely
spiritual philosophies, and perhaps they appeal to different types of
mind. We, at any rate, shall not undertake to judge between them. Both
alike are preferable to dogmatic naturalism.