are known to us is this: It is impossible to assume that God produced
anything from nothing, or that He reduces anything to nothing; that is
to say, it is impossible that an object consisting of matter and form
should be produced when that matter is absolutely absent, or that it
should be destroyed in such a manner that that matter be absolutely no
longer in existence. To say of God that He can produce a thing from
nothing or reduce a thing to nothing is, according to the opinion of
these philosophers, the same as if we were to say that He could cause
one substance to have at the same time two opposite properties, or
produce another being like Himself, or change Himself into a body, or
produce a square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar
impossibilities. The philosophers thus believe that it is no defect in
the Supreme Being that He does not produce impossibilities, for the
nature of that which is impossible is constant—it does not depend on
the action of an agent, and for this reason it cannot be changed.
Similarly there is, according to them, no defect in the greatness of
God, when He is unable to produce a thing from nothing, because they
consider this as one of the impossibilities. They therefore assume that
a certain substance has co-existed with God from eternity in such a
manner that neither God existed without that substance nor the latter
without God. But they do not hold that the existence of that substance
equals in rank that of God; for God is the cause of that existence, and
the substance is in the same relation to God as the clay is to the
potter, or the iron to the smith; God can do with it what He pleases;
at one time He forms of it heaven and earth, at another time He forms
some other thing. Those who hold this view also assume that the heavens
are transient, that they came into existence, though not from nothing,
and may cease to exist, although they cannot be reduced to nothing.
They are transient in the same manner as the individuals among living
beings which are produced from some existing substance, and are again
reduced to some substance that remains in existence. The process of
genesis and destruction is, in the case of the heavens, the same as in
that of earthly beings.
The followers of this theory are divided into different schools, whose
opinions and principles it is useless to discuss here; but what I have
mentioned is common to all of them. Plato holds the same opinion.
Aristotle says in his Physics, that according to Plato the heavens are
transient. This view is also stated in Plato’s Timæus. His opinion,
however, does not agree with our belief; only superficial and careless
persons wrongly assume that Plato has the same belief as we have. For
whilst we hold that the heavens have been created from absolutely
nothing, Plato believes that they have been formed out of
something.—This is the second theory.
Third Theory.—viz., that of Aristotle, his followers, and commentators.
Aristotle maintains, like the adherents of the second theory, that a
corporeal object cannot be produced without a corporeal substance. He
goes, however, farther, and contends that the heavens are
indestructible. For he holds that the Universe in its totality has
never been different, nor will it ever change: the heavens, which form
the permanent element in the Universe, and are not subject to genesis
and destruction, have always been so; time and motion are eternal,
permanent, and have neither beginning nor end; the sublunary world,
which includes the transient elements, has always been the same,
because the materia prima is itself eternal, and merely combines
successively with different forms; when one form is removed, another is
assumed. This whole arrangement, therefore, both above and here below,
is never disturbed or interrupted, and nothing is produced contrary to
the laws or the ordinary course of Nature. He further says—though not
in the same terms—that he considers it impossible for God to change His
will or conceive a new desire; that God produced this Universe in its
totality by His will, but not from nothing. Aristotle finds it as
impossible to assume that God changes His will or conceives a new
desire, as to believe that He is non-existing, or that His essence is
changeable. Hence it follows that this Universe has always been the
same in the past, and will be the same eternally.
This is a full account of the opinions of those who consider that the
existence of God, the First Cause of the Universe, has been established
by proof. But it would be quite useless to mention the opinions of
those who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the
existing state of things is the result of accidental combination and
separation of the elements, and that the Universe has no Ruler or
Governor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and his school, and similar
philosophers, as stated by Alexander [Aphrodisiensis]; it would be
superfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of God has been
demonstrated whilst their theory is built upon a basis proved to be
untenable. It is likewise useless to prove the correctness of the
followers of the second theory in asserting that the heavens are
transient, because they at the same time believe in the Eternity of the
Universe, and so long as this theory is adopted, it makes no difference
to us whether it is believed that the heavens are transient, and that
only their substance is eternal, or the heavens are held to be
indestructible, in accordance with the view of Aristotle. All who
follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, and Abraham, our Father, and all
who adopt similar theories, assume that nothing is eternal except God,
and that the theory of Creatio ex nihilo includes nothing that is
impossible, whilst some thinkers even regard it as an established
truth.
After having described the different theories, I will now proceed to
show how Aristotle proved his theory, and what induced him to adopt it.
CHAPTER XIV
It is not necessary to repeat in every chapter that I write this
treatise with the full knowledge of what you have studied; that I
therefore need not quote the exact words of the philosophers; it will
suffice to give an abstract of their views. I will, however, point out
the methods which they employ, in the same manner as I have done when I
discussed the theories of the Mutakallemim. No notice will be taken of
the opinion of any philosopher but that of Aristotle; his opinions
alone deserve to be criticized, and if our objections or doubts with
regard to any of these be well founded, this must be the case in a far
higher degree in respect to all other opponents of our fundamental
principles.
I now proceed to describe the methods of the philosophers.
First Method.—According to Aristotle, motion, that is to say, motion
par excellence, is eternal. For if the motion had a beginning, there
must already have been some motion when it came into existence, for
transition from potentiality into actuality, and from non-existence
into existence, always implies motion; then that previous motion, the
cause of the motion which follows, must be eternal, or else the series
would have to be carried back ad infinitum. On the same principle he
maintains that time is eternal, for time is related to and connected
with motion: there is no motion except in time, and time can only be
perceived by motion, as has been demonstrated by proof. By this
argument Aristotle proves the eternity of the Universe.
Second Method.—The First Substance common to the four elements is
eternal. For if it had a beginning it would have come into existence
from another substance; it would further be endowed with a form, as
coming into existence is nothing but receiving Form. But we mean by
“First Substance” a formless substance; it can therefore not have come
into existence from another substance, and must be without beginning
and without end; hence it is concluded that the Universe is eternal.
Third Method.—The substance of the spheres contains no opposite
elements; for circular motion includes no such opposite directions as
are found in rectilinear motion. Whatever is destroyed, owes its
destruction to the opposite elements it contains. The spheres contain
no opposite elements; they are therefore indestructible, and because
they are indestructible they are also without beginning. Aristotle thus
assumes the axiom that everything that has had a beginning is
destructible, and that everything destructible has had a beginning;
that things without beginning are indestructible, and indestructible
things are without beginning. Hence follows the Eternity of the
Universe.
Fourth Method.—The actual production of a thing is preceded in time by
its possibility. The actual change of a thing is likewise preceded in
time by its possibility. From this proposition Aristotle derives the
eternity of the circular motion of the spheres. The Aristotelians in
more recent time employ this proposition in demonstrating the Eternity
of the Universe. They argue thus: When the Universe did not yet exist,
its existence was either possible or necessary, or impossible. If it
was necessary, the Universe could never have been non-existing; if
impossible, the Universe could never have been in existence; if
possible, the question arises, What was the substratum of that
possibility? for there must be in existence something of which that
possibility can be predicated. This is a forcible argument in favour of
the Eternity of the Universe. Some of the later schools of the
Mutakallemim imagined that they could confute this argument by
objecting that the possibility rests with the agent, and not with the
production. But this objection is of no force whatever; for there are
two distinct possibilities, viz., the thing produced has had the
possibility of being produced before this actually took place; and the
agent has had the possibility of producing it before he actually did
so. There are, therefore, undoubtedly two possibilities—that of the
substance to receive a certain form, and that of the agent to perform a
certain act.
These are the principal methods, based on the properties of the
Universe, by which Aristotle proves the Eternity of the Universe. There
are, however, other methods of proving the Eternity of the Universe.
They are based on the notions formed of God, and philosophers after
Aristotle derived them from his philosophy. Some of them employed the
following argument:—
Fifth Method.—If God produced the Universe from nothing, He must have
been a potential agent before He was an actual one, and must have
passed from a state of potentiality into that of actuality—a process
that is merely possible, and requires an agent for effecting it. This
argument is likewise a source of great doubts, and every intelligent
person must examine it in order to refute it and to expose its
character.
Sixth Method.—An agent is active at one time and inactive at another,
according as favourable or unfavourable circumstances arise. The
unfavourable circumstances cause the abandonment of an intended action.
The favourable ones, on the other hand, even produce a desire for an
action for which there has not been a desire previously. As, however,
God is not subject to accidents which could bring about a change in His
will, and is not affected by obstacles and hindrances that might appear
or disappear, it is impossible, they argue, to imagine that God is
active at one time and inactive at another. He is, on the contrary,
always active in the same manner as He is always in actual existence.
Seventh Method.—The actions of God are perfect; they are in no way
defective, nor do they contain anything useless or superfluous. In
similar terms Aristotle frequently praises Him, when he says that
Nature is wise and does nothing in vain, but makes everything as
perfect as possible. The philosophers therefore contend that this
existing Universe is so perfect that it cannot be improved, and must be
permanent; for it is the result of God’s wisdom, which is not only
always present in His essence, but is identical with it.
All arguments in favour of the Eternity of the Universe are based on
the above methods, and can be traced to one or other of them. The
following objection is also raised against Creatio ex nihilo: How could
God ever have been inactive without producing or creating anything in
the infinite past? How could He have passed the long infinite period
which preceded the Creation without producing anything, so as to
commence, as it were, only yesterday, the Creation of the Universe? For
even if you said, e.g., that God created previously as many successive
worlds as the outermost sphere could contain grains of mustard, and
that each of these worlds existed as many years: considering the
infinite existence of God, it would be the same as if He had only
yesterday commenced the Creation. For when we once admit the beginning
of the existence of things after their non-existence, it makes no
difference whether thousands of centuries have passed since the
beginning, or only a short time. Those who defend the Eternity of the
Universe find both assumptions equally improbable.
Eighth Method.—The following method is based on the circumstance that
the theory implies a belief which is so common to all peoples and ages,
and so universal, that it appears to express a real fact and not merely
an hypothesis. Aristotle says that all people have evidently believed
in the permanency and stability of the heavens; and thinking that these
were eternal, they declared them to be the habitation of God and of the
spiritual beings or angels. By thus attributing the heavens to God,
they expressed their belief that the heavens are indestructible.
Several other arguments of the same kind are employed by Aristotle in
treating of this subject in order to support the results of his
philosophical speculation by common sense.
CHAPTER XV
In this chapter I intend to show that Aristotle was well aware that he
had not proved the Eternity of the Universe. He was not mistaken in
this respect. He knew that he could not prove his theory, and that his
arguments and proofs were only apparent and plausible. They are the
least objectionable, according to Alexander; but, according to the same
authority, Aristotle could not have considered them conclusive, after
having himself taught us the rules of logic, and the means by which
arguments can be refuted or confirmed.
The reason why I have introduced this subject is this: Later
philosophers, disciples of Aristotle, assume that he has proved the
Eternity of the Universe, and most of those who believe that they are
philosophers blindly follow him in this point, and accept all his
arguments as conclusive and absolute proofs. They consider it wrong to
differ from Aristotle, or to think that he was ignorant or mistaken in
anything. For this reason, taking their standpoint, I show that
Aristotle himself did not claim to have proved the Eternity of the
Universe. He says in his book Physics (viii., chap. i.) as follows:
“All the Physicists before us believed that motion is eternal, except
Plato, who holds that motion is transient; according to his opinion the
heavens are likewise transient.” Now if Aristotle had conclusive proofs
for his theory, he would not have considered it necessary to support it
by citing the opinions of preceding Physicists, nor would he have found
it necessary to point out the folly and absurdity of his opponents. For
a truth, once established by proof, does neither gain force nor
certainty by the consent of all scholars, nor lose by the general
dissent. We further find that Aristotle, in the book The Heavens and
the World, introduces his theory of the Eternity of the Universe in the
following manner: “Let us inquire into the nature of the heavens, and
see whether they are the product of something or not, destructible or
not.” After this statement of the problem, he proceeds to cite the
views of those who hold that the heavens have had a beginning, and
continues thus: “By doing this, our theory will be most plausible and
acceptable in the opinion of profound thinkers; and it will be the more
so, when, as we propose, the arguments of our opponents are first
heard. For if we were to state our opinion and our arguments without
mentioning those of our opponents, our words would be received less
favourably. He who desires to be just must not show himself hostile to
his opponent; he must have sympathy with him, and readily acknowledge
any truth contained in his words; he must admit the correctness of such
of his opponent’s arguments as he would admit if they were in his own
favour.” This is the contents of the words of Aristotle. Now, I ask
you, men of intelligence, can we have any complaint against him after
this frank statement? Or can any one now imagine that a real proof has
been given for the Eternity of the Universe? Or can Aristotle, or any
one else, believe that a theorem, though fully proved, would not be
acceptable unless the arguments of the opponents were fully refuted? We
must also take into consideration that Aristotle describes this theory
as his opinion, and his proofs as arguments. Is Aristotle ignorant of
the difference between argument and proof? between opinions, which may
be received more or less favourably, and truths capable of
demonstration? or would rhetorical appeal to the impartiality of
opponents have been required for the support of his theory if a real
proof had been given? Certainly not. Aristotle only desires to show
that his theory is better than those of his opponents, who hold that
philosophical speculation leads to the conviction that the heavens are
transient, but have never been entirely without existence; or that the
heavens have had a beginning, but are indestructible; or to defend any
of the other views mentioned by him. In this he is undoubtedly right;
for his opinion is nearer the truth than theirs, so far as a proof can
be taken from the nature of existing things; we differ from him, as
will be explained. Passion, that exercises great influence in most of
the different sects, must have influenced even the philosophers who
wished to affirm that Aristotle demonstrated his theory by proof.
Perhaps they really believe it, and assume that Aristotle himself was
not aware of it, as it was only discovered after his death! My
conviction is, that what Aristotle says on the Eternity of the
Universe, the cause of the variety in the motion of the spheres and the
order of the Intelligences, cannot be proved, and that Aristotle never
intended to prove these things. I agree with him that the ways of
proving this theory have their gates closed before us, there being no
foundation on which to build up the proof. His words on this subject
are well known. He says, “There are things concerning which we are
unable to reason, or which we find too high for us; to say why these
things have a certain property is as difficult as to decide whether the
Universe is eternal or not.” So far Aristotle. The interpretation which
Abu-nasr offers of this parallel is well known. He denies that
Aristotle had any doubt about the Eternity of the Universe, and is very
severe upon Galen, who maintains that this theory is still doubtful,
and that no proof has been offered. According to Abu-nasr, it is clear
and demonstrable by proof that the heavens are eternal, but all that is
enclosed within the heavens is transient. We hold, that by none of the
methods mentioned in this chapter can a theory be established, refuted,
or shaken.
We have mentioned these things only because we know that the majority
of those who consider themselves wise, although they know nothing of
science, accept the theory of the Eternity of the Universe on the
authority of famous scholars. They reject the words of the prophets,
because the latter do not employ any scientific method by which only a
few persons would be instructed who are intellectually well prepared,
but simply communicate the truth as received by Divine inspiration.
In the chapters which follow we will expound the theory of the Creation
in accordance with the teaching of Scripture.
CHAPTER XVI
In this chapter I will first expound my view on this question, and then
support it by argument—not by such arguments as those of the
Mutakallemim, who believe that they have proved the Creatio ex nihilo.
I will not deceive myself, and consider dialectical methods as proofs;
and the fact that a certain proposition has been proved by a
dialectical argument will never induce me to accept that proposition,
but, on the contrary, will weaken my faith in it, and cause me to doubt
it. For when we understand the fallacy of a proof, our faith in the
proposition itself is shaken. It is therefore better that a proposition
which cannot be demonstrated be received as an axiom, or that one of
the two opposite solutions of the problem be accepted on authority. The
methods by which the Mutakallemim proved the Creatio ex nihilo have
already been described by me, and I have exposed their weak points. As
to the proofs of Aristotle and his followers for the Eternity of the
Universe, they are, according to my opinion, not conclusive; they are
open to strong objections, as will be explained. I intend to show that
the theory of the Creation, as taught in Scripture, contains nothing
that is impossible; and that all those philosophical arguments which
seem to disprove our view contain weak points which make them
inconclusive, and render the attacks on our view untenable. Since I am
convinced of the correctness of my method, and consider either of the
two theories—viz., the Eternity of the Universe, and the Creation—as
admissible, I accept the latter on the authority of Prophecy, which can
teach things beyond the reach of philosophical speculation. For the
belief in prophecy is, as will be shown in the course of this treatise,
consistent even with the belief in the Eternity of the Universe. When I
have established the admissibility of our theory, I will, by
philosophical reasoning, show that our theory of the Creation is more
acceptable than that of the Eternity of the Universe; and although our
theory includes points open to criticism, I will show that there are
much stronger reasons for the rejection of the theory of our opponents.
I will now proceed to expound the method by which the proofs given for
the Eternity of the Universe can be refuted.
CHAPTER XVII
Everything produced comes into existence from non-existence; even when
the substance of a thing has been in existence, and has only changed
its form, the thing itself, which has gone through the process of
genesis and development, and has arrived at its final state, has now
different properties from those which it possessed at the commencement
of the transition from potentiality to reality, or before that time.
Take, e.g., the human ovum as contained in the female’s blood when
still included in its vessels; its nature is different from what it was
in the moment of conception, when it is met by the semen of the male
and begins to develop; the properties of the semen in that moment are
different from the properties of the living being after its birth when
fully developed. It is therefore quite impossible to infer from the
nature which a thing possesses after having passed through all stages
of its development, what the condition of the thing has been in the
moment when this process commenced; nor does the condition of a thing
in this moment show what its previous condition has been. If you make
this mistake, and attempt to prove the nature of a thing in potential
existence by its properties when actually existing, you will fall into
great confusion; you will reject evident truths and admit false
opinions. Let us assume, in our above instance, that a man born without
defect had after his birth been nursed by his mother only a few months;
the mother then died, and the father alone brought him up in a lonely
island, till he grew up, became wise, and acquired knowledge. Suppose
this man has never seen a woman or any female being; he asks some
person how man has come into existence, and how he has developed, and
receives the following answer: “Man begins his existence in the womb of
an individual of his own class, namely, in the womb of a female, which
has a certain form. While in the womb he is very small; yet he has
life, moves, receives nourishment, and gradually grows, till he arrives
at a certain stage of development. He then leaves the womb and
continues to grow till he is in the condition in which you see him.”
The orphan will naturally ask: “Did this person, when he lived, moved,
and grew in the womb, eat and drink, and breathe with his mouth and his
nostrils? Did he excrete any substance?” The answer will be, “No.”
Undoubtedly he will then attempt to refute the statements of that
person, and to prove their impossibility, by referring to the
properties of a fully developed person, in the following manner: “When
any one of us is deprived of breath for a short time he dies, and
cannot move any longer: how then can we imagine that any one of us has
been inclosed in a bag in the midst of a body for several months and
remained alive, able to move? If any one of us would swallow a living
bird, the bird would die immediately when it reached the stomach, much
more so when it came to the lower part of the belly; if we should not
take food or drink with our mouth, in a few days we should undoubtedly
be dead: how then can man remain alive for months without taking food?
If any person would take food and would not be able to excrete it,
great pains and death would follow in a short time, and yet I am to
believe that man has lived for months without that function! Suppose by
accident a hole were formed in the belly of a person, it would prove
fatal, and yet we are to believe that the navel of the fœtus has been
open! Why should the fœtus not open the eyes, spread forth the hands
and stretch out the legs, if, as you think, the limbs are all whole and
perfect.” This mode of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that man
cannot come into existence and develop in the manner described.
If philosophers would consider this example well and reflect on it,
they would find that it represents exactly the dispute between
Aristotle and ourselves. We, the followers of Moses, our Teacher, and
of Abraham, our Father, believe that the Universe has been produced and
has developed in a certain manner, and that it has been created in a
certain order. The Aristotelians oppose us, and found their objections
on the properties which the things in the Universe possess when in
actual existence and fully developed. We admit the existence of these
properties, but hold that they are by no means the same as those which
the things possessed in the moment of their production; and we hold
that these properties themselves have come into existence from absolute
non-existence. Their arguments are therefore no objection whatever to
our theory; they have demonstrative force only against those who hold
that the nature of things as at present in existence proves the
Creation. But this is not my opinion.
I will now return to our theme, viz., to the description of the
principal proofs of Aristotle, and show that they prove nothing
whatever against us, since we hold that God brought the entire Universe
into existence from absolute non-existence, and that He caused it to
develop into the present state. Aristotle says that the materia prima
is eternal, and by referring to the properties of transient beings he
attempts to prove this statement, and to show that the materia prima
could not possibly have been produced. He is right; we do not maintain
that the materia prima has been produced in the same manner as man is
produced from the ovum, and that it can be destroyed in the same manner
as man is reduced to dust. But we believe that God created it from
nothing, and that since its creation it has its own properties, viz.,
that all things are produced of it and again reduced to it, when they
cease to exist; that it does not exist without Form; and that it is the
source of all genesis and destruction. Its genesis is not like that of
the things produced from it, nor its destruction like theirs; for it
has been created from nothing, and if it should please the Creator, He
might reduce it to absolutely nothing. The same applies to motion.
Aristotle founds some of his proofs on the fact that motion is not
subject to genesis or destruction. This is correct; if we consider
motion as it exists at present, we cannot imagine that in its totality
it should be subject, like individual motions, to genesis and
destruction. In like manner Aristotle is correct in saying that
circular motion is without beginning, in so far as seeing the rotating
spherical body in actual existence, we cannot conceive the idea that
that rotation has ever been absent. The same argument we employ as
regards the law that a state of potentiality precedes all actual
genesis. This law applies to the Universe as it exists at present, when
everything produced originates in another thing; but nothing perceived
with our senses or comprehended in our mind can prove that a thing
created from nothing must have been previously in a state of
potentiality. Again, as regards the theory that the heavens contain no
opposites [and are therefore indestructible], we admit its correctness;
but we do not maintain that the production of the heavens has taken
place in the same way as that of a horse or ass, and we do not say that
they are like plants and animals, which are destructible on account of
the opposite elements they contain. In short, the properties of things
when fully developed contain no clue as to what have been the
properties of the things before their perfection. We therefore do not
reject as impossible the opinion of those who say that the heavens were
produced before the earth, or the reverse, or that the heavens have
existed without stars, or that certain species of animals have been in
existence, and others not. For the state of the whole Universe when it
came into existence may be compared with that of animals when their
existence begins; the heart evidently precedes the testicles, the veins
are in existence before the bones; although, when the animal is fully
developed, none of the parts is missing which is essential to its
existence. This remark is not superfluous, if the Scriptural account of
the Creation be taken literally; in reality, it cannot be taken
literally, as will be shown when we shall treat of this subject.
The principle laid down in the foregoing must be well understood; it is
a high rampart erected round the Law, and able to resist all missiles
directed against it. Aristotle, or rather his followers, may perhaps
ask us how we know that the Universe has been created; and that other
forces than those it has at present were acting in its Creation, since
we hold that the properties of the Universe, as it exists at present,
prove nothing as regards its creation? We reply, there is no necessity
for this according to our plan; for we do not desire to prove the
Creation, but only its possibility; and this possibility is not refuted
by arguments based on the nature of the present Universe, which we do
not dispute. When we have established the admissibility of our theory,
we shall then show its superiority. In attempting to prove the
inadmissibility of Creatio ex nihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore
not derive any support from the nature of the Universe; they must
resort to the notion our mind has formed of God. Their proofs include
the three methods which I have mentioned above, and which are based on
the notion conceived of God. In the next chapter I will expose the weak
points of these arguments, and show that they really prove nothing.
CHAPTER XVIII
The first method employed by the philosophers is this: they assume that
a transition from potentiality to actuality would take place in the
Deity itself, if He produced a thing only at a certain fixed time. The
refutation of this argument is very easy. The argument applies only to
bodies composed of substance—the element that possesses the possibility
[of change]—and form; for when such a body does not act for some time,
and then acts by virtue of its form, it must undoubtedly have possessed
something in potentia that hath now become actual, and the transition
can only have been effected by some external agent. As far as corporeal
bodies are concerned, this has been fully proved. But that which is
incorporeal and without substance does not include anything merely
possible; everything it contains is always in existence. The above
argument does not apply to it, and it is not impossible that such a
being acts at one time and does not act at another. This does not imply
a change in the incorporeal being itself nor a transition from
potentiality to actuality. The Active Intellect may be taken as an
illustration. According to Aristotle and his school, the Active
Intellect, an incorporeal being, acts at one time and does not act at
another, as has been shown by Abu-nasr in his treatise on the
Intellect. He says there quite correctly as follows: “It is an evident
fact that the Active Intellect does not act continually, but only at
times.” And yet he does not say that the Active Intellect is
changeable, or passes from a state of potentiality to that of
actuality, although it produces at one time something which it has not
produced before. For there is no relation or comparison whatever
between corporeal and incorporeal beings, neither in the moment of
action nor in that of inaction. It is only by homonymity that the term
“action” is used in reference to the forms residing in bodies, and also
in reference to absolutely spiritual beings. The circumstance that a
purely spiritual being does not effect at one time that which it
effects at another, does not necessitate a transition from potentiality
to actuality; such a transition is necessary in the case of forces
connected with bodies. It might, perhaps, be objected that our argument
is, to some extent, a fallacy; since it is not due to anything
contained in the Active Intellect itself, but to the absence of
substances sufficiently prepared for its action, that at times it does
not act; it does act always when substances sufficiently prepared are
present, and, when the action does not continue, it is owing to the
absence of substance sufficiently prepared, and not to any change in
the Intellect. I answer that it is not our intention to state the
reason why God created at one time and not at another; and, in
referring to the Active Intellect as a parallel, we do not mean to
assert that God acts at one time and not at another, in the same manner
as the Active Intellect, an absolutely spiritual being, acts
intermittently. We do not make this assertion, and, if we did, the
conclusion would be fallacious. What we infer, and what we are
justified in inferring, is this: the Active Intellect is neither a
corporeal object nor a force residing in a body; it acts
intermittently, and yet whatever the cause may be why it does not
always act, we do not say that the Active Intellect has passed from a
state of potentiality to that of actuality; or that it implies the
possibility [of change], or that an agent must exist that causes the
transition from potentiality to actuality. We have thus refuted the
strong objection raised by those who believe in the Eternity of the
Universe; since we believe that God is neither a corporeal body nor a
force residing in a body, we need not assume that the Creation, after a
period of inaction, is due to a change in the Creator Himself.
The second method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is
based on the theory that all wants, changes, and obstacles are absent
from the Essence of God. Our refutation of this proof, which is both
difficult and profound, is this. Every being that is endowed with free
will and performs certain acts in reference to another being,
necessarily interrupts those acts at one time or another, in
consequence of some obstacles or changes. E.g., a person desires to
have a house, but he does not build one, because he meets with some
obstacles: he has not the material, or he has the material, but it is
not prepared for the purpose on account of the absence of proper
instruments; or he has material and instruments, and yet does not build
a house, because he does not desire to build it; since he feels no want
for a refuge. When changed circumstances, as heat or cold, impel him to
seek a refuge, then he desires to build a house. Thus changed
circumstances change his will, and the will, when it meets with
obstacles, is not carried into effect. This, however, is only the case
when the causes of the actions are external; but when the action has no
other purpose whatever than to fulfil the will, then the will does not
depend on the existence of favourable circumstances. The being endowed
with this will need not act continually even in the absence of all
obstacles, because there does not exist anything for the sake of which
it acts, and which, in the absence of all obstacles, would necessitate
the action: the act simply follows the will. But, some might ask, even
if we admit the correctness of all this, is not change imputed in the
fact that the will of the being exists at one time and not at another?
I reply thus: The true essence of the will of a being is simply the
faculty of conceiving a desire at one time and not conceiving it at
another. In the case of corporeal beings, the will which aims at a
certain external object changes according to obstacles and
circumstances. But the will of an absolutely spiritual being which does
not depend on external causes is unchangeable, and the fact that the
being desires one thing one day and another thing another day, does not
imply a change in the essence of that being, or necessitate the
existence of an external cause [for this change in the desire].
Similarly it has been shown by us that if a being acted at one time and
did not act at another, this would not involve a change in the being
itself. It is now clear that the term “will” is homonymously used of
man’s will and of the will of God, there being no comparison whatever
between God’s will and that of man. The objection is refuted, and our
theory is not shaken by it. This is all we desire to establish.
The third method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is
this: whatever the wisdom of God finds necessary to produce is produced
eo ipso; but this wisdom, being His Essence, is eternal, and that which
results from His wisdom must be eternal. This is a very weak argument.
As we do not understand why the wisdom of God produced nine spheres,
neither more nor less, or why He fixed the number and size of the stars
exactly as they are; so we cannot understand why His wisdom at a
certain time caused the Universe to exist, whilst a short time before
it had not been in existence. All things owe their existence to His
eternal and constant wisdom, but we are utterly ignorant of the ways
and methods of that wisdom, since, according to our opinion [that God
has no attributes], His will is identical with His wisdom, and all His
attributes are one and the same thing, namely, His Essence or Wisdom.
More will be said on this question in the section on Providence. Thus
this objection to our theory falls likewise to the ground.
There is no evidence for the theory of the Eternity of the Universe,
neither in the fact cited by Aristotle of the general consent of the
ancient peoples when they describe the heavens as the habitation of the
angels and of God, nor in the apparent concurrence of Scriptural texts
with this belief. These facts merely prove that the heavens lead us to
believe in the existence of the Intelligences, i.e., ideals and angels,
and that these lead us to believe in the existence of God; for He sets
them in motion, and rules them. We will explain and show that there is
no better evidence for the existence of a Creator, as we believe, than
that furnished by the heavens; but also according to the opinion of the
philosophers, as has been mentioned by us, they give evidence that a
being exists that sets them in motion, and that this being is neither a
corporeal body nor a force residing in a body.
Having proved that our theory is admissible, and not impossible, as
those who defend the Eternity of the Universe assert, I will, in the
chapters which follow, show that our theory is preferable from a
philosophical point of view, and expose the absurdities implied in the
theory of Aristotle.
CHAPTER XIX
It has been shown that according to Aristotle, and according to all
that defend his theory, the Universe is inseparable from God; He is the
cause, and the Universe the effect; and this effect is a necessary one;
and as it cannot be explained why or how God exists in this particular
manner, namely, being One and incorporeal, so it cannot be asked
concerning the whole Universe why or how it exists in this particular
way. For it is necessary that the whole, the cause as well as the
effect, exist in this particular manner, it is impossible for them not
to exist, or to be different from what they actually are. This leads to
the conclusion that the nature of everything remains constant, that
nothing changes its nature in any way, and that such a change is
impossible in any existing thing. It would also follow that the
Universe is not the result of design, choice, and desire; for if this
were the case, they would have been non-existing before the design had
been conceived.
We, however, hold that all things in the Universe are the result of
design, and not merely of necessity; He who designed them may change
them when He changes His design. But not every design is subject to
change; for there are things which are impossible, and their nature
cannot be altered, as will be explained. Here, in this chapter, I
merely wish to show by arguments almost as forcible as real proofs,
that the Universe gives evidence of design; but I will not fall into
the error in which the Mutakallemim have so much distinguished
themselves, namely, of ignoring the existing nature of things or
assuming the existence of atoms, or the successive creation of
accidents, or any of their propositions which I have tried to explain,
and which are intended to establish the principle of Divine selection.
You must not, however, think that they understood the principle in the
same sense as we do, although they undoubtedly aimed at the same thing,
and mentioned the same things which we also will mention, when they
treated of Divine Selection. For they do not distinguish between
selection in the case of a plant to make it red and not white, or sweet
and not bitter, and determination in the case of the heavens which gave
them their peculiar geometrical form and did not give them a triangular
or quadrilateral shape. The Mutakallemim established the principle of
determination by means of their propositions, which have been
enumerated above (Part I., chap. lxxiii.). I will establish this
principle only as far as necessary, and only by philosophical
propositions based on the nature of things. But before I begin my
argument, I will state the following facts: Matter is common to things
different from each other; there must be either one external cause
which endows this matter partly with one property, partly with another,
or there must be as many different causes as there are different forms
of the matter common to all things. This is admitted by those who
assume the Eternity of the Universe. After having premised this
proposition, I will proceed with the discussion of our theme from an
Aristotelian point of view, in form of a dialogue.
We.—You have proved that all things in the sublunary world have one
common substance; why then do the species of things vary? why are the
individuals in each species different from each other?
Aristotelian.—Because the composition of the things formed of that
substance varies. For the common substance at first received four
different forms, and each form was endowed with two qualities, and
through these four qualities the substance was turned into the elements
of which all things are formed. The composition of the elements takes
place in the following manner:—First they are mixed in consequence of
the motion of the spheres, and then they combine together; a cause for
variation arises then in the variation of the degree of heat, cold,
moisture, and dryness of the elements which form the constituent parts
of the things. By these different combinations things are variously
predisposed to receive different forms; and these in their turn are
again prepared to receive other forms, and so on. Each generic form
finds a wide sphere in its substance both as regards quality and
quantity; and the individuals of the classes vary accordingly. This is
fully explained in Natural Science. It is quite correct and clear to
every one that readily acknowledges the truth, and does not wish to
deceive himself.
We.—Since the combination of the elements prepares substances and
enables them to receive different forms, what has prepared the first
substance and caused one part of it to receive the form of fire,
another part the form of earth, and the parts between these two the
forms of water and of air, since one substance is common to all?
Through what has the substance of earth become more fit for the form of
earth, and the substance of fire more fit for that of fire?
Ar.—The difference of the elements was caused by their different
position; for the different places prepared the same substance
differently, in the following way: the portion nearest the surrounding
sphere became more rarified and swifter in motion, and thus approaching
the nature of that sphere, it received by this preparation the form of
fire. The farther the substance is away from the surrounding sphere
towards the centre, the denser, the more solid, and the less luminous
it is; it becomes earth; the same is the cause of the formation of
water and air. This is necessarily so; for it would be absurd to deny
that each part of the substance is in a certain place; or to assume
that the surface is identical with the centre, or the centre with the
surface. This difference in place determined the different forms, i.e.,
predisposed the substance to receive different forms.
We.—Is the substance of the surrounding sphere, i.e., the heavens, the
same as that of the elements?
Ar.—No; the substance is different, and the forms are different. The
term “body” is homonymously used of these bodies below and of the
heavens, as has been shown by modern philosophers. All this has been
demonstrated by proof.
But let now the reader of this treatise hear what I have to say.
Aristotle has proved that the difference of forms becomes evident by
the difference of actions. Since, therefore, the motion of the elements
is rectilinear, and that of the spheres circular, we infer that the
substances are different. This inference is supported by Natural
Science. When we further notice that substances with rectilinear motion
differ in their directions, that some move upward, some downward, and
that substances which move in the same direction have different
velocities, we infer that their forms must be different. Thus we learn
that there are four elements. In the same way we come to the conclusion
that the substance of all the spheres is the same, since they all have
circular motion. Their forms, however, are different, since one sphere
moves from east to west, and another from west to east; and their
motions have also different velocities. We can now put the following
question to Aristotle: There is one substance common to all spheres;
each one has its own peculiar form. Who thus determined and predisposed
these spheres to receive different forms? Is there above the spheres
any being capable of determining this except God? I will show the
profundity and the extraordinary acumen which Aristotle displayed when
this question troubled him. He strove very hard to meet this objection
with arguments, which, however, were not borne out by facts. Although
he does not mention this objection, it is clear from his words that he
endeavours to show the nature of the spheres, as he has shown that of
the things in the sublunary world. Everything is, according to him, the
result of a law of Nature, and not the result of the design of a being
that designs as it likes, or the determination of a being that
determines as it pleases. He has not carried out the idea consistently,
and it will never be done. He tries indeed to find the cause why the
sphere moves from east and not from west; why some spheres move with
greater velocity, others with less velocity, and he finds the cause of
these differences in their different positions in reference to the
uppermost sphere. He further attempts to show why there are several
spheres for each of the seven planets, while there is only one sphere
for the large number of fixed stars. For all this he endeavours to
state the reason, so as to show that the whole order is the necessary
result of the laws of Nature. He has not attained his object. For as
regards the things in the sublunary world, his explanations are in
accordance with facts, and the relation between cause and effect is
clearly shown. It can therefore be assumed that everything is the
necessary result of the motions and influences of the spheres. But when
he treats of the properties of the spheres, he does not clearly show
the causal relation, nor does he explain the phenomena in that
systematic way which the hypothesis of natural laws would demand. For
let us consider the spheres: in one case a sphere with greater velocity
is above a sphere with less velocity, in another case we notice the
reverse; in a third case there are two spheres with equal velocities,
one above the other. There are, besides, other phenomena which speak
strongly against the hypothesis that all is regulated by the laws of
Nature, and I will devote a special chapter to the discussion of these
phenomena. In short, there is no doubt that Aristotle knew the weakness
of his arguments in tracing and describing the cause of all these
things, and therefore he prefaces his researches on these things as
follows:—“We will now thoroughly investigate two problems, which it is
our proper duty to investigate and to discuss according to our
capacity, wisdom, and opinion. This our attempt must not be attributed
to presumption and pride, but to our extraordinary zeal in the study of
philosophy; when we attempt the highest and grandest problems, and
endeavour to offer some proper solution, every one that hears it should
rejoice and be pleased.” So far Aristotle. This shows that he
undoubtedly knew the weakness of his theory. How much weaker must it
appear when we bear in mind that the science of Astronomy was not yet
fully developed, and that in the days of Aristotle the motions of the
spheres were not known so well as they are at present. I think that it
was the object of Aristotle in attributing in his Metaphysics one
Intelligence to every sphere, to assume the existence of something
capable of determining the peculiar course of each sphere. Later on I
will show that he has not gained anything thereby; but now I will
explain the words, “according to our capacity, wisdom, and opinion,”
occurring in the passage which we quoted. I have not noticed that any
of the commentators explain them. The term “our opinion” refers to the
principle that everything is the result of natural laws, or to the
theory of the Eternity of the Universe. By “our wisdom” he meant the
knowledge of that which is clear and generally accepted, viz., that the
existence of every one of these things is due to a certain cause, and
not to chance. By “our capacity” he meant the insufficiency of our
intellect to find the causes of all these things. He only intended to
trace the causes for a few of them; and so he did. For he gives an
excellent reason why the sphere of the fixed stars moves slowly, while
the other spheres move with greater velocity, namely, because its
motion is in a different direction [from the uppermost sphere]. He
further says that the more distant a sphere is from the eighth sphere
the greater is its velocity. But this rule does not hold good in all
cases, as I have already explained (p. 174). More forcible still is the
following objection: There are spheres below the eighth that move from
east to west. Of these each upper one, according to this rule, would
have a greater velocity than the lower one; and the velocity of these
spheres would almost equal that of the ninth sphere. But Astronomy had,
in the days of Aristotle, not yet developed to the height it has
reached at present.
According to our theory of the Creation, all this can easily be
explained; for we say that there is a being that determines the
direction and the velocity of the motion of each sphere; but we do not
know the reason why the wisdom of that being gave to each sphere its
peculiar property. If Aristotle had been able to state the cause of the
difference in the motion of the spheres, and show that it corresponded
as he thought to their relative positions, this would have been
excellent, and the variety in their motions would be explained in the
same way as the variety of the elements, by their relative position
between the centre and the surface; but this is not the case, as I said
before.
There is a phenomenon in the spheres which more clearly shows the
existence of voluntary determination; it cannot be explained otherwise
than by assuming that some being designed it: this phenomenon is the
existence of the stars. The fact that the sphere is constantly in
motion, while the stars remain stationary, indicates that the substance
of the stars is different from that of the spheres. Abu-nasr has
already mentioned the fact in his additions to the Physics of
Aristotle. He says: “There is a difference between the stars and the
spheres; for the spheres are transparent, the stars are opaque; and the
cause of this is that there is a difference, however small it may be,
between their substances and forms.” So far Abu-nasr. But I do not say
that there is a small difference, but a very great difference; because
I do not infer it from the transparency of the spheres, but from their
motions. I am convinced that there are three different kinds of
substance, with three different forms, namely:—(1) Bodies which never
move of their own accord; such are the bodies of the stars; (2) bodies
which always move, such are the bodies of the spheres; (3) bodies which
both move and rest, such are the elements. Now, I ask, what has united
these two bodies, which, according to my opinion, differ very much from
each other, though, according to Abu-nasr, only a little? Who has
prepared the bodies for this union? In short, it would be strange that,
without the existence of design, one of two different bodies should be
joined to the other in such a manner that it is fixed to it in a
certain place but does not combine with it. It is still more difficult
to explain the existence of the numerous stars in the eighth sphere;
they are all spherical; some of them are large, some small; here we
notice two stars apparently distant from each other one cubit; there a
group of ten close together; whilst in another place there is a large
space without any star. What determined that the one small part should
have ten stars, and the other portion should be without any star? and
the whole body of the sphere being uniform throughout, why should a
particular star occupy the one place and not another? The answer to
these and similar questions is very difficult, and almost impossible,
if we assume that all emanates from God as the necessary result of
certain permanent laws, as Aristotle holds. But if we assume that all
this is the result of design, there is nothing strange or improbable;
and the only question to be asked is this: What is the cause of this
design? The answer to this question is that all this has been made for
a certain purpose, though we do not know it; there is nothing that is
done in vain, or by chance. It is well known that the veins and nerves
of an individual dog or ass are not the result of chance; their
magnitude is not determined by chance; nor is it by chance, but for a
certain purpose, that one vein is thick, another thin; that one nerve
has many branches, another has none; that one goes down straight,
whilst another is bent; it is well known that all this must be just as
it is. How, then, can any reasonable person imagine that the position,
magnitude, and number of the stars, or the various courses of their
spheres, are purposeless, or the result of chance? There is no doubt
that every one of these things is necessary and in accordance with a
certain design; and it is extremely improbable that these things should
be the necessary result of natural laws, and not that of design.
The best proof for design in the Universe I find in the different
motions of the spheres, and in the fixed position of the stars in the
spheres. For this reason you find all the prophets point to the spheres
and stars when they want to prove that there must exist a Divine Being.
Thus Abraham reflected on the stars, as is well known; Isaiah (xl. 26)
exhorts to learn from them the existence of God, and says, “Lift up
your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things?” Jeremiah
[calls God] “The Maker of the heavens”; Abraham calls Him “The God of
the heavens” (Gen. xxiv. 7); [Moses], the chief of the Prophets, uses
the phrase explained by us (Part I., chap, lxx.), “He who rideth on the
heavens” (Deut. xxxiii. 26). The proof taken from the heavens is
convincing; for the variety of things in the sublunary world, though
their substance is one and the same, can be explained as the work of
the influences of the spheres, or the result of the variety in the
position of the substance in relation to the spheres, as has been shown
by Aristotle. But who has determined the variety in the spheres and the
stars, if not the Will of God? To say that the Intelligences have
determined it is of no use whatever; for the Intelligences are not
corporeal, and have no local relation to the spheres. Why then should
the one sphere in its desire to approach the Intelligence, move
eastward, and another westward? Is the one Intelligence in the east,
the other in the west? or why does one move with great velocity,
another slowly? This difference is not in accordance with their
distances from each other, as is well known. We must then say that the
nature and essence of each sphere necessitated its motion in a certain
direction, and in a certain manner, as the consequence of its desire to
approach its Intelligence. Aristotle clearly expresses this opinion. We
thus have returned to the part from which we started; and we ask, Since
the substance of all things is the same, what made the nature of one
portion different from another? Why has this sphere a desire which
produces a motion different from that which the desire of another
sphere produces? This must have been done by an agent capable of
determining. We have thus been brought to examine two questions:—(1) Is
it necessary to assume that the variety of the things in the Universe
is the result of Design, and not of fixed laws of Nature, or is it not
necessary? (2) Assuming that all this is the result of Design, does it
follow that it has been created after not having existed, or does
Creatio ex nihilo not follow, and has the Being which has determined
all this done always so? Some of those who believe in the Eternity of
the Universe hold the last opinion. I will now begin the examination of
these two questions, and explain them as much as necessary in the
following chapters.
CHAPTER XX
According to Aristotle, none of the products of Nature are due to
chance. His proof is this: That which is due to chance does not
reappear constantly nor frequently, but all products of Nature reappear
either constantly or at least frequently. The heavens, with all that
they contain, are constant; they never change, as has been explained,
neither as regards their essence nor as regards their place. But in the
sublunary world we find both things which are constant and things which
reappear frequently [though not constantly]. Thus, e.g., the heat of
fire and the downward tendency of a stone are constant properties,
whilst the form and life of the individuals in each species are the
same in most cases. All this is clear. If the parts of the Universe are
not accidental, how can the whole Universe be considered as the result
of chance? Therefore the existence of the Universe is not due to
chance. The following is, in short, the objection which Aristotle
raises against one of the earlier philosophers who assumed that the
Universe is the result of chance, and that it came into existence by
itself, without any cause. Some assume that the heavens and the whole
Universe came into existence spontaneously, as well as the rotation and
motion [of the spheres], which has produced the variety of things and
established their present order. This opinion implies a great
absurdity. They admit that animals and plants do not owe their
existence or production to chance, but to a certain cause, be that
cause Nature, or reason, or the like; e.g., they do not assume that
everything might be formed by chance of a certain seed or semen, but
that of a certain seed only an olive-tree is produced, and of a certain
semen only a human being is developed. And yet they think that the
heavens, and those bodies which appear divine among the rest of bodies,
came into existence spontaneously, without the action of any such cause
as produces plants and animals. Having thus examined this theory,
Aristotle then proceeds to refute it at greater length. It is therefore
clear that Aristotle believes and proves that things in real existence
are not accidental; they cannot be accidental, because they are
essential, i.e., there is a cause which necessitates that they should
be in their actual condition, and on account of that cause they are
just as they in reality are. This has been proved, and it is the
opinion of Aristotle. But I do not think that, according to Aristotle,
the rejection of the spontaneous origin of things implies the admission
of Design and Will. For as it is impossible to reconcile two opposites,
so it is impossible to reconcile the two theories, that of necessary
existence by causality, and that of Creation by the desire and will of
a Creator. For the necessary existence assumed by Aristotle must be
understood in this sense, that for everything that is not the product
of work there must be a certain cause that produces it with its
properties; for this cause there is another cause, and for the second a
third, and so on. The series of causes ends with the Prime Cause, from
which everything derives existence, since it is impossible that the
series should continue ad infinitum. He nevertheless does not mean to
say that the existence of the Universe is the necessary product of the
Creator, i.e., the Prime Cause, in the same manner as the shadow is
caused by a body, or heat by fire, or light by the sun. Only those who
do not comprehend his words attribute such ideas to him. He uses here
the term necessary in the same sense as we use the term when we say
that the existence of the intellectus necessarily implies that of the
intellectum, for the former is the efficient cause of the latter in so
far as intellectum. Even Aristotle holds that the Prime Cause is the
highest and most perfect Intellect; he therefore says that the First
Cause is pleased, satisfied, and delighted with that which necessarily
derives existence from Him, and it is impossible that He should wish it
to be different. But we do not call this “design,” and it has nothing
in common with design. E.g., man is pleased, satisfied, and delighted
that he is endowed with eyes and hands, and it is impossible that he
should desire it to be otherwise, and yet the eyes and hands which a
man has are not the result of his design, and it is not by his own
determination that he has certain properties and is able to perform
certain actions. The notion of design and determination applies only to
things not yet in existence, when there is still the possibility of
their being in accordance with the design or not. I do not know whether
the modern Aristotelians understood his words to imply that the
existence of the Universe presupposes some cause in the sense of design
and determination, or whether, in opposition to him, they assumed
design and determination, in the belief that this does not conflict
with the theory of the Eternity of the Universe.
Having explained this, I will now proceed to examine the opinions of
the modern philosophers.
CHAPTER XXI
Some of the recent philosophers who adhere to the theory of the
Eternity of the Universe hold that God produces the Universe, that He
by His will designs and determines its existence and form; they reject,
however, the theory that this act took place at one certain time, and
assume that this always has been the case, and will always be so. The
circumstance that we cannot imagine an agent otherwise than preceding
the result of its action, they explain by the fact that this is
invariably the case in all that we produce; because for agents of the
same kind as we are, there are some moments in which they are not
active, and are only agents in potentia; they become agents when they
act. But as regards God there are no moments of non-action, or of
potentiality in any respect; He is not before His work, He is always an
actual agent. And as there is a great difference between His essence
and ours, so is also a great difference between the relation of His
work to Him and the relation of our work to us. They apply the same
argument to will and determination; for there is no difference in this
respect whether we say He acts, wills, designs, or determines. They
further assume that change in His action or will is inadmissible. It is
therefore clear that these philosophers abandoned the term “necessary
result,” but retained the theory of it; they perhaps sought to use a
better expression, or to remove an objectionable term. For it is the
same thing, whether we say in accordance with the view of Aristotle
that the Universe is the result of the Prime Cause, and must be eternal
as that Cause is eternal, or in accordance with these philosophers that
the Universe is the result of the act, design, will, selection, and
determination of God, but it has always been so, and will always be so;
in the same manner as the rising of the sun undoubtedly produces the
day, and yet it does not precede it. But when we speak of design we do
not mean it in this sense; we mean to express by it that the Universe
is not the “necessary result” of God’s existence, as the effect is the
necessary result of the efficient cause; in the latter case the effect
cannot be separated from the cause; it cannot change unless the cause
changes entirely, or at least in some respect. If we accept this
explanation we easily see how absurd it is to say that the Universe is
in the same relation to God as the effect is to the efficient cause,
and to assume at the same time that the Universe is the result of the
action and determination of God.
Having fully explained this subject, we come to the question whether
the cause, which must be assumed for the variety of properties noticed
in the heavenly beings, is merely an efficient cause, that must
necessarily produce that variety as its effect, or whether that variety
is due to a determining agent, such as we believe, in accordance with
the theory of Moses our Teacher. Before I discuss this question I will
first explain fully what Aristotle means by “necessary result”; after
that I will show by such philosophical arguments as are free from every
fallacy why I prefer the theory of Creatio ex nihilo. It is clear that
when he says that the first Intelligence is the necessary result of the
existence of God, the second Intelligence the result of the existence
of the first, the third of the second [and so on], and that the spheres
are the necessary result of the existence of the Intelligences, and so
forth, in the well-known order which you learnt from passages dealing
with it, and of which we have given a résumé in this part (ch. iv.)—he
does not mean that the one thing was first in existence, and then the
second came as the necessary result of the first; he denies that any
one of these beings has had a beginning. By “necessary result” he
merely refers to the causal relation; he means to say that the first
Intelligence is the cause of the existence of the second; the second of
the third, and so on to the last of the Intelligences; and the same is
also the case as regards the spheres and the materia prima; none of
these preceded another, or has been in existence without the existence
of that other. We say, e.g., that the necessary result of the primary
qualities are roughness [and] smoothness, hardness [and] softness,
porosity and solidity; and no person doubts that heat, cold, moisture,
and dryness are the causes of smoothness and roughness, of hardness and
softness, porosity and solidity, and similar qualities, and that the
latter are the necessary result of those four primary qualities. And
yet it is impossible that a body should exist with the primary
qualities without the secondary ones; for the relation between the two
sets of qualities is that of causality, not that of agent and its
product. Just in the same way the term “necessary result” is used by
Aristotle in reference to the whole Universe, when he says that one
portion is the result of the other, and continues the series up to the
First Cause as he calls it, or first Intellect, if you prefer this
term. For we all mean the same, only with this difference, that
according to Aristotle everything besides that Being is the necessary
result of the latter, as I have already mentioned; whilst, according to
our opinion, that Being created the whole Universe with design and
will, so that the Universe which had not been in existence before, has
by His will come into existence. I will now begin in the following
chapters my proofs for the superiority of our theory, that of Creatio
ex nihilo.
CHAPTER XXII
Aristotle and all philosophers assume as an axiom that a simple element
can only produce one simple thing, whilst a compound can produce as
many things as it contains simple elements; e.g., fire combines in
itself two properties, heat and dryness; it gives heat by the one
property, and produces dryness by the other: an object composed of
matter and form produces certain things on account of its matter, and
others on account of its form, if [both matter and form] consist of
several elements. In accordance with this axiom, Aristotle holds that
the direct emanation from God must be one simple Intelligence, and
nothing else.
A second axiom assumed by him is this: Things are not produced by other
things at random; there must be some relation between cause and effect.
Thus accidents are not produced by accidents promiscuously; quality
cannot be the origin of quantity, nor quantity that of quality; a form
cannot emanate from matter, nor matter from form.
A third axiom is this: A single agent that acts with design and will,
and not merely by the force of the laws of Nature, can produce
different objects.
A fourth axiom is as follows: An object, whose several elements are
only connected by juxtaposition, is more properly a compound than an
object whose different elements have entirely combined; e.g., bone,
flesh, veins, or nerves, are more simple than the hand or the foot,
that are a combination of bone, flesh, veins, and nerves. This is very
clear, and requires no further explanation.
Having premised these axioms, I ask the following question: Aristotle
holds that the first Intelligence is the cause of the second, the
second of the third, and so on, till the thousandth, if we assume a
series of that number. Now the first Intellect is undoubtedly simple.
How then can the compound form of existing things come from such an
Intellect by fixed laws of Nature, as Aristotle assumes? We admit all
he said concerning the Intelligences, that the further they are away
from the first, the greater is the variety of their compounds, in
consequence of the larger number of the objects comprehensible by the
Intelligences; but even after admitting this, the question remains, By
what law of Nature did the spheres emanate from the Intelligences? What
relation is there between material and immaterial beings? Suppose we
admit that each sphere emanates from an Intelligence of the form
mentioned; that the Intelligence, including, as it were, two elements,
in so far as it comprehends itself and another thing, produces the next
Intelligence by the one element, and a sphere by the other; but the
question would then be, how the one simple element could produce the
sphere, that contains two substances and two forms, namely, the
substance and the form of the sphere, and also the substance and the
form of the star fixed in that sphere. For, according to the laws of
Nature, the compound can only emanate from a compound. There must
therefore be one element, from which the body of the sphere emanates,
and another element, from which the body of the star emanates. This
would be necessary even if the substance of all stars were the same;
but it is possible that the luminous stars have not the same substance
as the non-luminous stars; it is besides well known that each body has
its own matter and its own form. It must now be clear that this
emanation could not have taken place by the force of the laws of
Nature, as Aristotle contends. Nor does the difference of the motions
of the spheres follow the order of their positions; and therefore it
cannot be said that this difference is the result of certain laws of
Nature. We have already mentioned this (ch. xix.).
There is in the properties of the spheres another circumstance that is
opposed to the assumed laws of Nature; namely, if the substance of all
spheres is the same, why does it not occur that the form of one sphere
combines with the substance of another sphere, as is the case with
things on earth, simply because their substance is fit [for such
changes]? If the substance of all spheres is the same, if it is not
assumed that each of them has a peculiar substance, and if, contrary to
all principles, the peculiar motion of each sphere is no evidence for
the special character of its substance, why then should a certain form
constantly remain united with a certain substance? Again, if the stars
have all one substance, by what are they distinguished from each other?
is it by forms? or by accidents? Whichever be the case, the forms or
the accidents would interchange, so that they would successively unite
with every one of the stars, so long as their substance [being the
same] admits the combinations [with every one of the forms or the
accidents]. This shows that the term substance, when used of the
spheres or the stars, does not mean the same as it signifies when used
of the substance of earthly things, but is applied to the two
synonymously. It further shows that every one of the bodies of the
spheres has its own peculiar form of existence different from that of
all other beings. Why then is circular motion common to all spheres,
and why is the fixed position of the stars in their respective spheres
common to all stars? If we, however, assume design and determination of
a Creator, in accordance with His incomprehensible wisdom, all these
difficulties disappear. They must arise when we consider the whole
Universe, not as the result of free will, but as the result of fixed
laws of Nature: a theory which, on the one hand, is not in harmony with
the existing order of things, and does not offer for it a sufficient
reason or argument; and, on the other hand, implies many and great
improbabilities. For, according to this theory, God, whose perfection
in every respect is recognised by all thinking persons, is in such a
relation to the Universe that He cannot change anything; if He wished
to make the wing of a fly longer, or to reduce the number of the legs
of a worm by one, He could not accomplish it. According to Aristotle,
He does not try such a thing, and it is wholly impossible for Him to
desire any change in the existing order of things; if He could, it
would not increase His perfection; it might, on the contrary, from some
point of view, diminish it.
Although I know that many partial critics will ascribe my opinion
concerning the theory of Aristotle to insufficient understanding, or to
intentional opposition, I will not refrain from stating in short the
results of my researches, however poor my capacities may be. I hold
that the theory of Aristotle is undoubtedly correct as far as the
things are concerned which exist between the sphere of the moon and the
centre of the earth. Only an ignorant person rejects it, or a person
with preconceived opinions of his own, which he desires to maintain and
to defend, and which lead him to ignore clear facts. But what Aristotle
says concerning things above the sphere of the moon is, with few
exceptions, mere imagination and opinion; to a still greater extent
this applies to his system of Intelligences, and to some of his
metaphysical views; they include great improbabilities, [promote] ideas
which all nations consider as evidently corrupt, and cause views to
spread which cannot be proved.
It may perhaps be asked why I have enumerated the doubts which can be
raised against the theory of Aristotle; whether by mere doubts a theory
can be overthrown, or its opposite established? This is certainly not
the case. But we treat this philosopher exactly as his followers tell
us to do. For Alexander stated that when a theory cannot be established
by proof, the two most opposite views should be compared as to the
doubts entertained concerning each of them, and that view which admits
of fewer doubts should be accepted. Alexander further says that this
rule applies to all those opinions of Aristotle in Metaphysics for
which he offered no proof. For those that followed Aristotle believed
that his opinions are far less subject to doubt than any other opinion.
We follow the same rule. Being convinced that the question whether the
heavens are eternal or not cannot be decided by proof, neither in the
affirmative nor in the negative, we have enumerated the objections
raised to either view, and shown how the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe is subject to stronger objections, and is more apt to corrupt
the notions concerning God [than the other]. Another argument can be
drawn from the fact that the theory of the Creation was held by our
Father Abraham, and by our Teacher Moses.
Having mentioned the method of testing the two theories by the
objections raised against them, I find it necessary to give some
further explanation of the subject.
CHAPTER XXIII
In comparing the objections raised against one theory with those raised
against the opposite theory, in order to decide in favour of the least
objectionable, we must not consider the number of the objections, but
the degree of improbability and of deviation from real facts [pointed
out by the objections]; for one objection may sometimes have more
weight than a thousand others. But the comparison cannot be trustworthy
unless the two theories be considered with the same interest, and if
you are predisposed in favour of one of them, be it on account of your
training or because of some advantage, you are too blind to see the
truth. For that which can be demonstrated you cannot reject, however
much you may be inclined against it; but in questions like those under
consideration you are apt to dispute [in consequence of your
inclination]. You will, however, be able to decide the question, as far
as necessary, if you free yourself from passions, ignore customs, and
follow only your reason. But many are the conditions which must be
fulfilled. First you must know your mental capacities and your natural
talents; you will find this out when you study all mathematical
sciences, and are well acquainted with Logic. Secondly, you must have a
thorough knowledge of Natural Science, that you may be able to
understand the nature of the objections. Thirdly, you must be morally
good. For if a person is voluptuous or passionate, and, loosening the
reins, allows his anger to pass the just limits, it makes no difference
whether he is so from nature or from habit, he will blunder and stumble
in his way, he will seek the theory which is in accordance with his
inclinations. I mention this lest you be deceived; for a person might
some day, by some objection which he raises, shake your belief in the
theory of the Creation, and then easily mislead you; you would then
adopt the theory [of the Eternity of the Universe] which is contrary to
the fundamental principles of our religion, and leads to “speaking
words that turn away from God.” You must rather have suspicion against
your own reason, and accept the theory taught by two prophets who have
bid the foundation for the existing order in the religious and social
relations of mankind. Only demonstrative proof should be able to make
you abandon the theory of the Creation; but such a proof does not exist
in Nature.
You will not find it strange that I introduce into this discussion
historical matter in support of the theory of the Creation, seeing that
Aristotle, the greatest philosopher, in his principal works, introduces
histories in support of the theory of the Eternity of the Universe. In
this regard we may justly quote the saying: “Should not our perfect Law
be as good as their gossip?” (B. T. Baba batra, 115 b). When he
supports his view by quoting Sabean stories, why should we not support
our view by that which Moses and Abraham said, and that which follows
from their words?
I have before promised to describe in a separate chapter the strong
objections which must occur to him who thinks that human wisdom
comprehends fully the nature of the spheres and their motions; that
these are subject to fixed laws, and capable of being comprehended as
regards order and relation. I will now explain this.
CHAPTER XXIV
You know of Astronomy as much as you have studied with me, and learnt
from the book Almagest; we had not sufficient time to go beyond this.
The theory that [the spheres] move regularly, and that the assumed
courses of the stars are in harmony with observation, depends, as you
are aware, on two hypotheses: we must assume either epicycles, or
excentric spheres, or a combination of both. Now I will show that each
of these two hypotheses is irregular, and totally contrary to the
results of Natural Science. Let us first consider an epicycle, such as
has been assumed in the spheres of the moon and the five planets,
rotating on a sphere, but not round the centre of the sphere that
carries it. This arrangement would necessarily produce a revolving
motion; the epicycle would then revolve, and entirely change its place;
but that anything in the spheres should change its place is exactly
what Aristotle considers impossible. For that reason Abu-bekr
ibn-Alzaig, in an astronomical treatise which he wrote, rejects the
existence of epicycles. Besides this impossibility, he mentions others,
showing that the theory of epicycles implies other absurd notions. I
will here explain them:—(1) It is absurd to assume that the revolution
of a cycle has not the centre of the Universe for its centre; for it is
a fundamental principle in the order of the Universe that there are
only three kinds of motion—from the centre, towards the centre, and
round the centre; but an epicycle does not move away from the centre,
nor towards it, nor round it. (2) Again, according to what Aristotle
explains in Natural Science, there must be something fixed round which
the motion takes place; this is the reason why the earth remains
stationary. But the epicycle would move round a centre which is not
stationary. I have heard that Abu-bekr discovered a system in which no
epicycles occur; but excentric spheres are not excluded by him. I have
not heard it from his pupils; and even if it be correct that he
discovered such a system, he has not gained much by it; for
excentricity is likewise as contrary as possible to the principles laid
down by Aristotle. For it seems to me that an excentric sphere does not
move round the centre of the Universe, but round an imaginary point
distant from the centre, and therefore round a point which is not
fixed. A person ignorant of astronomy might think that the motion of
the excentric spheres may still be considered as taking place round
something fixed, since their centre is apparently within the sphere of
the moon. I would admit this if the centre were situated in the region
of fire or air, although the spheres would not move round a stable
point. But I will show that the amount of excentricity has, in a
certain way, been described in the Almagest; and later scholars have
calculated the exact amount of excentricity in terms of radii of the
earth, and have proved the result. The same measure has been used in
astronomy in describing all distances and magnitudes. It has thus been
shown that the point round which the sun moves lies undoubtedly beyond
the sphere of the moon, and below the superficies of the sphere of
Mercury. The centre for the circuit of Mars, that is, the centre of the
excentric sphere of Mars, is beyond the sphere of Mercury, and below
the sphere of Venus. The centre of Jupiter has the same distance; it
lies between the sphere of Venus and that of Mercury, whilst the centre
of Saturn lies between the spheres of Mars and Jupiter. Now, consider
how improbable all this appears according to the laws of Natural
Science. You will find it out when you consider the known distances and
magnitudes of each sphere and each star, all expressed in terms of the
radii of the earth. There is a uniform measure for all, and the
excentricity of each sphere is not determined by units proportionate to
its own magnitude.
It is still more improbable and more objectionable to assume that there
are two spheres, the one within the other; that these are closely
joined from all sides, and have, nevertheless, different centres. For
in this case the smaller sphere might move whilst the larger be at
rest; but the smaller cannot be at rest when the larger moves, and must
move with the larger when the latter rotates round any other axis than
that which passes through the two centres. Now we have this proposition
which can be proved; and, further, the established theory that there is
no vacuum, and also the assumed excentricity of the spheres; from all
this it follows that in every two spheres the motion of the upper one
should cause the lower sphere to move in the same way, and round the
same centre. But this is not the case; the outer and the inner spheres
do not move in the same way, and not round the same centre or the same
axis; each of them has its peculiar motion. For this reason it has been
assumed that between every two spheres there are substances different
from those of the spheres. It may be very much doubted whether this is
the case; for where should the centres of these intermediate substances
be placed? have these substances likewise their own peculiar motion?
Thabith has explained the above-mentioned theory in one of his
treatises, and proved that we must assume a substance of a spherical
form intermediate between one sphere and the other. All this is part of
that which I have not explained to you when you studied with me, for I
was afraid you might become confused and would not understand even
those things which I wished to show you. But as to the inclination and
the deviation assumed in respect to the latitude of the paths of Venus
and Mercury, I have already clearly shown you vivâ voce that it is
impossible to imagine material beings under such conditions. You have
seen that Ptolemy has already pointed out this difficulty. He says as
follows: “Let no one think that these and similar principles are
improbable. If any one considers what we have here expounded in the
same light as he considers things produced by skill and subtle work, he
will find it improbable; but it is not right to compare human things to
divine things.” This is, as you know, what Ptolemy says, and I have
already pointed out to you the passages by which you can verify all I
said, except what I stated about the position of the centres of the
excentric spheres; for I have not heard that any one has paid attention
to this question. But you will understand it when you know the length
of the diameter of each sphere, and the extent of its excentricity in
terms of radii of the earth, according to the facts which Kabici has
established in his treatise on the distances. When you notice these
distances you will confirm my words.
Consider, therefore, how many difficulties arise if we accept the
theory which Aristotle expounds in Physics. For, according to that
theory, there are no epicycles, and no excentric spheres, but all
spheres rotate round the centre of the earth! How then can the
different courses of the stars be explained? how is it possible to
assume a uniform perfect rotation with the phenomena which we perceive,
except by admitting one of the two hypotheses or both of them? The
difficulty is still more apparent when we find that admitting what
Ptolemy said as regards the epicycle of the moon, and its inclination
towards a point different both from the centre of the Universe and from
its own centre, the calculations according to these hypotheses are
perfectly correct, within one minute; that their correctness is
confirmed by the most accurate calculation of the time, duration, and
extent of the eclipses, which is always based on these hypotheses.
Furthermore, how can we reconcile, without assuming the existence of
epicycles, the apparent retrogression of a star with its other motions?
How can rotation or motion take place round a point which is not fixed?
These are real difficulties.
I have explained to you already vivâ voce, that these difficulties do
not concern the astronomer; for he does not profess to tell us the
existing properties of the spheres, but to suggest, whether correctly
or not, a theory in which the motion of the stars is circular and
uniform, and yet in agreement with our observation. You know that
Abu-bekr al-Zaig, in his treatise on Physics, expresses a doubt whether
Aristotle knew the excentricity of the sun but ignored it, and only
discussed the effect of the inclination, because he saw that the effect
of the excentricity was identical with that of the inclination; or
whether he did not perceive it. The truth is that he did not notice it
or hear of it; the science was not perfect in his age. If he had heard
of it, he would have strongly opposed it; if he had been convinced of
its correctness, he would have been greatly embarrassed as regards all
that he said on the question. What I said before (ch. xxii.) I will
repeat now, namely, that the theory of Aristotle, in explaining the
phenomena in the sublunary world, is in accordance with logical
inference; here we know the causal relation between one phenomenon and
another; we see how far science can investigate them, and the
management of nature is clear and intelligible. But of the things in
the heavens man knows nothing except a few mathematical calculations,
and you see how far these go. I say in the words of the poet, “The
heavens are the Lord’s, but the earth He hath given to the sons of man”
(Ps. cxv. 16); that is to say, God alone has a perfect and true
knowledge of the heavens, their nature, their essence, their form,
their motions, and their causes; but He gave man power to know the
things which are under the heavens; here is man’s world, here is his
home, into which he has been placed, and of which he is himself a
portion. This is in reality the truth. For the facts which we require
in proving the existence of heavenly beings are withheld from us; the
heavens are too far from us, and too exalted in place and rank. Man’s
faculties are too deficient to comprehend even the general proof the
heavens contain for the existence of Him who sets them in motion. It is
in fact ignorance or a kind of madness to weary our minds with finding
out things which are beyond our reach, without having the means of
approaching them. We must content ourselves with that which is within
our reach, and that which cannot be approached by logical inference let
us leave to him who has been endowed with that great and divine
influence, expressed in the words: “Mouth to mouth do I speak with Him”
(Num. xii. 8).
This is all I can say on this question; another person may perhaps be
able to establish by proof what appears doubtful to me. It is on
account of my great love of truth that I have shown my embarrassment in
these matters, and I have not heard, nor do I know that any of these
theories have been established by proof.
CHAPTER XXV
We do not reject the Eternity of the Universe, because certain passages
in Scripture confirm the Creation; for such passages are not more
numerous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal being;
nor is it impossible or difficult to find for them a suitable
interpretation. We might have explained them in the same manner as we
did in respect to the Incorporeality of God. We should perhaps have had
an easier task in showing that the Scriptural passages referred to are
in harmony with the theory of the Eternity of the Universe if we
accepted the latter, than we had in explaining the anthropomorphisms in
the Bible when we rejected the idea that God is corporeal. For two
reasons, however, we have not done so, and have not accepted the
Eternity of the Universe. First, the Incorporeality of God has been
demonstrated by proof; those passages in the Bible, which in their
literal sense contain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and
can be interpreted otherwise. But the Eternity of the Universe has not
been proved; a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not
sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text,
and explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be
supported by an equally good argument.
Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary to
any of the fundamental principles of our religion; it is not contrary
to the words of any prophet. Only ignorant people believe that it is
contrary to the teaching of Scripture; but we have shown that this is
not the case; on the contrary, Scripture teaches the Incorporeality of
God. If we were to accept the Eternity of the Universe as taught by
Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws,
that Nature does not change, and that there is nothing supernatural, we
should necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion,
we should disbelieve all miracles and signs, and certainly reject all
hopes and fears derived from Scripture, unless the miracles are also
explained figuratively. The Allegorists amongst the Mohammedans have
done this, and have thereby arrived at absurd conclusions. If, however,
we accepted the Eternity of the Universe in accordance with the second
of the theories which we have expounded above (ch. xxiii.), and
assumed, with Plato, that the heavens are likewise transient, we should
not be in opposition to the fundamental principles of our religion;
this theory would not imply the rejection of miracles, but, on the
contrary, would admit them as possible. The Scriptural text might have
been explained accordingly, and many expressions might have been found
in the Bible and in other writings that would confirm and support this
theory. But there is no necessity for this expedient, so long as the
theory has not been proved. As there is no proof sufficient to convince
us, this theory need not be taken into consideration, nor the other
one; we take the text of the Bible literally, and say that it teaches
us a truth which we cannot prove; and the miracles are evidence for the
correctness of our view.
Accepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, that
Revelation is possible, and that every difficulty in this question is
removed. We might be asked, Why has God inspired a certain person and
not another? why has He revealed the Law to one particular nation, and
at one particular time? why has He commanded this, and forbidden that?
why has He shown through a prophet certain particular miracles? what is
the object of these laws? and why has He not made the commandments and
the prohibitions part of our nature, if it was His object that we
should live in accordance with them? We answer to all these questions:
He willed it so; or, His wisdom decided so. Just as He created the
world according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form, and
as we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decided upon that
peculiar form, and upon that peculiar time, so we do not know why His
will or wisdom determined any of the things mentioned in the preceding
questions. But if we assume that the Universe has the present form as
the result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions;
and these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying
denial and rejection of the Biblical texts, the correctness of which no
intelligent person doubts. Owing to the absence of all proof, we reject
the theory of the Eternity of the Universe; and it is for this very
reason that the noblest minds spent and will spend their days in
research. For if the Creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if
only according to the Platonic hypothesis, all arguments of the
philosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand,
Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the whole teaching of Scripture
would be rejected, and we should be forced to other opinions. I have
thus shown that all depends on this question. Note it.
CHAPTER XXVI
In the famous chapters known as the Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, I find
R. Eliezer the Great saying something more extraordinary than I have
ever seen in the utterances of any believer in the Law of Moses. I mean
the following passage: “Whence were the heavens created? He took part
of the light of His garment, stretched it like a cloth, and thus the
heavens were extending continually, as it is said: He covereth Himself
with light as with a garment, He stretcheth the heavens like a curtain”
(Ps. civ. 2). “Whence was the earth created? He took of the snow under
the throne of glory, and threw it; according to the words: He saith to
the snow, Be thou earth” (Job xxxvii. 6). These are the words given
there; and I, in my surprise, ask, What was the belief of this sage?
did he think that nothing can be produced from nothing, and that a
substance must have existed of which the things were formed? and did he
for this reason ask whence were the heavens and the earth created? What
has he gained by the answer? We might ask him, Whence was the light of
His garment created? or the snow under the throne of His glory? or the
throne of glory itself? If the terms “the light of His garment” and
“the throne of glory” mean something eternal, they must be rejected;
the words would imply an admission of the Eternity of the Universe,
though only in the form taught by Plato. The creation of the throne of
glory is mentioned by our Sages, though in a strange way; for they say
that it has been created before the creation of the Universe.
Scripture, however, does not mention the creation of the throne, except
in the words of David, “The Lord hath established his throne in the
heavens” (Ps. ciii. 19), which words admit of figurative
interpretation; but the eternity of the throne is distinctly described,
“Thou, O Lord, dwellest for ever, thy throne for ever and ever” (Lam.
v. 19). Now, if R. Eliezer had believed that the throne was eternal, so
that the word “throne” expressed an attribute of God, and not something
created, how could anything be produced of a mere attribute? Stranger
still is his expression “of the light of His garment.”
In short, it is a passage that greatly confuses the notions of all
intelligent and religious persons. I am unable to explain it
sufficiently. I quoted it in order that you may not be misled by it.
One important thing R. Eliezer taught us here, that the substance of
the heavens is different from that of the earth; that there are two
different substances: the one is described as belonging to God, being
the light of His garment, on account of its superiority; and the other,
the earthly substance, which is distant from His splendour and light,
as being the snow under the throne of His glory. This led me to explain
the words, “And under his feet as the work of the whiteness of the
sapphire” (Exod. xxiv. 10), as expressing that the nobles of the
children of Israel comprehended in a prophetical vision the nature of
the earthly materia prima. For, according to Onkelos, the pronoun in
the phrase, “His feet” refers to “throne,” as I have shown; this
indicates that the whiteness under the throne signifies the earthly
substance. R. Eliezer has thus repeated the same idea, and told us that
there are two substances—a higher one, and a lower one; and that there
is not one substance common to all things. This is an important
subject, and we must not think light of the opinion which the wisest
men in Israel have held on this point. It concerns an important point
in explaining the existence of the Universe, and one of the mysteries
of the Law. In Bereshit Rabba (chap. xii.) the following passage
occurs: “R. Eliezer says, The things in the heavens have been created
of the heavens, the things on earth of the earth.” Consider how
ingeniously this sage stated that all things on earth have one common
substance; the heavens and the things in them have one substance,
different from the first. He also explains in the Chapters [of R.
Eliezer], in addition to the preceding things, the superiority of the
heavenly substance, and its proximity to God; and, on the other hand,
the inferiority of the earthly substance and its position. Note it.
CHAPTER XXVII
We have already stated that the belief in the Creation is a fundamental
principle of our religion; but we do not consider it a principle of our
faith that the Universe will again be reduced to nothing. It is not
contrary to the tenets of our religion to assume that the Universe will
continue to exist for ever. It might be objected that everything
produced is subject to destruction, as has been shown; consequently the
Universe, having had a beginning, must come to an end. This axiom
cannot be applied according to our views. We do not hold that the
Universe came into existence, like all things in Nature, as the result
of the laws of Nature. For whatever owes its existence to the action of
physical laws is, according to the same laws, subject to destruction:
the same law which caused the existence of a thing after a period of
non-existence, is also the cause that the thing is not permanent; since
the previous non-existence proves that the nature of that thing does
not necessitate its permanent existence. According to our theory,
taught in Scripture, the existence or non-existence of things depends
solely on the will of God and not on fixed laws, and, therefore, it
does not follow that God must destroy the Universe after having created
it from nothing. It depends on His will. He may, according to His
desire, or according to the decree of His wisdom, either destroy it, or
allow it to exist, and it is therefore possible that He will preserve
the Universe for ever, and let it exist permanently as He Himself
exists. It is well known that our Sages never said that the throne of
glory will perish, although they assumed that it has been created. No
prophet or sage ever maintained that the throne of glory will be
destroyed or annihilated; but, on the contrary, the Scriptural passages
speak of its permanent existence. We are of opinion that the souls of
the pious have been created, and at the same time we believe that they
are immortal. Some hold, in accordance with the literal meaning of the
Midrashim, that the bodies of the pious will also enjoy everlasting
happiness. Their notion is like the well-known belief of certain
people, that there are bodily enjoyments in Paradise. In short,
reasoning leads to the conclusion that the destruction of the Universe
is not a certain fact. There remains only the question as to what the
prophets and our Sages say on this point; whether they affirm that the
world will certainly come to an end, or not. Most people amongst us
believe that such statements have been made, and that the world will at
one time be destroyed. I will show you that this is not the case; and
that, on the contrary, many passages in the Bible speak of the
permanent existence of the Universe. Those passages which, in the
literal sense, would indicate the destruction of the Universe, are
undoubtedly to be understood in a figurative sense, as will be shown.
If, however, those who follow the literal sense of the Scriptural texts
reject our view, and assume that the ultimate certain destruction of
the Universe is part of their faith, they are at liberty to do so. But
we must tell them that the belief in the destruction is not necessarily
implied in the belief in the Creation; they believe it because they
trust the writer, who used a figurative expression, which they take
literally. Their faith, however, does not suffer by it.
CHAPTER XXVIII
Many of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believed in the
Eternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can we suppose that
any one that adheres to the Law of Moses, our Teacher, should accept
that theory? if we were to assume that Solomon has on this point, God
forbid, deviated from the Law of Moses, the question would be asked,
Why did most of the Prophets and of the Sages accept it of him? Why
have they not opposed him, or blamed him for holding that opinion, as
he has been blamed for having married strange women, and for other
things? The reason why this has been imputed to him is to be found in
the following passage: “They desired to suppress the book Koheleth,
because its words incline towards scepticism.” It is undoubtedly true
that certain passages in this book include, when taken literally,
opinions different from those taught in the Law, and they must
therefore be explained figuratively. But the theory of the Eternity of
the Universe is not among those opinions, the book does not even
contain any passage that implies this theory; much less a passage in
which it is clearly set forth. There are, however, in the book, some
passages which imply the indestructibility of the Universe, a doctrine
that is true; and from the fact that the indestructibility of the
Universe is taught in this book, some persons wrongly inferred that the
author believed in the Eternity of the Universe. The following are the
words that refer to the indestructibility of the Universe: “And the
earth remaineth for ever.” And those who do not agree with me as
regards the above distinction [between the indestructibility and the
Eternity of the Universe], are compelled to explain the term le-ʻolam
(lit., “for ever”), to mean “the time fixed for the existence of the
earth.” Similarly they explain the words of God, “Yet all the days of
the earth” (Gen. viii. 22) to signify the days fixed for its existence.
But I wonder how they would explain the words of David: “He laid the
foundations of the earth, that it should not be moved for ever” (Ps.
civ. 5). If they maintain here also that the term le-ʻolam va-ʻed (lit.
“for ever”) does not imply perpetuity, they must come to the conclusion
that God exists only for a fixed period, since the same term is
employed in describing the perpetuity of God, “The Lord will reign
(le-ʻolam) for ever” (Exod. xv. 18, or Ps. x. 16). We must, however,
bear in mind that ʻolam only signifies perpetuity when it is combined
with ʻad; it makes no difference whether ʻad follows, as in ʻolam
va-ʻed, or whether it precedes, as in ʻad ʻolam. The words of Solomon
which only contain the word le-ʻolam, have therefore less force than
the words of David, who uses the term ʻolam va-ʻed. David has also in
other passages clearly spoken of the incorruptibility of the heavens,
the perpetuity and immutability of their laws, and of all the heavenly
beings. He says, “Praise ye the Lord from the heavens, etc. For He
commanded, and they were created. He hath also stablished them for ever
and ever; he hath made a decree which shall not pass” (Ps. cxlviii.
1–6); that is to say, there will never be a change in the decrees which
God made, or in the sources of the properties of the heavens and the
earth, which the Psalmist has mentioned before. But he distinctly
states that they have been created. For he says, “He hath commanded,
and they were created.” Jeremiah (xxxi. 35) likewise says, “He giveth
the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the
stars for a light by night,” etc. “If these ordinances depart from
before me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall cease
from being a nation before me for ever.” He thus declares, that these
decrees will never be removed, although they had a beginning. We
therefore find this idea, when we search for it, expressed not only by
Solomon but also by others. Solomon himself has stated that these works
of God, the Universe, and all that is contained in it, remain with
their properties for ever, although they have been created. For he
says, “Whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put
to it, nor anything taken away from it” (Eccles. iii. 14). He declares
in these words that the world has been created by God and remains for
ever. He adds the reason for it by saying, “Nothing can be put to it,
nor anything taken from it;” for this is the reason for the perpetuity,
as if he meant to say that things are changed in order to supply that
which is wanting, or in order to take away what is superfluous. The
works of God being most perfect, admitting no addition or deduction,
must remain the same for ever. It is impossible that anything should
exist that could cause a change in them. In the conclusion of the
verse, Solomon, as it were describes the purpose of exceptions from the
laws of Nature, or an excuse for changes in them, when he says, “And
God doeth it (viz., He performs miracles) that men should fear before
him.” The words which follow, “That which hath been is now; and that
which is to be hath already been, and God seeketh that which is
pursued,” contain the idea that God desires the perpetuity and
continuity of the Universe. The fact that the works of God are perfect,
admitting of no addition or diminution, has already been mentioned by
Moses, the wisest of all men, in the words: “The rock, His work is
perfect” (Deut. xxxii. 14). All His works or creations are most
perfect, containing no defect whatever, nothing superfluous, nor
anything unnecessary. Also whatever God decrees for those created
things, and whatever He effects through them, is perfectly just, and is
the result of His wisdom, as will be explained in some chapters of this
treatise.