CHAPTER C.

MR. BENTON'S SPEECH IN REPLY TO MR. CLAY--EXTRACTS.

Mr. Clay had spoken on three successive days, being the last days of

the year 1833. Mr. Benton followed him,--and seeing the advantage

which was presented in the character of the resolve, and that of

the speech in support of it, all bearing the impress of a criminal

proceeding, without other result than to procure a sentence of

condemnation against the President for violating the laws and the

constitution, endangering the public liberty and establishing a

tyranny,--he took up the proceeding in that sense; and immediately

turned all the charges against the resolution itself and its mover,

as a usurpation of the rights of the House of Representatives in

originating an impeachment, and a violation of law and constitution

in trying it _ex parte_; and said:

"The first of these resolutions contained impeachable matter,

and was in fact, though not in form, a direct impeachment of the

President of the United States. He recited the constitutional

provision, that the President might be impeached--1st, for

treason; 2d, for bribery; 3d, for high crimes; 4th, for

misdemeanors; and said that the first resolution charged both a

high crime and a misdemeanor upon the President; a high crime,

in violating the laws and constitution, to obtain a power over

the public treasure, to the danger of the liberties of the

people; and a misdemeanor, in dismissing the late Secretary

of the Treasury from office. Mr. B. said that the terms of

the resolution were sufficiently explicit to define a high

crime, within the meaning of the constitution, without having

recourse to the arguments and declarations used by the mover in

illustration of his meaning; but, if any doubt remained on that

head, it would be removed by the whole tenor of the argument,

and especially that part of it which compared the President's

conduct to that of Cæsar, in seizing the public treasure, to aid

him in putting an end to the liberties of his country; and every

senator, in voting upon it, would vote as directly upon the

guilt or innocence of the President, as if he was responding to

the question of guilty or not guilty, in the concluding sentence

of a formal impeachment.

"We are, then, said Mr. B., trying an impeachment! But how?

The constitution gives to the House of Representatives the

sole power to originate impeachments; yet we originate this

impeachment ourselves. The constitution gives the accused a

right to be present; but he is not here. It requires the Senate

to be sworn as judges; but we are not so sworn. It requires the

Chief Justice of the United States to preside when the President

is tried; but the Chief Justice is not presiding. It gives the

House of Representatives a right to be present, and to manage

the prosecution; but neither the House nor its managers are

here. It requires the forms of criminal justice to be strictly

observed; yet all these forms are neglected and violated. It is

a proceeding in which the First Magistrate of the republic is to

be tried without being heard, and in which his accusers are to

act as his judges!

"Mr. B. called upon the Senate to consider well what they did

before they proceeded further in the consideration of this

resolution. He called upon them to consider what was due to the

House of Representatives, whose privilege was invaded, and who

had a right to send a message to the Senate, complaining of the

proceeding, and demanding its abandonment. He conjured them to

consider what was due to the President, who was thus to be tried

in his absence for a most enormous crime; what was due to the

Senate itself, in thus combining the incompatible characters

of accusers and judges, and which would itself be judged by

Europe and America. He dwelt particularly on the figure which

the Senate would make in going on with the consideration of

this resolution. It accused the President of violating the

constitution; and itself committed twenty violations of the

same constitution in making the accusation! It accused him of

violating a single law, and itself violated all the laws of

criminal justice in prosecuting him for it. It charged him

with designs dangerous to the liberties of the citizens, and

immediately trampled upon the rights of all citizens, in the

person of their Chief Magistrate.

"Mr. B. descanted upon the extraordinary organization of the

Senate, and drew an argument from it in favor of the reserve

and decorum of their proceedings. The Senate were lawgivers,

and ought to respect the laws already made; they were the

constitutional advisers of the President, and should observe,

as nearly as possible, the civil relations which the office

of adviser presumes; they might be his judges, and should be

the last in the world to stir up an accusation against him, to

prejudge his guilt, or to attack his character with defamatory

language. Decorum, the becoming ornament of every functionary,

should be the distinguishing trait of an American senator,

who combines, in his own office, the united dignities of the

executive, the legislative, and the judicial character. In his

judicial capacity especially, he should sacrifice to decorum

and propriety; and shun, as he would the contagious touch of

sin and pestilence, the slightest approach to the character

of prosecutor. He referred to British parliamentary law to

show that the Lords could not join in an accusation, because

they were to try it; but here the Senate was sole accuser,

and had nothing from the House of Representatives to join; but

made the accusation out and out, and tried it themselves. He

said the accusation was a double one--for a high crime and a

misdemeanor--and the latter a more flagrant proceeding than the

former; for it assumed to know for what cause the President had

dismissed his late Secretary, and undertook to try the President

for a thing which was not triable or impeachable.

"From the foundation of the government, it had been settled

that the President's right to dismiss his secretaries resulted

from his constitutional obligation to see that the laws were

faithfully executed. Many Presidents had dismissed secretaries,

and this was the first time that the Senate had ever undertaken

to found an impeachment upon it, or had assumed to know the

reasons for which it was done.

"Mr. B. said that two other impeachments seemed to be going on,

at the same time, against two other officers, the Secretary of

the Treasury and the Treasurer; so that the Senate was brimful

of criminal business. The Treasurer and the Secretary of the

Treasury were both civil officers, and were both liable to

impeachment for misdemeanors in office; and great misdemeanors

were charged upon them. They were, in fact, upon trial, without

the formality of a resolution; and, if hereafter impeached by

the House of Representatives, the Senate, if they believed what

they heard, would be ready to pronounce judgment and remove them

from office, without delay or further examination.

"Mr. B. then addressed himself to the Vice-President (Mr. Van

Buren), upon the novelty of the scene which was going on before

him, and the great change which had taken place since he had

served in the Senate. He commended the peculiar delicacy and

decorum of the Vice-President himself, who, in six years'

service, in high party times, and in a decided opposition,

never uttered a word, either in open or secret session, which

could have wounded the feelings of a political adversary, if

he had been present and heard it. He extolled the decorum of

the opposition to President Adams' administration. If there

was one brilliant exception, the error was redeemed by classic

wit, and the heroic readiness with which a noble heart bared

its bosom to the bullets of those who felt aggrieved. Still

addressing himself to the Vice-President, Mr. B. said that if

he should receive some hits in the place where he sat, without

the right to reply, he must find consolation in the case of his

most illustrious predecessor, the great apostle of American

liberty (Mr. Jefferson), who often told his friends of the

manner in which he had been cut at when presiding over the

Senate, and personally annoyed by the inferior--no, young and

inconsiderate--members of the federal party.

"Mr. B. returned to the point in debate. The President, he

repeated, was on trial for a high crime, in seizing the public

treasure in violation of the laws and the constitution. Was

the charge true? Does the act which he has done deserve the

definition which has been put upon it? He had made up his own

mind that the public deposits ought to be removed from the

Bank of the United States. He communicated that opinion to the

Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary refused to remove them;

the President removed him, and appointed a Secretary who gave

the order which he thought the occasion required. All this he

did in virtue of his constitutional obligation to see the laws

faithfully executed; and in obedience to the same sense of duty

which would lead him to dismiss a Secretary of War, or of the

Navy, who would refuse to give an order for troops to march,

or a fleet to sail. True, it is made the duty of the Secretary

of the Treasury to direct the removal of the deposits; but the

constitution makes it the duty of the President to see that the

Secretary performs his duty; and the constitution is as much

above law as the President is above the Secretary.

"The President is on trial for a misdemeanor--for dismissing his

Secretary without sufficient cause. To this accusation there

are ready answers: first, that the President may dismiss his

Secretaries without cause; secondly, that the Senate has no

cognizance of the case; thirdly, that the Senate cannot assume

to know for what cause the Secretary in question was dismissed.

"The Secretary of the Treasury is on trial. In order to get at

the President, it was found necessary to get at a gentleman

who had no voice on this floor. It had been found necessary to

assail the Secretary of the Treasury in a manner heretofore

unexampled in the history of the Senate. His religion, his

politics, his veracity, his understanding, his Missouri

restriction vote, had all been arraigned. Mr. B. said he would

leave his religion to the constitution of the United States,

Catholic as he was, and although 'the Presbyterian might cut

off his head the first time he went to mass;' for he could see

no other point to the anecdote of Cromwell and the capitulating

Catholics, to whom he granted the free exercise of their

religion, only he would cut off their heads if they went to

mass. His understanding he would leave to himself. The head

which could throw the paper which was taken for a stone on this

floor, but which was, in fact, a double-headed chain-shot fired

from a forty-eight pounder, carrying sails, masts, rigging,

all before it, was a head that could take care of itself. His

veracity would be adjourned to the trial which was to take

place for misquoting a letter of Secretary Crawford, and he

had no doubt would end as the charge did for suppressing a

letter which was printed _in extenso_ among our documents, and

withholding the name and compensation of an agent; when that

name and the fact of no compensation was lying on the table.

The Secretary of the Treasury was arraigned for some incidental

vote on the Missouri restriction, when he was a member of the

Maryland legislature. Mr. B. did not know what that vote was;

but he did know that a certain gentleman, who lately stood in

the relation of _sergeant_ to another gentleman, in a certain

high election, was the leader of the forces which deforced

Missouri of her place in the Union for the entire session which

he first attended (not served) in the Congress of the United

States. His politics could not be severely tried in the time

of the alien and sedition law, when he was scarce of age; but

were well tried during the late war, when he sided with his

country, and received the constant denunciations of that great

organ of federalism, the Federal Republican newspaper. For the

rest, Mr. B. admitted that the Secretary had voted for the

elder Adams to be President of the United States, but denied

the right of certain persons to make that an objection to him.

Mr. B. dismissed these personal charges, for the present, and

would adjourn their consideration until his (Mr. Taney's) trial

came on, for which the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), stood

pledged; and after the trial was over, he had no doubt but

that the Secretary of the Treasury, although a Catholic and a

federalist, would be found to maintain his station in the first

rank of American gentlemen and American patriots.

"Mr. B. took up the serious charges against the Secretary:

that of being the mere instrument of the President in removing

the deposits, and violating the constitution and laws of the

land. How far he was this mere instrument, making up his mind,

in three days, to do what others would not do at all, might

be judged by every person who would refer to the opposition

papers for the division in the cabinet about the removal of

the deposits; and which constantly classed Mr. Taney, then the

Attorney General, on the side of removal. This classification

was correct, and notorious, and ought to exempt an honorable

man, if any thing could exempt him, from the imputation of being

a mere instrument in a great transaction of which he was a prime

counsellor. The fact is, he had long since, in his character of

legal adviser to the President, advised the removal of these

deposits; and when suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to take

the office which would make it his duty to act upon his own

advice, he accepted it from the single sense of honor and duty;

and that he might not seem to desert the President in flinching

from the performance of what he had recommended. His personal

honor was clean; his personal conduct magnanimous; his official

deeds would abide the test of law and truth.

"Mr. B. said he would make short work of long accusations,

and demolish, in three minutes, what had been concocting for

three months, and delivering for three days in the Senate. He

would call the attention of the Senate to certain clauses of

law, and certain treasury instructions which had been left out

of view, but which were decisive of the accusation against

the Secretary. The first was the clause in the bank charter,

which invested the Secretary with the power of transferring

the public funds from place to place. It was the 15th section

of the charter: he would read it. It enacted that whenever

required by the Secretary of the Treasury, the bank should give

the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds

from place to place, within the United States, or territories

thereof; and for distributing the same in payment of the public

creditors, &c.

"Here is authority to the Secretary to transfer the public

moneys from place to place, limited only by the bounds of the

United States and its territories; and this clause of three

lines of law puts to flight all the nonsense about the United

States Bank being the treasury, and the Treasurer being the

keeper of the public moneys, with which some politicians and

newspaper writers have been worrying their brains for the last

three months. In virtue of this clause, the Secretary of the

Treasury gave certain transfer drafts to the amount of two

millions and a quarter; and his legal right to give the draft

was just as clear, under this clause of the bank charter, as his

right to remove the deposits was under another clause of it. The

transfer is made by draft; a payment out of the treasury is made

upon a warrant; and the difference between a transfer draft and

a treasury warrant was a thing necessary to be known by every

man who aspired to the office of illuminating a nation, or of

conducting a criminal prosecution, or even of understanding what

he is talking about. They have no relation to each other. The

warrant takes the money out of the treasury: the draft transfers

it from point to point, for the purpose of making payment: and

all this attack upon the Secretary of the Treasury is simply

upon the blunder of mistaking the draft for the warrant.

"The senator from Kentucky calls upon the people to rise, and

drive the Goths from the capital. Who are those Goths? They

are General Jackson and the democratic party,--he just elected

President over the senator himself, and the party just been

made the majority in the House--all by the vote of the people.

It is their act that has put these Goths in possession of the

capital to the discomfiture of the senator and his friends; and

he ought to be quite sure that he felt no resentment at an event

so disastrous to his hopes, when he has indulged himself with so

much license in vituperating those whom the country has put over

him.

"The senator from Kentucky says the eyes and the hopes of the

country are now turned upon Congress. Yes, Congress is his

word, and I hold him to it. And what do they see? They see one

House of Congress--the one to which the constitution gives the

care of the purse, and the origination of impeachments, and

which is fresh from the popular elections: they see that body

with a majority of above fifty in favor of the President and

the Secretary of the Treasury, and approving the act which

the senator condemns. They see that popular approbation in

looking at one branch of Congress, and the one charged by the

constitution with the inquisition into federal grievances. In

the other branch they see a body far removed from the people,

neglecting its proper duties, seizing upon those of another

branch, converting itself into a grand inquest, and trying

offences which itself prefers; and in a spirit which bespeaks

a zeal quickened by the sting of personal mortification. He

says the country feels itself deceived and betrayed--insulted

and wronged--its liberties endangered--and the treasury robbed:

the representatives of the people in the other House, say the

reverse of all this--that the President has saved the country

from the corrupt dominion of a great corrupting bank, by taking

away from her the public money which she was using in bribing

the press, subsidizing members, purchasing the venal, and

installing herself in supreme political power.

"The senator wishes to know what we are to do? What is

our duty to do? I answer, to keep ourselves within our

constitutional duties--to leave this impeachment to the House of

Representatives--leave it to the House to which it belongs, and

to those who have no private griefs to avenge--and to judges,

each of whom should retire from the bench, if he happened to

feel in his heart the spirit of a prosecutor instead of a judge.

The Senate now tries General Jackson; it is subject to trial

itself--to be tried by the people, and to have its sentence

reversed."

The corner-stone of Mr. Clay's whole argument was, that the Bank of

the United States was the treasury of the United States. This was

his fundamental position, and utterly unfounded, and shown to be so

by the fourteenth article of what was called the constitution of

the bank. It was the article which provided for the establishment

of branches of the mother institution, and all of which except the

branch at Washington city, were to be employed, or not employed,

as the directors pleased, as depositories of the public money; and

consequently were not made so by any law of Congress. The article

said:

"The directors of said corporation shall establish a competent

office of discount and deposit in the District of Columbia,

whenever any law of the United States shall require such an

establishment; also one such office of discount and deposit

in any State in which two thousand shares shall have been

subscribed, or may be held, whenever, upon application of the

legislature of such State, Congress may, by law, require the

same: Provided, The directors aforesaid shall not be bound

to establish such office before the whole of the capital of

the bank shall have been paid up. And it shall be lawful for

the directors of the said corporation to establish offices of

discount and deposit wheresoever they shall think fit, within

the United States or the territories thereof, to such persons,

and under such regulations, as they shall deem proper, not

being contrary to law, or the constitution of the bank. Or,

instead of establishing such offices, it shall be lawful for the

directors of the said corporation, from time to time, to employ

any other bank or banks, to be first approved by the Secretary

of the Treasury, at any place or places that they may deem

safe and proper, to manage and transact the business proposed

as aforesaid, other than for the purposes of discount, to be

managed and transacted by such officers, under such agreements,

and subject to such regulations, as they shall deem just and

proper.

"Mr. B. went on to remark upon this article, that it placed

the establishment of but one branch in the reach or power of

Congress, and that one was in the District of Columbia--in

a district of ten miles square--leaving the vast extent of

twenty-four States, and three Territories, to obtain branches

for themselves upon contingencies not dependent upon the will

or power of Congress; or requiring her necessities, or even her

convenience, to be taken into the account. A law of Congress

could obtain a branch in this district; but with respect to

every State, the establishment of the branch depended, first,

upon the mere will and pleasure of the bank; and, secondly, upon

the double contingency of a subscription, and a legislative

act, within the State. If then, the mother bank does not think

fit, for its own advantage, to establish a branch; or, if the

people of a State do not acquire 2,000 shares of the stock of

the bank, and the legislature, therefore, demand it, no branch

will be established in any State, or any Territory of the Union.

Congress can only require a branch, in any State, after two

contingencies have happened in the State; neither of them having

the slightest reference to the necessities, or even convenience,

of the federal government.

"Here, then, said Mr. B., is the Treasury established for the

United States! A Treasury which is to have an existence but

at the will of the bank, or the will of a State legislature,

and a few of its citizens, enough to own 2,000 shares of stock

worth $100 a share! A Treasury which Congress has no hand in

establishing, and cannot preserve after it is established; for

the mother bank, after establishing her branches, may shut

them up, or withdraw them. Such a thing has already happened.

Branches in the West have been, some shut up, some withdrawn;

and, in these cases, the Treasury was broken up, according to

the new-fangled conception of a national Treasury. No! said

Mr. B., the Federal bank is no more the Treasury of the United

States than the State banks are. One is just as much the

Treasury as the other; and made so by this very 14th fundamental

article of the constitution of the bank. Look at it! Look at

the alternative! Where branches are not established, the State

banks are to be employed!

"The Bank of the United States is to select the State bank; the

Secretary of the Treasury is to approve the selection; and if

he does so the State bank so selected, and so approved becomes

the keeper of the public moneys; it becomes the depository of

the public moneys; it transfers them; it pays them out; it does

every thing except make discounts for the mother bank and issue

notes; it does everything which the federal government wants

done; and that is nothing but what a bank of deposit can do. The

government makes no choice between State banks and branch banks.

They are all one to her. They stand equal in her eyes; they

stand equal in the charter of the bank itself; and the horror

that has now broken out against the State banks is a thing of

recent conception--a very modern impulsion; which is rebuked and

condemned by the very authority to which it traces its source.

Mr. B. said, the State banks were just as much made the federal

treasury by the bank charter, as the United States Bank itself

was: and that was sufficient to annihilate the argument which

now sets up the federal bank for the federal treasury. But the

fact was, that neither was made the Treasury; and it would be

absurd to entertain such an idea for an instant; for the federal

bank may surrender her charter, and cease to exist--it can do

so at any moment it pleases--the State banks may expire upon

their limitation; they may surrender; they may be dissolved in

many ways, and so cease to exist; and then there would be no

Treasury! What an idea, that the existence of the Treasury of

this great republic is to depend, not upon itself, but upon

corporations, which may cease to exist, on any day, by their own

will, or their own crimes."

The debates on this subject brought out the conclusion that

the treasury of the United States had a legal, not a material

existence--that the Treasurer having no buildings, and keepers, to

hold the public moneys, resorted (when the treasury department was

first established), to the collectors of the revenue, leaving the

money in their hands until drawn out for the public service--which

was never long, as the revenues were then barely adequate to meet

the daily expenses of the government; afterwards to the first Bank

of the United States--then to local banks; again to the second bank;

and now again to local banks. In all these cases the keepers of

the public moneys were nothing but keepers, being the mere agents

of the Secretary of the treasury in holding the moneys which he

had no means of holding himself. From these discussions came the

train of ideas which led to the establishment of the independent

treasury--that is to say, to the creation of officers, and the

erection of buildings, to hold the public moneys.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 1 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 100 / 166 章