circumstance that he is subject to genesis and destruction, or that he
possesses a body. It is on account of the body that some persons happen
to have great deformities or paralysis of some of the organs. This evil
may be part of the natural constitution of these persons, or may have
developed subsequently in consequence of changes in the elements, e.g.,
through bad air, or thunderstorms, or landslips. We have already shown
that, in accordance with the divine wisdom, genesis can only take place
through destruction, and without the destruction of the individual
members of the species the species themselves would not exist
permanently. Thus the true kindness, and beneficence, and goodness of
God is clear. He who thinks that he can have flesh and bones without
being subject to any external influence, or any of the accidents of
matter, unconsciously wishes to reconcile two opposites, viz., to be at
the same time subject and not subject to change. If man were never
subject to change there could be no generation; there would be one
single being, but no individuals forming a species. Galen, in the third
section of his book, The Use of the Limbs, says correctly that it would
be in vain to expect to see living beings formed of the blood of
menstruous women and the semen virile, who will not die, will never
feel pain, or will move perpetually, or will shine like the sun. This
dictum of Galen is part of the following more general
proposition:—Whatever is formed of any matter receives the most perfect
form possible in that species of matter; in each individual case the
defects are in accordance with the defects of that individual matter.
The best and most perfect being that can be formed of the blood and the
semen is the species of man, for as far as man’s nature is known, he is
living, reasonable, and mortal. It is therefore impossible that man
should be free from this species of evil. You will, nevertheless, find
that the evils of the above kind which befall man are very few and
rare; for you find countries that have not been flooded or burned for
thousands of years; there are thousands of men in perfect health,
deformed individuals are a strange and exceptional occurrence, or say
few in number if you object to the term exceptional,—they are not
one-hundredth, not even one-thousandth part of those that are perfectly
normal.
(2) The second class of evils comprises such evils as people cause to
each other, when, e.g., some of them use their strength against others.
These evils are more numerous than those of the first kind; their
causes are numerous and known; they likewise originate in ourselves,
though the sufferer himself cannot avert them. This kind of evil is
nevertheless not widespread in any country of the whole world. It is of
rare occurrence that a man plans to kill his neighbour or to rob him of
his property by night. Many persons are, however, afflicted with this
kind of evil in great wars; but these are not frequent, if the whole
inhabited part of the earth is taken into consideration.
(3) The third class of evils comprises those which every one causes to
himself by his own action. This is the largest class, and is far more
numerous than the second class. It is especially of these evils that
all men complain,—only few men are found that do not sin against
themselves by this kind of evil. Those that are afflicted with it are
therefore justly blamed in the words of the prophet, “This hath been by
your means” (Mal. i. 9); the same is expressed in the following
passage, “He that doeth it destroyeth his own soul” (Prov. vi. 32). In
reference to this kind of evil, Solomon says, “The foolishness of man
perverteth his way” (ibid. xix. 3). In the following passage he
explains also that this kind of evil is man’s own work, “Lo, this only
have I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have thought out
many inventions” (Eccles. vii. 29), and these inventions bring the
evils upon him. The same subject is referred to in Job (v. 6), “For
affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring
out of the ground.” These words are immediately followed by the
explanation that man himself is the author of this class of evils, “But
man is born unto trouble.” This class of evils originates in man’s
vices, such as excessive desire for eating, drinking, and love;
indulgence in these things in undue measure, or in improper manner, or
partaking of bad food. This course brings diseases and afflictions upon
body and soul alike. The sufferings of the body in consequence of these
evils are well known; those of the soul are twofold:—First, such evils
of the soul as are the necessary consequence of changes in the body, in
so far as the soul is a force residing in the body; it has therefore
been said that the properties of the soul depend on the condition of
the body. Secondly, the soul, when accustomed to superfluous things,
acquires a strong habit of desiring things which are neither necessary
for the preservation of the individual nor for that of the species.
This desire is without a limit, whilst things which are necessary are
few in number and restricted within certain limits; but what is
superfluous is without end—e.g., you desire to have your vessels of
silver, but golden vessels are still better: others have even vessels
of sapphire, or perhaps they can be made of emerald or rubies, or any
other substance that could be suggested. Those who are ignorant and
perverse in their thought are constantly in trouble and pain, because
they cannot get as much of superfluous things as a certain other person
possesses. They as a rule expose themselves to great dangers, e.g., by
sea-voyage, or service of kings, and all this for the purpose of
obtaining that which is superfluous and not necessary. When they thus
meet with the consequences of the course which they adopt, they
complain of the decrees and judgments of God; they begin to blame the
time, and wonder at the want of justice in its changes; that it has not
enabled them to acquire great riches, with which they could buy large
quantities of wine for the purpose of making themselves drunk, and
numerous concubines adorned with various kind of ornaments of gold,
embroidery, and jewels, for the purpose of driving themselves to
voluptuousness beyond their capacities, as if the whole Universe
existed exclusively for the purpose of giving pleasure to these low
people. The error of the ignorant goes so far as to say that God’s
power is insufficient, because He has given to this Universe the
properties which they imagine cause these great evils, and which do not
help all evil-disposed persons to obtain the evil which they seek, and
to bring their evil souls to the aim of their desires, though these, as
we have shown, are really without limit. The virtuous and wise,
however, see and comprehend the wisdom of God displayed in the
Universe. Thus David says, “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and
truth unto such as keep His covenant and His testimonies” (Ps. xxv.
10). For those who observe the nature of the Universe and the
commandments of the Law, and know their purpose, see clearly God’s
mercy and truth in everything; they seek, therefore, that which the
Creator intended to be the aim of man, viz., comprehension. Forced by
the claims of the body, they seek also that which is necessary for the
preservation of the body, “bread to eat and garment to clothe,” and
this is very little; but they seek nothing superfluous; with very
slight exertion man can obtain it, so long as he is contented with that
which is indispensable. All the difficulties and troubles we meet in
this respect are due to the desire for superfluous things; when we seek
unnecessary things, we have difficulty even in finding that which is
indispensable. For the more we desire to have that which is
superfluous, the more we meet with difficulties; our strength and
possessions are spent in unnecessary things, and are wanting when
required for that which is necessary. Observe how Nature proves the
correctness of this assertion. The more necessary a thing is for living
beings, the more easily it is found and the cheaper it is; the less
necessary it is, the rarer and dearer it is. E.g., air, water, and food
are indispensable to man: air is most necessary, for if man is without
air a short time he dies; whilst he can be without water a day or two.
Air is also undoubtedly found more easily and cheaper [than water].
Water is more necessary than food; for some people can be four or five
days without food, provided they have water; water also exists in every
country in larger quantities than food, and is also cheaper. The same
proportion can be noticed in the different kinds of food; that which is
more necessary in a certain place exists there in larger quantities and
is cheaper than that which is less necessary. No intelligent person, I
think, considers musk, amber, rubies, and emerald as very necessary for
man except as medicines; and they, as well as other like substances,
can be replaced for this purpose by herbs and minerals. This shows the
kindness of God to His creatures, even to us weak beings. His
righteousness and justice as regards all animals are well known; for in
the transient world there is among the various kinds of animals no
individual being distinguished from the rest of the same species by a
peculiar property or an additional limb. On the contrary, all physical,
psychical, and vital forces and organs that are possessed by one
individual are found also in the other individuals. If any one is
somehow different it is by accident, in consequence of some exception,
and not by a natural property; it is also a rare occurrence. There is
no difference between individuals of a species in the due course of
Nature; the difference originates in the various dispositions of their
substances. This is the necessary consequence of the nature of the
substance of that species; the nature of the species is not more
favourable to one individual than to the other. It is no wrong or
injustice that one has many bags of finest myrrh and garments
embroidered with gold, while another has not those things, which are
not necessary for our maintenance; he who has them has not thereby
obtained control over anything that could be an essential addition to
his nature, but has only obtained something illusory or deceptive. The
other, who does not possess that which is not wanted for his
maintenance, does not miss anything indispensable: “He that gathered
much had nothing over, and he that gathered little had no lack: they
gathered every man according to his eating” (Exod. xvi. 18). This is
the rule at all times and in all places; no notice should be taken of
exceptional cases, as we have explained.
In these two ways you will see the mercy of God toward His creatures,
how He has provided that which is required, in proper proportions, and
treated all individual beings of the same species with perfect
equality. In accordance with this correct reflection the chief of the
wise men says, “All his ways are judgment” (Deut. xxxii. 4); David
likewise says: “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth” (Ps.
xxv. 10); he also says expressly, “The Lord is good to all; and his
tender mercies are over all his works” (ibid. cxlv. 9); for it is an
act of great and perfect goodness that He gave us existence; and the
creation of the controlling faculty in animals is a proof of His mercy
towards them, as has been shown by us.
CHAPTER XIII
Intelligent persons are much perplexed when they inquire into the
purpose of the Creation. I will now show how absurd this question is,
according to each one of the different theories [above-mentioned]. An
agent that acts with intention must have a certain ulterior object in
that which he performs. This is evident, and no philosophical proof is
required. It is likewise evident that that which is produced with
intention has passed over from non-existence to existence. It is
further evident, and generally agreed upon, that the being which has
absolute existence, which has never been and will never be without
existence, is not in need of an agent. We have explained this before.
The question, “What is the purpose thereof?” cannot be asked about
anything which is not the product of an agent; therefore we cannot ask
what is the purpose of the existence of God. He has not been created.
According to these propositions it is clear that the purpose is sought
for everything produced intentionally by an intelligent cause; that is
to say, a final cause must exist for everything that owes its existence
to an intelligent being: but for that which is without a beginning, a
final cause need not be sought, as has been stated by us. After this
explanation you will understand that there is no occasion to seek the
final cause of the whole Universe, neither according to our theory of
the Creation, nor according to the theory of Aristotle, who assumes the
Eternity of the Universe. For according to Aristotle, who holds that
the Universe has not had a beginning, an ultimate final cause cannot be
sought even for the various parts of the Universe. Thus it cannot be
asked, according to his opinion, What is the final cause of the
existence of the heavens? Why are they limited by this measure or by
that number? Why is matter of this description? What is the purpose of
the existence of this species of animals or plants? Aristotle considers
all this as the result of a permanent order of things. Natural
Philosophy investigates into the object of everything in Nature, but it
does not treat of the ultimate final cause, of which we speak in this
chapter. It is a recognized fact in Natural Philosophy that everything
in Nature has its object, or its final cause, which is the most
important of the four causes, though it is not easily recognized in
most species. Aristotle repeatedly says that Nature produces nothing in
vain, for every natural action has a certain object. Thus, Aristotle
says that plants exist for animals; and similarly he shows of other
parts of the Universe for what purpose they exist. This is still more
obvious in the case of the organs of animals. The existence of such a
final cause in the various parts of Nature has compelled philosophers
to assume the existence of a primal cause apart from Nature; it is
called by Aristotle the intellectual or divine cause, and this cause
creates one thing for the purpose of another. Those who acknowledge the
truth will accept as the best proof for the Creation the fact that
everything in Nature serves a certain purpose, so that one thing exists
for the benefit of another; this fact is supported by numerous
instances, and shows that there is design in Nature; but the existence
of design in Nature cannot be imagined unless it be assumed that Nature
has been produced.
I will now return to the subject of this chapter, viz., the final
cause. Aristotle has already explained that in Nature the efficient
cause of a thing, its form, and its final cause are identical; that is
to say, they are one thing in relation to the whole species. E.g., the
form of Zeid produces the form of his son Amr; its action consists in
imparting the form of the whole species [of man] to the substance of
Amr, and the final cause is Amr’s possession of human form. The same
argument is applied by Aristotle to every individual member of a class
of natural objects which is brought to existence by another individual
member. The three causes coincide in all such cases. All this refers
only to the immediate purpose of a thing; but the existence of an
ultimate purpose in every species, which is considered as absolutely
necessary by every one who investigates into the nature of things, is
very difficult to discover: and still more difficult is it to find the
purpose of the whole Universe. I infer from the words of Aristotle that
according to his opinion the ultimate purpose of the genera is the
preservation of the course of genesis and destruction; and this course
is absolutely necessary [in the first instance] for the successive
formation of material objects, because individual beings formed of
matter are not permanent; [secondly], for the production of the best
and the most perfect beings that can be formed of matter, because the
ultimate purpose [in these productions] is to arrive at perfection. Now
it is clear that man is the most perfect being formed of matter; he is
the last and most perfect of earthly beings, and in this respect it can
truly be said that all earthly things exist for man, i.e., that the
changes which things undergo serve to produce the most perfect being
that can be produced. Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity of the
Universe, need therefore not ask to what purpose does man exist, for
the immediate purpose of each individual being is, according to his
opinion, the perfection of its specific form. Every individual thing
arrives at its perfection fully and completely when the actions that
produce its form are complete. The ultimate purpose of the species is
the perpetuation of this form by the repeated succession of genesis and
destruction, so that there might always be a being capable of the
greatest possible perfection. It seems therefore clear that, according
to Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity of the Universe, there is no
occasion for the question what is the object of the existence of the
Universe. But of those who accept our theory that the whole Universe
has been created from nothing, some hold that the inquiry after the
purpose of the Creation is necessary, and assume that the Universe was
only created for the sake of man’s existence, that he might serve God.
Everything that is done they believe is done for man’s sake; even the
spheres move only for his benefit, in order that his wants might be
supplied. The literal meaning of some passages in the books of the
prophets greatly support this idea. Comp. “He formed it (viz., the
earth) to be inhabited” (Isa. xlv. 18); “If my covenant of day and
night were not,” etc. (Jer. xxxiii. 25); “And spreadeth them out as a
tent to dwell in” (Isa. xl. 22). If the sphere existed for the sake of
man, how much more must this be the case with all other living beings
and the plants. On examining this opinion as intelligent persons ought
to examine all different opinions, we shall discover the errors it
includes. Those who hold this view, namely, that the existence of man
is the object of the whole creation, may be asked whether God could
have created man without those previous creations, or whether man could
only have come into existence after the creation of all other things.
If they answer in the affirmative, that man could have been created
even if, e.g., the heavens did not exist, they will be asked what is
the object of all these things, since they do not exist for their own
sake but for the sake of something that could exist without them? Even
if the Universe existed for man’s sake and man existed for the purpose
of serving God, as has been mentioned, the question remains, What is
the end of serving God? He does not become more perfect if all His
creatures serve Him and comprehend Him as far as possible; nor would He
lose anything if nothing existed beside Him. It might perhaps be
replied that the service of God is not intended for God’s perfection;
it is intended for our own perfection,—it is good for us, it makes us
perfect. But then the question might be repeated, What is the object of
our being perfect? We must in continuing the inquiry as to the purpose
of the creation at last arrive at the answer, It was the Will of God,
or His Wisdom decreed it; and this is the correct answer. The wise men
in Israel have, therefore, introduced in our prayers (for Neʻilah of
the Day of Atonement) the following passage:—“Thou hast distinguished
man from the beginning, and chosen him to stand before Thee; who can
say unto Thee, What dost Thou? And if he be righteous, what does he
give Thee?” They have thus clearly stated that it was not a final cause
that determined the existence of all things, but only His will. This
being the case, we who believe in the Creation must admit that God
could have created the Universe in a different manner as regards the
causes and effects contained in it, and this would lead to the absurd
conclusion that everything except man existed without any purpose, as
the principal object, man, could have been brought into existence
without the rest of the creation. I consider therefore the following
opinion as most correct according to the teaching of the Bible, and
best in accordance with the results of philosophy; namely, that the
Universe does not exist for man’s sake, but that each being exists for
its own sake, and not because of some other thing. Thus we believe in
the Creation, and yet need not inquire what purpose is served by each
species of the existing things, because we assume that God created all
parts of the Universe by His will; some for their own sake, and some
for the sake of other beings, that include their own purpose in
themselves. In the same manner as it was the will of God that man
should exist, so it was His will that the heavens with their stars
should exist, that there should be angels, and each of these beings is
itself the purpose of its own existence. When anything can only exist
provided some other thing has previously existed, God has caused the
latter to precede it; as, e.g., sensation precedes comprehension. We
meet also with this view in Scripture: “The Lord hath made everything
(la-maʻanehu) for its purpose” (Prov. xvi. 4). It is possible that the
pronoun in la-maanehu refers to the object; but it can also be
considered as agreeing with the subject; in which case the meaning of
the word is, for the sake of Himself, or His will which is identical
with His self [or essence], as has been shown in this treatise. We have
also pointed out that His essence is also called His glory. The words,
“The Lord hath made everything for Himself,” express therefore the same
idea as the following verse, “Everything that is called by my name: I
have created it for my glory, I have formed it; yea, I have made it”
(Isa. xliii. 7); that is to say, everything that is described as My
work has been made by Me for the sake of My will and for no other
purpose. The words, “I have formed it,” “I have made it,” express
exactly what I pointed out to you, that there are things whose
existence is only possible after certain other things have come into
existence. To these reference is made in the text, as if to say, I have
formed the first thing which must have preceded the other things, e.g.,
matter has been formed before the production of material beings; I have
then made out of that previous creation, or after it, what I intended
to produce, and there was nothing but My will. Study the book which
leads all who want to be led to the truth, and is therefore called
Torah (Law or Instruction), from the beginning of the account of the
Creation to its end, and you will comprehend the opinion which we
attempt to expound. For no part of the creation is described as being
in existence for the sake of another part, but each part is declared to
be the product of God’s will, and to satisfy by its existence the
intention [of the Creator]. This is expressed by the phrase, “And God
saw that it was good” (Gen. i. 4, etc.). You know our interpretation of
the saying of our Sages, “Scripture speaks the same language as is
spoken by man.” But we call “good” that which is in accordance with the
object we seek. When therefore Scripture relates in reference to the
whole creation (Gen. i. 31), “And God saw all that He had made, and
behold it was exceedingly good,” it declares thereby that everything
created was well fitted for its object, and would never cease to act,
and never be annihilated. This is especially pointed out by the word
“exceedingly”; for sometimes a thing is temporarily good; it serves its
purpose, and then it fails and ceases to act. But as regards the
Creation it is said that everything was fit for its purpose, and able
continually to act accordingly. You must not be misled by what is
stated of the stars [that God put them in the firmament of the heavens]
to give light upon the earth, and to rule by day and by night. You
might perhaps think that here the purpose of their creation is
described. This is not the case; we are only informed of the nature of
the stars, which God desired to create with such properties that they
should be able to give light and to rule. In a similar manner we must
understand the passage, “And have dominion over the fish of the sea”
(ibid. i. 28). Here it is not meant to say that man was created for
this purpose, but only that this was the nature which God gave man. But
as to the statement in Scripture that God gave the plants to man and
other living beings, it agrees with the opinion of Aristotle and other
philosophers. It is also reasonable to assume that the plants exist
only for the benefit of the animals, since the latter cannot live
without food. It is different with the stars, they do not exist only
for our sake, that we should enjoy their good influence; for the
expressions “to give light” and “to rule” merely describe, as we have
stated above, the benefit which the creatures on earth derive from
them. I have already explained to you the character of that influence
that causes continually the good to descend from one being to another.
To those who receive the good flowing down upon them, it may appear as
if the being existed for them alone that sends forth its goodness and
kindness unto them. Thus some citizen may imagine that it was for the
purpose of protecting his house by night from thieves that the king was
chosen. To some extent this is correct; for when his house is
protected, and he has derived this benefit through the king whom the
country had chosen, it appears as if it were the object of the king to
protect the house of that man. In this manner we must explain every
verse, the literal meaning of which would imply that something superior
was created for the sake of something inferior, viz., that it is part
of the nature of the superior thing [to influence the inferior in a
certain manner]. We remain firm in our belief that the whole Universe
was created in accordance with the will of God, and we do not inquire
for any other cause or object. Just as we do not ask what is the
purpose of God’s existence, so we do not ask what was the object of His
will, which is the cause of the existence of all things with their
present properties, both those that have been created and those that
will be created.
You must not be mistaken and think that the spheres and the angels were
created for our sake. Our position has already been pointed out to us,
“Behold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket” (Isa. xl. 15). Now
compare your own essence with that of the spheres, the stars, and the
Intelligences, and you will comprehend the truth, and understand that
man is superior to everything formed of earthly matter, but not to
other beings; he is found exceedingly inferior when his existence is
compared with that of the spheres, and a fortiori when compared with
that of the Intelligences. Comp. “Behold, he putteth no trust in his
servants: and his messengers he charged with folly: how much less in
them that dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust,
which are crushed before the moth?” (Job iv. 18, 19). The expression
“his servants,” occurring in this passage, does not denote human
beings; this may be inferred from the words, “How much less in them
that dwell in houses of clay?” The “servants” referred to in this place
are the angels; whilst by the term “his messengers” the spheres are
undoubtedly meant. Eliphas himself, who uttered the above words,
explains this [in the second speech] when he refers to it in one of his
replies in other words, saying, “Behold, he putteth no trust in his
holy ones; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight, how much more
abominable and filthy is man, who drinketh iniquity like water” (ibid.
xv. 15, 16). He thus shows that “his servants” and “his holy ones” are
identical, and that they are not human beings; also that “his
messengers,” mentioned in the first passage, are the same as “the
heavens.” The term “folly” is explained by the phrase “they are not
clean in his sight,” i.e., they are material; although their substance
is the purest and the most luminous, compared with the Intelligences it
appears dark, turbid, and impure. The phrase, “Behold, he putteth no
trust in his servants,” is employed in reference to the angels,
indicating that these do not possess perpetual existence, since, as we
believe, they have had a beginning; and even according to those who
assume the Eternity of the Universe, the existence of the angels is at
all events dependent on and therefore inferior to, the absolute
existence of God. The words, “How much more abominable and filthy is
man,” in the one passage, correspond to the phrase “How much less in
those who dwell in houses of clay” in the other passage. Their meaning
is this: How much less in man who is abominable and filthy, in whose
person crookedness or corporeality is mixed up and spread through all
his parts. “Iniquity” (ʻavlah) is identical with “crookedness,” as may
be inferred from the passage, “In the land of uprightness he will act
with iniquity” (Isa. xxvi. 10), and ish, “man,” is here used in the
same sense as adam, “human being”; for “man” in a general sense is
sometimes expressed in Scripture by ish. Comp. “He who smiteth a man
(ish) and he die” (Exod. xxi. 12).
This must be our belief when we have a correct knowledge of our own
self, and comprehend the true nature of everything; we must be content,
and not trouble our mind with seeking a certain final cause for things
that have none, or have no other final cause but their own existence,
which depends on the Will of God, or, if you prefer, on the Divine
Wisdom.
CHAPTER XIV
In order to obtain a correct estimate of ourselves, we must reflect on
the results of the investigations which have been made into the
dimensions and the distances of the spheres and the stars. The
distances are clearly stated in radii of the earth, and are well known,
since the circumference and the radius of the earth are known. It has
been proved that the distance between the centre of the earth and the
outer surface of the sphere of Saturn is a journey of nearly eight
thousand seven hundred solar years. Suppose a day’s journey to be forty
legal miles of two thousand ordinary cubits, and consider the great and
enormous distance! or in the words of Scripture, “Is not God in the
height of heaven? and behold the height of the stars, how high they
are!” (Job xxii. 12); that is to say, learn from the height of the
heavens how far we are from comprehending God, for there is an enormous
distance between ourselves and these corporeal objects, and the latter
are greatly distinguished from us by their position, and hidden from us
as regards their essence and most of their actions. How much more
incomprehensible therefore is their Maker, who is incorporeal! The
great distance which has been proved is, in fact, the least that can be
assumed. The distance between the centre of the earth and the surface
of the sphere of the fixed stars can by no means be less, but it may
possibly be many times as great; for the measure of the thickness of
the body of the spheres has not been proved, and the least possible has
been assumed, as appears from the treatises On the Distances. The same
is the case with the substances which are between every two spheres.
According to logical inference, as has been mentioned by Thabit, the
thickness of these substances cannot be accurately stated, since they
do not contain any star, which might serve as a means of obtaining it.
As to the thickness of the sphere of the fixed stars, it is at least
four years’ journey, as may be inferred from the measure of the stars
contained in the sphere. The body of each of these stars is more than
ninety times as big as the globe of the earth, and it is possible that
the thickness of the sphere is still greater. Of the ninth sphere, that
causes the daily revolution of the whole system of spheres, we do not
know the dimensions; it contains no stars, and therefore we have no
means of finding out its magnitude. Now consider the enormous
dimensions and the large number of these material beings. If the whole
earth is infinitely small in comparison with the sphere of the stars,
what is man compared with all these created beings! How, then, could
any one of us imagine that these things exist for his sake and benefit,
and that they are his tools! This is the result of an examination of
the corporeal beings: how much more so will this be the result of an
examination into the nature of the Intelligences!
The following question may be asked against the opinion of philosophers
on this subject: There is no doubt that from a philosophical point of
view it would be a mistake to assume that the spheres exist for the
purpose of regulating the fate of one individual person or community;
but it is not absurd to think that they serve to regulate the affairs
of mankind, since these mighty individual beings would serve to give
existence to the individual members of the species, the number of
which, according to the philosophers, will never come to an end. We can
best illustrate this by the following simile: An artisan makes iron
tools of a hundred-weight for the purpose of making a small needle of
the weight of a grain. If only one needle had to be produced, we admit
that it would certainly be bad management, though it would not be
entirely a failure; but if with those enormous tools needle after
needle is produced, even many hundred-weights of needles, the
preparation of those tools would be a wise act and excellent
management. In a similar manner the object of the spheres may be the
continuance of successive genesis and destruction; and the succession
of genesis and destruction serves, as has already been said, to give
existence to mankind. This idea is supported by Biblical texts and
sayings [of our Sages]. The philosopher replies thus: If the difference
between the heavenly bodies and the transient individual members of the
species consisted in their different sizes, this opinion could be
maintained; but as the difference consists in their essence, it remains
improbable that the superior beings should be the means of giving
existence to the lower ones. In short, this question supports our
belief in the Creation; and this is the principal object of this
chapter. [It serves] besides [a second purpose]. I frequently hear from
those who know something about astronomy, that our Sages exaggerated
the distances [of the heavenly bodies] when they said that the
thickness of each sphere is five hundred years’ journey; the distance
of the seven spheres from each other five hundred years’ journey, so
that the distance of the outer surface of the seventh sphere from the
centre of the earth is seven thousand years’ journey. Those who hear
such statements consider them [at first thought] as exaggeration, and
believe that the distance is not so great. But you may ascertain from
the data proved in scientific treatises on the distances, that the
centre of the earth is distant from the inner surface of the seventh
sphere, that of Saturn, nearly seven thousand and twenty-four years’
journey. The number eight thousand and seven hundred given by us,
refers to the distance of the centre of the earth from the inner
surface of the eighth sphere. The distance of the spheres from each
other, mentioned by astronomers, is identical with the thickness of the
substance that intervenes between one sphere and the other, and does
not imply that there is a vacuum. You must, however, not expect that
everything our Sages say respecting astronomical matters should agree
with observation, for mathematics were not fully developed in those
days; and their statements were not based on the authority of the
Prophets, but on the knowledge which they either themselves possessed
or derived from contemporary men of science. But I will not on that
account denounce what they say correctly in accordance with real fact,
as untrue or accidentally true. On the contrary, whenever the words of
a person can be interpreted in such a manner that they agree with fully
established facts, it is the duty of every educated and honest man to
do so.
CHAPTER XV
That which is impossible has a permanent and constant property, which
is not the result of some agent, and cannot in any way change, and
consequently we do not ascribe to God the power of doing what is
impossible. No thinking man denies the truth of this maxim; none ignore
it, but such as have no idea of Logic. There is, however, a difference
of opinion among philosophers with reference to the existence of any
particular thing. Some of them consider its existence to be impossible,
and hold that God cannot produce the thing in question, whilst others
think that it is possible, and that God can create it if He pleases to
do so. E.g., all philosophers consider that it is impossible for one
substratum to have at the same moment two opposite properties, or for
the elementary components of a thing, substance and accident, to
interchange, so that the substance becomes accident, and the accident
becomes substance, or for a material substance to be without accident.
Likewise it is impossible that God should produce a being like Himself,
or annihilate, corporify, or change Himself. The power of God is not
assumed to extend to any of these impossibilities. But the existence of
accidents independent of substance is possible according to one class
of philosophers, the Mutazilah, whilst according to others it is
impossible; it must, however, be added that those who admit the
existence of an accident independent of substance, have not arrived at
this conclusion by philosophical research alone; but it was mainly by
the desire to defend certain religious principles, which speculation
had greatly shaken, that they had recourse to this theory. In a similar
manner the creation of corporeal things, otherwise than from a
substance, is possible according to our view, whilst the philosophers
say that it is impossible. Again, whilst philosophers say that it is
impossible to produce a square with a diagonal equal to one of the
sides, or a solid angle that includes four right angles, or similar
things, it is thought possible by some persons who are ignorant of
mathematics, and who only know the words of these propositions, but
have no idea of that which is expressed by them. I wonder whether this
gate of research is open, so that all may freely enter, and whilst one
imagines a thing and considers it possible, another is at liberty to
assert that such a thing is impossible by its very nature; or whether
the gate is closed and guarded by certain rules, so that we are able to
decide with certainty whether a thing is physically impossible. I
should also like to know, in the latter case, whether imagination or
reason has to examine and test objects as to their being possible or
not; likewise how things imagined, and things conceived intellectually,
are to be distinguished from each other. For it occurs that we consider
a thing as physically possible, and then some one objects, or we
ourselves fear that our opinion is only the result of imagination, and
not that of reason. In such a case it would be desirable to ascertain
whether there exists some faculty to distinguish between imagination
and intellect, [and if so,] whether this faculty is different from
both, or whether it is part of the intellect itself to distinguish
between intellectual and imaginary objects. All this requires
investigation, but it does not belong to the theme of this chapter.
We have thus shown that according to each one of the different theories
there are things which are impossible, whose existence cannot be
admitted, and whose creation is excluded from the power of God, and the
assumption that God does not change their nature does not imply
weakness in God, or a limit to His power. Consequently things
impossible remain impossible, and do not depend on the action of an
agent. It is now clear that a difference of opinion exists only as to
the question to which of the two classes a thing belongs; whether to
the class of the impossible, or to that of the possible. Note it.
CHAPTER XVI
The philosophers have uttered very perverse ideas as regards God’s
Omniscience of everything beside Himself; they have stumbled in such a
manner that they cannot rise again, nor can those who adopt their
views. I will further on tell you the doubts that led them to these
perverse utterances on this question; and I will also tell you the
opinion which is taught by our religion, and which differs from the
evil and wrong principles of the philosophers as regards God’s
Omniscience.
The principal reason that first induced the philosophers to adopt their
theory is this: at first thought we notice an absence of system in
human affairs. Some pious men live a miserable and painful life, whilst
some wicked people enjoy a happy and pleasant life. On this account the
philosophers assumed as possible the cases which you will now hear.
They said that only one of two things is possible, either God is
ignorant of the individual or particular things on earth, and does not
perceive them, or He perceives and knows them. These are all the cases
possible. They then continued thus: If He perceives and knows all
individual things, one of the following three cases must take place:
(1) God arranges and manages human affairs well, perfectly and
faultlessly; (2) He is overcome by obstacles, and is too weak and
powerless to manage human affairs; (3) He knows [all things] and can
arrange and manage them, but leaves and abandons them, as too base,
low, and vile, or from jealousy; as we may also notice among ourselves
some who are able to make another person happy, well knowing what he
wants for his happiness, and still in consequence of their evil
disposition, their wickedness and jealousy against him, they do not
help him to his happiness.—This is likewise a complete enumeration of
all possible cases. For those who have a knowledge of a certain thing
necessarily either (1) take care of the thing which they know, and
manage it, or (2) neglect it (as we, e.g., neglect and forget the cats
in our house, or things of less importance); or (3) while taking care
of it, have not sufficient power and strength for its management,
although they have the will to do so. Having enumerated these different
cases, the philosophers emphatically decided that of the three cases
possible [as regards the management of a thing by one who knows that
thing], two are inadmissible in reference to God—viz., want of power,
or absence of will; because they imply either evil disposition or
weakness, neither of which can by any means be attributed to Him.
Consequently there remains only the alternative that God is altogether
ignorant of human affairs, or that He knows them and manages them well.
Since we, however, notice that events do not follow a certain order,
that they cannot be determined by analogy, and are not in accordance
with what is wanted, we conclude that God has no knowledge of them in
any way or for any reason. This is the argument which led the
philosophers to speak such blasphemous words. In the treatise On
Providence, by Alexander Aphrodisiensis, you will find the same as I
have said about the different views of the philosophers, and as I have
stated as to the source of their error.
You must notice with surprise that the evil into which these
philosophers have fallen is greater than that from which they sought to
escape, and that they ignore the very thing which they constantly
pointed out and explained to us. They have fallen into a greater evil
than that from which they sought to escape, because they refuse to say
that God neglects or forgets a thing, and yet they maintain that His
knowledge is imperfect, that He is ignorant of what is going on here on
earth, that He does not perceive it. They also ignore, what they
constantly point out to us, in as much as they judge the whole universe
by that which befalls individual men, although, according to their own
view, frequently stated and explained, the evils of man originate in
himself, or form part of his material nature. We have already discussed
this sufficiently. After having laid this foundation, which is the ruin
of all good principles, and destroys the majesty of all true knowledge,
they sought to remove the opprobrium by declaring that for many reasons
it is impossible that God should have a knowledge of earthly things,
for the individual members of a species can only be perceived by the
senses, and not by reason; but God does not perceive by means of any of
the senses. Again, the individuals are infinite, but knowledge
comprehends and circumscribes the object of its action, and the
infinite cannot be comprehended or circumscribed; furthermore,
knowledge of individual beings, that are subject to change,
necessitates some change in him who possesses it, because this
knowledge itself changes constantly. They have also raised the
following two objections against those who hold, in accordance with the
teaching of Scripture, that God knows things before they come into
existence. First, this theory implies that there can be knowledge of a
thing that does not exist at all; secondly, it leads to the conclusion
that the knowledge of an object in potentia is identical with the
knowledge of that same object in reality. They have indeed come to very
evil conclusions, and some of them assumed that God only knows the
species, not the individual beings, whilst others went as far as to
contend that God knows nothing beside Himself, because they believe
that God cannot have more than one knowledge.
Some of the great philosophers who lived before Aristotle agree with
us, that God knows everything, and that nothing is hidden from Him.
Alexander also refers to them in the above-mentioned treatise; he
differs from them, and says that the principal objection against this
theory is based on the fact that we clearly see evils befalling good
men, and wicked men enjoying happiness.
In short, you see that if these philosophers would find human affairs
managed according to rules laid down by the common people, they would
not venture or presume to speak on this subject. They are only led to
this speculation because they examine the affairs of the good and the
wicked, and consider them as being contrary to all rule, and say in the
words of the foolish in our nation, “The way of the Lord is not right”
(Ezek. xxxiii. 17).
After having shown that knowledge and Providence are connected with
each other, I will now proceed to expound the opinions of thinkers on
Providence, and then I shall attempt to remove their doubts as to God’s
knowledge of individual beings.
CHAPTER XVII
There are four different theories concerning Divine Providence; they
are all ancient, known since the time of the Prophets, when the true
Law was revealed to enlighten these dark regions.
First Theory.—There is no Providence at all for anything in the
Universe; all parts of the Universe, the heavens and what they contain,
owe their origin to accident and chance; there exists no being that
rules and governs them or provides for them. This is the theory of
Epicurus, who assumes also that the Universe consists of atoms, that
these have combined by chance, and have received their various forms by
mere accident. There have been atheists among the Israelites who have
expressed the same view; it is reported of them: “They have denied the
Lord, and said he is not” (Jer. v. 12). Aristotle has proved the
absurdity of the theory, that the whole Universe could have originated
by chance; he has shown that, on the contrary, there is a being that
rules and governs the Universe. We have already touched upon this
subject in the present treatise.
Second Theory.—Whilst one part of the Universe owes its existence to
Providence, and is under the control of a ruler and governor, another
part is abandoned and left to chance. This is the view of Aristotle
about Providence, and I will now explain to you his theory. He holds
that God controls the spheres and what they contain: therefore the
individual beings in the spheres remain permanently in the same form.
Alexander has also expressed it in his writings that Divine Providence
extends down to, and ends with, the sphere of the moon. This view
results from his theory of the Eternity of the Universe; he believes
that Providence is in accordance with the nature of the Universe:
consequently in the case of the spheres with their contents, where each
individual being has a permanent existence, Providence gives permanency
and constancy. From the existence of the spheres other beings derive
existence, which are constant in their species but not in their
individuals: in the same manner it is said that Providence sends forth
[from the spheres to the earth] sufficient influence to secure the
immortality and constancy of the species, without securing at the same
time permanence for the individual beings of the species. But the
individual beings in each species have not been entirely abandoned,
that portion of the materia prima which has been purified and refined,
and has received the faculty of growth, is endowed with properties that
enable it to exist a certain time, to attract what is useful and to
repel what is useless. That portion of the materia prima which has been
subject to a further development, and has received the faculty of
sensation, is endowed with other properties for its protection and
preservation; it has a new faculty of moving freely toward that which
is conducive to, and away from that which is contrary to its
well-being. Each individual being received besides such properties as
are required for the preservation of the species to which it belongs.
The portion of the materia prima which is still more refined, and is
endowed with the intellectual faculty, possesses a special property by
which each individual, according to the degree of his perfection, is
enabled to manage, to calculate, and to discover what is conducive both
to the temporary existence of the individual and to the preservation of
the species. All other movements, however, which are made by the
individual members of each species are due to accident; they are not,
according to Aristotle, the result of rule and management; e.g., when a
storm or gale blows, it causes undoubtedly some leaves of a tree to
drop, breaks off some branches of another tree, tears away a stone from
a heap of stones, raises dust over herbs and spoils them, and stirs up
the sea so that a ship goes down with the whole or part of her
contents. Aristotle sees no difference between the falling of a leaf or
a stone and the death of the good and noble people in the ship; nor
does he distinguish between the destruction of a multitude of ants
caused by an ox depositing on them his excrement and the death of
worshippers killed by the fall of the house when its foundations give
way; nor does he discriminate between the case of a cat killing a mouse
that happens to come in her way, or that of a spider catching a fly,
and that of a hungry lion meeting a prophet and tearing him. In short,
the opinion of Aristotle is this: Everything is the result of
management which is constant, which does not come to an end and does
not change any of its properties, as e.g., the heavenly beings, and
everything which continues according to a certain rule, and deviates
from it only rarely and exceptionally, as is the case in objects of
Nature. All these are the result of management, i.e., in a close
relation to Divine Providence. But that which is not constant, and does
not follow a certain rule, as e.g., incidents in the existence of the
individual beings in each species of plants or animals, whether
rational or irrational, is due to chance and not to management; it is
in no relation to Divine Providence. Aristotle holds that it is even
impossible to ascribe to Providence the management of these things.
This view is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity of the
Universe, and with his opinion that everything different from the
existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of
those who turned away from our Law, and said: “God hath forsaken the
earth” (Ezek. ix. 9).
Third Theory.—This theory is the reverse of the second. According to
this theory, there is nothing in the whole Universe, neither a class
nor an individual being, that is due to chance; everything is the
result of will, intention, and rule. It is a matter of course that he
who rules must know [that which is under his control]. The Mohammedan
Ashariyah adhere to this theory, notwithstanding evident absurdities
implied in it; for they admit that Aristotle is correct in assuming one
and the same cause [viz., the wind] for the fall of leaves [from the
tree] and for the death of a man [drowned in the sea]. But they hold at
the same time that the wind did not blow by chance; it is God that
caused it to move; it is not therefore the wind that caused the leaves
to fall; each leaf falls according to the Divine decree; it is God who
caused it to fall at a certain time and in a certain place; it could
not have fallen before or after that time or in another place, as this
has previously been decreed. The Ashariyah were therefore compelled to
assume that motion and rest of living beings are predestined, and that
it is not in the power of man to do a certain thing or to leave it
undone. The theory further implies a denial of possibility in these
things; they can only be either necessary or impossible. The followers
of this theory accepted also the last-mentioned proposition, and say,
that we call certain things possible, as e.g., the facts that Zeid
stands, and that Amr is coming; but they are only possible for us,
whilst in their relation to God they cannot be called possible; they
are either necessary or impossible. It follows also from this theory,
that precepts are perfectly useless, since the people to whom any law
is given are unable to do anything: they can neither do what they are
commanded nor abstain from what they are forbidden. The supporters of
this theory hold that it was the will of God to send prophets, to
command, to forbid, to promise, and to threaten, although we have no
power [over our actions]. A duty would thus be imposed upon us which is
impossible for us to carry out, and it is even possible that we may
suffer punishment when obeying the command and receive reward when
disobeying it. According to this theory, it must also be assumed that
the actions of God have no final cause. All these absurdities are
admitted by the Ashariyah for the purpose of saving this theory. When
we see a person born blind or leprous, who could not have merited a
punishment for previous sins, they say, It is the will of God; when a
pious worshipper is tortured and slain, it is likewise the will of God;
and no injustice can be asserted to Him for that, for according to
their opinion it is proper that God should afflict the innocent and do
good to the sinner. Their views on these matters are well known.
Fourth Theory.—Man has free will; it is therefore intelligible that the
Law contains commands and prohibitions, with announcements of reward
and punishment. All acts of God are due to wisdom; no injustice is
found in Him, and He does not afflict the good. The Mu’tazila profess
this theory, although they do not believe in man’s absolute free will.
They hold also that God takes notice of the falling of the leaf and the
destruction of the ant, and that His Providence extends over all
things. This theory likewise implies contradictions and absurdities.
The absurdities are these: The fact that some persons are born with
defects, although they have not sinned previously, is ascribed to the
wisdom of God, it being better for those persons to be in such a
condition than to be in a normal state, though we do not see why it is
better; and they do not suffer thereby any punishment at all, but, on
the contrary, enjoy God’s goodness. In a similar manner the slaughter
of the pious is explained as being for them the source of an increase
of reward in future life. They go even further in their absurdities. We
ask them why is God only just to man and not to other beings, and how
has the irrational animal sinned, that it is condemned to be
slaughtered? and they reply it is good for the animal, for it will
receive reward for it in the world to come; also the flea and the louse
will there receive compensation for their untimely death: the same
reasoning they apply to the mouse torn by a cat or vulture; the wisdom
of God decreed this for the mouse, in order to reward it after death
for the mishap. I do not consider it proper to blame the followers of
any of the [last named] three theories on Providence, for they have
been driven to accept them by weighty considerations. Aristotle was
guided by that which appears to be the nature of things. The Ashariyah
refused to ascribe to God ignorance about anything, and to say that God
whilst knowing one individual being or one portion of the Universe is
ignorant of another portion; they preferred to admit the
above-mentioned absurdities. The Mu’tazilites refused to assume that
God does what is wrong and unjust; on the other hand, they would not
contradict common sense and say that it was not wrong to inflict pain
on the guiltless, or that the mission of the Prophets and the giving of
the Law had no intelligible reason. They likewise preferred to admit
the above-named absurdities. But they even contradicted themselves,
because they believe on the one hand that God knows everything, and on
the other that man has free will. By a little consideration we discover
the contradiction.
Fifth Theory.—This is our theory, or that of our Law. I will show you
[first] the view expressed on this subject in our prophetical books,
and generally accepted by our Sages. I will then give the opinion of
some later authors among us, and lastly, I will explain my own belief.
The theory of man’s perfectly free will is one of the fundamental
principles of the Law of our Teacher Moses, and of those who follow the
Law. According to this principle man does what is in his power to do,
by his nature, his choice, and his will; and his action is not due to
any faculty created for the purpose. All species of irrational animals
likewise move by their own free will. This is the Will of God; that is
to say, it is due to the eternal divine will that all living beings
should move freely, and that man should have power to act according to
his will or choice within the limits of his capacity. Against this
principle we hear, thank God, no opposition on the part of our nation.
Another fundamental principle taught by the Law of Moses is this: Wrong
cannot be ascribed to God in any way whatever; all evils and
afflictions as well as all kinds of happiness of man, whether they
concern one individual person or a community, are distributed according
to justice; they are the result of strict judgment that admits no wrong
whatever. Even when a person suffers pain in consequence of a thorn
having entered into his hand, although it is at once drawn out, it is a
punishment that has been inflicted on him [for sin], and the least
pleasure he enjoys is a reward [for some good action]; all this is
meted out by strict justice; as is said in Scripture, “all his ways are
judgment” (Deut. xxxii. 4); we are only ignorant of the working of that
judgment.
The different theories are now fully explained to you; everything in
the varying human affairs is due to chance, according to Aristotle, to
the Divine Will alone according to the Ashariyah, to Divine Wisdom
according to the Mu’tazilites, to the merits of man according to our
opinion. It is therefore possible, according to the Ashariyah, that God
inflicts pain on a good and pious man in this world, and keeps him for
ever in fire, which is assumed to rage in the world to come; they
simply say it is the Will of God. The Mu’tazilites would consider this
as injustice, and therefore assume that every being, even an ant, that
is stricken with pain [in this world], has compensation for it, as has
been mentioned above; and it is due to God’s Wisdom that a being is
struck and afflicted in order to receive compensation. We, however,
believe that all these human affairs are managed with justice; far be
it from God to do wrong, to punish any one unless the punishment is
necessary and merited. It is distinctly stated in the Law, that all is
done in accordance with justice; and the words of our Sages generally
express the same idea. They clearly say: “There is no death without
sin, no sufferings without transgression.” (B. T. Shabbath, 55a.)
Again, “The deserts of man are meted out to him in the same measure
which he himself employs.” (Mish. Sotah, i. 7.) These are the words of
the Mishnah. Our Sages declare it wherever opportunity is given, that
the idea of God necessarily implies justice; that He will reward the
most pious for all their pure and upright actions, although no direct
commandment was given them through a prophet; and that He will punish
all the evil deeds of men, although they have not been prohibited by a
prophet, if common sense warns against them, as e.g., injustice and
violence. Thus our Sages say: “God does not deprive any being of the
full reward [of its good deed]” (B. T. Pes. 118a) again, “He who says
that God remits part of a punishment, will be punished severely; He is
long-suffering, but is sure to exact payment.” (B. T. Baba K. 50a.)
Another saying is this: “He who has received a commandment and acts
accordingly is not like him who acts in the same manner without being
commanded to do so” (B. T. Kidd. 31a); and it is distinctly added that
he who does a good thing without being commanded, receives nevertheless
his reward. The same principle is expressed in all sayings of our
Sages. But they contain an additional doctrine which is not found in
the Law; viz., the doctrine of “afflictions of love,” as taught by some
of our Sages. According to this doctrine it is possible that a person
be afflicted without having previously committed any sin, in order that
his future reward may be increased; a view which is held by the
Mu’tazilites, but is not supported by any Scriptural text. Be not
misled by the accounts of trials, such as “God tried Abraham” (Gen.
xxii. 1); “He afflicted thee and made thee hungry,” etc. (Deut. viii.
3); for you will hear more on this subject later on (chap. xxiv.). Our
Law is only concerned with the relations of men; but the idea that
irrational living beings should receive a reward, has never before been
heard of in our nation; the wise men mentioned in the Talmud do not
notice it; only some of the later Geonim were pleased with it when they
heard it from the sect of the Mu’tazilites, and accepted it.
My opinion on this principle of Divine Providence I will now explain to
you. In the principle which I now proceed to expound I do not rely on
demonstrative proof, but on my conception of the spirit of the Divine
Law, and the writings of the Prophets. The principle which I accept is
far less open to objections, and is more reasonable than the opinions
mentioned before. It is this: In the lower or sublunary portion of the
Universe Divine Providence does not extend to the individual members of
species except in the case of mankind. It is only in this species that
the incidents in the existence of the individual beings, their good and
evil fortunes, are the result of justice, in accordance with the words,
“For all His ways are judgment.” But I agree with Aristotle as regards
all other living beings, and à fortiori as regards plants and all the
rest of earthly creatures. For I do not believe that it is through the
interference of Divine Providence that a certain leaf drops [from a
tree], nor do I hold that when a certain spider catches a certain fly,
that this is the direct result of a special decree and will of God in
that moment; it is not by a particular Divine decree that the spittle
of a certain person moved, fell on a certain gnat in a certain place,
and killed it; nor is it by the direct will of God that a certain fish
catches and swallows a certain worm on the surface of the water. In all
these cases the action is, according to my opinion, entirely due to
chance, as taught by Aristotle. Divine Providence is connected with
Divine intellectual influence, and the same beings which are benefited
by the latter so as to become intellectual, and to comprehend things
comprehensible to rational beings, are also under the control of Divine
Providence, which examines all their deeds in order to reward or punish
them. It may be by mere chance that a ship goes down with all her
contents, as in the above-mentioned instance, or the roof of a house
falls upon those within; but it is not due to chance, according to our
view, that in the one instance the men went into the ship, or remained
in the house in the other instance; it is due to the will of God, and
is in accordance with the justice of His judgments, the method of which
our mind is incapable of understanding. I have been induced to accept
this theory by the circumstance that I have not met in any of the
prophetical books with a description of God’s Providence otherwise than
in relation to human beings. The prophets even express their surprise
that God should take notice of man, who is too little and too
unimportant to be worthy of the attention of the Creator; how, then,
should other living creatures be considered as proper objects for
Divine Providence! Comp. “What is man, that thou takest knowledge of
him?” (Ps. cxliv. 3); “What is man, that thou art mindful of him?”
(ibid. viii. 8). It is clearly expressed in many Scriptural passages
that God provides for all men, and controls all their deeds—e.g., “He
fashioneth their hearts alike, he considereth all their works” (ibid.
xxxiii. 15); “For thine eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of
men, to give every one according to his ways” (Jer. xxxii. 19). Again:
“For his eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings”
(Job xxxii. 21). In the Law there occur instances of the fact that men
are governed by God, and that their actions are examined by him. Comp.
“In the day when I visit I will visit their sin upon them” (Exod.
xxxii. 34); “I will even appoint over you terror” (Lev. xxvi. 16);
“Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book”
(Exod. xxxii. 33); “The same soul will I destroy” (Lev. xxiii. 30); “I
will even set my face against that soul” (ibid. xx. 6). There are many
instances of this kind. All that is mentioned of the history of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is a perfect proof that Divine Providence
extends to every man individually. But the condition of the individual
beings of other living creatures is undoubtedly the same as has been
stated by Aristotle. On that account it is allowed, even commanded, to
kill animals; we are permitted to use them according to our pleasure.
The view that other living beings are only governed by Divine
Providence in the way described by Aristotle, is supported by the words
of the Prophet Habakkuk. When he perceived the victories of
Nebuchadnezzar, and saw the multitude of those slain by him, he said,
“O God, it is as if men were abandoned, neglected, and unprotected like
fish and like worms of the earth.” He thus shows that these classes are
abandoned. This is expressed in the following passage: “And makest men
as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler
over them. They take up all of them with the angle,” etc. (Hab. i. 14,
15). The prophet then declares that such is not the case; for the
events referred to are not the result of abandonment, forsaking, and
absence of Providence, but are intended as a punishment for the people,
who well deserved all that befell them. He therefore says: “O Lord,
Thou hast ordained them for judgment, and O mighty God, Thou hast
established them for correction” (ibid. ver. 12). Our opinion is not
contradicted by Scriptural passages like the following: “He giveth to
the beast his food” (Ps. cxlvii. 9); “The young lions roar after their
prey, and seek their meat from God” (ibid. civ. 21); “Thou openest
thine hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing” (ibid.
cxlv. 16); or by the saying of our Sages: “He sitteth and feedeth all,
from the horns of the unicorns even unto the eggs of insects.” There
are many similar sayings extant in the writings of our Sages, but they
imply nothing that is contrary to my view. All these passages refer to
Providence in relation to species, and not to Providence in relation to
individual animals. The acts of God are as it were enumerated; how He
provides for every species the necessary food and the means of
subsistence. This is clear and plain. Aristotle likewise holds that
this kind of Providence is necessary, and is in actual existence.
Alexander also notices this fact in the name of Aristotle, viz., that
every species has its nourishment prepared for its individual members;
otherwise the species would undoubtedly have perished. It does not
require much consideration to understand this. There is a rule laid
down by our Sages that it is directly prohibited in the Law to cause
pain to an animal, and is based on the words: “Wherefore hast thou
smitten thine ass?” etc. (Num. xxii. 32). But the object of this rule
is to make us perfect; that we should not assume cruel habits; and that
we should not uselessly cause pain to others; that, on the contrary, we
should be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures,
except when necessity demands the contrary: “When thy soul longeth to
eat flesh,” etc. (Deut. xii. 20). We should not kill animals for the
purpose of practising cruelty, or for the purpose of play. It cannot be
objected to this theory, Why should God select mankind as the object of
His special Providence, and not other living beings? For he who asks
this question must also inquire, Why has man alone, of all species of
animals, been endowed with intellect? The answer to this second
question must be, according to the three afore-mentioned theories: It
was the Will of God, it is the decree of His Wisdom, or it is in
accordance with the laws of Nature. The same answers apply to the first
question. Understand thoroughly my theory, that I do not ascribe to God
ignorance of anything or any kind of weakness; I hold that Divine
Providence is related and closely connected with the intellect, because
Providence can only proceed from an intelligent being, from a being
that is itself the most perfect Intellect. Those creatures, therefore,
which receive part of that intellectual influence, will become subject
to the action of Providence in the same proportion as they are acted
upon by the Intellect. This theory is in accordance with reason and
with the teaching of Scripture, whilst the other theories previously
mentioned either exaggerate Divine Providence or detract from it. In
the former case they lead to confusion and entire nonsense, and cause
us to deny reason and to contradict that which is perceived with the
senses. The latter case, viz., the theory that Divine Providence does
not extend to man, and that there is no difference between man and
other animals, implies very bad notions about God; it disturbs all
social order, removes and destroys all the moral and intellectual
virtues of man.
CHAPTER XVIII
Having shown in the preceding chapter that of all living beings mankind
alone is directly under the control of Divine Providence, I will now
add the following remarks: It is an established fact that species have
no existence except in our own minds. Species and other classes are
merely ideas formed in our minds, whilst everything in real existence
is an individual object, or an aggregate of individual objects. This
being granted, it must further be admitted that the result of the
existing Divine influence, that reaches mankind through the human
intellect, is identical with individual intellects really in existence,
with which, e.g., Zeid, Amr, Kaled and Bekr, are endowed. Hence it
follows, in accordance with what I have mentioned in the preceding
chapter, that the greater the share is which a person has obtained of
this Divine influence, on account of both his physical predisposition
and his training, the greater must also be the effect of Divine
Providence upon him, for the action of Divine Providence is
proportional to the endowment of intellect, as has been mentioned
above. The relation of Divine Providence is therefore not the same to
all men; the greater the human perfection a person has attained, the
greater the benefit he derives from Divine Providence. This benefit is
very great in the case of prophets, and varies according to the degree
of their prophetic faculty; as it varies in the case of pious and good
men according to their piety and uprightness. For it is the intensity
of the Divine intellectual influence that has inspired the prophets,
guided the good in their actions, and perfected the wisdom of the
pious. In the same proportion as ignorant and disobedient persons are
deficient in that Divine influence, their condition is inferior, and
their rank equal to that of irrational beings; and they are “like unto
the beasts” (Ps. xlix. 21). For this reason it was not only considered
a light thing to slay them, but it was even directly commanded for the
benefit of mankind. This belief that God provides for every individual
human being in accordance with his merits is one of the fundamental
principles on which the Law is founded.
Consider how the action of Divine Providence is described in reference
to every incident in the lives of the patriarchs, to their occupations,
and even to their passions, and how God promised to direct His
attention to them. Thus God said to Abraham, “I am thy shield” (Gen.
xv. 1); to Isaac, “I will be with thee, and I will bless thee” (ibid.
xxvi. 3); to Jacob, “I am with thee, and will keep thee” (ibid. xxviii.
15); to [Moses] the chief of the Prophets, “Certainly I will be with
thee, and this shall be a token unto thee” (Exod. iii. 12); to Joshua,
“As I was with Moses, so I shall be with thee” (Josh. i. 5). It is
clear that in all these cases the action of Providence has been
proportional to man’s perfection. The following verse describes how
Providence protects good and pious men, and abandons fools; “He will
keep the feet of his saints, and the wicked shall be silent in
darkness; for by strength shall no man prevail” (1 Sam. ii. 9). When we
see that some men escape plagues and mishaps, whilst others perish by
them, we must not attribute this to a difference in the properties of
their bodies, or in their physical constitution, “for by strength shall
no man prevail”; but it must be attributed to their different degrees
of perfection, some approaching God, whilst others moving away from
Him. Those who approach Him are best protected, and “He will keep the
feet of his saints”; but those who keep far away from Him are left
exposed to what may befall them; there is nothing that could protect
them from what might happen; they are like those who walk in darkness,
and are certain to stumble. The protection of the pious by Providence
is also expressed in the following passages:—“He keepeth all his
bones,” etc. (Ps. xxxiv. 21); “The eyes of the Lord are upon the
righteous” (ibid. ver. 16); “He shall call upon me and I shall answer
him” (ibid. xci. 15). There are in Scripture many more passages
expressing the principle that men enjoy Divine protection in proportion
to their perfection and piety. The philosophers have likewise discussed
this subject. Abu-nasr, in the Introduction to his Commentary on
Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics, says as follows:—Those who possess the
faculty of raising their souls from virtue to virtue obtain, according
to Plato, Divine protection to a higher degree.
Now consider how by this method of reasoning we have arrived at the
truth taught by the Prophets, that every person has his individual
share of Divine Providence in proportion to his perfection. For
philosophical research leads to this conclusion, if we assume, as has
been mentioned above, that Divine Providence is in each case
proportional to the person’s intellectual development. It is wrong to
say that Divine Providence extends only to the species, and not to
individual beings, as some of the philosophers teach. For only
individual beings have real existence, and individual beings are
endowed with Divine Intellect; Divine Providence acts, therefore, upon
these individual beings.
Study this chapter as it ought to be studied; you will find in it all
the fundamental principles of the Law; you will see that these are in
conformity with philosophical speculation, and all difficulties will be
removed; you will have a clear idea of Divine Providence.
After having described the various philosophical opinions on
Providence, and on the manner how God governs the Universe, I will
briefly state the opinion of our co-religionists on the Omniscience of
God, and what I have to remark on this subject.
CHAPTER XIX
It is undoubtedly an innate idea that God must be perfect in every
respect and cannot be deficient in anything. It is almost an innate
idea that ignorance in anything is a deficiency, and that God can
therefore not be ignorant of anything. But some thinkers assume, as I
said before, haughtily and exultingly, that God knows certain things
and is ignorant of certain other things. They did so because they
imagined that they discovered a certain absence of order in man’s
affairs, most of which are not only the result of physical properties,
but also of those faculties which he possesses as a being endowed with
free will and reason. The Prophets have already stated the proof which
ignorant persons offer for their belief that God does not know our
actions; viz., the fact that wicked people are seen in happiness, ease,
and peace. This fact leads also righteous and pious persons to think
that it is of no use for them to aim at that which is good and to
suffer for it through the opposition of other people. But the Prophets
at the same time relate how their own thoughts were engaged on this
question, and how they were at last convinced that in the instances to
which these arguments refer, only the end and not the beginning ought
to be taken into account. The following is a description of these
reflections (Ps. lxxiii. 11, seq.): “And they say, How does God know?
and is there knowledge in the Most High? Behold, these are the ungodly
who prosper in the world; they increase in riches. Verily I have
cleansed my heart in vain, and washed my hands in innocency.” He then
continues, “When I thought to know this, it was too painful for me,
until I went into the sanctuary of God; then understood I their end.
Surely thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down
into destruction. How are they brought into desolation, as in a moment!
They are utterly consumed with terrors.” The very same ideas have also
been expressed by the prophet Malachi, for he says thus (Mal. iii.
13–18): “Your words have been stout against me, saith the Lord. As you
have said, It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have
kept his ordinance, and that we have walked mournfully before the Lord
of hosts? And now we call the proud happy; yea, they that work
wickedness are set up; yea, they that tempt God are even delivered.
Then they that feared the Lord spake often one to another, etc. Then
shall ye return and discern between the righteous and the wicked,
between him that serveth God and him that serveth him not.” David
likewise shows how general this view was in his time, and how it led
and caused people to sin and to oppress one another. At first he argues
against this theory, and then he declares that God is omniscient. He
says as follows:—“They slay the widow and the stranger, and murder the
fatherless. Yet they say, The Lord shall not see, neither shall the God
of Jacob regard it. Understand, ye brutish among the people, and ye
fools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall he not
hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that chastiseth
nations, shall not he correct? or he that teacheth man knowledge?” I
will now show you the meaning of these arguments, but first I will
point out how the opponents to the words of the Prophets misunderstood
this passage. Many years ago some intelligent co-religionists—they were
physicians—told me that they were surprised at the words of David; for
it would follow from his arguments that the Creator of the mouth must
eat and the Creator of the lungs must cry; the same applies to all
other organs of our body. You who study this treatise of mine, consider
how grossly they misunderstood David’s arguments. Hear now what its
true meaning is: He who produces a vessel must have had in his mind an
idea of the use of that instrument, otherwise he could not have
produced it. If, e.g., the smith had not formed an idea of sewing and
possessed a knowledge of it, the needle would not have had the form so
indispensable for sewing. The same is the case with all instruments.
When some philosopher thought that God, whose perception is purely
intellectual, has no knowledge of individual things, which are
perceivable only by the senses, David takes his argument from the
existence of the senses, and argues thus:—If the sense of sight had
been utterly unknown to God, how could He have produced that organ of
the sense of sight? Do you think that it was by chance that a
transparent humour was formed, and then another humour with certain
similar properties, and besides a membrane which by accident had a hole
covered with a hardened transparent substance? in short, considering
the humour of the eye, in membranes and nerves, with their well-known
functions, and their adaptation to the purpose of sight, can any
intelligent person imagine that all this is due to chance? Certainly
not; we see here necessarily design in nature, as has been shown by all
physicians and philosophers; but as nature is not an intellectual
being, and is not capable of governing [the universe], as has been
accepted by all philosophers, the government [of the universe], which
shows signs of design, originates, according to the philosophers, in an
intellectual cause, but is according to our view the result of the
action of an intellectual being, that endows everything with its
natural properties. If this intellect were incapable of perceiving or
knowing any of the actions of earthly beings, how could He have
created, or, according to the other theory, caused to emanate from
Himself, properties that bring about those actions of which He is
supposed to have no knowledge? David correctly calls those who believe
in this theory brutes and fools. He then proceeds to explain that the
error is due to our defective understanding; that God endowed us with
the intellect which is the means of our comprehension, and which on
account of its insufficiency to form a true idea of God has become the
source of great doubts; that He therefore knows what our defects are,
and how worthless the doubts are which originate in our faulty
reasoning. The Psalmist therefore says: “He who teaches man knowledge,
the Lord, knoweth the thoughts of man that they are vanity” (ibid.
xciv. 10–11).
My object in this chapter was to show how the belief of the ignorant,
that God does not notice the affairs of man because they are uncertain
and unsystematic, is very ancient. Comp. “And the Israelites uttered
things that were not right against the Lord” (2 Kings xvii. 9). In
reference to this passage the Midrash says: “What have they uttered?
This Pillar [i.e., God] does not see, nor hear, nor speak”; i.e., they
imagine that God takes no notice of earthly affairs, that the Prophets
received of God neither affirmative nor negative precepts; they imagine
so, simply because human affairs are not arranged as every person would
think it desirable. Seeing that these are not in accordance with their
wish, they say, “The Lord does not see us” (Ezek. viii. 12). Zephaniah
(i. 12) also describes those ignorant persons “who say in their heart
the Lord will not do good, neither will he do evil.” I will tell you my
own opinion as regards the theory that God knows all things on earth,
but I will before state some propositions which are generally adopted,
and the correctness of which no intelligent person can dispute.
CHAPTER XX
It is generally agreed upon that God cannot at a certain time acquire
knowledge which He did not possess previously; it is further impossible
that His knowledge should include any plurality, even according to
those who admit the Divine attributes. As these things have been fully
proved, we, who assert the teaching of the Law, believe that God’s
knowledge of many things does not imply any plurality; His knowledge
does not change like ours when the objects of His knowledge change.
Similarly we say that the various events are known to Him before they
take place; He constantly knows them, and therefore no fresh knowledge
is acquired by Him. E.g., He knows that a certain person is
non-existent at present, will come to existence at a certain time, will
continue to exist for some time, and will then cease to exist. When
this person, in accordance with God’s foreknowledge concerning him,
comes into existence, God’s knowledge is not increased; it contains
nothing that it did not contain before, but something has taken place
that was known previously exactly as it has taken place. This theory
implies that God’s knowledge extends to things not in existence, and
includes also the infinite. We nevertheless accept it, and contend that
we may attribute to God the knowledge of a thing which does not yet
exist, but the existence of which God foresees and is able to effect.
But that which never exists cannot be an object of His knowledge; just
as our knowledge does not comprise things which we consider as
non-existing. A doubt has been raised, however, whether His knowledge
includes the infinite. Some thinkers assume that knowledge has the
species for its object, and therefore extends at the same time to all
individual members of the species. This view is taken by every man who
adheres to a revealed religion and follows the dictates of reason.
Philosophers, however, have decided that the object of knowledge cannot
be a non-existing thing, and that it cannot comprise that which is
infinite. Since, therefore, God’s knowledge does not admit of any
increase, it is impossible that He should know any transient thing. He
only knows that which is constant and unchangeable. Other philosophers
raised the following objection: God does not know even things that
remain constant; for His knowledge would then include a plurality
according to the number of objects known; the knowledge of every thing
being distinguished by a certain peculiarity of the thing. God
therefore only knows His own essence.
My opinion is this: the cause of the error of all these schools is
their belief that God’s knowledge is like ours; each school points to
something withheld from our knowledge, and either assumes that the same
must be the case in God’s knowledge, or at least finds some difficulty
how to explain it. We must blame the philosophers in this respect more
than any other persons, because they demonstrated that there is no
plurality in God, and that He has no attribute that is not identical
with His essence; His knowledge and His essence are one and the same
thing; they likewise demonstrated, as we have shown, that our intellect
and our knowledge are insufficient to comprehend the true idea of His
essence. How then can they imagine that they comprehend His knowledge,
which is identical with His essence; seeing that our incapacity to
comprehend His essence prevents us from understanding the way how He
knows objects? for His knowledge is not of the same kind as ours, but
totally different from it and admitting of no analogy. And as there is
an Essence of independent existence, which is, as the philosophers call
it, the Cause of the existence of all things, or, as we say, the
Creator of everything that exists beside Him, so we also assume that
this Essence knows everything, that nothing whatever of all that exists
is hidden from it, and that the knowledge attributed to this essence
has nothing in common with our knowledge, just as that essence is in no
way like our essence. The homonymity of the term “knowledge” misled
people; [they forgot that] only the words are the same, but the things
designated by them are different; and therefore they came to the absurd
conclusion that that which is required for our knowledge is also
required for God’s knowledge.
Besides, I find it expressed in various passages of Scripture that the
fact that God knows things while in a state of possibility, when their
existence belongs to the future, does not change the nature of the
possible in any way; that nature remains unchanged; and the knowledge
of the realization of one of several possibilities does not yet effect
that realization. This is likewise one of the fundamental principles of
the Law of Moses, concerning which there is no doubt nor any dispute.
Otherwise it would not have been said, “And thou shalt make a
battlement for thy roof,” etc. (Deut. xxii. 8), or “Lest he die in the
battle, and another man take her” (ibid. xx. 7). The fact that laws
were given to man, both affirmative and negative, supports the
principle, that God’s knowledge of future [and possible] events does
not change their character. The great doubt that presents itself to our
mind is the result of the insufficiency of our intellect. Consider in
how many ways His knowledge is distinguished from ours according to all
the teaching of every revealed religion. First, His knowledge is one,
and yet embraces many different kinds of objects. Secondly, it is
applied to things not in existence. Thirdly, it comprehends the
infinite. Fourthly, it remains unchanged, though it comprises the
knowledge of changeable things; whilst it seems [in reference to
ourselves] that the knowledge of a thing that is to come into existence
is different from the knowledge of the thing when it has come into
existence; because there is the additional knowledge of its transition
from a state of potentiality into that of reality. Fifthly, according
to the teaching of our Law, God’s knowledge of one of two eventualities
does not determine it, however certain that knowledge may be concerning
the future occurrence of the one eventuality.—Now I wonder what our
knowledge has in common with God’s knowledge, according to those who
treat God’s knowledge as an attribute. Is there anything else common to
both besides the mere name? According to our theory that God’s
knowledge is not different from His essence, there is an essential
distinction between His knowledge and ours, like the distinction
between the substance of the heavens and that of the earth. The
Prophets have clearly expressed this. Comp. “For my thoughts are not
your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your
ways” (Isa. lv. 8–9). In short, as we cannot accurately comprehend His
essence, and yet we know that His existence is most perfect, free from
all admixture of deficiency, change, or passiveness, so we have no
correct notion of His knowledge, because it is nothing but His essence,
and yet we are convinced that He does not at one time obtain knowledge
which He had not before; i.e., He obtains no new knowledge, He does not
increase it, and it is not finite; nothing of all existing things
escapes His knowledge, but their nature is not changed thereby; that
which is possible remains possible. Every argument that seems to
contradict any of these statements is founded on the nature of our
knowledge, that has only the name in common with God’s knowledge. The
same applies to the term intention; it is homonymously employed to
designate our intention towards a certain thing, and the intention of
God. The term “management” (Providence) is likewise homonymously used
of our management of a certain thing, and of God’s management. In fact
management, knowledge, and intention are not the same when ascribed to
us and when ascribed to God. When these three terms are taken in both
cases in the same sense, great difficulties must arise; but when it is
noticed that there is a great difference whether a thing it predicated
of God or of us, the truth will become clear. The difference between
that which is ascribed to God and that which is ascribed to man is
expressed in the words above mentioned, “And your ways are not my
ways.”
CHAPTER XXI
There is a great difference between the knowledge which the producer of
a thing possesses concerning it, and the knowledge which other persons
possess concerning the same thing. Suppose a thing is produced in
accordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then
guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other
people, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the
whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. E.g., An
artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the
water, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of
the night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the
different ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every
little ball that descends—all this is fully perceived by him who makes
the clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the
movements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the
movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another
person who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at
every movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge
does he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully
understands the machinery. If an infinite number of movements were
assumed for this instrument, he would never be able to complete his
knowledge. Besides, he cannot know any of the movements before they
take place, since he only knows them from their actual occurrence. The
same is the case with every object, and its relation to our knowledge
and God’s knowledge of it. Whatever we know of the things is derived
from observation; on that account it is impossible for us to know that
which will take place in future, or that which is infinite.
Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things
known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is
not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there
would be change and plurality in His knowledge; on the contrary, the
things are in accordance with His eternal knowledge, which has
established their actual properties, and made part of them purely
spiritual, another part material and constant as regards its individual
members, a third part material and changeable as regards the individual
beings according to eternal and constant laws. Plurality, acquisition,
and change in His knowledge is therefore impossible. He fully knows His
unchangeable essence, and has thus a knowledge of all that results from
any of His acts. If we were to try to understand in what manner this is
done, it would be the same as if we tried to be the same as God, and to
make our knowledge identical with His knowledge. Those who seek the
truth, and admit what is true, must believe that nothing is hidden from
God; that everything is revealed to His knowledge, which is identical
with His essence; that this kind of knowledge cannot be comprehended by
us; for if we knew its method, we would possess that intellect by which
such knowledge could be acquired. Such intellect does not exist except
in God, and is at the same time His essence. Note this well, for I
think that this is an excellent idea, and leads to correct views; no
error will be found in it; no dialectical argument; it does not lead to
any absurd conclusion, nor to ascribing any defect to God. These
sublime and profound themes admit of no proof whatever, neither
according to our opinion who believe in the teaching of Scripture, nor
according to the philosophers who disagree and are much divided on this
question. In all questions that cannot be demonstrated, we must adopt
the method which we have adopted in this question about God’s
Omniscience. Note it.
CHAPTER XXII
The strange and wonderful Book of Job treats of the same subject as we
are discussing; its basis is a fiction, conceived for the purpose of
explaining the different opinions which people hold on Divine
Providence. You know that some of our Sages clearly stated Job has
never existed, and has never been created, and that he is a poetic
fiction. Those who assume that he has existed, and that the book is
historical, are unable to determine when and where Job lived. Some of
our Sages say that he lived in the days of the Patriarchs; others hold
that he was a contemporary of Moses; others place him in the days of
David, and again others believe that he was one of those who returned
from the Babylonian exile. This difference of opinion supports the
assumption that he has never existed in reality. But whether he has
existed or not, that which is related of him is an experience of
frequent occurrence, is a source of perplexity to all thinkers, and has
suggested the above-mentioned opinions on God’s Omniscience and
Providence. This perplexity is caused by the account that a simple and
perfect person, who is upright in his actions, and very anxious to
abstain from sin, is afflicted by successive misfortunes, namely, by
loss of property, by the death of his children, and by bodily disease,
though he has not committed any sin. According to both theories, viz.,
the theory that Job did exist, and the theory that he did not exist,
the introduction to the book is certainly a fiction; I mean the portion
which relates to the words of the adversary, the words of God to the
former, and the handing over of Job to him. This fiction, however, is
in so far different from other fictions that it includes profound ideas
and great mysteries, removes great doubts, and reveals the most
important truths. I will discuss it as fully as possible; and I will
also tell you the words of our Sages that suggested to me the
explanation of this great poem.
First, consider the words: “There was a man in the land Uẓ.” The term
Uẓ has different meanings; it is used as a proper noun. Comp. “Uẓ, his
first-born” (Gen. xxii. 21); it is also imperative of the verb Uẓ, “to
take advice.” Comp. uẓu, “take counsel” (Isa. viii. 10). The name Uẓ
therefore expresses the exhortation to consider well this lesson, study
it, grasp its ideas, and comprehend them, in order to see which is the
right view. “The sons of God then came to present themselves before the
Lord, and the adversary came also among them and in their number”
(chap. i. 6, ii. 1). It is not said: “And the sons of God and the
adversary came to present themselves before the Lord”; this sentence
would have implied that the existence of all that came was of the same
kind and rank. The words used are these: “And the sons of God came to
present themselves before the Lord, and the adversary came also among
them.” Such a phrase is only used in reference to one that comes
without being expected or invited; he only comes among others whose
coming has been sought. The adversary is then described as going to and
fro on the earth, and walking up and down thereon. He is in no relation
to the beings above, and has no place among them. For this reason it is
said, “from going to and fro on the earth, and walking up and down on
it,” for his “going” and “walking” can only take place on the earth.
[Job], the simple and righteous man, is given and handed over to the
adversary; whatever evils and misfortunes befell Job as regards his
property, children, and health, were all caused by this adversary. When
this idea is sufficiently indicated, the author begins to reflect on
it; one opinion Job is represented to hold, whilst other opinions are
defended by his friends. I will further on expound these opinions which
formed the substance of the discussion on the misfortunes of Job,
caused by the adversary alone. Job, as well as his friends, were of
opinion that God Himself was the direct agent of what happened, and
that the adversary was not the intermediate cause. It is remarkable in
this account that wisdom is not ascribed to Job. The text does not say
he was an intelligent, wise, or clever man; but virtues and
uprightness, especially in actions, are ascribed to him. If he were
wise he would not have any doubt about the cause of his suffering, as
will be shown later on. Besides, his misfortunes are enumerated in the
same order as they rank in man’s estimation. There are some who are not
perplexed or discouraged by loss of property, thinking little of it;
but are terrified when they are threatened with the death of their
children and are killed by their anxiety. There are others who bear
without shock or fainting even the loss of their children, but no one
endowed with sensation is able to bear bodily pain. We generally extol
God in words, and praise Him as righteous and benevolent, when we
prosper and are happy, or when the grief we have to bear is moderate.
But [it is otherwise] when such troubles as are described in Job come
over us. Some of us deny God, and believe that there is no rule in the
Universe, even if only their property is lost. Others retain their
faith in the existence of justice and order, even when suffering from
loss of property, whereas loss of children is too much affliction for
them. Others remain firm in their faith, even with the loss of their
children; but there is no one who can patiently bear the pain that
reaches his own person; he then murmurs and complains of injustice
either in his heart or with his tongue.
Now consider that the phrase, “to present themselves before the Lord,”
is used in reference to the sons of God, both the first and the second
times, but in reference to the adversary, who appeared on either
occasion among them and in their number, this phrase is not used the
first time, whilst in his second appearance “the adversary also came
among them to present himself before the Lord.” Consider this, and see
how very extraordinary it is!—These ideas presented themselves like an
inspiration to me.—The phrase, “to present themselves before the Lord,”
implies that they are beings who are forced by God’s command to do what
He desires. This may be inferred from the words of the prophet
Zechariah concerning the four chariots that came forth. He says: “And
the angel answered and said to me, These four winds of the heavens come
forth from presenting themselves before the Lord of the whole earth”
(Zech. vi. 5). It is clear that the relation of the sons of God to the
Universe is not the same as that of the adversary. The relation of the
sons of God is more constant and more permanent. The adversary has also
some relation to the Universe, but it is inferior to that of the sons
of God. It is also remarkable in this account that in the description
of the adversary’s wandering about on the earth, and his performing
certain actions, it is distinctly stated that he has no power over the
soul; whilst power has been given to him over all earthly affairs,
there is a partition between him and the soul; he has not received
power over the soul. This is expressed in the words, “But keep away
from his soul” (Job. ii. 6). I have already shown you the homonymous
use of the term “soul” (nefesh) in Hebrew (Part I., chap. xli.). It
designates that element in man that survives him; it is this portion
over which the adversary has no power.—After these remarks of mine
listen to the following useful instruction given by our Sages, who in
truth deserve the title of “wise men”; it makes clear that which
appears doubtful, and reveals that which has been hidden, and discloses
most of the mysteries of the Law. They said in the Talmud as follows:
R. Simeon, son of Lakish, says: “The adversary (satan), evil
inclination (yeẓer ha-ra’), and the angel of death, are one and the
same being.” Here we find all that has been mentioned by us in such a
clear manner that no intelligent person will be in doubt about it. It
has thus been shown to you that one and the same thing is designated by
these three different terms, and that actions ascribed to these three
are in reality the actions of one and the same agent. Again, the
ancient doctors of the Talmud said: “The adversary goes about and
misleads, then he goes up and accuses, obtains permission, and takes
the soul.” You have already been told that when David at the time of
the plague was shown the angel “with the sword drawn in his hand
stretched out over Jerusalem” (2 Sam. xxiv. 17), it was done for the
purpose of conveying a certain idea to him. The same idea was also
expressed in the vision concerning the sins of the sons of Joshua, the
high priest, by the words, “And the adversary stood on his right hand
to accuse him” (Zech. iii. 1). The vision then reveals that [the
adversary] is far from God, and continues thus: “The Lord will rebuke
thee, O adversary, the Lord who hath chosen Jerusalem will rebuke thee”
(ibid. ver. 2). Balaam saw prophetically the same vision in his
journey, addressing him with the words, “Behold I have come forth to be
a hindrance to thee” (Num. xxii. 32). The Hebrew, satan, is derived
from the same root as séteh, “turn away” (Prov. iv. 15); it implies the
notion of turning and moving away from a thing; he undoubtedly turns us
away from the way of truth, and leads us astray in the way of error.
The same idea is contained in the passage, “And the imagination of the
heart of man is evil from his youth” (Gen. viii. 21). The theory of the
good and the evil inclinations (yeẓer ha-tob, ve-yeẓer ha-ra’) is
frequently referred to in our religion. Our Sages also say, “Serve God
with your good and your evil inclinations.” (B. T. Ber. 57a.) They also
say that the evil inclination we receive at our birth; for “at the door
sin croucheth” (Gen. iv. 7), as is distinctly said in the Law, “And the
imagination of the heart of man is evil from his youth” (ibid. viii.
21). The good inclination, however, comes when the mind is developed.
In explaining the allegory representing the body of man and his
different faculties, our Sages (B. T. Ned. 32b) said: “The evil
inclination is called a great king, whilst the good inclination is a
child, poor, though wise” (Eccles. ix. 14). All these sayings of our
Sages are contained in their writings, and are well known. According to
our Sages the evil inclination, the adversary (satan), and the angel
[of death], are undoubtedly identical; and the adversary being called
“angel,” because he is among the sons of God, and the good inclination
being in reality an angel, it is to the good and the evil inclinations
that they refer in their well-known words, “Every person is accompanied
by two angels, one being on his right side, one on his left.” In the
Babylonian Gemara (Shabbath 119b), they say distinctly of the two
angels that one is good and one bad. See what extraordinary ideas this
passage discloses, and how many false ideas it removes.
I believe that I have fully explained the idea contained in the account
of Job; but I will now show the character of the opinion attributed to
Job, and of the opinions attributed to his friends, and support my
statement by proofs gathered from the words of each of them. We need
not take notice of the remaining passages which are only required for
the context, as has been explained to you in the beginning of this
treatise.
CHAPTER XXIII
Assuming the first part of the history of Job as having actually taken
place, the five, viz., Job and his friends, agreed that the misfortune
of Job was known to God, and that it was God that caused Job’s
suffering. They further agree that God does no wrong, and that no
injustice can be ascribed to Him. You will find these ideas frequently
repeated in the words of Job. When you consider the words of the five
who take part in the discussion, you will easily notice that things
said by one of them are also uttered by the rest. The arguments are
repeated, mixed up, and interrupted by Job’s description of his acute
pain and troubles, which had come upon him in spite of his strict
righteousness, and by an account of his charity, humane disposition,
and good acts. The replies of the friends to Job are likewise
interrupted by exhortations to patience, by words of comfort, and other
speeches tending to make him forget his grief. He is told by them to be
silent; that he ought not to let loose the bridle of his tongue, as if
he were in dispute with another man; that he ought silently to submit
to the judgments of God. Job replies that the intensity of his pains
did not permit him to bear patiently, to collect his thoughts and to
say what he ought to say. The friends, on the other hand, contend that
those who act well receive reward, and those who act wickedly are
punished. When a wicked and rebellious person is seen in prosperity, it
may be assumed for certain that a change will take place; he will die,
or troubles will afflict him and his house. When we find a worshipper
of God in misfortune, we may be certain that God will heal the stroke
of his wound. This idea is frequently repeated in the words of the
three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar, who agree in this opinion.
It is, however, not the object of this chapter to describe in what they
agree, but to define the distinguishing characteristic of each of them,
and to elucidate the opinion of each as regards the question why the
most simple and upright man is afflicted with the greatest and acutest
pain. Job found in this fact a proof that the righteous and the wicked
are equal before God, who holds all mankind in contempt. Job therefore
says (ix. 22, 23): “This is one thing, therefore I said it, He
destroyeth the perfect and the wicked. If the scourge slay suddenly, he
will laugh at the trial of the innocent.” He thus declares that when a
scourge comes suddenly, killing and destroying all it meets, God laughs
at the trial of the innocent. He further confirms this view in the
following passage: “One dieth in his full strength, being wholly at
ease and quiet. His vessels are full of milk, etc. And another dieth in
the bitterness of his soul, and never eateth with pleasure. They shall
lie down alike in the dust, and the worms shall cover them” (ibid. xxi.
23–26). In a similar manner he shows the good condition and prosperity
of wicked people; and is even very explicit on this point. He speaks
thus: “Even when I remember I am afraid, and trembling taketh hold on
my flesh. Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in
power? Their seed is established in their sight with them,” etc. (ibid.
6–8). Having thus described their prosperity, he addresses his
opponents, and says to them: “Granted that as you think, the children
of this prosperous atheist will perish after his death, and their
memory will be blotted out, what harm will the fate of his family cause
him after his death? For what pleasure hath he in his house after him,
when the number of his months is cut off in the midst?” (ibid. 21). Job
then explains that there is no hope after death, so that the cause [of
the misfortune of the righteous man] is nothing else but entire neglect
on the part of God. He is therefore surprised that God has not
abandoned the creation of man altogether; and that after having created
him, He does not take any notice of him. He says in his surprise: “Hast
thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese?” etc.
(ibid. x. 10, seq.). This is one of the different views held by some
thinkers on Providence. Our Sages (B. T. Baba B. 16a) condemned this
view of Job as mischievous, and expressed their feeling in words like
the following: “dust should have filled the mouth of Job”; “Job wished
to upset the dish”; “Job denied the resurrection of the dead”; “He
commenced to blaspheme.” When, however, God said to Eliphaz and his
colleagues, “You have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my
servant Job hath” (xlii. 7), our Sages assume as the cause of this
rebuke, the maxim “Man is not punished for that which he utters in his
pain”; and that God ignored the sin of Job [in his utterances], because
of the acuteness of his suffering. But this explanation does not agree
with the object of the whole allegory. The words of God are justified,
as I will show, by the fact that Job abandoned his first very erroneous
opinion, and himself proved that it was an error. It is the opinion
which suggests itself as plausible at first thought, especially in the
minds of those who meet with mishaps, well knowing that they have not
merited them through sins. This is admitted by all, and therefore this
opinion was assigned to Job. But he is represented to hold this view
only so long as he was without wisdom, and knew God only by tradition,
in the same manner as religious people generally know Him. As soon as
he had acquired a true knowledge of God, he confessed that there is
undoubtedly true felicity in the knowledge of God; it is attained by
all who acquire that knowledge, and no earthly trouble can disturb it.
So long as Job’s knowledge of God was based on tradition and
communication, and not on research, he believed that such imaginary
good as is possessed in health, riches, and children, was the utmost
that men can attain; this was the reason why he was in perplexity, and
why he uttered the above-mentioned opinions, and this is also the
meaning of his words: “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear;
but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent
because of dust and ashes” (xlii. 5, 6); that is to say, he abhorred
all that he had desired before, and that he was sorry that he had been
in dust and ashes; comp. “and he sat down among the ashes” (ii. 8). On
account of this last utterance, which implies true perception, it is
said afterwards in reference to him, “for you have not spoken of me the
thing that is right, as my servant Job hath.”
The opinion set forth by Eliphaz in reference to Job’s suffering is
likewise one of the current views on Providence. He holds that the fate
of Job was in accordance with strict justice. Job was guilty of sins
for which he deserved his fate. Eliphaz therefore says to Job: “Is not
thy wickedness great, and thine iniquities infinite?” (xxii. 5). He
then points out to him that his upright actions and his good ways, on
which he relies, need not be so perfect in the eyes of God that no
punishment should be inflicted on him. “Behold, he putteth no trust in
his servants; and his angels he chargeth with folly: how much less in
them that dwell in houses of clay,” etc. (iv. 17–18). Eliphaz never
abandoned his belief that the fate of man is the result of justice,
that we do not know all our shortcomings for which we are punished, nor
the way how we incur the punishment through them.
Bildad the Shuhite defends in this question the theory of reward and
compensation. He therefore tells Job that if he is innocent and without
sin, his terrible misfortunes will be the source of great reward, will
be followed by the best compensation, and will prove a boon to him as
the cause of great bliss in the future world. This idea is expressed in
the words: “If thou be pure and upright, surely now he will awake for
thee, and make the habitation of thy righteousness prosperous. Though
thy beginning was small, yet thy latter end will greatly increase”
(viii. 6–8). This opinion concerning Providence is widespread, and we
have already explained it.
Zofar the Naamathite holds that the Divine Will is the source of
everything that happens; no further cause can be sought for His
actions, and it cannot be asked why He has done this and why He has not
done that. That which God does can therefore not be explained by the
way of justice or the result of wisdom. His true Essence demands that
He does what He wills; we are unable to fathom the depth of His wisdom,
and it is the law and rule of this wisdom that whatever He does is done
because it is His will and for no other cause. Zofar therefore says to
Job: “But oh that God would speak, and open his lips against thee; and
that he would show thee the secrets of wisdom, for wisdom hath two
portions! Know, therefore, that God exacteth of thee less than thine
iniquity deserveth. Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou
find out the Almighty unto perfection?” (xi. 6–7).