CHAPTER XI

THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES (_Continued_). THE INFLUENCE OF THE REVOLT OF

THE NETHERLANDS UPON FRANCE. THE AFFAIR OF MEAUX

From the field of Philip II’s empty victory the court resumed its

pilgrimage, crossing the Loire and traversing Guyenne which was “in

good repose,” visiting Angoulême, Cognac, Saintes, La Rochelle, and

Niort _en route_ to Nantes. The country was the veritable dominion

of Calvinism in France, but as yet the Huguenots let their hopes

belie their fears.[984] The progress through the western provinces

was purposely slow, for Catherine still hoped against hope that

Fourquevaux, who had succeeded St. Sulpice at the Spanish court,

might persuade Philip II to think more favorably of her matrimonial

schemes,[985] until finally, late in December, the bitter truth came

out; only the younger daughter of the Hapsburgs might marry a Valois,

even though he was king of France. The queen mother had been weighed

in the balance by Catholic-Hapsburg Europe and had been found wanting.

Then it was that Catherine turned her eyes toward eastern Europe in the

hope of finding in Poland a recompense for the fondled and despicable

Henry of Valois. Strange are the vicissitudes of history! The effect

of Philip II’s resolution was to put a mountebank on the throne of

Poland and cast Marguerite of Valois into the arms of the son of Jeanne

d’Albret.[986]

Long before this time, however, Spain had begun to be impatient for

the fulfilment of the compact of Bayonne. But procrastination was

Catherine’s trump suit. She averred that the plague was too prevalent

to make it safe for the court to return to Paris until winter,[987] and

when the cold weather diminished the danger from that source, pleaded

the poverty and famine of the realm as an excuse.[988] It was an excuse

the validity of which was everywhere manifest. France truly had been in

the dire pangs of hunger and intense cold during the celebrated winter

of 1564-65.[989] Claude Haton, the priest-historian of Provins, who

was a close observer of meteorological phenomena has given a graphic

description of this season.

The winter at its commencement in November [he says] was very mild

and was so until December 20, the vigil of St. Thomas the apostle,

without either cold or frost in the mornings. The rain was so warm

that it was thought that the winter would be mild and open, but on

the vigil of St. Thomas there came a great cold, accompanied in the

morning by a cold rain, which by midday turned into snow, and which

fell all the rest of the day in so great abundance that the earth,

which was very wet, was covered on the morrow to the depth of a foot,

king’s measure, and more, with snow. With this snow came a northeast

wind, which froze everything under a coating of thick ice. This cold

continued down to the last day of December. The ice was so thick that

a man could cross the river without breaking through. The snow lay

so heavy upon the fields that in the open places the drifts were as

high as a man. After the snow-storm had passed the cold redoubled, so

that even the best clad suffered whenever they went out doors. There

was not a house in the village where the water did not freeze, if it

was not set close by the fire; and I do not exaggerate when I say

that in many good and well-built houses wine froze before the great

chimney, though the latter was heaped up with wood. I saw in many

houses iron pots suspended above the fire with icicles hanging over

the edge. Every night and morning when the people got up there was

frost upon the coverlet, from the evaporation of the bodies of the

sleepers. There was not a wine-cellar where the wine did not freeze

in the casks, unless care was taken to keep charcoal fires burning

there. In some wine-cellars it was necessary to close every aperture

in order to prevent the wine from freezing. It frequently froze so

hard that it was necessary to pierce the bung-hole with a red hot

poker in order to draw it out. On the night of the 23-24 December, as

also on Christmas night, the ice was so heavy upon the trees that the

boughs were broken. These things had not been seen in France since

the year 1480.[990] The greatest cold was on the day of the feast of

the Innocents (December 28). Many men who were exposed died in the

roads. The crests of cocks and poultry were frozen and fell off some

days afterwards, and many were found dead under their roosts. The

sheep also died.

Early in January the ice began to melt. It grew uncommonly warm for

the season, so that fire became unnecessary. On the day following

the edict of the king, about noon, a soft warm rain began to fall,

which caused the snow to vanish rapidly. This lasted for five days,

so that the earth was covered with water. And then came a second cold

for three entire weeks, until the 28th of the month, and snow with a

high wind came, which drove the snow everywhere and piled it in great

drifts. The winter grain was frozen in the furrows. God knows how much

the poor people who had no wood suffered. Most of them stayed in bed

night and day without getting up except to eat once in twenty-four

hours. The poor of Paris and others who had no means, were compelled

to burn their furniture. Those who had made no provision for the

winter, chiefly of wood, were compelled to purchase at high prices,

for it was not possible to do carting because of the condition of

the roads; in many cases, moreover, the bridges were destroyed. When

the thaw came, the high waters penetrated houses and churches in

Provins to the depth of three, four, and even five feet, washing out

the very dead in the cemetery.[991] At Paris the flood damaged the

Pont-au-Change and caused many houses to topple. Vine-growers found

themselves in great difficulty. Those who were wise cut their vines

back to the root, in order that they might sprout better again, and

were repaid for so doing, for they were the only ones that bore.

The spring was fair and mild, so that barley and oats were sown. Yet

much ground lay bare because in the fields sown with winter wheat

the roots were all killed, so that no grain grew. The walnut trees

seemed to be dead through all the month of April and half of May,

for they did not put forth their buds. Pear and apple trees bore a

few blossoms. In some places there were plums and cherries, but not

everywhere.[992]

The winter was just as bad in Gascony, Provence, and Languedoc. On the

day of the Feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24) it snowed![993]

Even the poor people were compelled to build fires, though they could

not afford the fuel. The vines throughout central France were so badly

injured that not a third part of the crop remained. The grain likewise

was destroyed. Water courses were swollen and overflowed their banks,

and in the meadows of the Seine people had to take care lest they be

drowned. As a result of the cold spring, the harvest of 1565 failed

over almost all the realm to such an extent that it was necessary to

abolish the tolls between provinces and to permit free trade in grain.

Paris imported wheat from Champagne, Picardy, Anjou, Lower Brittany,

Burgundy, and Auvergne, the least stricken of the provinces.[994]

The Parlement of Paris passed an ordinance forbidding speculation in

foodstuffs and compelled those possessed of a surplus of grain to throw

what was not needed for their own necessity upon the market.[995] A

measure (_boisseau_) of wheat, from January to April cost from 12-15

sous (= 1½ pecks at from 36 to 45 cents), and after April the price

rose every week until harvest time, to the sum of 25 sous _tournois_

(approximately 75 cents). Wheat was very dear in Paris and throughout

all Brie, the Ile-de-France, Valois, Soissonais, and Picardy; less

so in Champagne, Burgundy, and Lorraine, where there was rye and

barley enough for the people. The stock starved because the grain

was consumed by the people. Many people went over into Champagne in

order to purchase rye and barley to make bread with until the harvest

came. Fortunately grain was plentiful in Champagne, and wheat fell

to 7 and 6 sous per measure (from 19 to 22 cents), and corn in like

proportion after the harvest. Because of the hard times which they had

experienced, many accumulated great stores in the expectation that in a

short time there would again be a dearth.

Wine was very dear until the vintage. In the months of August and

September before the grapes were gathered, it was not possible to

purchase wine by the cup at taverns, even for silver; it was with

great difficulty that sufficient wine was procurable for church

service. But after the vintage the price dropped to 14 _livres

tournois_ ($8.70) _la queue du creu_, whereas it had been as high as

80 before ($49.60).[996]

As so often appears elsewhere in history, the economic distress and

strain of poverty was followed by psychological manifestations of

a religio-sociological sort, among the lower and poor classes. In

1565, in the villages of Champagne and Brie and especially in the

bailiwicks of Sens, Melun, Montereau, Nogent, Troyes, Châlons, Rheims,

Epernay, Château-Thierry, Meaux, and Provins, the belief spread among

the peasantry that in honor of the Virgin they ought to refrain from

working in the fields on Saturday after midday, and that this Saturday

rest had been formally ordered by the Virgin in revelations and

apparitions. A young girl of Charly-sur-Marne, near Epernay, boasted

of having received these confidences, and showed miraculous signs of

her mission. But the cardinal of Lorraine caused her to be arrested and

questioned, and she was burned alive as a witch.[997]

Instead of going to Paris, the court passed the winter at Moulins in

Bourbonnais,[998] where the famine was most slightly felt. By this

time the expectations of the Catholics and the fears of the Huguenots

were beginning to bear their bitter fruit, and in the state of public

tension every incident was magnified. At Angers, in November, the

Rohans, having forbidden Catholic worship upon their domains, the King

had had to compel them to reinstate it by threatening to dispossess

them of their châteaux; at Blois the cardinal Bourbon reproached the

queen mother for suffering the edict to be violated by permitting the

queen of Navarre and the prince of Condé to maintain court-preachers

in their entourage. The Catholics of Dijon demanded that in future

Calvinist ministers be forbidden to attend the last hours of the dying,

a petition which the cardinal of Lorraine supported in order to make

the chancellor L’Hôpital commit himself. The answer of the latter

sustained the edict’s grant of the right of selection in the matter of

religion. Of greater anxiety still was the influx of Huguenots into

the town of Moulins, Montgomery among the rest, who for the first time

since the fatal tournament of June 30, 1559, looked upon the court.[999]

The memory of the conspiracy of Amboise haunted the queen like a

specter, and was the more vivid because of the _rapprochement_ between

the leaders of the Huguenots and the Montmorencys, who had met together

at Paris in November at the marriage of the amorous prince of Condé

to Mlle. de Longueville. The incident was sharp enough to strike fire

between the Catholic-Guisard and the Huguenot-Montmorency party. For

when the papal nuncio indignantly demanded the cardinal of Beauvais’

renunciation of the purple, the constable bluffly said: “I am a papist.

But if the Pope and his agents still seek to trouble the kingdom, my

sword will be Huguenot. My nephew will never renounce his dignity. The

edict gives him the right to it.” It is no wonder Catherine de Medici

was anxious to hear of the report of these words at Madrid and what

Philip II would say.[1000] The interdiction of the Protestant worship

at Moulins on January 9, 1566, on the very day that Coligny returned

from the wedding festivities, was her own reply.

The very next day she guarded against new fire being struck between

the factions by compelling at least outward reconciliation between

the admiral and the cardinal of Lorraine. On January 10, 1566, in the

presence of the court, she addressed the cardinal, saying that the

repose of the kingdom was destroyed by private quarrels and especially

by two of his, the one with the marshal Montmorency, the other with

the admiral for the murder of the duke of Guise.[1001] At the same

time the queen mother, in order to preserve peace between the rivals,

hit upon the novel scheme of lodging the cardinal and the admiral in

the same house, so that each had to use the same stairway in order to

reach his apartments, telling both that each was keeper of the other,

and that if either of them experienced any injury it would be imputed

to the other.[1002] The cardinal of Lorraine, for fear of losing all

his influence, accepted the situation (he did not stir from the side of

the queen),[1003] and was compelled to abide by the situation _telle

quelle_, as Sir Thomas Smith wrote to Cecil.[1004] But nothing could

mollify the anger of the constable against the Guises, and when the

duke of Guise at length came to court in February, Montmorency left it

forthwith.[1005]

While the factional feeling thus grew more embittered, serious

and noble effort was yet made to carry out the demands of the

States-General of Orleans and Pontoise—demands which were principles

of the political Huguenots. This programme was supported by the queen

mother, who seems in this way to have sought to placate the fears of

the Huguenots for their faith. The year 1566 is notable for the fact

that greater recognition was then accorded the political demands of the

Huguenots than at any time hitherto, so that large progress was made in

the betterment of the administrative system of France.

The King in his address to the council said that at his accession he

had wanted to travel through all the provinces desolated by the late

civil wars, in order to hear the complaints of his subjects and to

remedy conditions in the best manner possible; that it was for this

cause that he had convoked the assembly and so enjoined them, in virtue

of the royal authority, to apply themselves diligently to affairs.

Then the chancellor spoke: after dwelling upon the general evils of

the state, he asserted that the root of all the evils was the bad

administration of justice; that the King had become convinced of this

in the course of the tour of the provinces; that for himself he could

not refrain from calling things by their right name and from speaking

as he thought; that those who were appointed to administer justice were

guilty of great excesses; that these evils had increased owing to the

impunity and the license which obtained.

I do not deny [he added] that there are too many laws and ordinances

in France and that the multitude of the laws and the number of the

judges is the cause of much unnecessary and tyrannical litigation.

But it is no less true that when new evils arise there is a necessity

of new remedies, and that when the ancient laws have been abrogated

either by inobservance or by license, it is necessary to make new ones

in order to cure current evils and to arrest the course of public

calamity. The public welfare requires new legislation. If the new

laws are not observed, on account of the venality and avarice of the

ministers of justice, they must be punished severely and these public

pests who fatten upon the blood of a miserable people must be driven

from office. Superfluous offices, moreover, must be abolished and the

ruinous multiplication of legal causes stopped.

The justice of the last charge was particularly manifest. Since the

time of Francis I it had been the practice of the crown to sell offices

and even to create them for purposes of revenue only.

The chancellor further asserted that the King could not suffer those

who had not the right to make laws to attribute to themselves the

power to interpret them; he proposed to diminish the excessive number

of the courts, and raised the question whether the demands of justice

would not be better met if the Parlement ceased to be so sedentary and

became ambulatory instead—a suggestion which, it is interesting to

observe, found a partial realization in the seventeenth century in the

establishment of the Grands Jours d’Auvergne. He insinuated that it was

advisable to subject the judges to censure and to compel them to render

account of the manner in which they exercised their office, and that

it might be better to establish judges for two or three years than to

permit the holding of office in perpetuity.

After longer deliberation, in February, 1566, the famous ordinance

of Moulins was framed. It contained eighty-six articles, and dealt

radically with the evils of the time and imposed drastic reform,

especially in the administration of justice.

This act declared the royal domain inalienable, limited and regulated

the right of remonstrances of parlement, organized circuits of

inspection by magistrates especially appointed to go throughout the

realm, instituted certain changes in the judicial administration,

and pledged the word of the crown to appoint capable and honest

magistrates.[1006]

It profoundly modified both the public and private law of France. In

the former sphere the ordinance strengthened the legislative power of

the crown by laying down the principle that the King’s ordinances must

be observed in spite of remonstrances on the part of the parlements,

and even if the latter refused to register them; the _maîtres des

requêtes_ were enjoined to punish severely any infraction or failure to

observe the ordinances. The powers of the governors in the provinces

were much reduced; they were forbidden to exercise the right of pardon,

to levy taxes, or to institute fairs and markets. The judicial power

of the great _villes_ was almost entirely suppressed. The communal

judges were deprived of all civil jurisdiction and retained cognizance

only of petty offenses; at the same time, the attempt was made to

restrain seigneurial jurisdiction. The right of written proof was

recognized in cases involving 100 livres or more.[1007] No less than

1,500 superfluous offices, treasurerships, secretaryships, etc., were

abolished. In the matter of religion some of the articles were a

confirmation of the edict of 1563. Another article abolished entirely

all confraternities, and prohibited the formation of all leagues.[1008]

The financial administration came in for a most searching

investigation. The flaunting arrogance of some of the King’s treasurers

is remarkable. Numbers of them had had houses, and even châteaux

which rivaled the King’s own in elegance, the means to purchase and

furnish which they had secured by plundering the people and robbing

the government. One treasurer—among four who were hanged at

Montfaucon—was found to owe the crown over three million livres.[1009]

The young duke of Guise, who had refused to be a party to the farcical

reconciliation between his house and the Châtillons soon found means

to leave the court. In May the duke of Nemours and the duchess of

Guise were married at St. Maur-des-Fosses. It was a match which sowed

dragon’s teeth once more. For Nemours forsook his wife, who was a

Rohan, having induced the Pope to nullify the marriage. The Huguenots

murmured indignantly against the insult done the Rohan clan whose

powerful family influence was now joined with the Châtillons and

Montmorencys.[1010]

Catherine de Medici was not the ruler to govern France with a firm yet

facile hand under the circumstances that existed in 1566. Irrespective

of foreign influences, which we shall presently come to, the economic

distress[1011] of the country, the rivalry of the great houses, and

the religious acrimony prevailing made a combination of forces that

needed another sort of ruler to reconcile them—a ruler such as Henry

of Navarre was to be. The queen mother, while a woman of force, was so

deficient in sincerity that no one could have confidence in her; so

jealous of power that she would brook no other control of the King,

whose sovereignty she confounded with her maternal oversight of him,

making no distinction between Charles IX the ruler and Charles IX

the son. Catherine time and again marred or ruined the progress she

had made with the aid of one party’s support by her own envious fear

of that party’s predominance. Her “bridge policy,”[1012] instead of

uniting France, kept it divided. To maintain the balance of power—an

immemorial Italian policy—her Italian nature resorted to duplicity and

deception continually. Accordingly, suspicion prevailed at court and

suspicion prevailed in the provinces, the more so in the latter because

of the Huguenots’ uncertainty about what was done at Bayonne, and doubt

as to Philip II’s course. Men were doubtful of their neighbors; towns

were fearful of other nearby towns. “All the way of my coming hither,”

reported Sir Thomas Hoby, the new English ambassador to France, “I

found the strong towns marvelously jealous of strangers, insomuch that

only by the sound of a bell they discovered a number of horsemen or

footmen before they come; but also, after they are entered they have an

eye to them.”[1013]

When the court finally moved to Paris, the great nobles came thither

with such numerous trains[1014] that the queen sent four companies

of the King’s guard ahead of his coming, and ordered the marshal

Montmorency to require the retirement from the city of all those who

were not of the ordinary household of each nobleman and gentleman. In

vain the marshal, anxious to protect his party against the Guisards,

resisted the order and complained that the queen was interfering with

his authority. The King ordered Lansac and De la Garde to accomplish

what Montmorency was unwilling to do.

If choice must be made as to who were the worst offenders in this

respect, the greater blame lies with the Protestants. It was not

only impolitic, it was insolent on their part to permit Montgomery

to swagger around Paris as he did, “booted and spurred with all

his men.”[1015] Apparently the queen had not the daring to compel

his withdrawal, as she did that of the Guises’ recruiting sergeant,

Roggendorf.[1016] Her policy for the time being was to favor the

Châtillon-Montmorency faction.[1017] Backed by the joint support of

the admiral and the constable, the queen accordingly undertook to

bring certain unsettled or indefinite matters of religion and the

church to a conclusion. On May 31, 1566, Charles IX sent a series of

articles to the cardinal Bourbon for consideration by the clergy of

Paris, then sitting at St. Germain des Près. Two of these had to do

with the baptism of infants where one of the parents was a Catholic,

and the maintenance of Protestants schools. Three concerned church

temporalities, namely, the redemption of the fourth part of the

temporals of the church, given to the King during the late civil war;

the subsidy which was to expire in eighteen months; and the preparation

of an edict defining the privileges and jurisdiction of the church.

The residue of the articles dealt with infractions of the Edict of

Amboise, such as restraint of preaching according to the edict, and the

molestation of former Protestants who had returned to the church of

Rome by the Huguenots. By an awkward coincidence, the sending of these

articles exactly coincided with the arrival of the papal legate in

Paris, who came to request the promulgation of the decrees of Trent in

conformity with the agreement made with the cardinal de Santa Croce at

Bayonne.[1018]

Catherine de Medici’s policy at this time was that of the political

Huguenots. She hoped that the question of religion would settle

itself with time, and to divert attention from that issue, and also

because there was great need of it, she energetically continued the

administrative and economic reforms begun at Moulins. L’Hôpital began

so searching an investigation of the conduct of the King’s treasurers

that some of them were hanged and others banished. The constable was

of service here, although his notorious avarice tarnished the honesty

of his work.[1019] Yet there was peril even in a policy so just and so

much needed by France. Sooner or later such a course would unearth the

dishonesty of bigger thieves than the small collectors of the revenue

who, in many cases undoubtedly suffered for the peculation of their

superiors. The administration was full of “grafters” such as St. André

had been, who would not scruple to conceal their thievery behind the

smoke of another civil war. The queen mother knew this only too well

from former experience, not being unaware of the fact that one of the

causes of “the late unpleasantness” was the demand of the estates that

the Guises should make an accounting and be forced to disgorge their

ill-gotten gains. The government resorted to various devices to raise

money and an imposition was laid upon inn-keepers. The most singular

expedient, though, was the offer of a Genoese syndicate to pay the King

a lump sum for the privilege of taxing dowry gifts and for a license

to endure eight years to levy a crown on every first-born infant, and

after, for every boy born into a family five sous, and for every girl

babe, three sous.[1020] This preposterous measure actually passed the

council, and was only prevented from becoming law by the good sense of

the Parlement.[1021]

But the events happening in the Netherlands were of greater importance

to France at this time than anything within her borders. From the

beginning of the insurrection there the Huguenots had recognized

the important bearing of that struggle upon their own movement, and

as the shadow of Philip II fell in greater length each year across

France, the interest of the French Protestants in the rebellion of

the Low Countries increased.[1022] As Huguenot preachers in Flanders

sowed the double seed of Calvinism and revolt, so Protestant preachers

exiled from the Low Countries sought refuge in France.[1023] This

intercourse became a formidable historical issue by 1566. The issue

was understood from the beginning by all parties concerned, and Philip

II and his ministers were determined to profit by the lesson of France

and to prevent similar trouble by crushing all opposition in the bud.

The Turkish attack upon Malta[1024] had been very favorable to the

Protestant cause, and the raising of the siege in September, 1565,

probably influenced the King of Spain in his resolution to extirpate

heresy in the Low Countries.[1025] The Flemish government suspected

William of Orange who by July was openly allied with the Gueux[1026]

and his brother, Louis of Nassau, of direct intercourse with Condé and

Coligny,[1027] and sent Montigny—the faithless member of the patriotic

quartette composed of Orange, Egmont, Hoorne, and himself—to Paris in

the spring to pick up information.[1028] The fear lest Montgomery might

come to Flanders, which Granvella had once laughed at, by the summer of

1566 had some basis of reality, although the braggadocio character of

this adventurer discounted alarm.[1029]

Knowledge of the solidarity existing between his revolted subjects in

Flanders and the Huguenots[1030] which Montluc had warned Philip of

even two years before,[1031] coupled with information concerning the

dealings of Louis of Nassau with Protestant Germany[1032] and France,

stirred the Spanish King’s habitual indecision into action. He sounded

Charles IX as to the possibility of sending Spanish troops directly

across France to the Low Countries and asked him to restrain his

subjects from coming thither with arms,[1033] crowds of whom went to

Flanders disguised as merchants.[1034] Simultaneously Margaret of Parma

begged the Emperor to take the same course.[1035] But the government

of France could not have honored Philip II’s request, even if it had

been so minded, without risking an immediate rising of the Huguenots.

As a matter of fact, it had no desire to do so. The resentment felt by

France toward Spain on account of past scores at Trent, Rome, and in

Switzerland, was now all eclipsed in her rancor because of the massacre

by the Spaniards of her ill-fated colony in Florida in September,

1565.[1036]

Alexander VI’s bull had divided the western hemisphere between the

Spanish and the Portuguese. Florida belonged to Spain. France had built

Fort Caroline on Spanish territory. As peace existed in 1565, France

argued that the massacre by Menendez was a violation of international

law. To this Spain replied that Florida belonged to her by discovery

and as all treaties between Spain and France were silent as to any

change of ownership, there really had been no such change in law.

Consequently the French settlers were intruders and heretics to boot.

The answer was crushing, Fourquevaux was heavily handicapped, for he

could not openly espouse the cause of Frenchmen who were heretics.

Before news of the massacre reached France, Philip II, knowing the

facts, inquired if the French expedition had been commanded or

sanctioned by the French King. The only answer possible was a negative.

An affirmative answer would have been tantamount to a declaration of

war. “Then the incident is closed,” was the Spanish reply. This was

followed by a demand that Coligny, under whose sanction the expedition

had sailed, should be punished.

France was likewise at odds with the Emperor. The reason for this is

to be found in the strong attitude the empire had lately taken on

the question of Metz.[1037] Understanding of this question entails

a glance backward. In 1564 the baron Bolwiller, a native of upper

Alsace, but at that time bailiff of the Emperor in the grand bailiwick

of Haguenau, revived the plan he had conceived in 1558, of recovering

Metz by a surprise.[1038] Bolwiller represented that no time was to

be lost if France was to be prevented from fixing her hold upon the

Three Bishoprics forever. Philip II favored the enterprise and offered

20,000 sous cash, and the assignment of 8,000 écus annual revenue of

the territory, “pour celluy ou ceulx qui’lz luy rendroyent la ville

du dict Metz.”[1039] For with Metz in the hands of the Hapsburgs once

more, the chain of provinces connecting the Netherlands with Spain

through mid-Europe would have been practically complete, lying as Metz,

Toul, and Verdun did, between Franche-Comté and Luxembourg.[1040] This

was at the time when Condé was recreant to his people and was dallying

with the widow of the marshal St. André, and the idea was conceived and

abandoned of buying the prince over and bribing him to betray Metz to

Spain.[1041] Spain, however, in order to avoid a rupture with France

wished to conceal her own participation in the plot to recover Metz,

and urged the Emperor Maximilian to undertake the venture.[1042] The

plot was to tempt Metz to revolt against France by offering to convert

it into a free imperial city, it being expected that the Lutherans in

the city would support the movement.[1043] The alertness of the French

government, however, foiled the project’s being undertaken in April.

In August Bolwiller renewed his plan, alleging to Chantonnay that the

people of Metz were ready to provide 20,000 écus, and that there were

arms in plenty stored in secret. He urged prompt action now for the

French government had begun the erection of a citadel in the city.[1044]

By this time Philip II was so anxious to see France despoiled of Metz

and so impatient at Maximilian’s delay, that it was even considered

advisable by some to take advantage of the check given the Turks at

Malta and have the Emperor make peace with them in order to have his

hands free in the Three Bishoprics.[1045] As for himself, Philip II

dared not make an overt move against France, lest in the event of war

with Spain, Charles IX appeal to the Huguenots, with the result that

Protestantism would profit by the diversion.[1046]

But meanwhile things in Metz had got beyond control of either Spain

or the empire. The Calvinists in both France and the Netherlands had

been quick to see the advantage afforded, for the former by gaining

possession of the territory could connect France and the Palatinate,

thus aiding themselves and their coreligionists at one and the same

time, since by so doing the land route of Spain through Central Europe,

via Milan, Besançon, and Luxembourg, would be cut in half. Matters came

to a head in May and June, 1565, in what is known as the “Cardinal’s

War.” On May 5 the Emperor Maximilian had issued a decree affirming

his suzerainty over Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The cardinal of Lorraine

at once recognized the validity of this decree, which was equivalent

to treason to France. Thereupon, in the name of Charles IX Salzedo an

ex-Spaniard[1047] and leader of the French party in Metz assumed the

title of governor of Metz and appealed to the French King for support

against the cardinal. The issue was really one between France and

Spain. The Guises naturally supported the cardinal. The “war” which

followed was not formidable, although the issue as stake was of great

importance. But the cardinal soon discovered that discretion was the

better part of valor and yielded to the King, more especially as

neither Philip II nor Maximilian raised a hand for fear of betraying

themselves, for the cardinal feared that if he resisted longer Charles

IX would refuse to pardon his treasonable conduct. He was not unaware

of the fact—he did not even deny it—that it was known that he had

been in treasonable communication with Bolwiller and the archbishop of

Trèves.[1048]

If Charles IX and the queen mother had known the full extent of the

cardinal of Lorraine’s treasonable conduct at this time they might

not have been so lenient toward him. For he was guilty not only of

treasonable intercourse with the empire, but directly with Spain also.

The one supremely important result of this petty war over Metz is that

at this time the cardinal—and with him the whole Guise house—began

those secret negotiations with Philip of Spain which culminated

in the establishment of the Holy League. Shortly after the end of

his ignominious war around Metz, burning with anger and shame, the

cardinal sent a secret agent to Franche Comté, who found Granvella

at Beaudencourt in July, 1565, to whom he recited the cardinal’s

grievances, saying that owing to the death of his brother the duke of

Guise and the insolence of the marshal Montmorency, he had no hope

in the justice of Charles IX. The agent then went on to point out

the great danger threatening Catholic Europe by reason of what had

recently happened at Metz, and, speaking for the cardinal of Lorraine,

expressed the wish that Philip II would enter into a league with the

house of Guise, the duke of Montpensier—Alva’s convert at Bayonne—and

certain others for the protection of the Catholic faith in France

and the overthrow of the Châtillons, the prince of Condé, “Madame de

Vendôme,” and other Huguenots. This formidable overture was made under

the seal of secrecy. The cautious Granvella listened but refrained

from committing his master to the proposition.[1049] Again, Philip II

hesitated to implicate himself so directly in French affairs, as the

cardinal of Lorraine urged, just as he had hesitated the year before

with Montluc, and while he waited events in the Low Countries went

from bad to worse.

In August, 1566, a furious outburst of iconoclasm swept through the

churches of Flanders.

Commencing at St. Omer, the contagion rapidly spread, and in a

fortnight 400 churches were sacked in Flanders alone, while in Antwerp

the cathedral was stripped of all its treasures. Images, relics,

shrines, paintings, manuscripts, and books shared a common fate.[1050]

The event stirred Philip to action. He determined to send the duke of

Alva to Flanders to repress things with an iron hand.[1051]

On November 18, 1566, the duke of Alva formally requested the French

ambassador at Madrid to secure Charles IX’s permission for a Spanish

army to cross France.

The remedy has become little by little so difficult [said the duke]

that deeds not words and remonstrances, are now necessary. Having

exhausted all good and gracious means to reduce things in the Low

Countries, the King is constrained, to his great regret, to have

recourse to force. Public assemblies, preaching, the bearing of arms,

and violence prevail in the land and the King’s ministers amount to

nothing.

The duke then outlined the plan. Ten thousand new Spanish recruits

under three ensigns were to be sent to Luxembourg, Naples, Sardinia,

and Sicily to take the places of as many veteran troops there,

for the King was unwilling to use Italian infantry. A thousand

heavy-armed footmen and three or four hundred mounted arquebusiers,

all Spanish, were to be drawn from Milan, the most loyal of Spain’s

Italian dependencies. An indefinite number of reiters and other

mercenaries could be had for the asking. These troops would proceed

to the Netherlands through Savoy by way of Val d’Aoste or Mt. Cenis,

Montmélian, Chambéry, and La Bresse, into Franche Comté and Lorraine,

unless—and this was the crux of Alva’s interview with Fourquevaux—the

winter season made it impossible to traverse the mountain passes, in

which case His Catholic Majesty desired leave of France to take them by

sea to Marseilles or Toulon and thence to march them northward up the

Rhône to La Bresse and so reach Franche Comté.

No one knew better than Alva the formidable nature of this proposition

to France and he used all his artifice to conceal its danger, dwelling

on the mutual connection between the Huguenot and the Flemish movement

and the benefit that France would derive from the crushing of the

rebellion in the Low Countries. Fourquevaux in reply declared that

the Huguenots would fly to arms again, if a Spanish army should enter

France, to which the duke rejoined that the presence of a Spanish army

would so overawe them that they would not dare to do so. The ambassador

then inquired whether the Emperor could support Philip, seeing that

he was engaged in a war with the Turks[1052] and was incapable of

raising funds in his behalf. Alva told him that the German princes

would perceive that the Flemings were merely rebels and that “no prince

or soldier in Germany, even were he a Lutheran, would refuse to take

the pay of Spain.”[1053] But Fourquevaux refused to be convinced by

Alva’s smooth words. He had information that Spain was borrowing ships

from Malta, Genoa, and the papacy and Savoy and warned Charles IX to

strengthen the garrisons in Languedoc and Provence.[1054]

This information threw the court of France into great excitement.

Catherine de Medici declared that the heretics would take up arms

immediately, under such circumstances.[1055] The King wrote to

Fourquevaux on December 24 not to spare any efforts to penetrate

the designs of Spain.[1056] Sixteen thousand troops were sent into

the Lyonnais at once.[1057] The marshal Vieilleville returned to

Metz.[1058] The government began the erection of a great citadel in

Verdun and to fortify the frontier against Luxembourg.[1059] D’Andelot

was sent to Switzerland to make new enrolments.[1060] An agent was sent

into Normandy with instructions to pass along the coast and take the

names of master-mariners and sailors.[1061] The queen of Navarre began

to mobilize forces in Béarn.[1062] All this time the duke of Alva kept

endeavoring to quiet French alarm by reiterating that he would use all

means in his power to avoid troubling France and that the army destined

for Flanders, now increased by 1,500 light horse composed of Spaniards,

Italians, and Albanians, would go by the valley of the Rhône only as a

last recourse.[1063]

Finally, in the middle of February, the duke of Alva’s preparations

were made. Don Juan de Acuna, who had been sent to Savoy to make

arrangements with the duke for the transit of the Spanish army,

returned, after having made a satisfactory settlement. The army

was to go through Savoy, via the Mt. Cenis and Chambéry, cross the

Rhône at Yenne, and so proceed to Besançon in Franche Comté, where

it was to be joined by German contingents. This averted the danger

threatening Languedoc and Dauphiné, but threw it upon French Burgundy

and Champagne.[1064] It was a roundabout route for the Spanish troops

in the Milanais, but it was impossible to send them directly through

Switzerland by way of the Grisons, Constance, Basel, and Strasburg

without inflaming these localities; above all, Geneva would thereby

have been menaced, and any movement imperiling that city would have

fired the entire Calvinist world.[1065]

[Illustration: March of the DUKE of ALVA

THROUGH SAVOY, FRANCHE COMTÉ AND LORRAINE.

———————- Conjectured route]

In the face of common peril Bern, Freiburg, and Valais concluded a

defensive league on February 20, while Basel and Zurich took up arms

with French approval. Fear of a joint attack of Spain and Savoy upon

Geneva prevailed throughout Switzerland, which was divided into two

camps, the five cantons of the center favoring designs upon Geneva

and the Vaud. Spain aimed to profit by the impression produced by the

passage of her troops close to the Swiss frontier to force certain

military advantages and dispossess France from the exceptional

situation she had lately secured in the Alps. The western cantons

were offered cheap salt from Franche Comté, and those of the center

grain from the Milanais. The duke of Lorraine also offered salt at a

low price from his duchy. As a result Bern found herself deserted by

western Switzerland and apparently single-handed about to be called

upon to protect Geneva from Spanish attack. Perhaps if Spain had been

certain of the support of Savoy at this juncture, this might have

happened, but the duke of Savoy was content to profit by the fear of

the Bernois to compel them to restore the three bailiwicks which they

had formerly agreed to do in the treaty of Lausanne, October 30, 1564,

but had delayed to fulfil. Charles IX himself advised Bern to yield in

this particular and in August the settlement with the duke of Savoy was

made.[1066]

All that Philip now requested of France was leave for French subjects

to provide the army with supplies in its course. Again Fourquevaux

urged his sovereign to be cautious; the fact that France was just

recovering from a year of famine and could ill spare sustenance for

others was not so important as the necessity of avoiding every occasion

of civil war.[1067]

On May 10, 1567, the duke of Alva sailed from Cartagena and arrived at

Genoa on May 27. St. Ambroise at the foot of the Alps was the point

where his munitions and provisions were concentrated. Here on June

2 the duke had a grand review of his troops. There were 19 ensigns

(3,230 men), from Naples, under the command of Alonzo de Uloa; 10

ensigns from Sicily (1,620 men) under command of Julian Romero; 10

ensigns of Lombard troops (2,200 men) under command of Don Sancho

de Londono; 10 Sardinian ensigns with four companies of recruits in

addition (1,728 men) under command of Don Gonzalo de Bracamonte, making

a total of 49 ensigns of Spanish infantry (8,778 men). The duke’s

cavalry was composed of five companies of Spanish light horse and

three Italian and two Albanian companies and two companies of Spanish

arquebusiers on horseback, in all 1,200 horses.[1068] On the march a

company of 15 musketeers was placed between each ensign. This was the

first instance in modern warfare when muskets were used in the field.

Hitherto this weapon had been so enormously heavy that it was used in

siege work only, balanced upon a triangle of wood or iron.[1069]

The route lay via Alessandria de la Paille, St. Ambroise, Aosta,

Turin, the Mont Cenis, St. Jean de Maurienne, and the valley of the

Arve through Savoy. In spite of his small array it was necessary to

divide the army into three parts, the advance guard, the “battle,” and

the rear guard. The “battle” each day occupied the place abandoned by

the advance guard and was itself in turn replaced by the rear guard,

the three divisions of the army marching one day apart. The duke of

Alva commanded the advance guard, his son Don Ferdinand Alvarez de

Toledo the “battle;” while the rear guard was under the command of the

Italian, Ciappin-Vitelli, Marquis of Cetona formally in the service

of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The army thus divided occupied fourteen

days in traversing Savoy. It was a long and toilsome journey through a

wild and mountainous country, where the difficulties of the march were

increased by constant dread of famine. In many places the country was

completely sterile. In Burgundy the march was easier and twelve days

brought the army via Dôle and Gray to Fonteney near Toul, whence twelve

days more brought Alva by Thionville to Luxembourg (July 29), where he

was joined by new forces.[1070]

In spite of the length of the march and the hardships of it, the duke

retained his traditional iron discipline and the soldiers were not

allowed to forage upon the country or to break ranks.[1071]

On August 12, 1567, the duke of Alva entered Brussels. General terror

prevailed in the Low Countries upon his arrival. The Prince of Orange

left the land. Count Egmont, naïvely declaring that he had done nothing

wrong, remained; his friend Hoorne imitated his example. Alva at

once sent away all the Flemish soldiers and quartered the city with

the new troops. In order to facilitate his policy the duke created a

special tribunal, _not_ composed of lawyers “because they would not

condemn without proofs.” This was the famous Council of Troubles which

the people called the “Council of Blood.” The members of it held no

commissions from the King, but were the simple agents of the duke of

Alva. The most celebrated of them was a certain Vargas, a criminal

himself, against whom action had been suspended in return for his

infamous services.

If the policy of the Spanish government in Flanders took a new and

different form with the coming of Alva, the revolution there was no

less changed. The cardinal Granvella some months before this time had

written to Philip II: “It is a general rule, in matters of state, that

popular enterprises, if they do not terminate in the first outburst,

generally vanish in smoke if the remedy for them be applied before they

have time to follow up the movement.”[1072] He added that contemporary

history afforded some striking examples of the truth of this

observation. But the provinces he had lately governed were not of this

category. For it is clear that a change had taken place in the nature

of the Flemish revolt in the years 1565-67. The revolution by this time

had passed through the earlier stages of defiance and rebellion and

developed an organization with a definite, set purpose before it. The

formation of the Gueux was the clearest manifestation of this change.

In its inception this famous group was an aristocratic body, composed

solely of nobles, and the Spanish government had little fear then of

its becoming a popular association.[1073] Granvella saw the similarity

of the Gueux to the Huguenot association formed at Orleans in 1562, but

he did not anticipate the popular nature it was soon to develop.[1074]

He was soon disillusioned. What was believed by the Spanish government

to be a somewhat close political and aristocratic combination of nobles

before long became a popular confederation of congregations having a

religious propaganda, as well as a political purpose.[1075] Despite

this change, however, Philip’s minister did not yet believe the Gueux

to be formidable. As Alva had declared at Bayonne that all that was

necessary to destroy the Huguenot party in France was to kill the “big

fish,” so he now believed that if the leaders of the Gueux were cut

off, their movement would die too.[1076] But Alva soon discovered

that the Gueux were hardly ever weakened by the detachment of certain

of the nobles either by bribery or intimidation.[1077] By the time

of his arrival, under Brederode’s able leadership, the Calvinists of

the Flemish provinces had worked out a scheme of union in which every

congregation was at once a parish, a rating precinct, a military

hundred, and a political unit. Antwerp, whose population was so large

and so cosmopolitan that police scrutiny could be easily evaded, and

from which it was easy to make one’s escape, was the capital of the

association, as Orleans first, and later La Rochelle, was for the

Huguenots.[1078]

The Flemish government was soon alive to the necessity of breaking the

power of this confederation.[1079] Membership in the confederation,

if proved, was heavily punished. The retirement of the prince of

Orange from the land was believed by the government to be due to a

prudent effort to avoid being so compromised. It was certainly true

of Brederode. But Egmont and Hoorne remained, declaring they had done

nothing, and renewed their oath of allegiance to the King.[1080]

Nevertheless Granvella sarcastically quoted Lycurgus that neutrals were

more odious than enemies. “After the towns have been cleared out,”

wrote the provost Morillon, “it will be time to attack the garden in

order to destroy the weeds and roots there,” and Spain’s agent at

Amsterdam at the same time wrote: “God may pardon those who are the

cause of _one_ and the _other_ league; but I assure you, unless I am

much mistaken, that those who have made others to dance, have some

other purpose than we know. Time will discover it.”[1081]

[Illustration: EXECUTION OF EGMONT AND HOORNE IN THE MARKET SQUARE AT

BRUSSELS

Original copper plate by Franz Hogenberg.]

This somewhat long dissertation upon the nature and development of the

confederation formed by Philip’s II revolted subjects in Flanders is

not a digression beside the mark. The number of Huguenots to be found

in the Low Countries in 1566-67, intriguing with their coreligionists

against Spain was very great. The duke of Bouillon and the prince

of Porcien were the most prominent of these.[1082] In the aggregate

the number was so great and their participation so serious a matter

for the government, that the maintenance of the frontier against the

French was urged upon Alva as the first necessity, immediately after

his arrival at Brussels.[1083] France for her own part began to erect

a citadel at Verdun and to strengthen the Picard frontier, whose towns

received new troops in June, and when word came that there were German

troops in Luxembourg awaiting Alva’s arrival, D’Andelot was sent to

the frontier of Champagne with 6,000 Swiss which the government had

levied.[1084] This action ruffled Philip II’s temper, for to him it was

flaunting his failure to break the alliance of the Swiss with France

in his very face. His ambassador in France protested energetically and

charged the queen with duplicity.[1085] At Madrid the nuncio inquired

with curiosity of Fourquevaux, in what spirit Philip II—who had had

an audience with the ambassador the day before—received the news of

France’s activities in Switzerland. “I told him,” wrote the ambassador

to Charles IX, “that it was the usage and custom of great kings and

princes whenever they saw their neighbors arming, to assure themselves

also of their realms and states.”[1086] Calais was a double source of

anxiety, first because Spain, in pursuance of Alva’s recommendation,

had not been content with fortifying Gravelines, but had actually built

a fort of earth only five paces from the turnpike which marked the

French limit; secondly, because at this embarrassing time Elizabeth

of England had conceived the thought of reviving the English claim to

Calais.[1087] With the purpose of fathoming her son-in-law’s designs

Catherine sent the younger L’Aubespine to Madrid.[1088] War with Spain

was already on the lips of some in France.[1089]

In spite of the wisdom of these military precautions on the part of

the French crown, the Huguenots grew alarmed lest there was a movement

on foot to repress the edict.[1090] There was designed intention in

the unadmirable conduct of the prince of Condé, and perhaps some in

that of Coligny too. The prince craved chief command of the army, and

a war with Spain was in a direct line with his aspirations. He had

been well treated since the peace of Amboise, having been given the

government of Picardy and the county of Rotrou, which was erected

into a duchy under the name of Enghien-le-François. But his appetite

for power was insatiable. In July, after angry speech with the King,

Condé had retired from court, and was followed by the admiral, who gave

out that he had discovered “some practice that wholly tended to his

confusion.”[1091]

It was small politics. In this time of external danger from the

furtive designs of Philip II and the blustering enmity of England,

the honorable course of every subject of France was to stand by the

King and the nation. The Huguenot leaders compromised the cause at

large by indulging their personal vanity, their petty spite, their

pique at such an hour. Friction there was, disagreement there was over

the interpretation and the working of certain parts of the edict of

Amboise. The Catholics, for example, complained that the intention of

the edict was evaded by the Huguenots, asserting that in cases where

the right of preaching was permitted to all barons and high justiciars

only for themselves and their tenants, and for others of lower degree

for their household only, congregational worship was held under cover

thereof.[1092]

The bigotry of Paris and its vicinity, though, was the worst source

of disaffection. In the city district captains were chosen by the

populace to watch against Protestant activity—the nucleus of the

famous Sixteen (_Seize_) of Paris in 1589-94. It would have been the

height of political inexpediency, under such circumstances, to have

tried to enforce the letter of the edict in the Ile-de-France. The July

amendment of the edict of Amboise prohibiting exercise of Protestant

worship throughout the Ile-de-France except in such places as should

be licensed by the King, and the further one prohibiting Protestants

from filling public offices in the cities,[1093] I believe was framed

for the purpose of avoiding conflict and not with any reactionary

purpose. It is certainly of significance that the liberal chancellor

L’Hôpital favored them.[1094] Patience and experience would have worked

out the solution of such difficulties as these. It was criminal in

the prince of Condé to fan the ashes of the late civil war into flame

once more. For in this tense state the prince deliberately exaggerated

and misrepresented things for his own purpose and a spark from

Flanders—Alva’s arrest of the counts Egmont and Hoorne on September

9—kindled France into flame again.

The arrival of the news in France unfortunately coincided with the

session of two synods of the Huguenots, one at Châtillon-sur-Loing,

the other at Valéry.[1095] Dismay prevailed in them. The preachers

cried out that the arrest of Egmont and Hoorne[1096] was the proof

of a secret alliance between Spain and France for the overthrow of

Calvinism. The truth of Bayonne was out at last! Coligny’s iron will

might still have kept them in order, however, if in the midst of this

excitement word had not also come that 6,000 Swiss whom Charles IX had

enrolled to cover the French frontier against the duke of Alva had

entered France. The double news was too much for the excited minds of

the Huguenots. The admiral and the prince who had failed to perceive

the true policy of France in Switzerland, in desperation turned to the

constable for a word of truth and comfort. But the old Montmorency,

who desired to have his son, the marshal Montmorency, succeed him in

the office of constable[1097] (which the prince of Condé coveted for

himself), roughly rejoined: “The Swiss have their pay; don’t you expect

them to be used?”[1098] The words were brutally and thoughtlessly said.

They merely imported anger. The Huguenots interpreted them to mean that

they were to be overcome by military force, and Protestantism coerced,

if not extinguished. The synod of the Huguenots at Valéry[1099]

resolved upon war. The conference was held in the admiral’s château

at Châtillon under the outward guise of a banquet. There were present

the prince of Condé, La Rochefoucault, the cardinal of Châtillon,

D’Andelot, Bricquemault, Teligny, Mouy, Montgomery, and other nobles of

mark, besides some Huguenot ministers. The conference lasted the entire

week, at the end of which it was resolved that all the Huguenots in

France should be notified in every _bailliage_ and _sénéschaussée_, by

the deacons and other officers of their congregation; that they should

be called upon to furnish money according to the means which they had,

for the payment of reiters from Germany, which the count palatine of

the Rhine was to levy; and that all the young men of the religion

capable of bearing arms were to be enrolled for military service.[1100]

The plan was as bold as it was simple. It was to gain possession of the

King’s person by a sudden _coup de main_, for which purpose a force

of 1,500 horse was to be brought secretly to Valéry. The court at

this time was residing at the Château de Monceaux near Meaux, and was

without more than nominal military protection.[1101] On the evening

of September 24, the queen learned of the rendezvous at Rosay-en-Brie.

A midnight council was called. The Swiss, who had reached Château

Thierry, were hastily summoned. The Lorraine party and the duke

of Nemours advised immediate return to Paris. The chancellor and

Montmorency endeavored to persuade the King against so doing.[1102] The

former pointed out that to go to Paris would be for the King to commit

himself to the most bigoted of his subjects and destroy the possibility

of an amicable settlement, while the constable argued that Meaux was a

fortified city capable of withstanding a siege, and that to leave it

might be to court defeat in the open country. In the dilemma the Swiss

colonel Pfiffer cast the die.

“May it please your Majesty,” cried he, “to entrust your person and

that of the queen mother to the valor and fidelity of the Swiss. We are

6,000 men, and with the points of our pikes we will open a path wide

enough for you to pass through the army of your enemies.”[1103]

“Enough,” Charles rejoined. “I would rather die free with you than live

a captive among rebels.”[1104]

The return to Paris began at four o’clock in the morning. “When the

Swiss arrived at Meaux,” wrote Correro, “I vow they were the most

villainous looking gang I have ever seen. Yet in battle array they were

admirable. Three times they turned upon the enemy and lowering their

pikes charged upon them like savage dogs in serried ranks and in good

order, without one being a pace in advance of another. Thus the King

was able with his suite to get to Paris.”[1105] He reached the Louvre

that night, travel-worn, hot, famished, and so angry that his fierce

disposition never lost the memory of that humiliation.[1106]

The affair of Meaux came like a thunder-clap to most of France. The

suddenness of the Huguenot action and the all but complete success of

it astonished men. “This movement,” wrote the Venetian ambassador,

“of which several thousand men had knowledge, was conducted with such

precaution that nothing leaked out until it was all but an accomplished

fact. This could not possibly have been done without the perfect

intelligence that exists among the Huguenots, and is a striking

manifestation of their organization throughout the realm.”[1107]

In the light of this judgment, it remains to describe the Huguenot form

of government.

The ecclesiastical—and political unit—of French Calvinism was the

congregation. Congregations were grouped “according to number and

convenience” into colloquies or classes which met from two to four

times each year, the division being made by the authority of the

provincial synod.[1108] In church matters, no church had any primacy

or jurisdiction over another, nor one province over another.[1109]

Ministers brought with them to local classes or provincial synods

one or two elders chosen out of their consistories.[1110] Elders

who were deputies of churches had an equal power of voting with the

pastors.[1111] The authority of a provincial synod was subordinate

to that of the national synod,[1112] and whatever had been decreed

by provincial synods for the government of the churches in their

province had to be brought before the national synod.[1113] The

grand lines of division followed the historic provincial divisions

of France, but smaller provinces and parts of the larger ones, as

Guyenne and Languedoc, were associated together. The national synod

of 1559 divided France into sixteen Protestant provinces, as follows:

(1) The Ile-de-France, Chartrain, Picardy, Champagne and Brie; (2)

Normandy; (3) Brittany; (4) Orleans, Blesois, Dunois, Nivernais, Berry,

Bourbonnais, and La Marche; (5) Touraine, Anjou, Loudunois, Maine,

Vendôme, and Perche; (6) Upper and Lower Poitou; (7) Saintonge, Aunis,

La Rochelle, and Angoumois; (8) Lower Guyenne, Périgord, Gascony,

and Limousin; (9) Upper and Lower Vivarais, together with Velay,

and Le Forêt; (10) Lower Languedoc, including Nîmes, Montpellier,

and Beziers; (11) Upper Languedoc, Upper Guyenne, Toulouse,

Carcassonne, Quercy, Rouergue, Armagnac, and Upper Auvergne; (12)

Burgundy, Lyonnais, Beaujolais, Bresse, Lower Auvergne, and Gex; (13)

Provence; (14) Dauphiné and Orange; (15) Béarn; (16) the Cevennes and

Gévaudan.[1114]

This administrative partition, however, did not remain fixed. Some

provinces, like Brittany, had so few Protestants in them, that the

Huguenots therein could not stand alone, and the first civil war

brought out the weakness of this system. Accordingly, in 1563, the map

of France was partitioned anew, and the former sixteen “provinces”

were reduced to nine. Some of the changes made are interesting. For

example, the Chartrain was cut off from the Ile-de-France and attached

to the “province” of Orleans, manifestly in the endeavor to keep a

connecting link between Normandy and the Loire country. Brittany was

strengthened by the annexation of Anjou, Maine, and Touraine which

formerly constituted an independent “province,” which obviously drew

it into closer connection with the stronger Calvinistic provinces.

The “province” of Upper and Lower Poitou was combined with Saintonge,

Aunis, and Angoumois, thus knitting together all the country watered

by the Charente, the Clain, and lesser streams. Burgundy, Lyonnais,

Beaujolais, Bresse, Lower Auvergne, and Gex absorbed the small

Huguenot province composed of Vivarais, Velay, and Le Forêt. But the

most interesting consolidation was in the south of France. Formerly

Upper Languedoc, in which were Nîmes, Montpellier, and Beziers;

Lower Languedoc, comprising Upper Guyenne, Toulouse, Carcassonne,

Quercy, Rouergue, Armagnac, and Upper Auvergne; Provence; Dauphiné,

and Cevennes-Gévaudan had each formed separate “provinces.” But in

1563 this immense territory was all united to form the great Huguenot

province of Languedoc. The only ancient provinces which remained

unchanged in 1563 were Normandy,[1115] Béarn, and Lower Guyenne, with

Périgord and Limousin.

The Huguenot ecclesiastical organization and its political organization

were one and the same. The congregations, the “colloquia,” the synods,

constituted both taxation units and military _cadres_.[1116] The

strength of the Huguenot organization, however, before the massacre

of St. Bartholomew, I believe has been exaggerated, except in Guyenne

where, in the vicinity of Nérac especially, Montluc early came in

contact with a powerful combination of the Huguenots.[1117] The strong

elements in the Protestant organization were its simplicity and the

vigilance of all, from provincial chiefs to simple pastors, who

made up for scarcity of numbers by the most zealous activity.[1118]

“If our priests,” wrote the Venetian Correro in 1569, “were half

so energetic, of a certainty Christianity would not be in danger

in this country.”[1119] It was not until after 1572 that the

Huguenot organization reached a high point of military and political

development, when a solid federation of the Reformed churches was

formed at Milhaud in 1574, with rating precincts, military hundreds and

civil jurisdictions.[1120]

Exactly as the early organization of the Huguenots has been

overemphasized, so has the republican nature of the early Huguenot

movement been exaggerated. Apart from whatever religious motives may

have actuated them, the Protestant nobles were influenced by political

ambition; the bourgeoisie by the hope of administrative and economic

reform; the masses by the general spirit of discontent. The Huguenots

did not present a united front until after St. Bartholomew, when

the fusion of the political Huguenots with the Politiques reduced

the “religious” Huguenots to a left-wing minority. Before 1572 the

political ideas of the Reformed, if not still inchoate, were not

harmonized into one homogeneous cause, backed up by a compact and

highly organized political system. Individual political theorists or

fanatic devotees, of course, were to be found in the Huguenot ranks,

but there was no systematic political philosophy to guide their conduct

before the massacre of St. Bartholomew. It was this catastrophe that

crystallized Huguenot opinion and organized combination on a large

scale.[1121] In Guyenne, alone, where, as has been said, the Huguenot

organization was most completely developed at an early date, does any

clear republican idea seem to have early obtained.[1122]

The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576 The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II · 第 11 / 26 章