CHAPTER X

THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES.[814] THE BAYONNE EPISODE

“I am always _en voyage_,” wrote the Venetian ambassador to the senate.

“Since the beginning of my embassy the King has not staid more than

fifteen days in any one place. He goes from Lorraine to Poitou, and

then to Normandy and the edge of Belgium, back again to Normandy, then

to Paris, Picardy, Champagne, Burgundy.”[815] Dr. Dale wrote in the

same strain to Lord Burghley: “The Spanish ambassador has a saying that

ambassadors in France are eaten up by their horses, since they are

constrained to keep so many because of the habit of the court of moving

from place to place continually.”[816]

But there was point to Charles IX’s famous tour of the provinces in

1564-66. The unsettled condition of the country, if no other reason,

accounts for Catherine’s great design of completing the pacification

of the kingdom by having the King tour the realm. The route lay

through Sens[817] (March 15) to Troyes (March 23)[818] where the peace

with England was signed on April 13; thence to Châlons-sur-Marne,

Bar-le-Duc, Dijon (May 15), Macon (June 8), and thence to Lyons, where

the court arrived on June 13. The King traveled with his ordinary

train, that is, with his mother, his brother, the duke of Anjou,

the constable, and the archers of the guard, in order to spare the

people the burden of great entertainment, and those princes and

nobles who wished to follow were accompanied only by their ordinary

servants.[819] If the Huguenots viewed the King’s sojourn at Bar-le-Duc

with apprehension,[820] it was not without anxiety that his Catholic

subjects saw Charles IX visit the great city located at the junction

of the Rhone and the Saône rivers.[821] Lyons seems to have imbibed

something of Calvinism from the very waters of the arrowy river whose

source was the lake of the citadel of Calvinism.[822] The rumor was

current that a greater conspiracy than that of Amboise was on foot;

that the King and queen were to be deposed and slain, and that Lyons

would unite with Geneva to form a greater Calvinistic republic.[823]

[Illustration: The Tour of the Provinces, 1564-66]

But Lyons welcomed the King graciously, and gave him sumptuous

accommodation.[824] Charles was charmed with the reception given him

and amazed at the wealth and commercial prosperity of the city.[825]

Situated at the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône rivers, the

wines and grain of Burgundy came to Lyons for market, while it was

the natural entrepôt of the commerce out of Italy, besides much that

came from Spain and Flanders. There were four fairs there each year.

The great industry of the city was silk manufacturing. In 1450 Charles

VII had granted it the monopoly in this. Francis I in 1536 relieved

the silk operatives of all taxes and military service. The bulk of the

commerce was in the hands of Italians, of whom there were said to be

above twelve thousand in the city—chiefly Florentines, Genoese, and

Milanese.[826] There were also many Germans and Swiss, whose presence

gave the governor, the duke of Nemours,[827] great anxiety, because

large quantities of arms were smuggled into the city in the guise of

merchandise.[828]

The court had not been long upon its tour through the provinces before

Catherine de Medici discovered that the petition of the estates of

Burgundy for the abolition of Protestant worship was not merely a local

prejudice, but the sense of the provinces.[829] The elements of this

public opinion were various: The clergy—not all, however—wanted the

findings of the Council of Trent accepted _in toto_; all of them were

dissatisfied with the recognition of the rights of the Protestants;

the alienation of their lands was a grievance to the clergy, the more

so because speculators had bought them at a low price because of the

doubt as to the validity of the title.[830] The Guises were angry

that the prosecution of Coligny for the murder of the duke had been

abandoned.[831] Among high and low alike there were unprincipled folk

who had hopes of profiting by confiscations and forfeitures imposed

upon the Huguenots.[832]

The queen mother was too good a politician not to pay heed to these

signs of popular feeling, more especially as the voice of the provinces

chimed with those in high authority, who not only urged that the war

be renewed against the Protestants but also hinted broadly of foreign

support in aid of the crown. At first Catherine answered graciously,

yet guardedly, to the effect that a peace which had been so solemnly

made, by the advice of the princes of the blood and the council, could

not be too lightly cast aside.

The miserable effects of the war were everywhere evident. Agriculture

had almost ceased in a country famous for its fertility, and the whole

country had been so plundered and harassed by both parties that the

poor people, being stripped of all their substance, often preferred

to fly to the forests rather than to remain continually exposed to

the mercy of their enemies. Wandering soldiers and dissolute women,

with stolen goods in their possession, infested the roads.[833] As to

trade and manufacturing, the mechanic arts still were plied only in

the largest and strongest towns; even here merchants and tradesmen had

shut up shop and gone off to war, not always out of religious zeal,

but in the hope of enriching themselves by spoliation. The nobility

were divided; the clergy incensed. The civil war had been accompanied

by the attendant aids of violence, robbery, murder, rape, and justice

had not been administered in the courts for months. The very methods

resorted to for the preservation of religion rendered it hateful in the

eyes of many men of both parties. Both parties were bigoted in belief

and in practice. The iconoclasm of the Protestants, who tore down

church edifices hoary with age and sanctified by tradition, expelling

the inmates, both male and female, if doing them no worse injury,

familiarized society with changes wrought by violence and made the

people callous to one of the most precious possessions of a nation—a

reverence for tradition.[834]

To all these difficulties the prevalence of the plague must be added.

Since the century of the Black Death Europe had not so suffered

from this scourge as in the sixteenth. It recurred intermittently,

being especially violent in the years 1531, 1533, 1544, 1546, 1548,

1553, 1562-64, 1568, 1577-80.[835] No part of Europe was spared.

France, England, Spain, the Low Countries, Germany, and Italy, all

suffered. But certain portions of France suffered more than others,

as Bas-Languedoc, Provence, the Lyonnais, Burgundy, Champagne, the

Ile-de-France, and Normandy. The west and especially the southwest were

relatively exempt. Apparently the disease followed the trades-routes

along the river valleys, for Toulouse, Lyons, Châlons-sur-Saône,

Macon, Châlons-sur-Marne, Langres, Bourges, La Charité, Orleans,

Tours, Moulins, Sens, Melun, Dijon, Troyes, Château-Thierry, Soissons,

Beauvais, Pontoise, Paris, Rouen, and the Norman ports suffered

most.[836] As always, Italy was the immediate source of the epidemic,

which was communicated from place to place by the movements of trade.

Lyons paid dearly for its commercial pre-eminence, for the ravages of

the plague were terrible there.[837] It was at its height when the

court was there in July, 1564. The English ambassador, Smith, gives a

fearful picture of the state of the city. Men died in the street before

his lodgings. His servant who went daily for his provisions sometimes

saw ten and twelve corpses, some naked, lying in the streets where they

lay till “men clothed in yellow” removed them. A great many bodies

were cast into the river, “because they will not be at the cost to

make graves. This day,” he writes on July 12, “from break of day till

ten o’clock there laid a man naked in the street, groaning and drawing

his last breath, not yet dead. Round the town there are tents of the

pestiferous, besides those which are shut up in their houses.”[838]

Almost every third house was closed because of the plague. The city

authorities vainly tried to combat the disease by providing that

visits were to be made twice a day by those appointed; but as there

were but five “master surgeons” in the whole city, medical attention

must have been slight. Persons affected with the plague were to be

removed to the hospital—the oldest and one of the best in Europe at

that time. Corpses were to be buried at night and the clothes of the

dead burned.[839] “About the Rhone men dare eat no fish nor fishers

lay their engines and nets, because instead of fish they take up the

pestiferous carcasses which are thrown in.” New sanitary regulations

were made. All filth was to be cast into the river and not allowed to

pollute the streets or the river banks. Fires of scented wood were kept

burning between every ten houses in the street. Pigs and other animals

were not allowed at large. Meat, fish, and vegetable stalls were to be

inspected and all decayed provisions destroyed.[840]

It is interesting to observe the efforts made by local authorities to

prevent the spread of the disease and the relief measures that were

taken. As soon as the plague was discovered, the town authorities

usually set guards to watch the houses of those stricken and appointed

barbers and gravediggers to treat ill and to inter the dead. These

attendants were supported and paid by a tax laid upon the town. Those

who were ill were sent to a house of isolation appointed to be a

hospital, which was often upon the walls of the town, remote from the

people. In Provins the church and cemetery were immediately adjacent

to the hospital! The mortality was great. In Provins in 1562 there

were eighty persons stricken, of whom sixty died, among them four of

the attendants. Two of the barber-surgeons refused to serve and were

proceeded against by the town bailiff and were hanged in effigy because

the principals in the case had made their escape. Diseased houses were

sprinkled with perfumes and aromatic herbs were burned in them in order

to purify them.[841] As always, the dislocation of society and the

depravation of morals worked havoc in the community. Crimes of violence

were common.[842]

Little by little, however, this picture of misery faded into the

background of the queen’s mind and the question of political

expediency, which was always the lodestar of her policy, became her

primary consideration.[843] The Catholics plucked up courage as the

court progressed[844] and Huguenot suspicion of the queen’s course was

early aroused. Shortly after the tour of the provinces had begun, and

while the court was still at Troyes pending the signature of the treaty

of peace, there was a jar between D’Andelot and the queen mother, who

would not permit him to choose his own captains and other officers as

was customarily permitted to colonels. Partially in consequence of

this affront, and partially to avoid being compromised more with Queen

Elizabeth, D’Andelot, the prince of Condé, and the cardinal Châtillon

all remained away from the sessions of the council while the terms

of peace were under consideration, and when the court resumed its

migration, no one of these attended it.[845] Indeed, after the court

left Châlons-sur-Marne, so wide was the breach between the prince of

Condé, the admiral and all of that faction, and the court, that the

chancellor L’Hôpital was the only official who continued to treat them

with deference.[846] The consideration shown Jeanne d’Albret only

partially relieved the suspicions of the Protestants.[847]

We find the anxiety of the Protestants over the situation reflected in

the proceedings of the provincial synod of the Reformed churches of the

region through which the court had been traveling during this season,

namely the churches of Champagne, Brie, Picardy, the Ile-de-France, and

the French Vexin.[848] This synod assembled on April 27, 1564, at La

Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and was composed of forty-five ministers. Letters

were read from many parts of France and abroad, among which was one

from Beza bidding the Huguenots to be on their guard as the priests

were contributing money for the purpose of rooting out the truth. It

was agreed by the body to reply that the Protestants were suspicious of

the intentions of the queen mother.[849] In its resolutions the synod

condemned the policy of the magistrates who cloaked their religious

animosity under the guise of the law,[850] and complained that the

Catholics were carrying the King about the country in order to show

him the ruin of their churches.[851] The moderate La Roche even went so

far as to declare that the Reformed church never could have peace while

the queen mother governed.

Justice and historical accuracy, however, require that it be said that

the Huguenots’ own conduct was sometimes in violation of the privileges

granted them by the Edict of Amboise. Their iconoclasm toward the

images and the pictures which the Catholics considered sacred was

outrageous; they failed to confine their worship to authorized places,

so that the magistrates were acting within their rights in so far

repressing Protestant worship; their provincial synods not infrequently

were inflammatory political assemblies.[852] On the other hand, the

Catholics wilfully molested the Huguenots, interfering in their

congregations, and compelling them to pay tithes and other dues for the

support of the Catholic poor and even—Castelnau says—to support their

provincial leagues.[853]

But the Huguenots went too far in their suspicion of the government.

Beza, at the synod of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre had been apprehensive of

a joint attack of France and Savoy upon Geneva, not knowing that the

French aim was to renew the alliance with the Catholic cantons in

order to prevent Spanish ascendency there.[854] Bern and Zurich were

the pillars of French ascendency in the Alpine country. France counted

upon them more than upon all else to prevent Spanish recruiting, and

to close the Alpine passes to Spain’s army. To this end Bellièvre, the

marshal Vieilleville, and the bishop of Limoges, who had returned

from Madrid, where he was succeeded by St. Sulpice, were sent into

Switzerland in the early spring of 1564 to penetrate the designs

of Spain, and to promise an early payment of the French debts due

to the cantons in return for their military support in the wars of

Henry II.[855] Bellièvre’s particular mission was to the Grisons. The

position of the Grisons was a precarious one, for Spain could attack

them from the Valteline, or starve them by prohibiting the exportation

of grain into the country from Lombardy. By using such threats the

Spanish governor of Milan hoped to compel the adherence of the Grisons

to a treaty which would open to Spanish and imperial arms the great

Alpine routes of the Splügen, the Bernina, and the Stelvio, thus

connecting the territories of the two branches of the Hapsburg house

and shutting France out from eastern Switzerland. Bellièvre fraternized

with the popular element, and by May, 1564, had almost completely

neutralized the success of his Spanish rival in spite of Spanish gold.

Fortunately for France the Ten Jurisdictions declared in her favor and

the Grisons, though very Spaniardized, luckily had a French pensioner

as its chief magistrate, the Swiss captain Florin.

Meanwhile the negotiations of the bishop of Limoges and the marshal

Vieilleville had progressed so far that the treaty of alliance was all

but signed. Late in October Bellièvre received from Freiburg the text

of the articles of alliance which the bishop of Limoges and the marshal

Vieilleville proposed to submit to the Swiss diet. Encouraged by this

success, he went to Glarus in order to overcome the influence of the

Zurich preachers who were outspoken enemies of the French alliance, and

if possible to settle the difference between that state and Schwytz. By

great dexterity he prevailed upon the two cantons to accept a uniform

treaty. But he could not push negotiations to a conclusion until

hearing from his colleagues.

Spain made a supreme effort to secure the opening of the passages

between the Tyrol and the Milanais, but failed because the Grisons

promised France that they would accept the principle of a renewed

alliance, leaving the settlement of details pending, so that although

the supremacy of France in Switzerland was not absolutely assured, at

least the adherence of the three leagues to her seemed assured.

But the Escurial and the Vatican were leagued to destroy French

influence in Switzerland. Spain gave up hope of compelling the cantons

to make a direct alliance with her, but by means of commercial threats

and commercial inducements counted on still keeping the Alpine passes

open to her arms. Her maxim was, where the grain of Lombardy goes,

there Spain’s armies may go, too. To neutralize this danger the French

energetically opposed any renewal of an alliance between the Vatican

and the Swiss cantons. The Grey League, later won by the commercial

promises of Spain, separated from the other two in the end, but its

defection was not so serious as it might have been, since according to

the joint constitution the vote of two leagues in matters of foreign

policy compelled the adherence of the third. But in order further to

strengthen the hold of France, the French ambassadors had recourse to

a sort of referendum in order to secure an approval of the majority of

all the Swiss towns in favor of the French alliance, in addition to the

official action of the three leagues. The success of this stroke was

complete and the general diet of the three leagues gave its adherence

to the treaty of Freiburg concluded by the bishop of Limoges and the

marshal Vieilleville on December 7, 1564.[856] The poverty of France,

however, seriously endangered the continuance of this alliance. When it

was concluded, France tried to stave off payment of her debts, which

amounted to more than 600,000 livres, yet demanded the execution of the

articles of Freiburg. Glarus, Lucerne, Schwytz, Appenzell, Valais, the

Grisons, Schaffhausen, and Basel bitterly complained, the last also

because of the burdens laid upon the importations of her commerce into

France through Lyons.

In this conflict which France carried on against Spain and the Holy See

in Switzerland, Charles IX was supported by the German Protestants, who

of course were hostile to both houses of Hapsburg, and France may be

credited with considerable address in smoothing the ruffled feelings

of Basel and Schaffhausen, and softening the Protestant prejudices of

Zurich. This is simply another way of saying that the foreign policy

of France in Switzerland was a Protestant policy. Even Bern yielded

and joined the general treaty of alliance instead of insisting upon a

particular treaty, as she had at first done.[857]

The Huguenots, however, suspicious of the impending reaction at home

and misreading the diplomacy of France in Switzerland, grew more and

more fearful and began to turn their eyes again toward the prince of

Condé as a leader. But fortune and the craft of Catherine had lured

the prince away from his own; he had become a broken reed, dangerous

to lean upon. In July, 1564, Eleanor de Roye, the brave princess of

Condé, died.[858] The Guises and the queen mother, who were now in

co-operation,[859] at once began to practice to lure Condé away forever

from his party, and the former at the same time, in order to make the

alliance between France and Scotland more firm, conceived the idea of

marrying the prince of Condé to Mary Queen of Scots.[860] As another

possibility the Guises cherished the hope of marrying their niece to

Charles IX and thus recovering the ascendency they had enjoyed under

Francis II.[861] The corollary of such a plan was the reduction of the

Protestants of France. To these ideas Philip II, was stoutly opposed,

though he concealed his opposition thereto; Mary was too valuable for

his projects to be suffered to become a tool of the Guises. Their

purposes were limited to France; his purposes embraced Christendom.[862]

In 1575 the Venetian ambassador wrote, à propos of one of the

courtships of Queen Elizabeth: “Princes are wont to avail themselves

of matrimonial negotiations in many ways.”[863] These words sagely

summarize the efforts of much of the diplomacy of the sixteenth

century. By a singular combination of events and lineages, Mary Stuart

was necessarily almost the cornerstone of the universal monarchy Philip

II dreamed of forming in Europe; her possession of the Scottish crown,

her claims to England, her relationship with the Guises, united with

the religion she professed, made the furtherance of her power the most

practicable means to that end. Whether Mary’s future husband were Don

Carlos or the Austrian archduke was a matter of detail in Philip’s

plan—the end remained constant. Mary Stuart was of too much value to

Philip II’s political designs to risk such a marriage as the Guises

contemplated.[864] Her hand might be disposed elsewhere with greater

advantage.

Those intense religious convictions of the Spanish King which

made him believe he was the divinely ordained instrument of the

counter-Reformation, united with his political purposes and ambitions,

required him to keep a watchful eye upon France.[865] The Netherlands,

France, Italy, England, Scotland were like so many squares of a vast

political chessboard upon which he aimed so to move the pieces he was

in command of as ultimately to seize possession of those countries,

and redeem them from heresy. Mary Stuart was an important personage

in Philip’s purposes. He wanted to put her on the throne of Elizabeth

and thus unite Scotland and England under a common Catholic rule.

For a time he dreamed of marrying her to his own son, Don Carlos,

until Catherine interfered and offered her daughter Marguerite as a

less dangerous alternative to France. The death of Don Carlos,[866]

the eternal irresolution of the Spanish King, the development of new

events, continually altered the details of Philip’s purposes, but his

essential aim never varied an iota.[867]

The subjugation of France, not in the exact terms of loss of

sovereignty, perhaps, but no less in loss of true national independence

was a necessary condition of Philip’s purposes. The kingdom of France

was situated in the very center of those dominions whose consolidation

was to be the Spanish King’s realization of universal rule. Spain

bordered her on the south; the Netherlands on the north; in the east

lay Franche Comté. Besides these territories which were directly

Spanish, the Catholic cantons of Switzerland and Savoy were morally in

vassalage to Spain. Beyond Franche Comté lay the Catholic Rhinelands,

bound to the other branch of the house of Hapsburg. Beyond Switzerland

and Savoy lay Italy, save Venice entirely, and Rome in part, a group of

Spanish dominions.

Catherine de Medici combated Philip II both at Madrid and Vienna.

But by the side of the negative purpose to thwart Philip’s proposed

alliances, Catherine de Medici had purposes of her own of the same

sort. The daughter of a house made rich by banking and which never

lived down the bourgeois tradition of its ancestry in spite of all its

wealth and power, even though popes had come from its house, Catherine

was fascinated by the thought of marrying Charles IX to the eldest

daughter of the Hapsburgs, and her favorite son, the future Henry III,

then known as the duke of Orleans-Anjou, to the Spanish princess Juana,

sister of Philip, hoping to see some of Spain’s numerous dominions pass

to France as part of Juana’s dowry.

In the pursuance of this double marriage project, the queen early began

to beset Philip II for a personal interview, and urged her daughter

to persuade the king to the same end, using Pius IV’s cherished idea

of a concert of the great Catholic powers to consider the condition

and needs of Christendom with some adroitness as a screen to her own

personal purposes.[868]

Much of her correspondence with St. Sulpice relates to an interview

with Philip II for the purpose of arranging these matters, upon which

she had set her heart, and the time of both the ambassador and the

Spanish King was consumed with repeated interviews none of which was

ever satisfactory, and all of which were tedious.[869] The natural

reluctance of Philip II to commit himself to any positive course,

united with the great aversion he felt toward the queen mother because

of her wavering religious policy—for rigid adherence to Catholicism

was Philip’s one inflexible feature—led the King to follow a course

of procrastination and duplicity for months, during which, however, he

never evinced any outward sign of impatience; his countenance remained

as imperturbable as that of a Hindu idol, and never by any expression

reflected his thought.[870]

Foolish pride and undue affection led Catherine even to use the Turk

as a means of pressure upon Spain in order to accomplish this double

marriage project. In the year 1562 an ambassador of the Sultan passed

through France, having come by way of Venice to Lyons, and going

thence via Dijon and Troyes to Paris.[871] Turkey, after crushing

the revolt of Bajazet,[872] was seeking to avenge the accumulated

grievances which she had suffered from Austria and Spain, especially

the latter, for Philip II’s expedition to Oran and his capture of its

fortress, which was regarded as impregnable, had been a bitter blow

to the Porte.[873] Exasperated by Spain, Turkey whose war policy was

guided by the able grand vizier, Mohammed Sokolli, prepared a vast

expedition to expel her from all points which she occupied in Africa.

But such a campaign was not possible until Malta, lying midway in the

straits of the Mediterranean, was overcome.[874] Europe, which still

preserved an acute memory of the protracted siege of Rhodes, looked

forward with dismay to the prospective attack upon Malta, so that

Catherine de Medici’s cordial reception at Dax of another Turkish

ambassador—he was a Christian Pole in the employ of the Sultan—in the

course of the tour of the provinces was a political act that was daring

to rashness.[875] In order to force Philip II’s hand Catherine even

intimated that Charles IX might marry Queen Elizabeth, although this

proposition was too great a strain upon the credulity of Europe to be

given any consideration.[876] Soon after St. Sulpice reached Spain, we

find Toulouse suggested as the place for the desired interview,[877]

and thereafter for thirty-eight months this conference was one of the

dominant thoughts in Catherine’s mind.[878]

The queen mother’s original plan had been to avoid the heat of the

south by passing the winter at Moulins, and visiting Languedoc and

Guyenne in the next spring.[879] But the influence of impending

change impelled her forward in the maze of tournaments, balls, and

masques.[880] Although she was in “a country full of mountains and

brigands,”[881] so that she feared “que cette canaille sacageassent

quelques uns de sa cour,” and strengthened Strozzi’s band as a

precaution, nevertheless Catherine’s resolution seems to have increased

in degree as she moved southward. Probably the fact that the prince

of Condé was in the toils encouraged her; certainly the necessity of

exhibiting something positive that would please Spain, in view of the

approaching interview, actuated her. But apart from her own motives,

outside pressure had been brought to bear upon her to this end, when

at Bar-le-Duc, where the King went to attend the baptism of the infant

child of Charles III, duke of Lorraine, who had married Charles IX’s

sister, Claudine, in March.[882] Later “when the court came to Lyons

information was brought to it that if the King and his advisers should

continue to resist the general rising against the Huguenots, it would

be turned against itself.”[883] In this instance, however, the pressure

came, not from Spain, but from Pope Pius IV whose agent, the Florentine

Ludovico Antinori, was sent to France to urge the extirpation of

Calvinism and to plead the cause of the findings of the Council of

Trent.[884] Catherine obeyed the signs. But as a sudden rupture of the

peace of Amboise would have been attended with dangerous consequences

she proceeded cautiously.[885]

The first[886] definite intimation of the reaction was an edict issued

on July 24, prohibiting Calvinist worship within ten leagues of the

court, notwithstanding the fact that authorized places of Protestant

worship were affected by it. A fortnight later, on August 4, came a

more sweeping edict—the so-called Edict of Roussillon[887] which

forbade all persons of whatever religion, quality, or condition to

molest one another, or to violate or maltreat images, or to lay hands

upon any sacred objects upon pain of death; magistrates were likewise

enjoined to prevent the Huguenots from performing their devotions in

any suspected places, but to confine them to such places as had been

specified; finally, the Huguenots were forbidden to hold any synods

or other assemblies except in the presence of certain of the King’s

officers, who were appointed to be present at them.[888] The pretext

of both of these edicts was the trespass upon the terms of Amboise by

the Protestants, and fear of a Protestant conspiracy. But in reality

the action of the government constituted a partial yielding to that

Catholic pressure which already had made itself manifest at Nancy.

The Edict of Roussillon completely ignored a petition of the Huguenots

presented to the King while at Roussillon, which shows the pernicious

activity of the local Catholic leagues already. The complaint

specified that infractions of the Edict of Amboise had been committed

by the Catholics, especially in Burgundy; that Catholic associations

everywhere were being formed against them; that the priests openly

lauded the King of Spain from their pulpits; that their synods were

broken up by the enemies of their religion.[889]

After a sojourn of a month at Roussillon, the pilgrimage of the court

was again resumed. At Valence (August 22) Catherine received word

that Elizabeth of Spain had given birth to still-born twin babes. On

September 24 Avignon was reached, where a stay of two weeks was made

during which Catherine consulted the famous astrologer Nostradamus.

Hyères and Aix were stages on the road to Marseilles[890] (November

3-10), whence it led to Nîmes[891] (December 12), and Montpellier[892]

(December 17), and thence to Agde and Beziers,[893] where progress

for some time was blocked by heavy snow-falls. The snows irritated

Catherine and to placate her impatience she was shown historical

evidence that both Blanche of Castile and the queen of Charles VII had

once been snowed-in in these parts for three months.[894] Unlike his

mother, Charles IX enjoyed it, building a snow fort in which he and his

pages withstood a siege by some of the gentlemen of the household.[895]

During this enforced sojourn Catherine de Medici received word of the

famous conflict between the marshal Montmorency, who had been made

governor of Paris,[896] when the court started _en tour_, and the

cardinal of Lorraine. On January 8, 1565, the cardinal of Lorraine

sought to enter Paris with a great rout of armed retainers. The marshal

demanded the disarming of the company, in compliance with a royal

_ordonnance_ of 1564 forbidding the carrying of arquebuses, pistols,

or other firearms,[897] not knowing that the cardinal had a warrant

from the queen mother authorizing his men to wear arms if so desired.

The cardinal haughtily refused to obey, and a fight took place in

the street near the corner of St. Innocents, in which one man was

killed.[898]

The reactionary policy of the government stimulated the local Catholic

leagues in Languedoc during this winter of 1564-65.[899] The religious

prejudice which these associations manifested was influenced by the

bitter jealousy existing between the Guises and the Montmorencys. From

the hour of the clash between the cardinal and the marshal, the Guises

plotted to compass the ruin of the house of Montmorency, and sought to

find support in the Catholic leagues of the southern provinces. The

tolerant policy of the marshal Montmorency and his brother Damville

was seized upon by the Guises to make them odious.[900] The secular

clergy and still more the Jesuits and Capuchins were very active in

this work, going from town to town and village to village, urging

Catholics vigorously to defend their faith, and their fiery preaching

materially advanced the tendency to union among the provincial

leagues.[901]

Under the effective leadership of the sieur de Candalle, the league

of Agen had had an astonishing spread over Guyenne, exhibiting a

strength of organization and an audacity which foreshadows that of

the Holy League of 1576, in whose genesis, indeed, it represents an

evolutionary stage. What made the league of Guyenne so peculiarly

formidable, however, was not so much its perfection of organization and

its wide expansion, as the fact that it was organized and had existence

without the knowledge or consent of the crown, and in transgression

of the royal authority, which forbade such associations. This highly

developed stage of existence was arrived at by the league of Agen in

August, 1564, from which date it may properly be called the league of

Guyenne.[902]

Naturally the Guises approached Montluc with their plan. While the

court was sojourning at Mont-de-Marsan (March 9-24, 1565), waiting

the arrival of the Spanish queen and the duke of Alva at Bayonne,

an intimation was given to Montluc that a league was in process of

formation in France “wherein were several great persons, princes

and others,” and an agent of the Guises at this time endeavored

to persuade Montluc to join the association.[903] But Montluc was

cautious; he had no great affection for the Guises and, moreover,

leagues and such associations were against the law, which he, as a

crown officer, was pledged to support. Grammont who was opposed to

Montluc had already complained of his conduct to the queen mother.[904]

Besides, there were private reasons, whose nature will be soon

developed, which made him hesitate. Montluc carried his information to

Catherine de Medici, who, not yet perceiving that the ambition of the

Guises was the chief motive, was not at once seriously alarmed, since

the anti-Protestant policy of the government made it indifferent now

to such associations. Accordingly, when the court reached Bordeaux

(it arrived there on April 9) and the Huguenots renewed their

complaints against Candalle and his associates, the King ignored the

petition, recognizing that many of the nobles were members of the

league of Guyenne. Instead, he gave the league a quasi-legal status

by proclaiming that the crown would not listen to any more complaints

against Candalle and his associates.[905]

But the queen mother was genuinely alarmed a few weeks later when

the real purpose and scope of the proposed league were revealed

to her through an intercepted letter which the duke of Aumale had

written on February 27, 1565, to the marquis d’Elbœuf. The duke of

Montpensier, the vicomte de Martigues, Chavigny, who was a Guise

protégé, D’Angennes, and the bishop of Mans, were named in this letter

as the chiefs of an association, which had for its avowed end the

abasement of the house of Montmorency.[906] Catherine, apprehending

the consequences certain to result from such an extension of the feud

of the two houses, implored the King, at a large meeting of the council

held on May 18, 1565, to divulge what had been ascertained—that a

secret association had been discovered in defiance of the law, having

political aims detrimental to the monarchy, and a system of government

for the levying of men and money without the King’s authority. The

counselors, with one accord, denied their knowledge or implication,

and protested their devotion to the cause and the law. Catherine was

thoroughly alarmed, and appealed to Montluc for advice. What followed

may be told in his own words:

I heard then some whisper of a league that was forming in France,

wherein were several very great persons, both Princes and others,

whom nevertheless I have nothing to do to name, being engaged by

promise to the contrary. I cannot certainly say to what end this

League was contrived; but a certain gentleman named them to me every

one, endeavoring at the same time to persuade me to make one in the

Association, assuring me it was to a good end; but he perceived by my

countenance that it was not a dish for my palate. I presently gave

the Queen private intimation of it; for I could not endure such kind

of doings, who seemed to be very much astonished at it, telling me

it was the first syllable she had ever heard of any such thing; and

commanding me to enquire further into the business, which I did, but

could get nothing more out of my gentleman; for he now lay upon his

guard.

Her Majesty then was pleased to ask my advice, how she should behave

herself in this business, whereupon I gave her counsel to order it

so that the King himself should say in public that he had heard

of a League that was forming in his Kingdom, which no one could do

without giving him some jealousy and offence; and that therefore he

must require everyone without exception to break off this League,

and that he would make an Association in his Kingdom, of which he

himself would be the Head; for so for some time it was called, though

they afterwards changed the name, and called it the Confederation of

the King. The Queen at the time that I gave her this advice did by

no means approve of it, objecting, that should the King make one, it

was to be feared that others would make another; but I made answer

and said that the King must engage in his own all such as were in

any capacity of doing the contrary, which, however, was a thing that

could not be concealed, and might well enough be provided against. Two

days after, her Majesty being at supper, called me to her and told

me that she had considered better of the affair I had spoke to her

about, and found my counsel to be very good, and that the next day,

without further delay, she would make the King propound the business

to his Council; which she accordingly did, and sent to enquire for me

at my lodging, but I was not within. In the evening she asked me why

I did not come to her, and commanded me not to fail to come the next

day, because there were several great difficulties in the Council, of

which they had not been able to determine. I came according to her

command, and there were several disputes. Monsieur de Nemours made a

very elegant speech, remonstrating “That it would be very convenient

to make a League and Association for the good of the King and his

Kingdom, to the end, that if affairs should so require, every one

with the one and the same will might repair to his Majesty’s person,

to stake their lives and fortunes for his service, and also in case

any one of what religion soever, should offer to invade or assault

them, or raise any commotion in the state, that they might with one

accord unite, and expose their lives in their common defence.” The

Duke of Montpensier was of the same opinion, and several others saying

that they could not choose but so much the more secure the peace of

the Kingdom, when it should be known that all the Nobility were thus

united for the defence of the Crown.

The Queen then did me the honor to command me to speak; whereupon

I began, and said, “That the League proposed could be no ways

prejudicial to the King, being that it tended to a good end for his

Majesty’s service, the good of his Kingdom, and the peace and security

of his People; but that one which should be formed in private could

produce nothing but disorder and mischief; for the good could not

answer for the evil disposed; and should the cards once be shuffled

betwixt League and League, it would be a hard matter to make of it a

good game; that being the most infallible way to open a door to let

strangers into the kingdom, and to expose all things to spoil and

ruin; but that all of us in general, both Princes and others, ought to

make an Association, which should bear the title of the League, or

the Confederation of the King, and to take a great and solemn oath,

not to decline or swerve from it upon penalty of being declared such

as the oath should import; and that his Majesty having so concluded,

ought to dispatch messengers to all parts of the kingdom, with

commission to take the oaths of such as were not there present, by

which means it would be known, who were willing to live and die in

the service of the king and state. And should anyone be so foolish

or impudent as to offer to take arms, let us all swear to fall upon

them; I warrant your Majesty I will take such order in these parts,

that nothing shall stir to the prejudice of your royal authority.

And in like manner let us engage by the faith we owe to God, that if

any Counter-League shall disclose itself, we will give your Majesty

immediate notice of it; and let your Majesty’s be subscribed by all

the great men of your kingdom. The feast will not be right without

them, and they also are easy to be persuaded to it, and the fittest to

provide against any inconvenience that may happen.”

This was my proposition, upon which several disputes ensued; but in

the end the King’s Association was concluded on, and it was agreed,

that all the Princes, great Lords, Governors of Provinces, and

Captains of Gens d’armes should renounce all Leagues and Confederacies

whatsoever, as well without as within the Kingdom, excepting that of

the King, and should take the oath upon pain of being declared rebels

to the crown; to which there were also other obligations added, which

I do not remember.... In the end all was past and concluded, and the

Princes began to take the oath, and to sign the articles.[907]

The weakness of the crown’s position in these circumstances is evident.

Recognizing its inability to crush these local associations and fearing

lest control of them would pass over wholly to the Guises, the crown

tried to save its power and its dignity by fusing them into a single

confederation under the King and forbidding the formation of future

associations without royal consent. But the power of the crown was

not commensurate with its show of authority. The leagues continued to

multiply and to remain independent of the crown’s coercion. In the year

1565 the situation is different in degree but not in kind from that

which existed in 1576 when the Holy League was formed.

Even the Spanish affiliations of the Holy League existed potentially

at this time through the treason of Montluc.[908] For the wily Gascon,

whose character was a combination of daring determination, religious

bigotry and envy, in recommending the measures he did was really taking

steps to cover up his own tracks. Montluc, despite his professions of

allegiance, was angry at the queen mother, and quite ready to knife her

in the dark. His heart was filled with rebellious envy of Vieilleville,

because the latter had been given a marshal’s bâton. Disappointed

in this expectation he asked for the post of colonel-general which

D’Andelot filled.[909] Instead Montluc had to be satisfied with the

office of governor of Guyenne, which he regarded as ill compensation

of his services.[910] In consequence of these grievances, even before

the recovery of Havre, Montluc had entered into correspondence with

Philip II, to whom he represented the necessity of Spanish intervention

in France, on account of the double danger by which France was

threatened through the purposes of the Protestants and Catherine de

Medici’s toleration of them. The Spanish King at first hesitated,

but soon availed himself of the opportunity thus afforded, for two

strings were better than one to his bow. Profound secrecy covered the

negotiations. Philip’s love of mystery and the delicacy of the matter

led him to conceal the plan even from his ambassador in France, and

operate through Bardaxi, a cousin of a Spanish captain of that name,

who had been pursued by the Inquisition and had fled to France, where

he sought service under Montluc in recompense of which he finally was

rehabilitated.[911] Montluc proposed the formation of a league between

the Pope, the Emperor, the Spanish King, and the leading Catholic

princes of Germany and Italy to avert a union of the Huguenots with

outside Protestant princes for the overthrow of the Catholic religion

in France.[912] He enlarged upon the moral “benefit” of such a league

to France, now ridden by the Huguenots to the imminent ruin of the

monarchy, and pointed out to Philip II the peculiar interest he had in

crushing Calvinism.[913] The plan was for Philip II to kidnap Jeanne

d’Albret who was to be given over to the Inquisition, and to seize

possession of Béarn, and thus accomplish two purposes at once—destroy

the hearth of Calvinism in France, and establish Spanish power north

of the Pyrenees.[914] Fortunately for France, the French ambassador at

Madrid, St. Sulpice, was informed of the plan, though he did not know

of Montluc’s treason, by a servant of the Spanish queen, and Catherine

de Medici’s energetic steps in the protection of Béarn nipped the

scheme in the bud.[915]

This joint plan of Montluc and Philip II for the seizure of Béarn

and the capture of its queen telescoped with another plot against her

to which Philip and Pope Pius IV were parties. On September 28, 1563,

a papal bull excommunicated the queen for heresy, and she was cited

before the Holy Office for trial.[916] To Catherine’s credit she at

once took a firm stand in favor of the queen of Navarre.[917]

It was not in the nature of Philip II to be daring in daylight.

Precaution was second nature to him. Lansac’s mission to Madrid

to protest against the action of Pius IV coincided with Montluc’s

overtures to the Spanish King. The discovery of part of the plan made

Philip timid about pushing it at all until a more favorable time at

least. Accordingly he gave Montluc little encouragement, save offering

him an asylum in Spain if events should compel him to quit France on

account of his treasonable correspondence,[918] while to Lansac he

said that “what the Pope had done against ‘Madame de Vendôme’ was

very inopportune and would be remedied.”[919] In a word, Philip II

dissembled his participation in the Pope’s conduct, asserting that

the procedure had been taken without his knowledge, and that while he

deplored the queen of Navarre’s apostasy he could not be unmindful of

the fact that she was kith and kin of the queen of Spain, his wife![920]

There probably was a certain amount of spite work in Philip’s

repudiation of the Pope at this time. One of the important political

issues raised at the Council of Trent was the question of precedence

between the ambassadors of France and Spain. Lansac, Charles IX’s

ambassador to the Council, claimed the honor of going before the

count of Lara, Spain’s representative, at which Philip was “picqué

oultre mesure.”[921] The papal party in vain implored Lansac to yield.

Lansac replied that “la France ne pouvait renoncer aux droits qui lui

avaient été reconnus dans tous les précédents conciles, et que, plutôt

que de laisser rien innover sur ce point, ‘j’étais résolu, selon le

commandement de mon maître, après avoir protesté de nullité de ce

concile, de m’en aller incontinent avec tous les prélats de notre

nation, sans entrer dans aucune dispute ne composition.’”[922] Philip

II refrained from making any observation to France upon the disputed

point[923] pending the decision of the Pope.[924] But such a course

was impossible. The contest over the question became the absorbing

topic of conversation at Rome.[925] The Pope was between Scylla and

Charybdis.[926] Spain claimed precedence for Philip II through the

crown of Castile—“chose peu véritable”—and argued that the services

of Philip II to the church justified her pretension; to which France

rejoined that her king was historically first son of the church, the

Most Christian King, who “had bled and suffered for the preservation of

the Catholic religion in his kingdom, for which he had combated to the

hazarding of his entire state.”[927] Finally being compelled to decide,

Pius IV made a choice in favor of France, to the immense chagrin of

Philip II who actually fell sick of the humiliation and recalled his

ambassador Vargas from Rome as a sign of his displeasure.[928]

The catalogue of Spain’s grievances against France, besides the

question of religion, the dispute over precedence, and France’s refusal

to accept the findings of Trent which Philip II had recognized[929]

included still another complaint. This was the border difficulty

between the Spanish provinces of Artois and Luxembourg, and France.

It was a complex question, partly religious, partly political, partly

commercial. Like the Huguenot rebellion, the growing insurrection in

the Low Countries was of a double nature—religious and political.

Each side looked to the other for sympathy and support and neither was

disappointed. The Huguenots retaliated for the assistance afforded the

government of France by Spain during the first civil war by aiding the

revolt of the Netherlands. This intimate connection of events on each

side of the line is an important fact to be observed.

It was in 1563, as Granvella had divined,[930] that the intrigues

of the French Protestants in Flanders became a matter of serious

apprehension. Valenciennes was the most aggressive city of the religion

in Flanders, and Margaret of Parma actually was afraid of Montigny

doing as Maligny had done at Havre. Already the prince of Orange was

the recognized leader of those who sympathized with the Huguenots.

To this class England’s support of the prince of Condé, and above

all, the assassination of the duke of Guise, came as a real stimulus.

Valenciennes, Tournay, Antwerp, even Brussels were stirred. In May,

1563, the demonstrations of the Calvinists at Valenciennes and Tournay

became so bold that it required six companies of infantry to keep

them overawed. But this measure, instead of accomplishing the result

expected, aggravated the situation, for the marquis de Berghes, the

commander, was so ostracized by the nobles, that he lost courage.

Philip II grew alarmed and wrote to his sister on June 13, 1563, that

the example of France counseled most drastic suppression. In reply

the regent and the cardinal Granvella implored Philip to come to the

Netherlands, but he pleaded ignorance of the language and poverty as

excuse. Meanwhile the Orange party practiced so successfully with the

duchess of Parma that she inclined toward conciliation instead of

coercion. This threw the regent and De Berghes into alignment, who

proposed to convoke the States-General to remedy the evils—a programme

which the nobles enthusiastically advocated.

The similarity between the Flemish movement and the programme of the

political Huguenots in France is very close.[931] With the design of

suppressing heresy in its two most active centers, Granvella proposed

to imitate the method used at Paris, of exacting a profession of faith

together with a pledge to observe the laws, of all citizens who wished

to stay in the city. Recalcitrants were to be disarmed, compelled to

sell their property, one-third of the proceeds of which was to be

confiscated for the support of the soldiers and municipal expenses, and

the culprits were then to be banished from the country. This drastic

policy called forth a mingled protest and threat from the prince of

Orange, whose wealth and German connections, aside from other qualities

he possessed, gave him great influence. The government begged for money

and troops, “como la liga va cresciendo.”[932] Orange’s tactics were

to persuade the provincial estates to refuse to vote subsidies or to

throw the weight of the finances upon the church much after the manner

of things done at Pontoise. This he began to do in Brabant where the

indefinite postponement of a grant of money provoked mutiny among

the soldiers. In September De Berghes went out from office, having

distinguished himself by not putting a single heretic to death. The

change was immediately followed by the burning alive of a Protestant

preacher and the protestations of the quartet, Orange, Hoorne, Egmont,

and Montigny, became bolder.[933] Finally the nobles of Flanders

resolved to protest to the King of Spain. Philip II, always hesitating

and undecided, did not respond. To a petition which was sent him

demanding the recall of the cardinal, he replied by a flat refusal. The

nobles showed their offense by absenting themselves from the Council

of State and used their influence to detach the regent from Granvella.

At last, after months of negotiation, Philip II yielded. Granvella

retired to his splendid palace at Besançon in Franche Comté and the

nobles resumed their seats in the council. But the four were irritated

at Philip II’s delay in responding to their demands for reform. It was

evident, moreover, by November, 1563, that something like a common

purpose actuated the chief provinces—Flanders, Artois, Holland,

Zealand, and Utrecht.[934]

The Calvinists were especially numerous in the Walloon provinces,

and preachers from Geneva and England were active among them. The

government undertook to restrain their assemblies, and the conflict

broke out. This conflict, it is important to remark, did not turn

upon the question of religion in and of itself, but upon the manner

of treating the heretics. Philip wanted to apply the edicts of his

father, which required the death penalty for heresy; but the government

and Spanish officials in the Low Countries, Catholics though they were,

were opposed to so severe a penalty and would rather have treated

those offending as criminals than as heretics. But with Philip the

extirpation of heresy was a question of conscience.

Valenciennes still remained the most prominent place of

disaffection,[935] but Brussels was much infected.[936] But more

formidable than local spirit was the marked tendency toward a union

of the provinces[937] and the growing interest of the Huguenots in

the Dutch and Flemish cause,[938] so much so that Cardinal Granvella

strongly hinted at Spanish pressure being forcibly exerted upon France

for the reduction of the Huguenots.[939] The cardinal hoped to see

Charles IX and his mother more docile in receiving the advice of Spain

since the withdrawal of Chantonnay, who was made Philip II’s ambassador

at Vienna. But the theft of Alava’s cipher by the Huguenots threw him

into despair.[940] The reciprocal connection between politics and

religion in France and the Low Countries made the Spanish government

watch the movement of events in France with vigilance.[941] So acute

was the situation owing to Huguenot sympathy with the cause of

insurrection across the border,[942] that although Granvella ridiculed

the wild rumor that Montgomery was coming to Flanders, he nevertheless

apprehended the possibility of a rupture with France and was relieved

to know that precautions had been taken against any chance enterprise

of the Huguenots along the edge of Artois and Hainault.[943]

Margaret of Parma and the nobles sent ambassadors to Spain to ask

concession on two points: (1) that the provinces be governed by

native officials; (2) that the punishment of heresy be moderated. The

King hesitated long. It was not until October 17, 1565, that he gave

decisive pronouncement in dispatches issued from Segovia. In them he

ordered the maintenance of the Inquisition, the enforcement of the

edicts, and the impoverishment of those who resisted. In a word, Philip

II would not yield. The discontent against the administration of the

King of Spain now turned against the King himself. William of Orange

used the notable words, “We are witnessing the beginning of a great

tragedy.”

In the face of the growing resistance the duke of Alva strongly advised

Philip II to convert the towns into fortresses.[944] For the Flemish

cities were, as yet, commercial groups, not fortified burgs. With the

possible exception of Gravelines, no one of them was capable of making

a sustained defense.

This suggestion happened to coincide with the English occupation

of Havre-de-Grace and the possible return of Calais to England in

return therefor. Such a contingency could but be viewed with anxiety

by Spain,[945] and this fact, coupled with the uncertainty of

developments in France induced Philip to follow out Alva’s suggestion

by strengthening Gravelines. France at once became alarmed over Calais

and protested in the same breath against the building of fortifications

at Gravelines and the duty upon her wines.[946] In retaliation the

French government also strengthened the garrisons on the edge of

Picardy, under the direction of the prince of Condé (who was governor

of the province), to the immense indignation of Spain.[947] The

Spanish erections around Gravelines reacted also upon the state of

things in Flanders. For new and heavier taxation was the indispensable

point of departure for carrying out such measures, “unless one were

willing to see everything said upon the subject vanish in smoke.”

The sole effective remedy for the state of things prevailing in the

Flemish provinces was, of course, to reorganize the finances and the

administration of justice in accordance with the demands made by the

nobles. But instead of attempting to do this, the government aimed to

weaken the opposition by dividing the leaders, and the long silence of

Philip II covered an attempt to draw away Egmont, who was regarded as

the ringleader of the Flemish nobles at this time.[948] The Spanish

government dreaded to summon the estates, as Orange insisted should be

done, for fear of things in Brabant and the other provinces going the

road of things in France under like conditions.[949]

In order, therefore, to provide for funds without asking the estates to

vote subsidies, over which there was sure to be a conflict, the Spanish

government in the Netherlands undertook to raise the needed money

by tariffs. The cloth trade of England and the wine trade of France

were the two commodities so taxed. In 1563 a duty was laid on French

wine.[950] In the case of England, the excuse given for the high duty

placed on imported cloth was precaution against the plague.[951] France

at once protested against the tariff and threatened to retaliate by

taxing the herring and cod trade, though the Spanish ambassador at

Paris represented that such action would entirely destroy the wine

trade and would compel reprisal.[952]

Flemish merchants were doubly alarmed at the state of things, for

England, too, threatened reprisal by removing the cloth market from

Antwerp to Embden and imposing tonnage duties on merchant ships of

Flanders driven by stress of weather into English ports for safety

during storm.[953] But the government in Flanders was obdurate.

Granvella declared England’s threat to remove the staple to Embden

to be “puerile rhodomontade.” He believed that not only would the

prohibition against the import of English cloth compel Elizabeth

to redress the grievances of Spanish subjects against England, but

that it might even make the English government more lenient toward

the Catholic religion. Furthermore, he argued, the tax would operate

like a protective tariff to stimulate the manufacture of cloth in

the Low Countries. “If not a single bolt of English cloth ever comes

into Flanders again,” he wrote “it will be to the permanent profit

of the Pays-Bas. We saw this clearly last year during the plague

when the prohibition having temporarily suspended the importation of

this kind of goods, there was manufactured in the single county of

Flanders 60,000 pieces of cloth, or more than the sum total of the

three preceding years.”[954] In the case of French wines the Flemish

government even established a maximum law for their sale which cut the

throat of French merchants worse than ever.[955] The French government

carried the action of the Flemish government up to Madrid, where for

months the duty on wine and the buttresses of Gravelines were matters

of repeated interviews between St. Sulpice and the King, and were still

unsettled questions at the time of the conference at Bayonne.[956]

Meanwhile the conflict of the Flemish reform party became more acute

because it became complicated with the question of religion.

In the light of all these circumstances, it is no wonder that Philip II

hesitated long before giving his consent to an interview with Catherine

de Medici.[957] Even then he imposed a number of conditions and

regulations. He would not go in person to Bayonne—the place appointed;

his wife was to be accompanied by the duke of Alva; display was to

be avoided by either side both for motives of economy and to prevent

having undue political significance attached to an interview which

was to be understood to be purely personal. Philip II’s most striking

regulations, however, were those which had to do with the French

_entourage_. No one in the least tainted with heresy was to accompany

the court. The queen of Navarre, whom the Spanish King carefully

alluded to as “Madame de Vendôme,” the prince of Condé, the admiral,

and the cardinal Châtillon were specifically named with abhorrence. The

queen mother acquiesced in this prohibition, save in the case of the

prince of Condé, protesting that, on account of his rank, it would give

great offense to forbid his presence, as well as create belief among

the Huguenots that the meeting contemplated something disadvantageous

to them. History has shown that Catherine’s instincts were perfectly

right in this particular; since after the massacre of St. Bartholomew

the Huguenots—indeed almost the whole Protestant world—jumped to the

conclusion that that disaster was preconcerted at Bayonne. In vain St.

Sulpice argued political expediency, saying France and Spain must not

be judged alike, and that “experience had proved that the way of arms

had resulted in more dangers than profit to France.” Philip II’s answer

was metallically hard; he would not consent to the presence either of

Jeanne d’Albret or the prince of Condé at Bayonne, because it would be

a reproach to him and to Spain for his wife to have had converse with a

heretic.[958]

The last stage of Charles IX’s long tour of the provinces was from

Bordeaux[959] to Bayonne[960] where the French court arrived on May

22, 1565. But that indolence of spirit which is so much associated

with Spanish character seems as early as the sixteenth century to have

become habitual,[961] so that the Spanish queen was forced to travel in

the heat (six soldiers of Strozzi’s band died with their armor on from

heat prostration), which aggravated the plague prevailing in certain

parts.[962]

In conferences of state, especially international conferences, things

of importance are confined within four walls. The sixteenth century

was _par excellence_ the age of closet politics. The world upon the

outside saw only the fêtes[963] that marked the interview at Bayonne.

But these festivities were no more than the flecks or wreaths of

glittering foam that float upon the bosom of the water for an instant

and then are gone. The real business at Bayonne was politics. But the

great importance for three hundred years[964] attributed to this famous

interview is today proved to have had slight foundation in fact. The

light of recent research has dissipated the traditional belief that

Philip II and Catherine de Medici planned the massacre of the French

Protestants at Bayonne, and finally consummated it on St. Bartholomew’s

Day.[965] The truth is that not what was contemplated but _what was

imagined was contemplated_ at Bayonne became the important historical

influence of the future. An assumed fact came to have all the force

of reality. The principals in this unfortunate conference, in point

of truth, were far apart from one another. Philip II’s interests were

wholly political, and personalities were merely incidental to his main

purpose. On the other hand, the queen mother’s interests were chiefly

personal, being centered in plans to achieve brilliant marriage

alliances for her children, for whose sake she ruinously compromised

herself and France.

If Catherine had been less vain and less foolishly affectionate, she

would have striven harder for the solution of things more vital to

France. It is true she was far from ignoring these issues entirely, but

she weakened the cause of France in respect to them by subordinating

these to her main purpose, so that she awakened the greater suspicion

of Spain by her attempts to avoid answering in those matters of most

concern to Philip II and by her continual harping upon the things that

were nearest to her heart, but not of most moment either to France or

to Spain. When the duke of Alva drove her into a corner and compelled

her to answer the questions he put to her concerning greater politics,

Catherine’s replies were fatal to her aspirations. What were these

matters?

Alva’s instructions were strict. He was to demand the expulsion of the

Huguenot ministers from France within thirty days; the interdiction

of Protestant worship; acceptance of the decrees of the Council of

Trent; profession of the Catholic religion by all office holders.[966]

This policy of suppression and compulsion outlined by his sovereign

was wholly in keeping with his, the duke’s, own judgment. But with

greater penetration and less hesitation than Philip II, Alva recognized

clearly the intimate connection between the politics of Flanders and

the politics of France, and favored the adoption of a parallel line

of conduct at once in the Low Countries. He was convinced that France

was incapable of managing her own affairs and was a menace to other

states, politically and religiously.[967] The means of repression

which Spain had often urged had not produced the results desired:

they had only delayed the total ruin of the nation. Suggestion and

insinuation must be replaced by a more drastic policy. Assassination

was a recognized, perhaps a quasi-legitimate political recourse in the

eyes of the men of the sixteenth century. The old generation of French

Catholics upon whom Spain could rely, the cardinal de Tournon, the

duke of Guise, the marshal St. André, had passed away—one of them

assassinated at the hands of a Huguenot. Tavannes and Vieilleville

were reluctant to sacrifice country to religion, especially when a

rival nation would profit thereby. The constable was the only old-time

figure of prominence remaining, and he could not be relied on since the

conflict between the marshal Montmorency and the cardinal of Lorraine,

for he favored the side of his nephews and so was believed to be not

far distant from the party of the admiral.[968] Power had fallen into

the hands of the Huguenots, whose leaders now excelled in personal

force. “The shortest, the most expeditious way, is to behead Condé, the

admiral, D’Andelot, La Rochefoucauld, and Grammont,” Alva told the duke

of Montpensier[969] and Montluc, the two most earnest French converts

to this policy.[970]

But it was yet a far cry from this cool advocacy of assassination of

the Protestant leaders to the wholesale slaughter of August 24, 1572.

There is really no positive connection between the conference of

Bayonne and the massacre of St. Bartholomew.[971] The slaughter of the

French Protestants _as a sect_ was never advocated by any prince in

Europe, not even Philip II. There is no evidence at the Vatican of any

Catholic or papal league for the extirpation of the Protestants. Such

a solution of the religious problem was not contemplated, save by one

person in Europe at this time—Pope Pius V. It is this pontiff who has

the sinister distinction of having advocated general destruction of the

Protestants, rather than a discriminating assassination of the Huguenot

leaders.[972] The most radical action touching the Huguenots at large,

it may safely be said, that was regarded practicable in 1564-65 was

to forbid and prevent future conversion,[973] or else the wholesale

exile of the Huguenots from the realm.[974] The alternative of total

destruction was not contemplated anywhere in Europe or at any time,

except in the single case mentioned.

No such crime as the massacre of the Huguenots was planned at Bayonne,

nor perpetrated as the result of that conference. The principals in the

case were too far apart in intention and conviction for so gigantic

a programme. The paramount purpose of the queen mother was to marry

Charles IX to the elder daughter of the Emperor, Margaret of Valois to

Don Carlos, and the duke of Orleans (the future Henry III) to Donna

Juana, Philip II’s sister. But Alva was crafty. By a series of adroit

questions which tantalized her hopes and preyed upon her fears, he

compelled Catherine de Medici to commit herself upon the very political

issues which she wished to avoid discussing, until she was hopelessly

compromised. In vain she doubled like a fox pursued by the hounds and

tried to throw the duke off upon a false scent.

“France must be cleared of this vicious sect,” said Alva. In order

to avoid replying, Catherine attempted, by a question, to turn the

conversation to the subject of a universal league, whether it should be

against the Turk or against the heretic. Alva was not thrown off. The

queen resorted to sarcasm.

“Since you understand the evil from which France is suffering so well,”

she said, “tell me the remedy.”

Alva sidestepped the direct shot, by suavely rejoining:

“Madame, who knows better than yourself?”

“The King, your master,” said Catherine ironically, “knows better than

I everything that passes in France. What means would he employ to

overcome the rebellious Protestants?”

Alva resorted to the Socratic method, hoping to involve the queen in

the toils of argument.

“Has the religion gained or lost since the peace of Amboise?” he

inquired insidiously.

“It has gained,” replied she.

The answer, in Spain’s eyes, was a condemnation of the policy of

France; it was a thorn in the road of the queen’s ambitious hopes

of marriage alliance. In her exasperation, Catherine upbraided her

daughter for out-Spaniarding the Spaniard.

“I am a Spaniard, I admit,” said Elizabeth. “ It is my duty.”[975]

Catherine broached anew the possibility of Philip II consenting to have

his sister marry her Benjamin—Henry duke of Orleans—and conferring

Artois as dowry upon the pair.

“The king would never consent to sacrifice one of his provinces,” said

Alva brusquely.

“But to give a Spanish province to the duke of Orleans,” argued the

queen mother, blinded by maternal affection, “would be the same then as

giving it to his own brother.”

Alva taxed the queen with maintaining a heretic, L’Hôpital, in the

chancellorship, and of opposing the Tridentine decrees. Catherine

emphatically denied the first charge, although her daughter again

supported Alva’s indictment by declaring that even during the life of

her father, L’Hôpital had passed for a Huguenot; as to the second,

she said the crown of France objected to the political application

of certain findings of the Council of Trent, which she hoped to have

adjusted. Alva saw the vulnerable point in her reply and inquired if

she aimed to call another assembly like the Colloquy of Poissy.

“I recognize the danger of such assemblies,” said Catherine, “but the

king, my son, is strong enough to compel discussion only of those

subjects which he may designate.”

“Was it so at Poissy?” sneered Alva.

The queen’s reply was a tirade against the cardinal of Lorraine, whom

she blamed for the failure of the colloquy.

In the end there _was_ a promise given by the queen mother at Bayonne.

But it was verbal, not written, and so governed by circumstances that

the edge of Spain’s intentions was dulled. Compromising the agreement

certainly was; convicting it is not, for, aside from the fact that

its fulfilment was dependent upon an impossible condition of things,

Catherine never permitted herself to express in writing what the terms

of this promise were. Our knowledge of it is dependent upon Alva’s

letters of June 15 and July 4; upon Philip II’s construction of it in

a letter addressed by him to the cardinal Pacheco[976] on August 24,

1565, and the dispatch of the Venetian ambassador Suriano, who was

with the French queen, to the senate on July 22, supplemented by what

information St. Sulpice picked up during the last days of his mission

in Spain.

It is evident from the careful reading of these documents that the real

triumph at Bayonne was scored by the papacy; that Spain won a sterile

victory, and France met an indecisive defeat. Spain and France, being

unable to carry their own purpose through as each desired, compromised

on a course which was an intermediate plane of agreement to them, but

which, _according to the letter_, was a supreme triumph for Rome, and

would have been a complete victory for Rome _if the terms had ever been

executed_. The man of the hour was the cardinal Santa Croce, nuncio in

France. His services are thus reported by the Venetian ambassador in

France on July 2:

On the eve of departure, the queen, perceiving the discontent of the

duke of Alva, summoned the nuncio, who was not far away, to Bayonne,

in order to have him at hand. It is he who has found a solution; he

has satisfied both parties. I shall be able to inform you shortly as

to the nature of his solution.[977]

Three weeks later (July 22) the promised word was sent to Venice in

the form of a cipher dispatch,[978] the information in which had been

communicated to him in strictest secrecy.[979] This intensely important

document reads as follows:

Now that I have received positive information, I shall tell everything

to your Signory that has happened. Since his arrival, the duke of Alva

has not ceased to urge the queen to give his master a manifestation of

her good will toward the cause of religion by some manifest act, and

he had urged her to cause the decisions of the Council of Trent to be

observed throughout the whole realm of France, for which his Catholic

majesty would show his satisfaction. The queen had yielded readily

to this proposition and had told him that she was very inclined to

convene an assembly of prelates, of theologians, and savants, to

examine the decisions made at Trent, _without occupying themselves

with doctrine_, but confining themselves to the reform of abuses. The

duke had found this offer strange and had not concealed his discontent

over it. According to him, this was to oppose a council to a council,

which would be the worst of results and mightily displease the king

his master. Since he urged the necessity of this measure, before

passing to any other consideration, and was so obdurate, the queen,

being very pained to see him depart so unsatisfied, and things being

so desperate, notified the nuncio, who was not lodged at Bayonne

like all the ambassadors, and ordered the _mareschal de logis_ of

the palace to prepare accommodation for him and to have him come

immediately. He came at once and being informed by the queen, went to

find the duke, but was very badly received by him. The duke blamed

and reproached him for not remaining firm in his opinion. The queen

holding to the idea of this assembly of prelates and theologians, and

the duke opposing it, the nuncio found another expedient which seemed

to give satisfaction to all. He broached it to the queen, and with

her consent communicated it to the duke. This remedy, at the twelfth

hour, was very opportune. It is this: This assembly shall be held:

but under certain conditions. The first is that the persons chosen to

participate in it shall be of such influence as to be able to demand

that no Huguenot shall sit in it; secondly, the assembly must conform

to that which the queen had at first proposed; that is to say, all

disputes over dogma and doctrine shall be forbidden. The queen, having

accepted this, authorized the nuncio to communicate her consent to the

duke, who showed himself satisfied. Both of them then came together

to find the queen again, and on the next day, in the presence of the

queen of Spain, the cardinal Bourbon, the marshal Bourdillon, and the

leading nobles, the whole was confirmed.

Great benefit can come from this: by eliminating everything that

pertains to dogma, and avoiding doctrinal difficulties, all the

other resolutions which are of less importance will be strengthened,

especially as the Huguenots, the only ones who can give trouble will

be excluded. There is no doubt about both the king and the queen being

disposed to the Catholic religion, since they have given proofs of

it. I am, moreover, assured by what the queen has said, that there

is no intention to touch any of the privileges of the Holy See, nor,

per contra, any of the concessions made by the popes to the kings who

were predecessors of the king now reigning. The execution of this

convention thus arranged is not to take place until the return of the

king to Paris.

The King of Spain, in the letter cited to Cardinal Pacheco, expressed

his contentment with this agreement,[980] not perceiving that the

application of it was capable of a great amount of flexibility. In his

blindness he thought that the nuncio had broken the loaf so as to give

the greater portion to Spain; while in reality the greater part was in

the hands of the Pope, Philip II having actually but the difference

between a fragment and no bread. In fine, no plot was entered into

at Bayonne; no crime was ever committed in pursuance of an agreement

arranged there. The “plot” agreed upon at Bayonne between Catherine

de Medici and Philip II of Spain consisted of an ambiguous promise,

the fulfilment of which was dependent upon an impossible condition of

things.[981]

The affair of Bayonne was not a crime; it was a colossal blunder. The

destruction of the ambitious marriage expectations of the Valois was

the least loss. The irreparable thing was that France forfeited the

confidence of her Protestant subjects. The secrecy that enveloped

the conference made the Huguenots apprehensive of the worst. They

believed that a Franco-Spanish alliance was made at Bayonne for their

overwhelming; and the second civil war was the outcome of their

misgivings.[982] And when finally, _for other reasons_, the massacre

of St. Bartholomew befell them, not merely Protestant France but

Protestant Europe was convinced that the false hypothesis had been

demonstrated. The count Hector la Ferrière admirably summarizes the

situation:

To maintain and loyally to adhere to the edict of pacification; to

open to the daring sailors of France the Indies and America, which

Spain and Portugal were endeavoring to close to them; and finally to

rally Catholics and Protestants under the same banner against the

foreigner—this was the only true French policy. The Spaniard at this

time was the enemy of France. She encountered him everywhere in her

path; at Rome, at Vienna, at the Council of Trent he disputed her

precedence; in Switzerland by gold and by the menaces of his agents he

interfered with the renewals of the French treaties with the Catholic

cantons; at the very time when Catherine and Elizabeth of Valois were

exchanging false promises of alliance and friendship, Menendez was

sailing for Florida, bearing orders for the massacre of all the French

found there.[983]

The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576 The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II · 第 10 / 26 章