THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS
The prosecution of the prince of Condé and the vidame of Chartres was
pushed during the month of November in order to overcome any Huguenot
activity in the coming States-General.[263] The Guises assured both the
Pope and Spain that their intention was, after the execution of the
prince, to send soldiery into the provinces under the command of the
marshals St. André, Termes, Brissac, and Sipierre, whose Catholicism
was of a notoriously militant type, and thus either to crush the
Huguenots, or drive them out of the country.[264] Condé claimed, upon
the advice of his counsel, the advocates Claudius Robert and Francis
Marillac, that as a prince of the blood he had to give account to the
King alone and to judges suitable to his condition, as peers of France,
denying the jurisdiction of the ordinary judges.[265] This the latter
refused to allow, on the ground that there was no appeal from the King
in council (which at least had been the practice of the crown since
Francis I) because the judgment so given was an absolute declaration of
the king’s pleasure; whereupon Condé, after the example of Marchetas,
when condemned by Philip of Macedon, appealed from the King in bad
council to the King in good council. The prince, however, adhered to
his claim, until by a subterfuge he was made, in a way, to commit
himself; for at last he signed an answer _to his counsel_, Robert,
whereby the prosecution gained a point prejudicial to him, although
good lawyers affirmed that a defendant’s counsel could not be made his
judge. Thereupon the government organized a court in which there was
a sprinkling of peers, in order to seem to comply with the law.[266]
Under such practices the judgment was a foregone conclusion, although
even after being declared guilty, the general opinion was that the
prince would not be put to death, but that the worst that could befall
him would be imprisonment in the dungeons of Loches, where Ludovic
Sforza died in the reign of Louis XII; or that he would be kept in
confinement elsewhere pending greater age on the part of the king and
new developments.[267]
What Condé’s fate would have been still remains a problematical
question, for Francis II died at Orleans on December 5, 1560, and his
death put an end to all proceedings against the prince.[268] The prince
of Condé was released on December 24, and immediately went to La
Fère in Picardy.[269] The crown descended to the dead king’s younger
brother, Charles IX, a boy ten years of age. His accession was not an
auspicious one. Well might the Venetian ambassador exclaim: “Vae tibi
terra cujus rex puer est.”[270] The execution of two Calvinists in
Rouen on December 3 occasioned a riot during which the gates of the
city were shut,[271] and at Bordeaux a serious insurrection of 1,200
persons had taken place in consequence of the arrest of Condé, so that
the general pardon of religious offenders issued on January 3, 1561,
was a wise step.[272] All the plans designed and prepared for execution
at Orleans were broken by the death of the King. The Guises were
furious.[273]
It was hoped that the new reign might be established tranquilly,
without an appeal to arms, but there was much misgiving owing to “the
bad spirit among the people on account of the religious question, and
of their dislike of the existing government.”[274] Many had thought
that in the event of the death of the king a general uprising might
result throughout the realm, for religious and administrative reform,
since Charles IX, being a minor, would be placed under the guidance of
the king of Navarre, the oldest and nearest prince of the blood, who
by consenting to the demands of the Huguenots, either from inclination
or from inability to repress them, would open the door to such a
course. Others believed that the Guises would not be put down, but
that with the military resources concentrated around Orleans, at their
disposal, they would seek to overawe the opposition and retain their
power, finding means, through papal dispensation, to marry Mary Stuart
to the new king.[275] There was a third class who rightly surmised
that the queen mother, if not able to establish the regency in her
favor, would play the parties against each other in such a way as to
be able to exercise large control herself. In pursuance of this double
course, Catherine secretly incited the king of Navarre and the prince
of Condé, giving out that the action lately taken against the latter
had been by the advice of the Guises. At the same time she gave the
Guises to understand that the hard feeling which the Bourbon princes
felt for them was contrary to her wish and pleasure and that it was
they who had sought to compel the Guises to render account of their
administration.[276]. As the constable seemed to command the balance
of power, both the queen mother and the Guises began to compete for
his favor,[277] Catherine overcoming her old enmity on account of her
fear of the Guises.[278] Between the Guises and Montmorency the enmity
was too great for any _rapprochement_, so that the Guises endeavored
to counter the coalition of Catherine de Medici and the constable
by overtures to Antoine of Navarre, whose own pliant nature readily
yielded to their blandishments, telling him that Philip II probably
would be inclined to restore his lost kingdom of Navarre or give him
an equivalent in Sardinia, in the event of the adoption of a strong
Catholic policy on his part.[279]
Catherine de Medici, however, by the promptness of her action, and
perhaps not a little owing to the unpopularity of the cardinal of
Lorraine,[280] got the better of the Guises, the government being
organized around the queen mother and the three Bourbon princes, the
king of Navarre, the cardinal of Bourbon, the prince of Condé the
constable, the three Châtillons—the admiral Coligny, the cardinal
Odet, and D’Andelot—the duke de Montpensier and the prince de la
Roche-sur-Yon.[281] The duke of Aumale, the marquis of Elbœuf, the
grand prior of France, and the cardinals of Lorraine and Guise, all
brothers of the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine left the
court at the same time,[282] but if the pride of the Guises was
wounded, they did not show it. They were followed by all the companies
of ordinance, both cavalry and infantry, which had been sent to Orleans.
But Catherine de Medici looked farther than the present order of things
and schemed to have the coronation effected as soon as possible,
thinking that it would remove many difficulties alleged of the King’s
minority[283] and make him of sufficient authority to appoint such
governors as he pleased.[284] She found means to have it arranged in
the Privy Council (March 27, 1561) that she and the king of Navarre,
in the capacity of lieutenant-general, should rule jointly, the King’s
seal being in the custody of both and kept in a coffer to which each
should carry a different key. This astute move gave Catherine exclusive
guardianship of the person of Charles IX, and assured her at least an
equal power in the regency.[285] At the same time orders were given
for the ambassadors and others who wished for audience to ask it of
the queen mother through the secretaries.[286] By this new arrangement
it became unnecessary to give account of one’s business first of all
either to the cardinal of Lorraine or the constable, or to anyone else,
as was usually done before; but at once to address the queen, who,
should the matter need to be referred to the council, could propose
it and give reply according to their decision. As not one of these
councilors was superior to another, the power was all in Catherine’s
hands. She had played her cards well and had won. The duke of Guise
ceased to be of influence at court and the constable “was satisfied to
lose his authority in order to damage his enemies.”[287] France began
to awaken to the fact that the queen who had led a life of retirement
during her husband’s reign, in that of her son was evincing that
capacity for public affairs which was an hereditary possession in her
family. In her quality as queen mother, she kept the King well in hand.
She would not permit anyone but herself to sleep in his bed-chamber;
she never left him alone. She governed as if she were king. She
appointed to offices and to benefices; she granted pardon; she kept the
seal; she had the last word to say in council; she opened the letters
of the ambassadors and other ministers. Those who used to think she was
a timid woman discovered that her courage was great; and that, like Leo
X and all his house, she possessed the art of dissimulation.[288]
The Huguenots had hoped for much politically from the sudden
revolution, and looked forward to organizing the States-General,
while the Catholics hoped that the precautions taken during the
elections had insured the election of men opposed to any novelty in
the matter of religion.[289] The first session took place on December
13.[290] L’Hôpital, the chancellor, made an eloquent and earnest
plea in favor of harmony among the members, endeavoring to draw them
away from religious animosities by pointing out the great necessity
of administrative and political reform, urging that the root of the
present evils was to be found in the miscarriage of justice, the
burdensome taxes, the corruption of office, etc.[291]
He ascribed the religious inquietude to the degeneracy of the church
and advocated thorough reform of it, saying that the clergy gave
occasion for the introducing of a new religion, though he avoided
entering into the matter of merit of its doctrines.[292] He pointed out
the needs of France and the necessity for civil and religious concord,
and, in the peroration pleaded for earnest, patriotic support of the
boy-King, “for there never was a father, no matter of what estate or
condition, who ever left a little orphan more involved, more in debt,
more hampered than our young prince is by the death of the kings, his
father and his brother. All the cost and expenses of twelve or thirteen
years of long and continuous war have fallen upon him; three grand
marriages are to be paid for, and other things too long to tell of now;
the domain, the aids, the salt storehouses, and part of the _taille_
have been alienated.”[293]
In spite of the efforts of the chancellor, however, to smooth the
way, the ship of state encountered rough water at the very beginning.
It was doubtful whether anything would come of the session, as the
difficulties between the delegates were endless, partly from the
diversity of their commissions and of the requests they had to make,
partly from individual caprice. The commons and the clergy readily
agreed to meet together, but many of the nobility made difficulty.
Some of those of Guyenne and of some parts of Brittany, Normandy, and
Champagne would not consent to treat with the government without a
fresh commission, saying that their commission was to the late king,
Francis II—an invention of those who were not satisfied with the
present government and disliked the queen’s supremacy.[294] Perceiving
this obstacle, the queen sent for the president of La Rochelle and told
him to have an autograph list made of all those who dissented and to
bring it to her. But no one dared to be the first to sign this list.
This was admirable adroitness on Catherine’s part. She was playing for
a large stake, because if the estates treated with the new government,
they would in a certain way approve its legitimacy by general consent.
Finally, after a week’s delay, during which the _cahiers_ of the
delegates were handed in and classified, deliberations were resumed.
The three chief questions before the estates of Orleans were religion,
the finances, and the regulation of the courts of judicature. The
three estates in order, beginning with the commons, presented each its
cause. The orator of the third estate, an _avocat du roi_ at Bordeaux,
demanded a general council for the settlement of religious controversy;
the discipline of the clergy, whom he denounced in scathing terms;
their reformation in manners and morals; revision of justice, and
alleviation of taxes.[295] As a whole, the commons seemed to wish for
a general pardon for all the insurgents, and that everybody should be
restored to favor; that the election of prelates should be regulated,
so as to insure the nomination of fitting persons to reform the life
and customs of the clergy; and that the revenues of the churches should
be limited to persons appointed for that purpose.[296]
The spokesman of the noblesse, one Jacques de Silly, sieur de
Rochefort, invoked biblical authority, besides Assyrian and classical
history, to prove that the nobility had been ordained of God and
recognized by men of all times as the pillar of the state. The harangue
was a carefully worded assertion of the political interests and claims
of the nobility. Even religion was subordinated to their political
ends, a written memorial being presented by some of the nobles asking
for leave for each great feudal proprietor to ordain what worship he
might choose within his lands, after the manner of the settlement at
Augsburg in 1555 (_cujus regio, ejus religio_).[297]
[Illustration: STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS
(Tortorel and Perissin)]
The clergy naturally were in conformity with the canons and the
Catholic ritual. They were declared to be “the organ and mouth” of
France, much history and doctrinal writing being cited to prove their
supremacy. Liberty of election in the matter of church offices,
abolition of the abuse of the _dîme_, which, it was complained, had
been extorted from the church, not once, but four, five, six, and even
nine times in a year, and prelates put in prison for failure to pay, to
the destruction of worship in the churches; suppression of heresy (thus
early stigmatized as _la prétendue réformation_), and royal support
of the authority of the priest-class, were the four demands of the
clerical order.[298] The sittings were rendered less tedious by a bold
attack made upon the persecution of religion by a deputy who demanded
that the Huguenots be permitted to have their own church edifices—a
plea which was reinforced by a hot protest of the admiral Coligny
against an utterance of Quintin, the clerical orator.[299]
As to religion, grave questions arose. Would the toleration of religion
occasion civil war? Would it cause an ultimate alteration of the faith
of France? Would it, finally, alter the state, too? The States-General
refused to enter deeply into these problems. The petition of the
Protestants was not mentioned.[300] In the end it was determined to
grant a general pardon to all throughout the kingdom, without obliging
anyone to retract, or to make any other canonical recantation—a
proposal which was quite at variance with the constitution of the
church and was regarded by Rome as exceeding the bounds of the
authority of the King and his Council, cognizance of matters of this
nature appertaining to ecclesiastics and not to laymen.[301] The
pressure of the third estate as well as the influence of Coligny,
L’Hôpital, and others, is discernible in this measure. For it had been
determined in the Privy Council that should the Council-General not
be held before June, the National Council would assemble in France.
This could not be denied to the estates who demanded it; and this
concession apparently at first caused all the three estates to agree
not to renounce the old religion. To this must be added another reason,
viz., that although the greater part of the clergy, more especially the
bishops, approved the old religion, yet many of the nobility approved
the new one.[302]
Even more favorable action toward the Huguenots might have been taken
if Catherine’s caution and her fear of antagonizing the Guises too
much had not acted as a restraint. The pardon of the government was
theoretically not understood to be granted to those who _preached_ the
Calvinistic doctrine, nor to the King’s judges who had authority in
the cities and provinces of France who espoused it. But it was tacitly
admitted that no one was to be prosecuted for heresy on this account.
In Orleans the people worshiped in Huguenot form and in Paris—wonder
of wonders—_Catholic_ preachers were admonished to cease inveighing
against “Lutherans” and Huguenots, and not to speak against their sects
or their opinions—an order generally interpreted as consent from the
Privy Council for all to follow such opinions about faith as most
pleased their ideas.[303]
A corollary to the question of religion was that touching the
government of the church. Several excellent ordinances were passed for
reforming the abuses of the church, particularly for preventing the
sale of benefices. The election of the bishops was taken out of the
King’s direct jurisdiction and remitted to the clergy, and to satisfy
the people it was added that twelve noblemen and twelve commoners
together with the governor and judges of the city in which a bishop was
to be elected were to unite with the clergy in election, giving laymen
the same authority as ecclesiastics. Another matter also was determined
which was sure to displease the Pope, viz., that moneys should no
longer be sent to Rome for the annates or for other compositions on
account of benefices, on the ground that these charges drew large sums
of money from the kingdom and were the cause of its poverty. Even
the payment of the Peter’s Pence was resented by some. The bishop of
Vienne publicly asserted that it was with astonishment and sorrow that
he observed the patience with which the French people endured these
taxes “as if,” said he, “the wax and lead of the King was not worth
as much as the lead and the wax of Rome which cost so much.”[304] As
it would have seemed strange were the Pope not first informed of
it, the estates elected one of the presidents of the Parlement to go
to Rome to give an account to the Pope of the matter, not so much to
ask it as a favor from the Pope as merely to state the causes which
moved the government thus to decide. The strong inclination of many
in France whose catholicity could not be impugned, to diminish the
papal authority and assert the old Gallican liberties, is noticeable.
Pontifical authority would have been quite at an end if the estates had
determined to lay hands on the church property, as was desired by many
persons.
The two other questions before the estates were those of justice and
finance. In the matter of the former nothing was done. For although
there was universal dissatisfaction, the issue was too complicated,
as all judicial offices were sold, and in order to displace those
who had bought them it would have been necessary to reimburse the
holders, which could not have been done then. The chances, accordingly,
were that the administration of justice was likely to go from bad to
worse.[305]
The main work of the estates of Orleans had to do with the
reorganization of the finances of the kingdom, the administration of
which was intimately connected with the future government. The crown
was over forty million francs (exceeding eighteen million crowns) in
debt.[306]
It may be well at this point to give a short survey of the financial
policy of the French crown during the sixteenth century. Under Louis
XII the _taille_, which was the principal tax, and which fell upon
the peasant, was reduced to about six hundred thousand écus, a sum
little superior to the amount originally fixed under Charles VII. It
was raised by Francis I to two millions. In the time of Louis XII the
total revenue amounted to barely two millions; his successor brought
it up to five, the _dîmes_ of the clergy being included.[307] When the
expenses of the government came to exceed the receipts, Francis I had
recourse to extraordinary measures, that is to say, to augmentation
of the taxes, to new loans, or to new forms of taxation. In 1539 he
introduced the lottery from Italy. These extraordinary practices
were not submitted to any process of approval, not even in the _pays
d’état_. Foreigners were astonished at the ease with which the king
of France procured money at his pleasure. Francis I quadrupled the
_taille_ upon land, and even had the effrontery to raise it to the
fifth power. In general the people paid without murmuring, although in
1535 an insurrection broke out at Lyons on account of an alteration
in the _aides_ demanded by the crown; and in 1542 there was a serious
outbreak at La Rochelle owing to burdensome imposition of the _gabelle_.
The author of the new financial measures of 1539 was the chancellor
Poyet, a man of ability, who owed his advancement to the favor
of Montmorency. Several very excellent measures are due to him,
pre-eminently numerous ordinances relating to the inalienability of
the royal domain, which he promulgated as a fundamental law of the
monarchy, a law which the weak successors of Henry II repudiated. He
also endeavored to suppress dishonest administration in the provinces.
Thus he called to account both the marshal Montjean, whose exactions in
the Lyonnais produced wide complaint, and Galiot de Genoullac, the sire
d’Acir, whose stealings were enormous. These measures would have had a
salutary effect if the administration of justice had been independent
and honest in France. Unfortunately Poyet’s reputation for integrity
was not as great as it should have been in a minister, and his policy
made him many enemies.
The incomes of Francis I, great as they were, did not suffice for Henry
II, the renewal of the war continuing to increase his necessities.
Under him the increase of the _gabelle_ and the tithes and other
special taxes brought the total of the revenues up to six and a half
million écus, which did not yet save the King from being reduced to
the necessity of making alienations and loans, which reached on the day
of his death fourteen millions of écus, about thirty-six millions of
francs.[308]
The practice of the French government of making loans, a practice which
has today become familiar to us on a colossal scale, both in Europe and
America, antedates the Hundred Years’ War. St. Louis contracted various
loans with the Templars and Italian merchants for his crusades.[309]
Philip the Fair borrowed from Italian merchants, from the Templars,
and from his subjects.[310] His war with Edward I of England and his
enterprises in Italy increased the amount, so that his sons inherited a
considerable public debt. The Hundred Years’ War enormously increased
it. We have few means of knowing what rates of interest obtained upon
most of the public loans of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
but they were probably high in most cases. Charles VIII in 1487 fixed
the rate of interest upon a loan made in Normandy at twelve _deniers
tournois_ for each livre, which would not be over 5 per cent. Seven
years later, when he was preparing for the Italian campaign, a rate of
two sous per livre obtained, which would be approximately equivalent to
10 per cent.
In the time of the direct Valois kings, most of the government’s loans
were arranged in the provinces, as in Normandy and Languedoc. But,
beginning with Francis I, the city of Paris became increasingly the
place where the crown obtained financial aid, so much so indeed that
the supervision of the _rentes_ of the Hôtel-de-Ville became a separate
administrative bureau of the royal treasury, although it must not be
understood that the government’s operations were henceforth exclusively
confined to Paris; for loans continued to be made wherever possible
with towns, corporations, the clergy, and private loan brokers and
bankers. These _rentes_ of the capital, it should be understood,
were technically a substitution of the credit of the city of Paris
for the somewhat dubious credit of the crown.[311] From that date
(1522) forward in France, government loans took the form of perpetual
annuities, payable at the Hôtel-de-Ville in Paris. But other cities,
such as Orleans, Troyes, Toulouse, and Rouen, also furnished the King
with money in the form of annuities.
Aside from Paris, the church of France was the grand pillar of the
government’s finances, and as the initiation of the _rentes_ is due to
Francis I, so to this king also is the second expedient to be ascribed.
In 1516, on the occasion of the _concordat_, Leo X allowed Francis I to
exact a new tenth, theoretically to be distinguished from the _dîme_
of the clergy of France, the pretext being a war projected against the
Turks. The new tithe was levied by the King’s officers alone, on the
basis of a grand survey of the property of the clergy (_Description
générale du bien d’église_) made in this year. In this financial survey
the tax or quota of each benefice and the total of the tithe in every
diocese were indicated. Thenceforth it was easy for numerous tithes to
be levied by the will of the King alone. However, in order to conceal
the arbitrariness of this conduct, the crown sometimes indicated its
purpose to Rome which issued the necessary validation, but more often
the King addressed the clergy itself united in assemblies of the
bishops at Paris and in provincial or diocesan assemblies. The consent
of the clergy was nothing but a formality, for the royal authority
fixed in advance the sum to be paid. The diocesan assembly had nothing
to do but distribute the impost. This concession of the Pope was
successively renewed, under different pretexts, for a number of years,
under the name of a _don caritatif_, and was equivalent to another
tithe, the practice, prolonged year after year, at last hardening
into a permanent form of taxation required of the clergy, so much so
that under Henry II receivers of the “gift” were established in every
diocese.[312]
Wastefulness and bad management characterized the reign of Henry II
from the very first. The treasury was soon completely exhausted.
A reserve of four hundred thousand écus d’or, which Francis I had
amassed to carry the war into Germany, with little owing save to the
Swiss, payments to whom Francis I had continued in order to prolong
his alliance with them, was dissipated within a few months, and the
government had resort to increased taxation and the creation of new
taxes. The _gabelle_ upon salt, from which Poitou, Saintonge, and
Guyenne had hitherto been exempt, and which was now introduced into
those provinces, raised a terrible revolt which was not crushed until
much violence had been done and much blood shed. The renewal of the war
against Charles V and the invasion of Lorraine, added to the insatiable
demands of the court, required new financial expedients. Not less than
eighteen times during the twelve years of the reign of Henry II were
the _échevins_ of Paris called upon to supply the King with sums of
money. Four millions and a half were thus demanded of the capital.
In order to obtain these sums, which the people refused to advance
gratuitously, the King was forced to humiliate himself exceedingly.
Thus in 1550, in a general assembly of the sovereign courts of the
clergy and of the bourgeois it was reported that “the King, being
obliged to give money to the English, and not having any money in his
treasury except mutilated and debased currency which could not be
recoined, is under the necessity of offering this debased and mutilated
coin as security for a public loan.” As might be expected, this not
very tempting offer did not entice the provost of the merchants, much
to the chagrin of the King, who, however, consented to a short delay.
But three years later Henry II was even less shameless. Although there
was still just as much unwillingness on the part of the merchants of
the city to take the King’s notes, this little difficulty was easily
overcome by the King’s agents. If the money were not forthcoming, the
sideboards of the wealthy bourgeois of Paris contained enough gold and
silver plate to answer the purpose, and an edict of February 19, 1553,
ordered certain specified persons to bring to the mint their vessels of
gold and of silver, for which the government issued its notes.
But Paris was not the only city which was almost incessantly called
upon to supply the King’s needs. Each year, and even each month, was
characterized by a new demand, and numbers of the cities of France
were from time to time taxed for sums which were not secured, however,
without resistance to the royal treasurers. Lyons, which was at this
epoch the seat of a commerce greater even than that of Paris, was
more often mulcted than any other in this way. Conduct so high-handed
naturally resulted not only in creating bitterness against the
government, but demoralized trade as well. The credit of the government
depreciated to such an extent that the rate of interest rose as high as
14 per cent.[313] During the twelve years of Henry II’s reign a greater
amount in taxes had been imposed upon the people of France than in the
fourscore years preceding, besides which many of the crown lands had
been dissipated. Naturally “hard times” prevailed.[314]
Some members of the States-General were for bringing the officers of
finance to account and obliging them to submit the list of all the
grants which had been made in favor of the great and influential at
the court of Henry II. But the cooler element thought that this policy
could not be followed out on account of the powerful position of those
involved and that occasion for new commotions only would ensue.[315]
Instead, retrenchment was resolved upon. The stipends of the gentlemen
of the King’s household and of the _gens de finance_ were reduced
one-half and all pensions were abridged one-third,[316] except in the
case of foreigners in the King’s service, who were supposed to have
no other source of income. This last provision created an outcry, on
the ground that foreigners could only be so employed in time of war,
save in the case of the Scotch Guard.[317] Even this was cut down,
one hundred men-at-arms and one hundred archers being dismissed. The
royal stables and mews were also broken up and the horses and falcons
sold.[318]
Something more constructive than mere economy, however, was necessary,
and the burden of paying the King’s debts fell heaviest upon the
clergy. This was partly owing to the great wealth of the church; partly
to the fact that the clergy had rushed in where others feared to tread,
and, officiously asserting their superiority in matters of state as
well as of church, had proceeded to examine the royal accounts, which
the nobles and the commons were too wary to inspect.[319] The nobles
took the ground that they were not concerned in the matter of paying
the King’s debts, claiming that they paid their dues to the crown by
personal service in war time.[320]
As far back as the assembly at Fontainebleau far-sighted councilors
of the king had pointed out that the revenues of the church would
have to be made to do duty for the government, and intercourse with
Rome had been under way looking to such an arrangement.[321] The Pope
was not as bitterly opposed to such a policy as one might at first be
led to think, for he was thoroughly frightened at the prospect of a
national council of the French clergy being convened in France and was
disposed to be accommodating. But of course a roundabout method had
to be resorted to, for the church would not have suffered a barefaced
taxation of ecclesiastical revenues by the political authority. The
resulting arrangement was in the nature of a political “deal.” Upon the
understanding that no French council should be convened, the French
crown was permitted to appropriate three hundred and sixty thousand
ducats _per annum_ for five years from the incomes of the church,[322]
the condition of the subsidy, theoretically, being that France was to
maintain a fleet to serve against the Turks.[323]
When these things had been done and the King had received in writing
the _doléances_ and requests of the three orders, the States-General
were prorogued[324] until the first of May, to meet at Pontoise
in order to complete the settlement of affairs,[325] for time was
necessary to make the arrangements with the church, since the prelates
present had not been commissioned to enter into such a compact.