VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF '98-'99--DISABUSED OF THEIR SOUTH CAROLINA
INTERPRETATION--1. UPON THEIR OWN WORDS--2. UPON CONTEMPORANEOUS
INTERPRETATION.
The debate in the Senate, in 1830, on Mr. Foot's resolutions,
has been regarded as the dawn of those ideas which, three years
later, under the name of "nullification," but with the character
and bearing the seeds of disorganization and civil war, agitated
and endangered the Union. In that debate, Mr. Hayne, as heretofore
stated, quoted the third clause of the Virginia resolutions of
1798, as the extent of the doctrines he intended to avow. Though
Mr. Webster, at the time, gave a different and more portentous
interpretation to Mr. Hayne's course of argument, I did not believe
that Mr. Hayne purposed to use those resolutions to any other effect
than that intended by their authors and adopters; and they, I well
knew, never supposed any right in a State of the Union, of its
own motion, to annul an act of Congress, or resist its operation.
Soon after the discussion of 1830, however, nullification assumed
its name, with a clear annunciation of its purpose, namely, to
maintain an inherent right in a State to annul the acts of the
federal government, and resist their operation, in any case in which
the State might judge an act of Congress to exceed the limits of
the constitution. And to support this disorganizing doctrine, the
resolutions of 1798, were boldly and perseveringly appealed to, and
attempted to be wrested from their real intent. Nor is this effort
yet abandoned; nor can we expect it to be whilst nullification still
exists, either avowed or covert. The illustrious authorship of the
Resolutions of 1798; the character and reputation of the legislators
who adopted them; their general acceptance by the republican party,
the influence they exercised, not only on questions of the day,
but on the fate of parties, and in shaping the government itself,
all combine to give them importance, and a high place in public
esteem; and would go far to persuade the country that nullification
was right, if _they_ were nullification. In connection, therefore,
with the period and events in which nullification had its rise, the
necessity is imposed of an examination into the scope and objects of
those resolutions; and the same reasons that have made, and make,
the partisans of nullification so urgent to identify their fallacies
with the resolutions, must make every patriot solicitous for the
_vindication_ of them and their author and adopters from any such
affinity.
Fortunately, the material is at hand, and abundant. The resolutions
are vindicated on their text alone; and contemporaneous
authentic interpretation, and the reiterated, earnest--even
indignant--disclaimers of the illustrious author himself, utterly
repudiate the intent that nullification attempts to impute to them.
I propose, therefore, to treat them in these three aspects:
I. _Vindicated on their text._
The clause of the resolutions, chiefly relied on as countenancing
nullification, is the third resolution of the series, and is as
follows:
"That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare
that it views the powers of the federal government, as resulting
from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limited
by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting
that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable,
and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the
said compact, the States, who are the parties thereto, have
the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting
the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their
respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties
appertaining to them."
The right and duty of interposition is certainly here claimed for
the States, in case of a "deliberate, palpable, and dangerous
assumption of powers, by the federal government;" but, looking
alone to the words of the text, it is an unreasonable inference,
that forcible or nullifying interposition is meant. The word does
not import resistance, but rather the contrary; and can only be
understood in a hostile sense, when the connection in which it
is used necessarily implies force. Such is not the case in this
resolution; and no one has a right to suppose that, if its authors
had intended to assert a principle of such transcendent importance,
as that the States were severally possessed of the right to annul
an act of Congress, and resist its execution, they would not have
used words to declare that meaning explicitly, or, that they would
intimate covertly a doctrine they dared not avow.
The constitution itself suggests several modes of interposition,
competent for either the States or the people. It provides for the
election (by a mixed system, popular and State), at brief intervals,
of all the functionaries of the federal government; and hence,
the interposition of the will of the States and people to effect
a change of rulers; hence, of policy. It provides that freedom of
speech and the press, shall not be abridged, which is equivalent to
a provision that those powerful means be perpetually interposed to
affect the public conscience and sentiment--to counsel and alarm
the public servants; to influence public policy--to restrain and
remedy government abuses. It recognizes the right, and provides that
it shall not be abridged, of the people "to assemble and petition
the government for the redress of grievances;" hence, contemplating
that there may be grievances on the part of the government, and
suggesting a means of meeting and overcoming them. Finally, it
provides that, on the application of a designated proportion of
the States, Congress shall cause a convention to be called, to
provide, in the constitution itself, should it be judged necessary,
additional securities to the States and the people, and additional
restraints on the government.
To act on the sentiments of the country then; to bring to their aid
the potent engines of the press and public harangues; to move the
people to petition and remonstrance against the obnoxious measures;
to draw the attention of other States to the abuses complained
of, and to the latitudinous construction the federal authorities
were giving to their powers; and thus bring those States, in like
manner, to act on their senators and representatives, and on the
public voice, so as to produce an immediate remedy, or to co-operate
in calling a convention to provide further securities--one or
both; these alone are the modes of "interposition" the Virginia
resolutions of 1798 contemplated; all they professed; all they
attempted; all that the resolutions, or their history, warrant to
be imputed to them. These modes of interposition are all consistent
with peace and order; with obedience to the laws, and respect
to the lawful authorities; the very means, as was well argued
by the supporters of the resolutions, to prevent civil strife,
insubordination, or revolution; in all respects, the antipodes of
nullification.
To enlarge somewhat on the force of the words of the resolutions:
The right and duty of "the States" to interpose, certainly does
not mean the right of "a State" to nullify and set at nought. The
States--less than the whole number--have a right to interpose,
secured, as already shown, in the constitution; and this, not only
persuasively, but peremptorily; to compel the action they may
desire; and it is demonstrable, that it was this constitutional
provision that the Virginia legislature had in mind, as a last
resort. The resolutions do not speak any where of the right of a
State; but use the plural number, States. Virginia exercises the
right that pertains to a State--all the right that, in the premises,
she pretends to--in passing the resolutions, declaring her views,
and inviting the like action of her co-States. Instead, therefore,
of the resolutions being identical with nullification, the two
doctrines are not merely hostile, but exactly opposites; the sum of
the Virginia doctrine being, that it belongs to a State to take,
as Virginia does in this instance, the initiative in impeaching
any objectionable action of the federal government, and to ask
her co-States to co-operate in procuring the repeal of a law, a
change of policy, or an amendment of the constitution--according
as one or the other, or all, may be required to remedy the evil
complained of; whereas, nullification claims, that a single State
may, of its own motion, nullify any act of the federal government it
objects to, and stay its operation, until three fourths of all the
States come to the aid of the national authority, and re-enact the
nullified measure. One submits to the law, till a majority repeal
it, or a convention provides a constitutional remedy for it; the
other undertakes to annul the law, and suspend its operation, so
long as three fourths of the States are not brought into active
co-operation to declare it valid. The resolutions maintain the
government in all its functions, only seeking to call into use the
particular function of repeal or amendment: nullification would
stop the functions of government, and arrest laws indefinitely;
and is incapable of being brought to actual experiment, in a
single instance, without a subversion of authority, or civil war.
To this essential, radical, antagonistic degree do the Virginia
resolutions and the doctrine of nullification differ, one from the
other; and thus unjustly are the Virginia republicans, of 1798,
accused of planting the seeds of dissolution--a "deadly poison,"
as Mr. Madison, himself, emphatically calls the doctrine of
nullification--in the institutions they had so labored to construct.
II. _Upon their contemporaneous interpretation._
The contemporaneous construction of the resolutions is found in the
debates on their adoption; in the responses to them of other State
legislatures; and in the confirmatory report prepared by the same
author, and adopted by the Virginia general assembly, in January,
1800; and by the conduct of the State, in the case of Callender.
And it is remarkable (when we consider the uses to which the
resolutions have subsequently been turned), that, while the friends
of the resolutions nowhere claim more than a declaratory right for
the legislature, and deny all idea of force or resistance, their
adversaries, in the heat of debate, nor the States which manifested
the utmost bitterness in their responses, have not attributed to
the resolutions any doctrine like that of nullification. Both
in the debates and in the State responses, the opponents of the
resolutions denounce them as inflamatory, and "tending" to produce
insubordination, and whatever other evil could then be thought of,
concerning them; but no one attributes to them the absurdity of
claiming for the State a right to arrest, of its own motion, the
operation of the acts of Congress.
The principal speakers, in the Virginia legislature, in opposition
to the resolutions, were: Mr. George Keith Taylor, Mr. Magill, Mr.
Brooke, Mr. Cowan, Gen. Henry Lee, and Mr. Cureton. Nearly the whole
debate turned, not on the abstract propriety or expediency of such
resolutions, on the question whether the acts of Congress, which
were specially complained of, were, in fact, unconstitutional.
It was admitted, indeed, by Gen. Lee, who spoke elaborately and
argumentatively against the resolutions, that, if the acts were
unconstitutional, it was "proper to interfere;" but the extreme
notions of the powers of the federal government that then prevailed
in the federal party, led them to contend that those powers extended
to the acts in question, though, at this day, they are universally
acknowledged to be out of the pale of federal legislation.
Beyond the discussion of this point, and one or two others not
pertinent to the present matter, the speakers dwelt only on the
supposed "tendency" of such declarations to excite the people to
insubordination and non-submission to the law.
Mr. George K. Taylor complained at the commencement of his speech,
that the resolutions "contained a declaration, not of opinion, but
of fact;" and he apprehended that "the consequences of pursuing the
advice of the resolutions would be insurrection, confusion, and
anarchy;" but the legal effect and character that he attributed to
the resolutions, is shown in his concluding sentence, as follows:
"The members of that Congress which had passed those laws, had
been, so far as he could understand, since generally re-elected;
therefore he thought the people of the United States had decided
in favor of their constitutionality, and that such an attempt
as they were then making to induce Congress to repeal the laws
would be nugatory."
Mr. Brooke thought resolutions "declaring laws which had been made
by the government of the United States to be unconstitutional, null
and void," were "dangerous and improper;" that they had a "tendency
to inflame the public mind;" to lessen the confidence that ought to
subsist between the representatives of the people in the general
government and their constituents; and to "sap the very foundations
of the government, by producing resistance to its laws." But that
he did not apprehend the resolutions to be, or to intend, any thing
beyond an expression of sentiment, is evident from his further
declaration, that he was opposed to the resolutions, and equally
opposed to any modification of them, that should be "intended as
an expression of the general sentiment on the subject, because he
conceived it to be an improper mode by which to express the wishes
of the people of the State on the subject."
General Lee thought the alien and sedition laws "not
unconstitutional;" but if they were unconstitutional he "admitted
the right of interposition on the part of the general assembly."
But he thought these resolutions showed "indecorum and hostility,"
and were "not the likeliest way to obtain a repeal of the laws."
He "suspected," in fact, that "the repeal of the laws was not
the leading point in view," but that they "covered" the objects
of "promotion of disunion and separation of the States." The
resolutions "struck him as recommending resistance. They declared
the laws null and void. Our citizens thus thinking would disobey the
laws." His plan would be, if he thought the laws unconstitutional,
to let the people petition, or that the legislature come forward at
once, "with a proposition for amending the doubtful parts of the
constitution;" or with a "respectful or friendly memorial, urging
Congress to repeal the laws." But he "admitted" the only right
which the resolutions assert for the State, namely, the right "to
interpose." The remarks of the other opponents to the resolutions
were to the same effect.
On behalf of the resolutions, the principal speakers were, Mr.
John Taylor, of Caroline, who had introduced them, Mr. Ruffin, Mr.
Mercer, Mr. Pope, Mr. Foushee, Mr. Daniel, Mr. Peter Johnston, Mr.
Giles, Mr. James Barbour.
They obviated the objection of the speakers on the other side,
that the resolutions "contained a declaration, not of opinion,
but of fact," by striking out the words which, in the original
draft, declared the acts in question to be "null, void, and of
no force or effect;" so as to make it manifest, as the advocates
of the resolutions maintained, that they intended nothing beyond
an expression of sentiment. They obviated another objection
which appeared in the original draft, which asserted the States
_alone_ to be the parties to the constitution, by striking out
the word "alone." They thoroughly and successfully combated both
the "suspicion" that they hid any ulterior object of dissension
or disunion, and the "apprehension" that the resolutions would
encourage insubordination among the people. They acceded to
and affirmed, that their object was to obtain a repeal of the
offensive measures, that the resolutions might ultimately lead to
a convention for amending the constitution, and that they were
intended both to express and to affect public opinion; but nothing
more.
Says Mr. Taylor, of Caroline:
"If Congress should, as was certainly possible, legislate
unconstitutionally, it was evident that in theory they have
done wrong, and it only remained to consider whether the
constitution is so defective as to have established limitations
and reservations, without the means of enforcing them, in a
mode by which they could be made practically useful. Suppose
a clashing of opinion should exist between Congress and the
States, respecting the true limits of their constitutional
territories, it was easy to see, that if the right of decision
had been vested in either party, that party, deciding in the
spirit of party, would inevitably have swallowed up the other.
The constitution must not only have foreseen the possibility of
such a clashing, but also the consequence of a preference on
either side as to its construction. And out of this foresight
most have arisen the fifth article, by which two thirds of
Congress may call upon the States for an explanation of any
such controversy as the present; and thus correct an erroneous
construction of its own acts by a minority of the States, whilst
two thirds of the States are also allowed to compel Congress to
call a convention, in case so many should think an amendment
necessary for the purpose of checking the unconstitutional acts
of that body.... Congress is the creature of the States and the
people; but neither the States nor the people are the creatures
of Congress. It would be eminently absurd, that the creature
should exclusively construe the instrument of its own existence;
and therefore this construction was reserved indiscriminately
to one or the other of those powers, of which Congress was the
joint work; namely, to the people whenever a convention was
resorted to, or to the States whenever the operation should be
carried on by three fourths."
"Mr. Taylor then proceeded to apply these observations to
the threats of war, and the apprehension of civil commotion,
'towards which the resolutions were said to have a tendency.'
Are the republicans, said he, possessed of fleets and armies?
If not, to what could they appeal for defence and support?
To nothing, except public opinion. If that should be against
them, they must yield; if for them, did gentlemen mean to say,
that public will should be assailed by force?... And against a
State which was pursuing the only possible and ordinary mode
of ascertaining the opinion of two thirds of the States, by
declaring its own and asking theirs?"
"He observed that the resolutions had been objected to, as
couched in language too strong and offensive; whilst it
had also been said on the same side, that if the laws were
unconstitutional, the people ought to fly to arms and resist
them. To this he replied that he was not surprised to hear
the enemies of the resolutions recommending measures which
were either feeble or rash. Timidity only served to invite a
repetition of injury, whilst an unconstitutional resort to arms
would not only justly exasperate all good men, but invite those
who differed from the friends of the resolutions to the same
appeal, and produce a civil war. Hence, those who wished to
preserve the peace, as well as the constitution, had rejected
both alternatives, and chosen the middle way. They had uttered
what they conceived to be truth, and they had pursued a system
which was only an appeal to public opinion; because that appeal
was warranted by the constitution and by principle."
Mr. Mercer, in reply to Mr. G. K. Taylor, said:
"The gentleman from Prince George had told the committee
that the resolutions were calculated to rouse the people to
resistance, to excite the people of Virginia against the federal
government. Mr. Mercer did not see how such consequences could
result from their adoption. They contained nothing more than
the sentiment which the people in many parts of the State had
expressed, and which had been conveyed to the legislature in
their memorials and resolutions then lying on the table. He
would venture to say that an attention to the resolutions from
the committee would prove that the qualities attempted to be
attached to them by the gentleman could not be found."
"The right of the State government to interfere in the manner
proposed by the resolutions, Mr. Mercer contended was clear to
his mind.... The State believed some of its rights had been
invaded by the late acts of the general government, and proposed
a remedy whereby to obtain a repeal of them. The plan contained
in the resolutions appeared to Mr. Mercer the most advisable.
Force was not thought of by any one.... The States were equally
concerned, as their rights had been equally invaded; and nothing
seemed more likely to produce a temper in Congress for a repeal."
"The object (of the friends of the resolutions), in addressing
the States, is to obtain a similar declaration of opinion, with
respect to several late acts of the general government, ... and
thereby to obtain a repeal."
Mr. Barbour, likewise, in reply to Mr. G. K. Taylor, said:
"The gentleman from Prince George had remarked that those
resolutions invited the people to insurrection and to arms; but,
if he could conceive that the consequences foretold would grow
out of the measure, he would become its bitterest enemy."...
The resolutions were "addressed, not to the people but to the
sister States; praying, in a pacific way, their co-operation, in
arresting the tendency and effect of unconstitutional laws.
"For his part, he was for using no violence. It was the peculiar
blessing of the American people to have redress within their
reach, by constitutional and peaceful means."
On the same point, Mr. Daniel spoke as follows:
"If the other States think, with this, that the laws are
unconstitutional, the laws will be repealed, and the
constitutional question will be settled by this declaration of a
majority of the States."... "If, on the contrary, a sufficient
majority of the States should declare their opinion, that the
constitution gave Congress authority to pass these laws, the
constitutional question would still be settled; but an attempt
might be made so to amend the constitution as to take from
Congress this authority."
And, finally, Mr. Taylor of Caroline, in closing the debate, and
in explanation of his former remarks in respect to calling a
convention, said:
"He would explain, in a few words, what he had before said. That
the plan proposed by the resolutions would not eventuate in war,
but might in a convention. He did not admit, or contemplate,
that a convention would be called. He only said, that if
Congress, upon being addressed to have these laws repealed,
should persist, they might, by a concurrence of three fourths of
the States, be compelled to call a convention."
It is seen, then, by these extracts, that the opposers of the
resolutions did not charge upon them, nor their supporters in any
manner contend for, any principle like that of nullification;
that, on the contrary, the supporters of the resolutions, so far
from the absurd proposition that each State could, for itself,
annul the acts of Congress, and to that extent stop the operation
of the federal government, they did not recognize that power in a
majority of the States, nor even in all the States together, by
any extra-constitutional combination or process, or to annul a law
otherwise than through the prescribed forms of legislative repeal,
or constitutional amendment.
The resolutions were, however, vigorously assailed by the federal
party throughout the Union, especially in the responses of
several of the States; and at the ensuing session of the Virginia
legislature, those State responses were sent to a committee,
who made an elaborate examination of the resolutions, and of
the objections that had been made to them, concluding by a
justification of them in all particulars, and reiterating their
declarations. This report was adopted by the general assembly and is
a part of the contemporaneous and authentic interpretation of the
resolutions. The report says:
"A declaration that proceedings of the federal government are
not warranted by the constitution, is a novelty neither among
the citizens, nor among the legislatures of the States.
"Nor can the declarations of either, whether affirming or
denying the constitutionality of measures of the federal
government, or whether made before or after judicial decisions
thereon, be deemed, in any point of view, an assumption of
the office of judge. The declarations, in such cases, are
expressions of opinion, unaccompanied by any other effect than
what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection. The
expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried
into immediate effect by force."
Again: "In the example given by the State, of declaring
the alien and sedition acts to be unconstitutional, and of
communicating the declaration to other States, no trace of
improper means has appeared. And if the other States had
concurred in making a like declaration, supported too, by the
numerous applications flowing immediately from the people, it
can scarcely be doubted, that these simple means would have been
as sufficient, as they are unexceptionable.
"It is no less certain that other means might have been
employed, which are strictly within the limits of the
constitution. The legislatures of the States might have made
a direct representation to Congress, with a view to obtain
a rescinding of the two offensive acts; or they might have
represented to their respective senators in Congress their wish,
that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment
to the constitution; or two-thirds of themselves, if such had
been their option, might, by an application to Congress, have
obtained a convention for the same object.
"These several means, though not equally eligible in themselves,
nor probably to the States, were all constitutionally open for
consideration. And if the general assembly, after declaring the
two acts to be unconstitutional, the first and most obvious
proceeding on the subject, did not undertake to point out to
the other States a choice among the farther measures that
might become necessary and proper, the resource will not be
misconstrued by liberal minds into any culpable imputation."
These extracts are valuable, not only for their positive testimony
that the Resolution of 1798, nor their authors, had ever
contemplated such a doctrine as Nullification; but also for their
precise definition and enumeration of the powers which, in the
premises, were really claimed for the States, by the State-Rights
Republicans of that day. They are all distinctly laid down:
1. By a solemn declaration of opinion, calculated to operate on the
public sentiment, and to induce the co-operation of other States in
like declarations.
2. To make a direct representation to Congress, with a view to
obtain a repeal of the acts complained of.
3. To represent to their respective senators their wish that
two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the
constitution.
4. By the concurrence of two-thirds of the States to cause Congress
to call a convention for the same object.
These are the entire list of the remedial powers suspected, by
the Resolutions of 1798, and their author and adopters, to exist
in the States with reference to federal enactments. Their variant
character from the peremptory arrest of acts of Congress proposed
by nullification, is well illustrated in the comparison made in the
report between expressions of opinion like those of the resolutions,
and the compulsory operation of a judicial process. Supposing,
says the report, "that it belongs to the judiciary of the United
States, and not the State legislatures, to declare the meaning of
the federal constitution," yet the declarations either of a State,
or the people, "whether affirming or denying the constitutionality
of measures of the federal government, or whether made before or
after judicial decisions thereon," cannot "be deemed in any point
of view an assumption of the office of the judge;" because, "the
declarations in such cases are expressions of opinions unaccompanied
with any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by
exciting reflection;"--whereas, "the expositions of the judiciary
are carried into immediate effect by force."
The Republicans who adopted the Resolutions of 1798, never
contemplated carrying their expositions into effect by force; never
contemplated imparting to them the character of decisions, or
decrees, or the legal determination of a question; or of arresting
by means of them the operation of the acts they condemned. The
worst the enemies of the resolutions undertook to say of them,
was that they were intemperate, and might mislead the people into
disobedience of the laws. This was successfully combated; but had
it been true--had the authors of the resolutions even intended any
thing so base, it would still have been nothing comparable to the
crime of State nullification; of placing the State itself in hostile
array to the federal government. Insubordination of individuals
may usually be overcome by ordinary judicial process, or by the
_posse_ of the county where it occurs; or even if so extensive as
to require the peace-officers to be aided by the military, it is
still but a matter of police, and in our country cannot endanger the
existence of the government. But the array of a _State_ of the Union
against the federal authority, is _war_--a war between powers--both
sovereign in their respective spheres--and that could only terminate
in the destruction of the one, or the subjugation and abasement of
the other.
But neither the one or the other of these crimes was contemplated by
the authors of the Resolutions of 1798. The remedies they claimed a
right to exercise are all pointed out in the constitution itself;
capable of application without disturbing the processes of the
law, or suggesting an idea of insubordination; remedies capable of
saving the liberties of the people and the rights of the States,
and bringing back the federal government to its constitutional
track, without a jar or a check to its machinery; remedies felt to
be sufficient, and by crowning experience soon proven to be so. It
is due to the memory of those men and those times that their acts
should no longer be misconstrued to cover a doctrine synonymous with
disorganization and civil war. The conduct both of the government,
and the people, on the occasion of these resolutions, show how far
they were from any nullifying or insubordinate intention; and this
furnishes us with another convincing proof of the contemporaneous
interpretation of the resolutions. So far (as Mr. Madison justly
says,)[6] was the State of Virginia from countenancing the
nullifying doctrine, that the occasion was viewed as a proper one
for exemplifying its devotion to public order, and acquiescence in
laws which it deemed unconstitutional, while those laws were not
repealed. The language of the Governor of the State (Mr. James
Monroe), in a letter to Mr. Madison, in May and June of 1800, will
attest the principles and feelings which dictated the course pursued
on the occasion, and whether the people understood the resolutions
in any inflammatory or vicious sense.
[6] Selections from the correspondence of Madison, p. 399.
On the 15th May, 1800, Governor Monroe writes to Mr. Madison as
follows:
"Besides, I think there is cause to suspect the sedition law
will be carried into effect in this State at the approaching
federal court, and I ought to be there (Richmond) to aid in
preventing trouble.... I think it possible an idea may be
entertained of opposition, and by means whereof the fair
prospect of the republican party may be overcast. But in this
they are deceived, as certain characters in Richmond and some
neighboring counties are already warned of their danger, so that
an attempt to excite a hot-water insurrection will fail."
And on the 4th of June, 1800, he wrote again, as follows:
"The conduct of the people on this occasion was exemplary, and
does them the highest honor. They seemed aware that the crisis
demanded of them a proof of their respect for law and order,
and resolved to show they were equal to it. I am satisfied a
different conduct was expected from them, for every thing that
could was done to provoke it. It only remains that this business
be closed on the part of the people, as it has been so far
acted; that the judge, after finishing his career, go off in
peace, without experiencing the slightest insult from any one;
and that this will be the case I have no doubt."
Governor Monroe was correct in the supposition that the sedition
law would be carried into effect, at the approaching session of the
federal court, and he was also right in the anticipation that the
people would know how to distinguish between the exercise of means
to procure the repeal of an act, and the exercise of violence to
stop its operation. The act was enforced; was "carried into effect"
in their midst, and a fellow-citizen incarcerated under its odious
provisions, without a suggestion of official or other interference.
Thus we have the contemporaneous interpretation of the resolutions
exemplified and set at rest, by the most powerful of arguments: by
the impressive fact, that when the public indignation was at its
height, subsequent to the resolutions of 1798, and subsequent to the
report of '99, and when both had been universally disseminated and
read, and they had had, with the debates upon them, their entire
influence on the public mind; that at that moment, the act of
Congress against which the resolutions were chiefly aimed, and the
indignation of the community chiefly kindled, was then and there
carried into execution, and that in a form--the unjust deprivation
of a citizen of his liberty--the most obnoxious to a free people,
and the most likely to rouse their opposition; yet quietly and
peaceably done, by the simple, ordinary process of the federal
court. This fact, so creditable to the people of Virginia, is thus
noted in the annual message of Governor Monroe, to the general
assembly, at their next meeting, December, 1800:
"In connection with this subject [of the resolutions] it is
proper to add, that, since your last session, the sedition law,
one of the acts complained of, has been carried into effect in
this commonwealth by the decision of a federal court. I notice
this event, not with a view of censuring or criticising it. The
transaction has gone to the world, and the impartial will judge
of it as it deserves. I notice it for the purpose of remarking
that the decision was executed with the same order and tranquil
submission on the part of the people, as could have been shown
by them on a similar occasion, to any the most necessary,
constitutional and popular acts of the government."
Governor Monroe then adds his official and personal testimony to
the proper intent and character of the proceedings of '98, '9, as
follows:
"The general assembly and the good people of this commonwealth
have acquitted themselves to their own consciences, and to their
brethren in America, in support of a cause which they deem a
national one, by the stand which they made, and the sentiments
they expressed of these acts of the general government; but
they have looked for a change in that respect, to a change in
the public opinion, which ought to be free; not to measures of
violence, discord and disunion, which they abhor."