The function of coordination resulting from the use of language
evolved over time. What did not change is the structure of the
coordinating mechanism. Logic as we know it, i.e., a discipline
legitimized by literate use of language, is concerned with
structural aspects of various languages. The attempt to explain
how and why conditions leading to literacy were created, after
the writing entered the realm of human experience, can only
benefit from an understanding of the coordinating mechanism of
writing and literacy, which includes logic but is not reducible
to it. This mechanism consisted of rules for correct language
use (grammar), awareness of connections specific to the
pragmatic framework (logic), means of persuasion (rhetoric),
selection of choices (heuristics), and argumentation
(dialectics). Together, they give us an image of how complex the
process of self-constitution is. Separately, they give us insight
into the fragmented experiences of language use, rationality,
conviction, selection, actions, and beliefs. There is a logic
behind the (relative) normal course of events, and also behind
any crisis, if we want to extend the concept of logic so as to
include the rational description or explanation of whatever
might have led to the crisis. And there are logics behind the
logic, as Descartes, the authors of the Port Royale Logic
(actually The Art of Thinking), Locke, and many others saw it.
The logic of religion, the logic of art, of morality, of
science, of logic itself, the logic of literacy, are examples of
the variety people consider and establish as their object of
interest, subjecting such logic to the test of completeness
(does it apply to everything?), consistency (is it
contradictory?), and sometimes transitivity.
Independent of the subject (religion, art, ethics, a precise
science, literacy, etc.), human beings establish the particular
logic as a network of reciprocal relations and functional
dependencies according to which truth (religious, artistic,
ethical, etc.), relevant to the practical experience in more
than one way, can and should be pursued. This logic, an
extension of the incipient awareness of connections, became a
formal system, which some researchers in philosophy and
psychology still believe is somehow attached to the brain (or to
the mind), ensuring its correct functioning. Indeed, successful
action was seen as a result of logic, hard-wired as part of the
biological endowment. Other researchers perceived logic as a
product of our experience, in particular thinking, as this
applies to our self-constitution in the natural world and the
world we ourselves created. As a corpus of rules and criteria,
logic applies to language, but there is a logic of human
actions, a logic of art, a logic of morals, etc., described by
rules for preserving consistency, maintaining integrity,
facilitating causal inference and other relevant cognitive
operations, such as articulating a hypothesis or drawing
conclusions.
An old question sneaks in: Is there a universal logic, something
that in its purity transcends differences in language, in
biological characteristics, in differences, period? The answer
depends on whom one asks. From the perspective assumed so far,
the answer is definitely no. Differences are emphasized, even
celebrated here, precisely because they extend to the different
logics that pertain to various practical experiences. Formulated
as such, the answer is elusive because, after all, logic is
expressed through language, and once expressed, it constitutes a
body of knowledge which in turn participates in practical human
experiences. No stronger proof of this can be given than the
Boolean logic embedded in computer hardware and programming
languages. A more appropriate answer can be given once we notice
that major language systems embody different logical mechanisms
that pertain to language's coordinating function.
The main logical systems require our attention because they are
related to what makes literacy necessary and, under new
pragmatic conditions, less necessary, if not superfluous. Since
the civilization of illiteracy is viewed also from the
perspective of the changes resulting in a new scale of human
praxis, it becomes necessary to see whether in the global world
forces of uniformity or forces of heterogeneity and diversity,
embodied in various literacies and the logic attached to them, or
associated with their use, are at work. As almost all scholars
agree, Aristotle is the father of the logic that applies to the
Western language system. Writing helped to encode his logic of
proper inference from premises expressed in sentences. Literacy
gave this logic a house, and a sense of validity and permanency
that scholars accept almost as religion. For Eastern systems,
contributions of equal value and relevance can be found in the
major writings of ancient China and Japan, as well as in Hindu
documents. Instead of a superficial overview of the subject, I
prefer to quote Fung-Yu-lan's precise observation regarding the
particular focus of Chinese philosophy (which is also
representative of the Far East): "Philosophy must not be simply
the object of cognition, it must also be the object of an
experience." The resulting expression of this endeavor differs
from the Indian, in search of a certain state of mind, not
formulations of truth, and from Western philosophical
statements. It takes the form of concise, often enigmatic, and
usually paradoxical statements or aphorisms. A very good
presentation of this experience is given in a famous text by
Chuang-tzu: "The words serve to fix the ideas, but once the idea
is grasped, there is no need to think about words. I wish I could
find somebody who has ceased to think of words and have him with
me to talk to."
The logic of the Indo-European languages is based on the
recognition of the object-action distinction, expressed in
language through the noun and the verb. For over 2,000 years,
this logic has dominated and maintained the structure of society,
of the polis, to use Aristotle's term. Indeed, he defined the
human as zoon politikon- community (polis), animal (zoon)-and his
logic is an attempt to discover what was the cognitive structure
that ensured proper inference from premises expressed in
sentences. Probably as much as some who today hope for a similar
achievement through formal languages, he wanted logic to be as
independent as possible of the language used, as well as
independent of the particular language spoken by people
belonging to different communities.
Parallel to the language housing Aristotle's logic was a
different system in which the verb (referring to action) was
assimilated in the object, as in the Chinese and Japanese
languages. Every action became a noun (hunting, running,
talking), and a non-predicative language mode was achieved.
Aristotle's construction goes like this: If a is b (The sky is
covered), and if b is c (the cover are clouds), then a is c
(cloudy sky). Non-predicative constructions do not come to a
conclusion but continue from one condition to another, as in
approximately: Being covered, covers being clouds, clouding
being associated with rain, rain...and so on. That is, they are
open-ended connections in status nascendi. We notice that
Aristotelian logic derives the truth of the inference from the
truth of the premise, based on a formal relation independent of
both. In non- predicative logic, language only points to possible
chains of relations, implicitly acknowledging that others are
simultaneously possible without deriving knowledge, or without
subjecting conclusions to a formal test of their truth or
falsehood. To the abstract and formal representation of
knowledge inference, it opposes a model of concrete and natural
representation in which distinctions regarding quality are more
important than quantity distinctions.
Based on observations already accumulated, first of all that
ideographic writing keeps the means of expression very close to
the object represented in language, we can understand why
languages expressed in ideographic writing are not adapted to the
kind of thinking Aristotle and his followers developed and which
culminated in the Western notion of science, as well as in the
Western system of values. The successive rediscovery of Far
Eastern modes of representation and of the philosophy growing out
of this very different way of thinking, as well as of the
interest in subtleties rather uncommon to our culture, resulted
in the many attempts we witness to transcend the boundaries
between these fundamentally different language structures. The
purpose is to endow our language, and thus our thinking and
emotional life, with dimensions structurally impossible within
the Western framework of existence.
The logic of dependency-the Japanese amé-is one of embedded
relations and many conjectures resulting in a logic of actions,
a different way of thinking, and a different system of values.
These are partially reflected in the periodic misunderstandings
between the Western world and Japan. Of course, it can be
simplified as to mean that if a company and an employee accept
it, and they do so since amé is structurally embedded in the
life of people, both parties will be faithful to each other no
matter what. Amé can also be simplified to mean a mutual
relationship within families (all prejudices included), or among
friends. But as we get closer to the practical experience of amé
(Takeo Doi's writing on the "anatomy of dependence" helps us a
great deal in this attempt), we realize that it constitutes a
framework, marking not only distinct decisions (logically
justified), but an entire context of thinking, feeling, acting,
evaluating. It is reflected in the attitude towards language and
in the education system, inculcating dependency as a logic that
takes priority over the individual. Evidently, the only way to
integrate the logic of amé into our logic-if indeed we think
that this is right, moreover that it is possible-is through
practical experience. Although amé seems to point to some limits
inherent in our language, it actually reveals limits in our
self-constitution, as part of establishing a network of
generalized mutual relationships as part of our experience.
It should be added that practically a mirrored phenomenon occurs
in the Far East, where what can be perceived as the limitations
of the language system and the logic it supports (or embodies),
triggered an ever-growing interest in Western culture and many
attempts to copy or to quickly assimilate it in vocabulary and
behavior. From the Indian universe comes not only the mysticism
of the Vedic texts, but also the stubborn preoccupation with the
human condition (both the aspect of conditioning and of what
Mircea Eliade called de-conditioning). This resulted in the
attraction it exercises on many people looking for an
alternative to what they perceive as an over-conditioned
existence, usually translated as pressure of performance and
competitive attitudes. Some opted out of literacy, and generally
out of their culture, in search of liberation (mukti), a
practical experience of lower preoccupation with the useful and
higher spiritual goals, and of obstinate refusal of logic. (Some
really never fully appropriated or internalized the philosophy,
but adopted a lifestyle emulating commercialized models, the
exotic syntax of escapism.)
In short, and trying not to preclude future discussion of these
phenomena, the historic development of language and logic within
the many cultures we know of-more than the Western and Far
Eastern mentioned-bears witness to the very complex relation
between who and what people are: their language and the logic
that the language makes possible and later embodies. The hunter
in the West, and the hunter in the Far East, in Africa, India,
Papua, the fishermen, the forager, etc. relate in different ways
to their environment and to their peers in the community. The way
their relatively similar experiences are embodied in language
and other means of expression plays an important role in forms
of sharing, religion, art, in the establishment of a value
system, and later on education and identity preservation. There
are common points, however, and the most relevant refer to
relations established in the work process, as these affect
efficiency. These commonalties prove relevant to understanding
the role language, in conjunction with logic, exercises on
various stages of social and economic development.