COMPROMISE LEGISLATION; AND THE ACT, SO CALLED, OF 1833.
This is a species of legislation which wears a misnomer--which has
no foundation in the constitution--and which generally begets more
mischief than it assumes to prevent; and which, nevertheless, is
very popular--the name, though fictitious, being generally accepted
for the reality. There are compromises in the constitution, founded
upon what gives them validity, namely, mutual consent; and they
are sacred. All compromises are agreements, made voluntarily by
independent parties--not imposed by one upon another. They may
be made by compact--not by votes. The majority cannot subject
the minority to its will, except in the present decision--cannot
bind future Congresses--cannot claim any sanctity for their acts
beyond that which grows out of the circumstances in which they
originate, and which address themselves to the moral sense of their
successors, and to reasons of justice or policy which should exempt
an act from the inherent fate of all legislation. The act of 1820,
called the Missouri Compromise, is one of the most respectable and
intelligible of this species of legislation. It composed a national
controversy, and upon a consideration. It divided a great province,
and about equally, between slaveholding and non-slaveholding States.
It admitted a State into the Union; and that State accepted that
admission upon the condition of fidelity to that compromise. And
being founded in the material operation of a line drawn upon the
earth under an astronomical law, subject to no change and open
to all observation, visible and tangible, it became an object
susceptible of certainty, both in its breach and in its observance.
That act is entitled to respect, especially from the party which
imposed it upon the other; and has been respected; for it has
remained inviolate for thirty years--neither side attempting to
break or abolish it--each having the advantage of it--and receiving
all the while, like the first _magna charta_, many confirmations
from successive Congresses, and from State legislatures.
The act of 1833, called a "compromise," was a breach of all the
rules, and all the principles of legislation--concocted out of
doors, managed by politicians dominated by an outside interest--kept
a secret--passed by a majority pledged to its support, and pledged
against any amendment except from its managers;--and issuing
from the conjunction of rival politicians who had lately, and
long, been in the most violent state of legislative as well as
political antagonism. It comprised every title necessary to stamp
a vicious and reprehensible act--bad in the matter--foul in the
manner--full of abuse--and carried through upon the terrors of
some, the interests of others, the political calculations of many,
and the dupery of more; and all upon a plea which was an outrage
upon representative government--upon the actual government--and
upon the people of the States. That plea was, that the elections
(presidential and congressional), had decided the fate of the
protective system--had condemned it--had sentenced it to death--and
charged a new Congress with the execution of the sentence; and,
therefore, that it should be taken out of the hands of that
new Congress, withdrawn from it before it met--and laid away
for nine years and a half under the sanction of a, so called,
compromise--intangible to the people--safe in its existence during
all that time; and trusting to the chapter of accidents, and the
skill of management, for its complete restoration at the end of the
term. This was an outrage upon popular representation--an estoppel
upon the popular will--the arrest of a judgment which the people
had given--the usurpation of the rights of ensuing Congresses.
It was the conception of some rival politicians who had lately
distracted the country by their contention, and now undertook to
compose it by their conjunction; and having failed in the game of
agitation, threw it up for the game of pacification; and, in this
new character, undertook to settle and regulate the affairs of
their country for a term only half a year less than the duration
of the siege of Troy; and long enough to cover two presidential
elections. This was a bold pretension. Rome had existed above five
hundred years, and citizens had become masters of armies, and the
people humbled to the cry of _panem et circenses_--bread and the
circus--before two or three rivals could go together in a corner,
and arrange the affairs of the republic for five years: now this was
done among us for double that time, and in the forty-fourth year
of our age, and by citizens neither of whom had headed, though one
had raised, an army. And now how could this be effected, and in a
country so vast and intelligent? I answer: The inside view which I
have given of the transaction explains it. It was an operation upon
the best, as well as upon the worst feelings of our nature--upon
the patriotic alarms of many, the political calculations of others,
the interested schemes of more, and the proclivity of multitudes
to be deceived. Some political rivals finding tariff no longer
available for political elevation, either in its attack or defence;
and, from a ladder to climb on, become a stumbling-block to fall
over, and a pit to fall into, agree to lay it aside for the term
of two presidential elections; upon the pretext of quieting the
country which they had been disturbing; but in reality to get the
crippled hobby out of the way, and act in concert against an old
foe in power, and a new adversary, lately supposed to have been
killed off, but now appearing high in the political firmament, and
verging to its zenith. That new adversary was Mr. Van Buren, just
elected Vice-President, and in the line of old precedents for the
presidency; and the main object to be able to work against him, and
for themselves, with preservation to the tariff, and extrication
of Mr. Calhoun. The masses were alarmed at the cry of civil war,
concerted and spread for the purpose of alarm; and therefore
ready to hail any scheme of deliverance from that calamity. The
manufacturers saw their advantage in saving their high protecting
duties from immediate reduction. The friends of Mr. Clay believed
that the title of pacificator, which he was to earn, would win for
him a return of the glory of the Missouri compromise. Mr. Calhoun's
friends saw, for him, in any arrangement, a release from his
untenable and perilous position. Members of gentle temperaments in
both Houses, saw relief in middle courses, and felt safety in the
very word "compromise," no matter how fictitious and fallacious. The
friends of Mr. Van Buren saw his advantage at getting the tariff
out of his way also; and General Jackson felt a positive relief in
being spared the dire necessity of enforcing the laws by the sword
and by criminal prosecutions. All these parties united to pass the
act; and after it was passed, to praise it; and so it passed easily,
and was ushered into life in the midst of thundering applause. Only
a few of the well-known senators voted against it--Mr. Webster, Mr.
Dickerson, General Samuel Smith, Mr. Benton.
My objections to this bill, and its mode of being passed, were deep
and abiding, and went far beyond its own obnoxious provisions, and
all the transient and temporary considerations connected with it.
As a friend to popular representative government, I could not see,
without insurmountable repugnance, two citizens set themselves up
for a _power_ in the State, and undertake to regulate, by their
private agreement (to be invested with the forms of law), the
public affairs for years to come. I admit no man to stand for
a _power_ in our country, and to assume to be able to save the
Union. Its safety does not depend upon the bargains of any two
men. Its safety is in its own constitution--in its laws--and in
the affections of the people; and all that is wanted in public men
is to administer the constitution in its integrity, and to enforce
the laws without fear or affection. A compromise made with a State
in arms, is a capitulation to that State; and in this light, Mr.
Calhoun constantly presented the act of 1833 and if it had emanated
from the government, he would have been right in his fact, and
in his inductions; and all discontented States would have been
justified, so far as successful precedent was concerned, in all
future interpositions of its _fiat_ to arrest the action of the
federal government. But it did not emanate from the government. It
(the government) was proceeding wisely, justly, constitutionally
in settling with South Carolina, by removing the cause of her real
grievance, and by enforcing the laws against their violators. It
(the constituted government) was proceeding regularly in this way,
with a prospect of a successful issue at the actual session, and a
certainty of it at the next one, when the whole subject was taken
out of its hands by an arrangement between a few members. The
injury was great then, and of permanent evil example. It remitted
the government to the condition of the old confederation, acting
upon sovereignties instead of individuals. It violated the feature
of our Union which discriminated it from all confederacies which
ever existed, and which was wisely and patriotically put into
the constitution to save it from the fate which had attended all
confederacies, ancient and modern. All these previous confederacies
in their general, or collective capacity, acted upon communities,
and met organized resistance as often as they decreed any thing
disagreeable to one of its strong members. This opposition could
only be subdued by force; and the application of force has always
brought on civil war; which has ended in the destruction of the
confederacy. The framers of our constitutional Union knew all this,
and had seen the danger of it in history, and felt the danger of it
in our confederation; and therefore established a UNION instead of
a LEAGUE--to be sovereign and independent within its sphere, acting
upon persons through its own laws and courts, instead of acting
on communities through persuasion or force. It was the crowning
wisdom of the new constitution; and the effect of this compromise
legislation, was to destroy that great feature of our Union--to
bring the general and State governments into conflict--and to
substitute a sovereign State for an offending individual as often as
a State chose to make the cause of that individual her own. A State
cannot commit treason, but a citizen can, and that against the laws
of the United States; and so, if a citizen commits treason against
the United States he may (if this interposition be admitted), be
shielded by a State. Our whole frame of government is unhinged
when the federal government shifts from its foundation, and goes
to acting upon States instead of individuals and, therefore, the
"compromise," as it was called, with South Carolina in 1833 was in
violation of the great Union principle of our government--remitting
it to the imbecility of the old confederation, giving inducement of
the Nashville convention of the present year (1850); and which has
only to be followed up to see the States of this Union, like those
of the Mexican republic, issuing their _pronunciamientos_ at every
discontent; and bringing the general government to a fight, or a
capitulation, as often as they please.
I omit all consideration of the minor vices of the act--great
and flagrant in themselves, but subordinate in comparison to the
mischiefs done to the frame of our government. At any other time
these vices of matter, and manner, would have been crushing to a
bill. No bill containing a tithe of the vices, crowded into this
one, could ever have got through Congress before. The overthrow
of the old revenue principle, that duties were to be levied on
luxuries, and not on necessaries--substitution of universal _ad
valorems_ to the exclusion of all specific duties--the substitution
of the home for the foreign valuation--the abolition of all
discrimination upon articles in the imposition of duties--the
preposterous stipulation against protection, while giving
protection, and even in new and unheard of forms; all these were
flagrant vices of the bill, no one of which could ever have been
carried through in a bill before; and which perished in this one
before they arrived at their period of operation. The year 1842 was
to have been the jubilee of all these inventions, and set them all
off in their career of usefulness; but that year saw all these fine
anticipations fail! saw the high protective policy re-established,
more burthensome than ever: but of this hereafter. Then the vices
in the passage of the bill, being a political, not a legislative
action--dominated by an outside interest of manufacturers--and
openly carried in the Senate by a _douceur_ to some men, not in
"Kendal Green," but Kendal cotton. Yet it was received by the
country as a deliverance, and the ostensible authors of it greeted
as public benefactors; and their work declared by legislatures to
be sacred and inviolable, and every citizen doomed to political
outlawry that did not give in his adhesion, and bind himself to
the perpetuity of the act. I was one of those who refused this
adhesion--who continued to speak of the act as I thought--and who,
in a few years, saw it sink into neglect and oblivion--die without
the solace of pity or sorrow--and go into the grave without mourners
or witnesses, or a stone to mark the place of its interment.