I. THE COMPOSITION OF POETRY AND PROSE

(_a_) In so far as the _content_ appropriate to poetical composition

is concerned we may, relatively speaking at any rate, exclude the

external world of natural fact. It is spiritual interests rather than

the sun, mountains, landscape, or the bodily human form, and the

like, which are its proper subject-matter. For, although it naturally

embraces the element of sensuous impression and perception, it remains

none the less, even in this respect, an activity of mind. Its main

object is an intuition of ideality, to which it stands as spiritual

activity in closer relation and affinity than is possible for external

objects, as presented in their concrete substance to the senses. The

world of Nature therefore only enters into the content of poetry in so

far as mind discovers therein a stimulus or a material upon which to

exercise its own energy; as, for example, where it is regarded as the

environment of man, merely possessing essential worth in its relation

to the ideality of conscious life, which moreover can put forward no

claim to be itself the independent object of poetry. The object, in

short, which fully corresponds to its appeal is the infinite realm of

Spirit. For the medium of language, the most plastic medium possessed

immediately by conscious life, and the one most competent to grasp its

interests and movements in their ideal vitality, precisely as is the

case with the material of the other arts, such as stone, colour, and

tone, must necessarily and above all be employed to express that which

it is most qualified to express. It is consequently the pre-eminent

task of poetry to bring before our vision the energies of the life of

Spirit, all that surges to and fro in human passion and emotion, or

passes in tranquillity across the mind, that is the all-embracing realm

of human idea, action, exploit, fatality, the affairs of this world and

the divine Providence. It has been the most universal and cosmopolitan

instructor of the human race and is so still. Instruction and learning

are together the knowledge and experience of what is. Stars, animals

and plants are ignorant of their law--it does not come into their

experience; but man only then exists conformably to the principle of

his being when he knows what he is and by what he is surrounded. He

must recognize the powers by which he is driven or influenced; and it

is just such a knowledge which poetry, in its original and vital[2]

form, supplies.

(_b_) It is, however, also a content of the same character which

belongs to man's _ordinary_ conscious life. This too instructs him in

general laws, as such at least are interpreted by the motley crowd of

human life, in their distinction, coordination, and significance. The

question therefore arises, as previously observed, as to the nature of

the distinction between the mode of conception severally adopted by

prose and poetry, a similarity in the content of each being assumed as

possible.

(_α_) Poetry is of greater antiquity than speech modelled in the

artistic form of elaborate prose. It is the _original_ imaginative

grasp of truths a form of knowledge, which fails as yet to separate

the universal from its living existence in the particular object,

which does not as yet contrast law land phenomena, object and means,

or relate the one to the other in subordination to the process of

human reason, but comprehends the one exclusively in the other and by

virtue of the other. For this reason it does not merely, under the mode

of imagery, express a content already essentially apprehended in its

universality; on the contrary it lingers, conformably to its unmediated

notion, in the unity of concrete life itself, which has not as yet

effected such a separation or such an association of mere relationship.

(_αα_) Under the above forms of envisualization, poetry posits all that

it comprehends as an exclusive and consequently independent totality,

which, despite its capacity for a rich content and an extensive range

of condition, individuals, actions, events, emotions and ideas of

every kind, nevertheless is forced to exhibit the same in all their

wide complexity as an essentially self-determined whole, as displayed

and motived by the unity, whose individual expression this or that

fact in its singularity actually is. And consequently the universal

or rational principle is not expressed in poetry in its abstract

universality, or in the complexus which lies open to philosophical

exposition or under the relation of its varied aspects apprehended

by science, but on the contrary as a vital union, in its phenomenal

presence, possessed with soul and self-determined throughout; and it is

further expressed in such a way that the all-embracing unity, the real

soul of its vitality, is only suffered to be operative in mysterious

guise from within outwards.

(_ββ_) The character of this mode of apprehending, reclothing and

expressing fact is throughout one of construction. It is not the fact

itself and its _contemplative_[3] existence, but reconstruction and

speech which are the object of poetry. Its entrance on the scene dates

from the first efforts of man at self-expression. What is expressed

is simply made use of to satisfy this desire. The instant man, in the

midst of his practical activities and imperative duties, seeks to

summarize this effect for mind and to communicate himself to others,

then we have some kind of artistic expression, some accord with what

is poetical. To mention one from a host of examples, there is that

distich which we read in Herodotus referring to the slain heroes

of Thermopylae. As for its content it is simply the fact, the bare

announcement that four thousand Peloponesians on a certain spot fought

the battle with three hundred myriads. The main interest is, however,

the composition of an inscription which communicates to contemporary

life and posterity the historical fact, and is there exclusively to

do so. In other words, the expression of this fact is poetical; it

testifies to itself as a deed (εἱν ποιείν) which leaves the content in

its simplicity, but expresses the same with a definite purpose. The

language, in which the idea is embodied, is to that extent of such

increased value that an attempt is made to distinguish it from ordinary

speech; we have a distich in lieu of a sentence.

(_γγ_) For this reason, even from the point of view of language, poetry

makes an effort to keep its domain singular and distinct from ordinary

parlance, and to accomplish this elevates its expression to a higher

virtue than that of merely articulate expression. We must, however, not

only in this particular respect, but for the purposes of our present

inquiry generally, make an essential distinction between a primitive

poetry, which arises _previous to_ the creation of ordinary artificial

prose, and that mode of poetical composition and speech the development

of which is effected where already the conditions of our everyday life

and prosaic expression exist. The first is poetical without intention,

in idea no less than speech; the latter, on the contrary, is fully

conscious of the sphere, from which its task is to detach itself, in

order that it may establish itself on the free basis of art. It is

consequently quite aware of the distinction and contrast implied in its

self-creation to the world of prose.

(_β_) _Secondly_, the kind of _prose life_, from which poetry has to

separate itself, postulates an entirely different nature of conception

and speech.

(_αα_) In other words, looked at from one point of view, such a

consciousness regards the wide expanse of reality according to that

association of cause and effect, object and means, and all other

categories of the mode of reflection which deals with _finite_

conditions and the objective world generally, that is, the limited

categories of science or the understanding. It is a feature of such

thought that every particular trait should at one moment appear with

a false subsistency, at another should be placed in the position

of _bare_ relation to something else, that as such it should be so

apprehended in its relativity and dependence that no unity of a

free nature whatever is possible, no unity, that is, which remains

essentially throughout, and in all its branches and separate filaments,

a complete and free totality, no unity, in short, where we find that

the individual aspects are simply the appropriate explication and

phenomenal presence of _one_ content which constitutes the point of

focus, the soul that unites all together, and which also finds its

vital principle in this all-pervading centre of animation. Rather the

type of conception we above refer to as that of science goes no further

than the discovery of particular laws in phenomena, and persists for

this reason in the separation, or bare relation, of the particular

existence with its general law, the laws themselves under this view

tending to harden from each other in their isolate singularity; that

their relation is, in fact, conceived exclusively under external and

finite conditions.

(_ββ_) And, furthermore, man's _ordinary_ consciousness has nothing

to do with what we call the ideal principle of association, the

essential core of facts, their bases, causes, ends, and so forth. It

rests satisfied with the acceptance of the mere fact that something

exists or happens as distinct from something else; or, in other words,

with its insignificant contingency. It is no doubt true that the

unity of life is not, in such a case, deliberately cancelled by any

express separation; that unity, I mean, in which the intuition of the

poet arrests the ideal _rationale_ of the fact, its expression and

determinate existence. What, however, is absent here, is just that

flash of insight into this core of reason and significance, which

becomes consequently for our intelligence a thing essentially vacant,

possessing no further claim on our minds to a rational interest. The

comprehension of a rational cosmos; and its relations is exchanged then

and there for a mere flux and contiguity of indifference, which it

is true may possess a large expanse of external animation, but which

none the less suffers the profounder impulse of reason[4] to remain

unsatisfied. True vision, no less than soul-life in its full vigour,

can only obtain satisfaction, where such are made aware in phenomena,

through feeling no less than contemplation, of the reality in its

essence and truth which is compatible with such a world. The life which

is a mere external show is defunct to our deeper sense, if all that is

ideal and intrinsically rich in significance fails to shine through as

the very soul thereof.

(_γγ_) These defects, thirdly, in the conceptions of science and our

ordinary conscious life _speculative thought_ effaces. It stands,

therefore, in one respect in affinity with the imagination of the poet.

The cognizance of reason[5] is not solely, or even mainly, concerned

with contingent singularity, nor does it overlook in the phenomenal

world the essence of the same. It does not rest satisfied with the

differentiations and external relations proper to the conceptions and

deductions of the understanding; it unites them in a free totality,

which in the apprehension of our finite faculty in part fails to

preserve its self-consistency, and in part is posited in a relation

that possesses no synthetic unity. Pure thought, however, can have

but one result, namely thoughts. It evaporates the mode of reality

in that of the pure notion. And although it grasps and comprehends

actual things in their essential separation and their actual

existence, it does also nevertheless translate this particularity

into the ideal element of the universal, in which alone thought is

at home with itself. Consequently there arises, in contrast to the

world of phenomena, a world that is new in this sense, that though

the truth of the Real is present, it is not displayed in _reality_

itself as the power itself which gives it form and the veritable soul

thereof. Thinking is simply a reconciliation of truth with reality in

_Thought._ The creations and reconstruction, however, of the poet is a

reconciliation under the mode of phenomenal reality itself, albeit such

a _real appearance_ is merely ideally conceived.

(_γ_) We have, therefore, two distinct spheres of consciousness,

that of poetry and prose. In former times, in which there is neither

present a deliberate outlook on the world elaborated, in respect to

its religious belief and its general knowledge, under the co-ordinated

form of scientific ideas and cognition, nor an actual world of

human condition regulated conformably to such a standard, poetry is

confronted with a lighter task. Prose is not in such a case opposed to

it as an essentially independent field of ideal and external existence,

which it has first to overcome. Its problem is for the most part

simply limited to deepening all that is significant or transparent in

the forms of ordinary consciousness. If, on the contrary, the prose

of life has already appropriated within its mode of vision the entire

content of conscious life, setting its seal on all and every part

of it, the art of poetry is forced to undertake the task of melting

all down again and re-coining the same anew. In every direction it

finds itself involved in difficulties by the unresponsive nature of

prosaic existence. It has, in short, not only to wrest itself from the

adherence of ordinary consciousness to all that is indifferent and

contingent, and to raise the scientific apprehension of the cosmos of

fact to the level of reason's profounder penetration, or to translate

speculative thought into terms of the imagination, giving a body to

the same in the sphere of intelligence itself; it has further to

convert in many ways the _mode of expression_ common to the ordinary

consciousness into that appropriate to poetry; and, despite of all

deliberate intention enforced by such a contrast and such a process, to

make it appear as though all such purpose was absent, preserving the

original freedom essential to all art.

(_c_) We have now summarized in its most general terms that in which

the content of poetry consists. We have further distinguished the

form of poetry from that of prose. In conclusion, it is of importance

to draw attention to the particularization which the art of poetry,

to a degree unattained by the other arts, whose development is not

nearly so rich in results, admits of. We find, no doubt, architecture

illustrated in the arts of very varied peoples, and continuous through

many centuries. But of sculpture, at least, it is true that it reaches

its culminating point in the ancient world of Greece and Rome, just as

painting and music have done more recently in Christendom. The art of

poetry celebrates its epochs of brilliancy and bloom among all nations

and in all ages almost that present any real artistic activity at all.

It embraces the collective Spirit of mankind, and it is differentiated

through every kind of variation.

(_α_) Furthermore, inasmuch as poetry does not accept the universal in

scientific abstraction from its object, but seeks to represent what

is rational under the mode of individuality,[6] the specific traits

of national character are essential to its growth; the content and

the particular mode of its presentation are in fact conditioned by

the nature of these and the general outlook in each case. We find it

consequently adapting itself to every variety of form and peculiarity.

It matters not what the poetry may be, whether Oriental, Italian,

Spanish, English, Roman, Hellenic, or German, each and all differ

totally in their spirit, emotional impulse, general outlook and

expression.

A similar distinctive variety asserts itself in particular epochs as

they are favourable to the art of poetry or the reverse. The results

secured, for example, by our German poetry were impossible in the

Middle Ages, or the times of the thirty years' war. The particular

motives, which in our own day excite the greatest interest, are

inseparable from the entire evolution of contemporary life. And in the

same way every age has its own wider or more restricted, more exalted

and liberal, or more depressed phase of emotional life, in short its

specific outlook on the world, which it is the express aim of poetry

to bring home to the artistic consciousness in the most intelligible

and complete manner, inasmuch as language is the one medium capable of

expressing the human spirit wherever and in whatever form it may be

manifested.

(_β_) Among these national characteristics, or views and opinions

peculiar to particular epochs, some have closer affinity with the

poetic impulse than others. The Oriental consciousness is, for example,

in general more poetic than the Western mind, if we exclude Greece.

In the East the principle predominant is always that of coherence,

solidity, unity, substance. An outlook of this nature is intrinsically

most penetrative, even though it may fail to reach the freedom of the

Ideal. Our Western point of view, especially that of modern life, is

based on the endless breaking up and division of its boundless material

into fragments, in virtue of which process, the extreme emphasis laid

here on particular facts, what is merely finite becomes substantive for

the imagination, and despite of this must be once more subsumed under

the converse action of relativity. For the Oriental nothing persists as

really substantive, but everything appears as contingent, discovering

its supreme focus, stability and final justification in the One, the

Absolute, to which it is referred.

(_γ_) By means of this diversity of national traits and the

evolutionary process of the centuries we find that what is shared

by all mankind alike, no less than all that claims to be artistic,

is drawn as a common element within the reach of other nations and

epochs, intelligible and enjoyable to the same. It is in this twofold

connection that of late years to an exceptional degree Hellenic poetry

has roused the admiration and imitation of most diverse nationalities.

And this is so because in the content of it no less than in the

artistic form it receives the simply human is disclosed with most

beauty. The literature of India itself, however, despite all the

difficulties attendant on an outlook and artistic expression so alien

to our own, is not wholly outside our sympathy; and the boast is no

empty one that in our modern era pre-eminently a keen sense for all

that art and the human spirit embraces in every direction has begun to

unfold itself.

Were we in our present investigation of this impulse toward

individualization, pursued so persistently by poetry, under the

aspects we have already described, to restrict the same to a _general_

treatment of the art of poetry, such a generalization, however

established, could not fail to be abstract and devoid of content. It is

therefore of first importance, if our object be to consider poetry of

a really genuine type, that we include in our survey the forms of the

creative spirit as presented in their national form, the unique product

of one age; and further we must not overlook the individuality which

creates, the soul of the poet. Such, then, are the main points of view

to which I would draw attention by way of a general introduction to

poetical creation and conception.

The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4) Hegel's Aesthetik · 第 49 / 73 题