CHAPTER LXXVI

The reasonings and arguments of the Mutakallemim to demonstrate the

Incorporeality of God are very weak, and indeed inferior to their

arguments for the Unity of God. They treat the doctrine of the

Incorporeality of God as if it were the logical sequence of the theory

of His Unity, and they say that the attribute “one” cannot be applied

to a corporeal object. Those who maintain that God is incorporeal

because a corporeal object consists of substance and form—a combination

known to be impossible in the Divine Being, are not in my opinion

Mutakallemim, and such an argument is not founded on the propositions

of the Kalâm; on the contrary, it is a logical proof based on the

theory of substance and form, and on a right conception of their

properties. It has the character of a philosophical argument, and I

shall fully explain it when treating of the arguments of the

philosophers. Here we only propose to discuss the arguments by which

the Mutakallemim desire to prove the Incorporeality of God in

accordance with their propositions and the method of their reasoning.

First Argument.

If God were corporeal, His true essence would necessarily either exist

entirely in every part of the body, that is to say, in each of its

atoms, or would be confined to one of the atoms. In the latter

alternative the other atoms would be superfluous, and the existence of

the corporeal being [with the exception of the one atom] would be of no

purpose. If, on the other hand, each atom fully represented the Divine

Being, the whole body would not be one deity, but a complex of deities,

and this would be contrary to the doctrine adopted by the Kalām that

God is one. An examination of this argument shows that it is based on

the first and fifth propositions. But there is room for the following

objection: “God does not consist of atoms, that is to say, He is not,

as you assert, composed of a number of elements created by Himself, but

is one continuous body, and indivisible except in man’s imagination,

which affords no test; for in man’s imagination the substance of the

heavens may be torn or rent asunder. The philosopher holds that such a

possibility results from assuming a similarity and an analogy between

the visible, i.e., the bodies which exist among us, and the invisible.”

Second Argument.

This argument, they believe, is of great importance. Its main support

is the impossibility of comparison, i.e., the belief that God cannot be

compared to any of His creatures; and that He would be comparable to

other corporeal objects if He were corporeal. They put great stress on

this argument, and say as follows: “If it were asserted that God is

corporeal, but that His substance is not like that of other corporeal

beings, it would be self-contradictory; for all bodies are alike as

regards their substance, and are distinguished from each other by other

things, viz., the accidents.” They also argue that if God were

corporeal it would follow that He has created another being like

Himself. This argument is refuted in two ways. First, the objector does

not admit the impossibility of comparison; he asks how it could be

proved that God cannot be compared to any of His creatures. No doubt

that, in support of their view, that a comparison between the Almighty

and any other being is inadmissible, they would have to cite the words

of the Prophets, and thus accept this doctrine by the authority of

tradition, not by the authority of reason. The argument that God, if

comparable to any of His creatures, would be found to have created

beings like Himself, is refuted by the objector in the following way:

“The created things are not like Him in every respect; for I do not

deny that God has many properties and peculiarities.” For he who admits

the corporeality of God does not deny the existence of properties in

the divine Being. Another and more forcible argument is this: All who

have studied philosophy, and have made themselves thoroughly acquainted

with philosophical theories, assume as demonstrated facts, first that

the term substance, when applied to the spheres above and to, the

corporeal objects here on earth is a perfect homonym, for the substance

of the one is not the substance of the other; and secondly that the

forms of the things on this earth are different from the forms of the

spheres; the terms substance and form when applied both to things below

and to the spheres above are homonyms; although there is no doubt that

the spheres have [like the things below, three] dimensions, they are

corporeal because they consist of substance and form, not because they

have dimensions. If this explanation is admitted with reference to the

spheres, how much more is he who believes that God is corporeal

justified in saying that God is a corporeal being which has dimensions,

but which in its substance, its true nature and properties is very

different from all created bodies, and that the term “substance” is

applied to Him and to His creatures homonymously, in the same manner as

the true believers, who have a correct conception of the divine idea,

apply the term “existence” homonymously to Him and to His creatures.

The Corporealists do not admit that all bodies consist of similar

atoms; they believe that God created all things, and that these differ

from each other both in their substances and in their constituent

properties; and just as the substance of dung differs from the

substance of the sun, so does, according to this theory, the substance

of the spheres and the stars differ from the substance of the created

light, i.e., the Divine Glory (Shechinah), and again the substance of

the Divine Glory, or the pillar of cloud created [for the purpose],

differ from the substance of the Most High; for the substance of the

latter is sublime, perfect, simple, constant and immutable. His

absolute existence remains always the same, and He creates all things

according to His will and desire. How could this argument, though it be

weak, be refuted by these strange methods of the Mutakallemim, which I

pointed out to you?

Third Argument.

If God were corporeal, He would be finite, and so far this argument is

correct; if He were finite, He would have certain dimensions and a

certain form; this is also a correct conclusion. But they continue

thus: Attribute to God any magnitude or form whatever: He might be

either larger or smaller, and might also have a different form. The

fact that He has one special magnitude and one special form presupposes

the existence of a determining agens. I have heard that they attach

great importance to this argument, but in truth it is the weakest of

all the arguments mentioned above. It is founded on the tenth

proposition, the feebleness of which in ignoring the actual properties

of things, we have clearly shown in regard to ordinary beings and must

be much more evident in regard to the Creator. There is no difference

between this argument and their assertion that the fact of the

existence of the Universe having been preferred to its non-existence

proves the existence of an agens that preferred the existence of the

Universe to its non-existence at a time when both were equally

possible. If it were asked why this argument should not be applied to

God—viz., that His mere existence proved the existence of an agens

which determined His existence and rejected His non-existence—they

would undoubtedly answer that this admission would only lead to a

repetition of the same argument until at length a being be found whose

existence is not merely potential but necessary, and which does not

require a causa efficiens. But this same answer can also be applied to

dimensions and to form. It can only be said in reference to all other

forms and magnitudes, the existence of which is possible, that is to

say which came into existence after a state of non-existence, that they

might have been larger or smaller than they actually are, or that they

might have had a form different from that which they actually possess,

and require for this reason some determining agens. But the forms and

dimensions of God (who is above all imperfection and similitude)! did

not come into existence according to the opinion of the Corporealist

after a state of non-existence, and therefore no determining agens was

necessary; His substance with its dimensions and forms has a necessary

existence; no agens was required to decide upon His existence, and to

reject His non-existence, since non-existence is altogether

inadmissible in God. In like manner there was no force required to

determine His magnitude and form, they were absolutely inseparable from

His existence.

If you wish to go in search of truth, to cast aside your passions, your

tradition, and your fondness of things you have been accustomed to

cherish, if you wish to guard yourself against error: then consider the

fate of these speculators and the result of their labours; observe how

they rushed, as it were, from the ashes into the fire. They denied the

nature of the existing things, misrepresented the properties of heaven

and earth, and thought that they were able, by their propositions, to

prove the creation of the world, but in fact they were far from proving

the creatio ex nihilo, and have weakened the arguments for the

existence, the unity, and the incorporeality of God. The proofs of all

these doctrines must be based on the well-known nature of the existing

things, as perceived by the senses and the intellect.

Having thus discussed the arguments of the Mutakallemim, we shall now

proceed to consider the propositions of the philosophers and their

arguments for the existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality,

and we shall for the present assume the Eternity of the Universe

without finally accepting it. Next to this we shall develop our own

method, which is the result of deep study, in demonstrating these three

principles, and we shall then examine the theory of the Eternity of the

Universe as assumed by the philosophers.

PART II

INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five of the propositions which are employed in the proof for the

existence of God, or in the arguments demonstrating that God is neither

corporeal nor a force connected with a material being, or that He is

One, have been fully established, and their correctness is beyond

doubt. Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him have proved each

of these propositions. There is, however, one proposition which we do

not accept—namely, the proposition which affirms the Eternity of the

Universe, but we will admit it for the present, because by doing so we

shall be enabled dearly to demonstrate our own theory.

Proposition I.

The existence of an infinite magnitude is impossible.

Proposition II.

The co-existence of an infinite number of finite magnitudes is

impossible.

Proposition III.

The existence of an infinite number of causes and effects is

impossible, even if these were not magnitudes; if, e.g., one

Intelligence were the cause of a second, the second the cause of a

third, the third the cause of a fourth, and so on, the series could not

be continued ad infinitum.

Proposition IV.

Four categories are subject to change:—

(a.) Substance.—Changes which affect the substance of a thing are

called genesis and destruction.

(b.) Quantity.—Changes in reference to quantity are increase and

decrease.

(c.) Quality.—Changes in the qualities of things are transformations.

(d.) Place.—Change of place is called motion.

The term “motion” is properly applied to change of place, but is also

used in a general sense of all kinds of changes.

Proposition V.

Motion implies change and transition from potentiality to actuality.

Proposition VI.

The motion of a thing is either essential or accidental; or it is due

to an external force, or to the participation of the thing in the

motion of another thing. This latter kind of motion is similar to the

accidental one. An instance of essential motion may be found in the

translation of a thing from one place to another. The accident of a

thing, as, e.g., its black colour, is said to move when the thing

itself changes its place. The upward motion of a stone, owing to a

force applied to it in that direction, is an instance of a motion due

to an external force. The motion of a nail in a boat may serve to

illustrate motion due to the participation of a thing in the motion of

another thing; for when the boat moves, the nail is said to move

likewise. The same is the case with everything composed of several

parts: when the thing itself moves, every part of it is likewise said

to move.

Proposition VII.

Things which are changeable are, at the same time, divisible. Hence

everything that moves is divisible, and consequently corporeal; but

that which is indivisible cannot move, and cannot therefore be

corporeal.

Proposition VIII.

A thing that moves accidentally must come to rest, because it does not

move of its own accord; hence accidental motion cannot continue for

ever.

Proposition IX.

A corporeal thing that sets another corporeal thing in motion can only

effect this by setting itself in motion at the time it causes the other

thing to move.

Proposition X.

A thing which is said to be contained in a corporeal object must

satisfy either of the two following conditions: it either exists

through that object, as is the case with accidents, or it is the cause

of the existence of that object; such is, e.g., its essential property.

In both cases it is a force existing in a corporeal object.

Proposition XI.

Among the things which exist through a material object, there are some

which participate in the division of that object, and are therefore

accidentally divisible, as, e.g., its colour, and all other qualities

that spread throughout its parts. On the other hand, among the things

which form the essential elements of an object, there are some which

cannot be divided in any way, as, e.g., the soul and the intellect.

Proposition XII.

A force which occupies all parts of a corporeal object is finite, that

object itself being finite.

Proposition XIII.

None of the several kinds of change can be continuous, except motion

from place to place, provided it be circular.

Proposition XIV.

Locomotion is in the natural order of the several kinds of motion the

first and foremost. For genesis and corruption are preceded by

transformation, which, in its turn, is preceded by the approach of the

transforming agent to the object which is to be transformed. Also,

increase and decrease are impossible without previous genesis and

corruption.

Proposition XV.

Time is an accident that is related and joined to motion in such a

manner that the one is never found without the other. Motion is only

possible in time, and the idea of time cannot be conceived otherwise

than in connexion with motion; things which do not move have no

relation to time.

Proposition XVI.

Incorporeal bodies can only be numbered when they are forces situated

in a body; the several forces must then be counted together with

substances or objects in which they exist. Hence purely spiritual

beings, which are neither corporeal nor forces situated in corporeal

objects, cannot be counted, except when considered as causes and

effects.

Proposition XVII.

When an object moves, there must be some agent that moves it, from

without, as, e.g., in the case of a stone set in motion by the hand; or

from within, e.g., when the body of a living being moves. Living beings

include in themselves, at the same time, the moving agent and the thing

moved; when, therefore, a living being dies, and the moving agent, the

soul, has left the body, i.e., the thing moved, the body remains for

some time in the same condition as before, and yet cannot move in the

manner it has moved previously. The moving agent, when included in the

thing moved, is hidden from, and imperceptible to, the senses. This

circumstance gave rise to the belief that the body of an animal moves

without the aid of a moving agent. When we therefore affirm, concerning

a thing in motion, that it is its own moving agent, or, as is generally

said, that it moves of its own accord, we mean to say that the force

which really sets the body in motion exists in that body itself.

Proposition XVIII.

Everything that passes over from a state of potentiality to that of

actuality, is caused to do so by some external agent; because if that

agent existed in the thing itself, and no obstacle prevented the

transition, the thing would never be in a state of potentiality, but

always in that of actuality. If, on the other hand, while the thing

itself contained that agent, some obstacle existed, and at a certain

time that obstacle was removed, the same cause which removed the

obstacle would undoubtedly be described as the cause of the transition

from potentiality to actuality, [and not the force situated within the

body]. Note this.

Proposition XIX.

A thing which owes its existence to certain causes has in itself merely

the possibility of existence; for only if these causes exist, the thing

likewise exists. It does not exist if the causes do not exist at all,

or if they have ceased to exist, or if there has been a change in the

relation which implies the existence of that thing as a necessary

consequence of those causes.

Proposition XX.

A thing which has in itself the necessity of existence cannot have for

its existence any cause whatever.

Proposition XXI.

A thing composed of two elements has necessarily their composition as

the cause of its present existence. Its existence is therefore not

necessitated by its own essence; it depends on the existence of its two

component parts and their combination.

Proposition XXII.

Material objects are always composed of two elements [at least], and

are without exception subject to accidents. The two component elements

of all bodies are substance and form. The accidents attributed to

material objects are quantity, geometrical form, and position.

Proposition XXIII.

Everything that exists potentially, and whose essence includes a

certain state of possibility, may at some time be without actual

existence.

Proposition XXIV.

That which is potentially a certain thing is necessarily material, for

the state of possibility is always connected with matter.

Proposition XXV.

Each compound substance consists of matter and form, and requires an

agent for its existence, viz., a force which sets the substance in

motion, and thereby enables it to receive a certain form. The force

which thus prepares the substance of a certain individual being, is

called the immediate motor.

Here the necessity arises of investigating into the properties of

motion, the moving agent and the thing moved. But this has already been

explained sufficiently; and the opinion of Aristotle may be expressed

in the following proposition: Matter does not move of its own accord—an

important proposition that led to the investigation of the Prime Motor

(the first moving agent).

Of these foregoing twenty-five propositions some may be verified by

means of a little reflection and the application of a few propositions

capable of proof, or of axioms or theorems of almost the same force,

such as have been explained by me. Others require many arguments and

propositions, all of which, however, have been established by

conclusive proofs partly in the Physics and its commentaries, and

partly in the Metaphysics and its commentary. I have already stated

that in this work it is not my intention to copy the books of the

philosophers or to explain difficult problems, but simply to mention

those propositions which are closely connected with our subject, and

which we want for our purpose.

To the above propositions one must be added which enunciates that the

universe is eternal, and which is held by Aristotle to be true, and

even more acceptable than any other theory. For the present we admit

it, as a hypothesis, only for the purpose of demonstrating our theory.

It is the following proposition:—

Proposition XXVI.

Time and motion are eternal, constant, and in actual existence.

In accordance with this proposition, Aristotle is compelled to assume

that there exists actually a body with constant motion, viz., the fifth

element. He therefore says that the heavens are not subject to genesis

or destruction, because motion cannot be generated nor destroyed. He

also holds that every motion must necessarily be preceded by another

motion, either of the same or of a different kind. The belief that the

locomotion of an animal is not preceded by another motion, is not true;

for the animal is caused to move, after it had been in rest, by the

intention to obtain those very things which bring about that

locomotion. A change in its state of health, or some image, or some new

idea can produce a desire to seek that which is conducive to its

welfare and to avoid that which is contrary. Each of these three causes

sets the living being in motion, and each of them is produced by

various kinds of motion. Aristotle likewise asserts that everything

which is created must, before its actual creation, have existed in

potentiâ. By inferences drawn from this assertion he seeks to establish

his proposition, viz., The thing that moves is finite, and its path

finite; but it repeats the motion in its path an infinite number of

times. This can only take place when the motion is circular, as has

been stated in Proposition XIII. Hence follows also the existence of an

infinite number of things which do not co-exist but follow one after

the other.

Aristotle frequently attempts to establish this proposition; but I

believe that he did not consider his proofs to be conclusive. It

appeared to him to be the most probable and acceptable proposition. His

followers, however, and the commentators of his books, contend that it

contains not only a probable but a demonstrative proof, and that it

has, in fact, been fully established. On the other hand, the

Mutakallemim try to prove that the proposition cannot be true, as,

according to their opinion, it is impossible to conceive how an

infinite number of things could even come into existence successively.

They assume this impossibility as an axiom. I, however, think that this

proposition is admissible, but neither demonstrative, as the

commentators of Aristotle assert, nor, on the other hand, impossible,

as the Mutakallemim say. We have no intention to explain here the

proofs given by Aristotle, or to show our doubts concerning them, or to

set forth our opinions on the creation of the universe. I here simply

desire to mention those propositions which we shall require for the

proof of the three principles stated above. Having thus quoted and

admitted these propositions, I will now proceed to explain what may be

inferred from them.

CHAPTER I

According to Proposition XXV., a moving agent must exist which has

moved the substance of all existing transient things and enabled it to

receive Form. The cause of the motion of that agent is found in the

existence of another motor of the same or of a different class, the

term “motion,” in a general sense, being common to four categories

(Prop. IV.). This series of motions is not infinite (Prop. III.); we

find that it can only be continued till the motion of the fifth element

is arrived at, and then it ends. The motion of the fifth element is the

source of every force that moves and prepares any substance on earth

for its combination with a certain form, and is connected with that

force by a chain of intermediate motions. The celestial sphere [or the

fifth element] performs the act of locomotion which is the first of the

several kinds of motion (Prop. XIV.), and all locomotion is found to be

the indirect effect of the motion of this sphere; e.g., a stone is set

in motion by a stick, the stick by a man’s hand, the hand by the

sinews, the sinews by the muscles, the muscles by the nerves, the

nerves by the natural heat of the body, and the heat of the body by its

form. This is undoubtedly the immediate motive cause, but the action of

this immediate cause is due to a certain design, e.g., to bring a stone

into a hole by striking against it with a stick in order to prevent the

draught from coming through the crevice. The motion of the air that

causes the draught is the effect of the motion of the celestial sphere.

Similarly it may be shown that the ultimate cause of all genesis and

destruction can be traced to the motion of the sphere. But the motion

of the sphere must likewise have been effected by an agent (Prop.

XVII.) residing either without the sphere or within it; a third case

being impossible. In the first case, if the motor is without the

sphere, it must either be corporeal or incorporeal; if incorporeal, it

cannot be said that the agent is without the sphere; it can only be

described as separate from it; because an incorporeal object can only

be said metaphorically to reside without a certain corporeal object. In

the second case, if the agent resides within the sphere, it must be

either a force distributed throughout the whole sphere so that each

part of the sphere includes a part of the force, as is the case with

the heat of fire; or it is an indivisible force, e.g., the soul and the

intellect (Props. X. and XI.). The agent which sets the sphere in

motion must consequently be one of the following four things: a

corporeal object without the sphere; an incorporeal object separate

from it; a force spread throughout the whole of the sphere; or an

indivisible force [within the sphere].

The first case, viz., that the moving agent of the sphere is a

corporeal object without the sphere, is impossible, as will be

explained. Since the moving agent is corporeal, it must itself move

while setting another object in motion (Prop. IX.), and as the sixth

element would likewise move when imparting motion to another body, it

would be set in motion by a seventh element, which must also move. An

infinite number of bodies would thus be required before the sphere

could be set in motion. This is contrary to Proposition II.

The third case, viz., that the moving object be a force distributed

throughout the whole body, is likewise impossible. For the sphere is

corporeal, and must therefore be finite (Prop. I.); also the force it

contains must be finite (Prop. XII.), since each part of the sphere

contains part of the force (Prop. XI.): the latter can consequently not

produce an infinite motion, such as we assumed according to Proposition

XXVI., which we admitted for the present.

The fourth case is likewise impossible, viz., that the sphere is set in

motion by an indivisible force residing in the sphere in the same

manner as the soul resides in the body of man. For this force, though

indivisible, could not be the cause of infinite motion by itself alone;

because if that were the case the prime motor would have an accidental

motion (Prop. VI.). But things that move accidentally must come to rest

(Prop. VIII.), and then the thing comes also to rest which is set in

motion. (The following may serve as a further illustration of the

nature of accidental motion. When man is moved by the soul, i.e., by

his form, to go from the basement of the house to the upper storey, his

body moves directly, while the soul, the really efficient cause of that

motion, participates in it accidentally. For through the translation of

the body from the basement to the upper storey, the soul has likewise

changed its place, and when no fresh impulse for the motion of the body

is given by the soul, the body which has been set in motion by such

impulse comes to rest, and the accidental motion of the soul is

discontinued). Consequently the motion of that supposed first motor

must be due to some cause which does not form part of things composed

of two elements, viz., a moving agent and an object moved; if such a

cause is present the motor in that compound sets the other element in

motion; in the absence of such a cause no motion takes place. Living

beings do therefore not move continually, although each of them

possesses an indivisible motive element; because this element is not

constantly in motion, as it would be if it produced motion of its own

accord. On the contrary, the things to which the action is due are

separate from the motor. The action is caused either by desire for that

which is agreeable, or by aversion from that which is disagreeable, or

by some image, or by some ideal when the moving being has the capacity

of conceiving it. When any of these causes are present then the motor

acts; its motion is accidental, and must therefore come to an end

(Prop. VIII.). If the motor of the sphere were of this kind the sphere

could not move ad infinitum. Our opponent, however, holds that the

spheres move continually ad infinitum; if this were the case, and it is

in fact possible (Prop. XIII.), the efficient cause of the motion of

the sphere must, according to the above division, be of the second

kind, viz., something incorporeal and separate from the sphere.

It may thus be considered as proved that the efficient cause of the

motion of the sphere, if that motion be eternal, is neither itself

corporeal nor does it reside in a corporeal object; it must move

neither of its own accord nor accidentally; it must be indivisible and

unchangeable (Prop. VII. and Prop. V.). This Prime Motor of the sphere

is God, praised be His name!

The hypothesis that there exist two Gods is inadmissible, because

absolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted (Prop. XVI.), except as

cause and effect; the relation of time is not applicable to God (Prop.

XV.), because motion cannot be predicated of Him.

The result of the above argument is consequently this: the sphere

cannot move ad infinitum of its own accord; the Prime Motor is not

corporeal, nor a force residing within a body; it is One, unchangeable,

and in its existence independent of time. Three of our postulates are

thus proved by the principal philosophers.

The philosophers employ besides another argument, based on the

following proposition of Aristotle. If there be a thing composed of two

elements, and the one of them is known to exist also by itself, apart

from that thing, then the other element is likewise found in existence

by itself separate from that compound. For if the nature of the two

elements were such that they could only exist together—as, e.g., matter

and form—then neither of them could in any way exist separate from the

other. The fact that the one component is found also in a separate

existence proves that the two elements are not indissolubly connected,

and that the same must therefore be the case with the other component.

Thus we infer from the existence of honey-vinegar and of honey by

itself, that there exists also vinegar by itself. After having

explained this Proposition Aristotle continues thus: We notice many

objects consisting of a motor and a motum, i.e., objects which set

other things in motion, and whilst doing so are themselves set in

motion by other things; such is clearly the case as regards all the

middle members of a series of things in motion. We also see a thing

that is moved, but does not itself move anything, viz., the last member

of the series; consequently a motor must exist without being at the

same time a motum, and that is the Prime Motor, which, not being

subject to motion, is indivisible, incorporeal, and independent of

time, as has been shown in the preceding argument.

Third Philosophical Argument.—This is taken from the words of

Aristotle, though he gives it in a different form. It runs as follows:

There is no doubt that many things actually exist, as, e.g., things

perceived with the senses. Now there are only three cases conceivable,

viz., either all these things are without beginning and without end, or

all of them have beginning and end, or some are with and some without

beginning and end. The first of these three cases is altogether

inadmissible, since we clearly perceive objects which come into

existence and are subsequently destroyed. The second case is likewise

inadmissible, for if everything had but a temporary existence all

things might be destroyed, and that which is enunciated of a whole

class of things as possible is necessarily actual. All things must

therefore come to an end, and then nothing would ever be in existence,

for there would not exist any being to produce anything. Consequently

nothing whatever would exist [if all things were transient]; but as we

see things existing, and find ourselves in existence we conclude as

follows:—Since there are undoubtedly beings of a temporary existence,

there must also be an eternal being that is not subject to destruction,

and whose existence is real, not merely possible.

It has been further argued that the existence of this being is

necessary, either on account of itself alone or on account of some

external force. In the latter case its existence and non-existence

would be equally possible, because of its own properties, but its

existence would be necessary on account of the external force. That

force would then be the being that possesses absolute existence (Prop.

XIX.). It is therefore certain that there must be a being which has

absolutely independent existence, and is the source of the existence of

all things, whether transient or permanent, if, as Aristotle assumes,

there is in existence such a thing, which is the effect of an eternal

cause, and must therefore itself be eternal. This is a proof the

correctness of which is not doubted, disputed, or rejected, except by

those who have no knowledge of the method of proof. We further say that

the existence of anything that has independent existence is not due to

any cause (Prop. X.), and that such a being does not include any

plurality whatever (Prop. XXI.); consequently it cannot be a body, nor

a force residing in a body (Prop. XXII.). It is now clear that there

must be a being with absolutely independent existence, a being whose

existence cannot be attributed to any external cause, and which does

not include different elements; it cannot therefore be corporeal, or a

force residing in a corporeal object; this being is God.

It can easily be proved that absolutely independent existence cannot be

attributed to two beings. For, if that were the case, absolutely

independent existence would be a property added to the substance of

both; neither of them would be absolutely independent on account of

their essence, but only through a certain property, viz., that of this

independent existence, which is common to both. It can besides be shown

in many ways that independent existence cannot be reconciled with the

principle of dualism by any means. It would make no difference, whether

we imagine two beings of similar or of different properties. The reason

for all this is to be sought in the absolute simplicity and in the

utmost perfection of the essence of this being, which is the only

member of its species, and does not depend on any cause whatever; this

being has therefore nothing in common with other beings.

Fourth Argument.—This is likewise a well-known philosophical argument.

We constantly see things passing from a state of potentiality to that

of actuality, but in every such case there is for that transition of a

thing an agent separate from it (Prop. XVIII.). It is likewise clear

that the agent has also passed from potentiality to actuality. It has

at first been potential, because it could not be actual, owing to some

obstacle contained in itself, or on account of the absence of a certain

relation between itself and the object of its action; it became an

actual agent as soon as that relation was present. Whichever cause be

assumed, an agent is again necessary to remove the obstacle or to

create the relation. The same can be argued respecting this

last-mentioned agent that creates the relation or removes the obstacle.

This series of causes cannot go on ad infinitum; we must at last arrive

at a cause of the transition of an object from the state of

potentiality to that of actuality, which is constant, and admits of no

potentiality whatever. In the essence of this cause nothing exists

potentially, for if its essence included any possibility of existence

it would not exist at all (Prop. XXIII.); it cannot be corporeal, but

it must be spiritual (Prop. XXIV.); and the immaterial being that

includes no possibility whatever, but exists actually by its own

essence, is God. Since He is incorporeal, as has been demonstrated, it

follows that He is One (Prop. XVI.).

Even if we were to admit the Eternity of the Universe, we could by any

of these methods prove the existence of God; that He is One and

incorporeal, and that He does not reside as a force in a corporeal

object.

The following is likewise a correct method to prove the Incorporeality

and the Unity of God: If there were two Gods, they would necessarily

have one element in common by virtue of which they were Gods, and

another element by which they were distinguished from each other and

existed as two Gods; the distinguishing element would either be in both

different from the property common to both—in that case both of them

would consist of different elements, and neither of them would be the

First Cause, or have absolutely independent existence; but their

existence would depend on certain causes (Prop. XIX.)—or the

distinguishing element would only in one of them be different from the

element common to both: then that being could not have absolute

independence.

Another proof of the Unity of God.—It has been demonstrated by proof

that the whole existing world is one organic body, all parts of which

are connected together; also, that the influences of the spheres above

pervade the earthly substance and prepare it for its forms. Hence it is

impossible to assume that one deity be engaged in forming one part, and

another deity in forming another part of that organic body of which all

parts are closely connected together. A duality could only be imagined

in this way, either that at one time the one deity is active, the other

at another time, or that both act simultaneously, nothing being done

except by both together. The first alternative is certainly absurd for

many reasons; if at the time the one deity be active the other could

also be active, there is no reason why the one deity should then act

and the other not; if, on the other hand, it be impossible for the one

deity to act when the other is at work, there must be some other cause

[besides these deities] which [at a certain time] enables the one to

act and disables the other. [Such difference would not be caused by

time], since time is without change, and the object of the action

likewise remains one and the same organic whole. Besides, if two

deities existed in this way, both would be subject to the relations of

time, since their actions would depend on time; they would also in the

moment of acting pass from potentiality to actuality, and require an

agent for such transition; their essence would besides include

possibility [of existence]. It is equally absurd to assume that both

together produce everything in existence, and that neither of them does

anything alone; for when a number of forces must be united for a

certain result, none of these forces acts of its own accord, and none

is by itself the immediate cause of that result, but their union is the

immediate cause. It has, furthermore, been proved that the action of

the absolute cannot be due to an [external] cause. The union is also an

act which presupposes a cause effecting that union, and if that cause

be one, it is undoubtedly God; but if it also consists of a number of

separate forces, a cause is required for the combination of these

forces, as in the first case. Finally, one simple being must be arrived

at, that is the cause of the existence of the Universe, which is one

whole; it would make no difference whether we assumed that the First

Cause had produced the Universe by creatio ex nihilo, or whether the

Universe co-existed with the First Cause. It is thus clear how we can

prove the Unity of God from the fact that this Universe is one whole.

Another argument concerning the Incorporeality of God.—Every corporeal

object is composed of matter and form (Prop. XXII.); every compound of

these two elements requires an agent for effecting their combination.

Besides, it is evident that a body is divisible and has dimensions; a

body is thus undoubtedly subject to accidents. Consequently nothing

corporeal can be a unity, either because everything corporeal is

divisible or because it is a compound; that is to say, it can logically

be analysed into two elements; because a body can only be said to be a

certain body when the distinguishing element is added to the corporeal

substratum, and must therefore include two elements; but it has been

proved that the Absolute admits of no dualism whatever.

Now that we have discussed these proofs, we will expound our own method

in accordance with our promise.

CHAPTER II

The fifth essence, i.e., the heavenly spheres, must either be

transient, and in this case motion would likewise be temporary, or, as

our opponent assumes, it must be eternal. If the spheres are transient,

then God is their Creator; for if anything comes into existence after a

period of non-existence, it is self-evident that an agent exists which

has effected this result. It would be absurd to contend that the thing

itself effected it. If, on the other hand, the heavenly spheres be

eternal, with a regular perpetual motion, the cause of this perpetual

motion, according to the Propositions enumerated in the Introduction,

must be something that is neither a body, nor a force residing in a

body, and that is God, praised be His name! We have thus shown that

whether we believe in the Creatio ex Nihilo, or in the Eternity of the

Universe, we can prove by demonstrative arguments the existence of God,

i.e., an absolute Being, whose existence cannot be attributed to any

cause, or admit in itself any potentiality. The theory that God is One

and Incorporeal has likewise been established by proof without any

reference to the theory of the Creation or the Eternity of the

Universe. This has been explained by us in the third philosophical

argument [in support of the Existence of God], and also in our

subsequent description of the methods of the philosophers in proving

the Incorporeality and the Unity of God.

We deem it now convenient to continue with the theory of the

philosophers, and to give their proofs for the existence of

Intelligences. We will then show that their theory in this regard is in

harmony with the teaching of Scripture concerning the existence of

angels. After the full treatment of this subject we shall return to our

task and discuss the theory of creatio ex nihilo. For the best

arguments in favour of this theory cannot be fully comprehended unless

the theory of the existence of Intelligences be well understood, and

also the method which I adopt in proving their existence. We must,

however, first give the following note, which will introduce you into

the secrets of this whole subject, both of that which we have already

given and of what will yet be given.

Note.—It was not my intention when writing this treatise to expound

natural science or discuss metaphysical systems; it was not my object

to prove truths which have already been demonstrated, or describe the

number and the properties of the spheres: for the books written on

these subjects serve their purpose, and if in some points they are not

satisfactory, I do not think that what I could say would be better than

what has already been explained by others. But my intention was, as has

been stated in the Introduction, to expound Biblical passages which

have been impugned, and to elucidate their hidden and true sense, which

is above the comprehension of the multitude. When you therefore notice

that I prove the existence and number of Intelligences or the number of

the spheres, with the causes of their motion, or discuss the true

relation of matter and form, the meaning of Divine manifestation, or

similar subjects, you must not think that I intend merely to establish

a certain philosophical proposition; for these subjects have been

discussed in many books, and most of them have been demonstrated by

proof. I only desire to mention that which might, when well understood,

serve as a means of removing some of the doubts concerning anything

taught in Scripture; and indeed many difficulties will disappear when

that which I am about to explain is taken into consideration. From the

Introduction to this treatise you may learn that its principal object

is to expound, as far as can be done, the account of the Creation (Gen.

i.-iii.), and of the Divine Chariot (Ezek. i.), and to answer questions

raised in respect to Prophecy and to the knowledge of God. You will

sometimes notice that I am rather explicit on truths already

ascertained; some of them Natural Philosophy has established as facts;

others Metaphysics has either fully demonstrated, or at least shown to

be worthy of belief; others Mathematics have made plain. But you will

invariably find that my exposition includes the key for the

understanding of some allegorical passage of Holy Writ and its esoteric

interpretation, and that I have mentioned, explained, and demonstrated

the subject only because it furthers the knowledge of the “Divine

Chariot,” or “the Creation,” or explains some principle with respect to

Prophecy, or to the belief in any of the truths taught in Scripture.

Now, having made this statement, we return to the subject of which we

began to treat.

CHAPTER III

The theory of Aristotle in respect to the causes of the motion of the

spheres led him to assume the existence of Intelligences. Although this

theory consists of assertions which cannot be proved, yet it is the

least open to doubt, and is more systematic than any other, as has been

stated by Alexander in the book called The Origin of the Universe. It

includes maxims which are identical with those taught in Scripture, and

it is to a still greater extent in harmony with doctrines contained in

well-known genuine Midrashim, as will be explained by me. For this

reason I will cite his views and his proofs, and collect from them what

coincides with the teachings of Scripture, and agrees with the doctrine

held by our Sages.

CHAPTER IV

The enunciation that the heavenly sphere is endowed with a soul will

appear reasonable to all who sufficiently reflect on it; but at first

thought they may find it unintelligible or even objectionable; because

they wrongly assume that when we ascribe a soul to the heavenly spheres

we mean something like the soul of man, or that of an ass, or ox. We

merely intend to say that the locomotion of the sphere undoubtedly

leads us to assume some inherent principle by which it moves; and this

principle is certainly a soul. For it would be absurd to assume that

the principle of the circular motion of the spheres was like that of

the rectilinear motion of a stone downward or of fire upwards, for the

cause of the latter motion is a natural property and not a soul; a

thing set in motion by a natural property moves only as long as it is

away from the proper place of its element, but when it has again

arrived there, it comes to rest; whilst the sphere continues its

circular motion in its own place. It is, however, not because the

sphere has a soul, that it moves in this manner; for animate beings

move either by instinct or by reason. By “instinct” I mean the

intention of an animal to approach something agreeable, or to retreat

from something disagreeable; e.g., to approach the water it seeks

because of thirst, or to retreat from the sun because of its heat. It

makes no difference whether that thing really exists or is merely

imaginary, since the imagination of something agreeable or of something

disagreeable likewise causes the animal to move. The heavenly sphere

does not move for the purpose of withdrawing from what is bad or

approaching what is good. For in the first instance it moves toward the

same point from which it has moved away, and vice versâ it moves away

from the same point towards which it has moved. Secondly, if this were

the object of the motion, we should expect that the sphere would move

towards a certain point, and would then rest; for if it moved for the

purpose of avoiding something, and never obtained that object, the

motion would be in vain. The circular motion of the sphere is

consequently due to the action of some idea which produces this

particular kind of motion; but as ideas are only possible in

intellectual beings, the heavenly sphere is an intellectual being. But

even a being that is endowed with the faculty of forming an idea, and

possesses a soul with the faculty of moving, does not change its place

on each occasion that it forms an idea; for an idea alone does not

produce motion, as has been explained in [Aristotle’s] Metaphysics. We

can easily understand this, when we consider how often we form ideas of

certain things, yet do not move towards them, though we are able to do

so; it is only when a desire arises for the thing imagined, that we

move in order to obtain it. We have thus shown that both the soul, the

principle of motion, and the intellect, the source of the ideas, would

not produce motion without the existence of a desire for the object of

which an idea has been formed. It follows that the heavenly sphere must

have a desire for the ideal which it has comprehended, and that ideal,

for which it has a desire, is God, exalted be His name! When we say

that God moves the spheres, we mean it in the following sense: the

spheres have a desire to become similar to the ideal comprehended by

them. This ideal, however, is simple in the strictest sense of the

word, and not subject to any change or alteration, but constant in

producing everything good, whilst the spheres are corporeal; the latter

can therefore not be like this ideal in any other way, except in the

production of circular motion; for this is the only action of corporeal

beings that can be perpetual; it is the most simple motion of a body;

there is no change in the essence of the sphere, nor in the beneficial

results of its motion.

When Aristotle had arrived at this result, he further investigated the

subject, and found, by proof, that there were many spheres, and that

all moved in circles, but each with its peculiar motion as regards

velocity and direction. He naturally argued that the ideal comprehended

by the one sphere, which completes its circuit in one day, is different

from that of another sphere which completes its circuit in thirty

years; he thus arrived at the conclusion that there were as many ideals

as there were spheres; each sphere has a desire for that ideal which is

the source of its existence, and that desire is the cause of its

individual motion, so that in fact the ideal sets the sphere in motion.

Aristotle does not say, nor does any other authority, that there are

ten or a hundred ideals; he simply states that their number agrees with

that of the spheres. When, therefore, some of his contemporaries held

that the number of spheres was fifty, he said, if that was true, the

number of ideals must likewise be fifty. For the scholars in his time

were few and possessed but imperfect learning; they thought that there

must be a separate sphere for each movement, because they did not know

that what appear to be several distinct movements can be explained as

resulting from the inclination of one sphere as is, e.g., the case with

the change in the longitude of a star, its declination and the places

of its rising and setting noticed in the circle of the horizon. This

point, however, does not concern us at present; let us therefore return

to our subject.

The later philosophers assumed ten Intelligences, because they counted

the spheres containing stars and the all-encompassing sphere, although

some of the spheres included several distinct orbits. There are

altogether nine spheres, viz., the all-encompassing sphere, that of the

fixed stars, and those of the seven planets; nine Intelligences

correspond to the nine spheres; the tenth Intelligence is the Active

Intellect. The existence of the latter is proved by the transition of

our intellect from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, and by

the same transition in the case of the forms of all transient beings.

For whatever passes from potentiality into actuality, requires for that

transition an external agent of the same kind as itself. Thus the

builder does not build the storehouse in his capacity of workman, but

in that of a person that has the form of the storehouse in his mind;

and that form of the building which exists in the mind of the builder

caused the transition of the potential form of the storehouse into

actuality, and impressed it on the material of the building. As that

which gives form to matter must itself be pure form, so the source of

intellect must itself be pure intellect, and this source is the Active

Intellect. The relation of the latter to the elements and their

compounds is the same as that of the Intelligences to their respective

spheres; and our intellect in action, which originates in the Active

Intellect, and enables us to comprehend that intellect, finds a

parallel in the intellect of each of the spheres which originates in

the Intelligence corresponding to that sphere, and enables the sphere

to comprehend that Intelligence, to form an idea of it, and to move in

seeking to become similar to it.

Aristotle further infers, what has already been explained, that God

does not act by means of direct contact. When, e.g., He destroys

anything with fire, the fire is set in motion through the movement of

the spheres, and the spheres by the Intelligences; the latter, which

are identical with “the angels,” and act by direct influence, are

consequently, each in its turn, the cause of the motion of the spheres;

as however, purely spiritual beings do not differ in their essence, and

are by no means discrete quantities, he (Aristotle) came to the

following conclusion: God created the first Intelligence, the motive

agent of the first sphere; the Intelligence which causes the second

sphere to move has its source and origin in the first Intelligence, and

so on; the Intelligence which sets the sphere nearest to the earth in

motion is the source and origin of the Active Intellect, the last in

the series of purely spiritual beings. The series of material bodies

similarly begins with the uppermost sphere, and ends with the elements

and their compounds. The Intelligence which moves the uppermost sphere

cannot be the Absolute Being, for there is an element common to all

Intelligences, namely, the property of being the motive agent of a

sphere, and there is another element by which each of them is

distinguished from the rest; each of the ten Intelligences includes,

therefore, two elements, and consequently another being must be the

First Cause.

This is the theory and opinion of Aristotle on these questions, and his

proofs, where proof is possible, are given in various works of the

Aristotelian school. In short, he believes that the spheres are

animated and intellectual beings, capable of fully comprehending the

principia of their existence; that there exist purely spiritual beings

(Intelligences), which do not reside in corporeal objects, and which

derive existence from God; and that these form the intermediate element

between God and this material world.

In the chapters which follow I will show how far the teaching of

Scripture is in harmony with these views, and how far it differs from

them.

CHAPTER V

Scripture supports the theory that the spheres are animate and

intellectual, i.e., capable of comprehending things; that they are not,

as ignorant persons believe, inanimate masses like fire and earth, but

are, as the philosophers assert, endowed with life, and serve their

Lord, whom they mightily praise and glorify; comp. “The heavens declare

the glory of God,” etc. (Ps. xix. 2). It is a great error to think that

this is a mere figure of speech; for the verbs “to declare” and “to

relate,” when joined together, are, in Hebrew, only used of

intellectual beings. That the Psalmist really means to describe the

heavens’ own doing, in other words, what the spheres actually do, and

not what man thinks of them, may be best inferred from the words,

“There is no speech, nor language, their voice is not heard” (ver. 4).

Here he clearly shows that he describes the heavens themselves as in

reality praising God, and declaring His wonders without words of lip

and tongue. When man praises God in words actually uttered, he only

relates the ideas which he has conceived, but these ideas form the real

praise. The reason why he gives expression to these ideas is to be

found in his desire to communicate them to others, or to make himself

sure that he has truly conceived them. Therefore it is said, “Commune

with your own heart upon your bed, and be still” (Ps. iv. 5). Only

ignorant or obstinate persons would refuse to admit this proof taken

from Scripture.

As to the opinion of our Sages, I do not see any necessity for

expounding or demonstrating it. Consider only the form they gave to the

blessing recited on seeing the new moon, the ideas repeatedly occurring

in the prayers and the remarks in the Midrash on the following and

similar passages:—“And the host of heaven worshippeth thee” (Neh. ix.

6); “When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God

shouted for joy” (Job xxxviii. 7). In Bereshit Rabba, on the

passage—“And the earth was empty and formless” (Gen. i. 2), our Sages

remark as follows: “The words tohu and bohu mean mourning and crying;

the earth mourned and cried on account of her evil lot, saying, ‘I and

the heavens were created together, and yet the beings above live for

ever, and we are mortal.’” Our Sages, by this remark, indicate their

belief that the spheres are animated beings, and not inanimate matter

like the elements.

The opinion of Aristotle, that the spheres are capable of comprehension

and conception, is in accordance with the words of our prophets and our

theologians or Sages. The philosophers further agree that this world

below is governed by influences emanating from the spheres, and that

the latter comprehend and have knowledge of the things which they

influence. This theory is also met with in Scripture; comp. [the stars

and all the host of heaven] “which the Lord thy God hath divided unto

all nations” (Deut. iv. 19), that is to say, the stars, which God

appointed to be the means of governing His creatures, and not the

objects of man’s worship. It has therefore been stated clearly: “And to

rule over the day and over the night” (Gen. i. 18). The term “ruling”

here refers to the power which the spheres possess of governing the

earth, in addition to the property of giving light and darkness. The

latter property is the direct cause of genesis and destruction; it is

described in the words, “And to divide the light from the darkness”

(ibid.). It is impossible to assume that those who rule a thing are

ignorant of that very thing which they rule, if we take “to rule” in

its proper sense. We will add another chapter on this subject.

CHAPTER VI

As for the existence of angels, there is no necessity to cite any proof

from Scripture, where the fact is frequently mentioned. The term elohim

signifies “judges”; comp. “The cause of both parties shall come before

the ‘judges’” (ha-elohim; Exod. xxii. 8). It has been figuratively

applied to angels, and to the Creator as being Judge over the angels.

When God says, “I am the Lord your God,” the pronoun “your” refers to

all mankind; but in the phrase elohe ha-elohim, He is described as the

God of the angels, and in adone ha-adonim, as the Lord of the spheres

and the stars, which are the masters of the rest of the corporeal

creation. The nouns elohim and adonim in these phrases do not refer to

human judges or masters, because these are in rank inferior to the

heavenly bodies; much less do they refer to mankind in general,

including masters and servants, or to objects of stone and wood

worshipped by some as gods; for it is no honour or greatness to God to

be superior to stone, wood, or a piece of metal. The phrases therefore

admit of no other meaning than this: God is the Judge over the judges;

i.e., over the angels, and the Lord over the spheres.

We have already stated above that the angels are incorporeal. This

agrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference in

the names employed—he uses the term “Intelligences,” and we say instead

“angels.” His theory is that the Intelligences are intermediate beings

between the Prime Cause and existing things, and that they effect the

motion of the spheres, on which motion the existence of all things

depends. This is also the view we meet with in all parts of Scripture;

every act of God is described as being performed by angels. But “angel”

means “messenger”; hence every one that is intrusted with a certain

mission is an angel. Even the movements of the brute creation are

sometimes due to the action of an angel, when such movements serve the

purpose of the Creator, who endowed it with the power of performing

that movement; e.g., “God hath sent His angel, and hath shut the lions’

mouths that they have not hurt me” (Dan. vi. 22). Another instance may

be seen in the movements of Balaam’s ass, described as caused by an

angel. The elements are also called angels. Comp. “Who maketh winds His

angels, flaming fire His ministers” (Ps. civ. 4). There is no doubt

that the word “angel” is used of a messenger sent by man; e.g., “And

Jacob sent angels” (Gen. xxxii. 4); of a prophet, e.g., “And an angel

of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim” (Judges ii. 1); “And He sent

an angel, and hath brought us forth out of Egypt” (Num. xx. 16). It is

also used of ideals, perceived by prophets in prophetic visions, and of

man’s animal powers, as will be explained in another place.

When we assert that Scripture teaches that God rules this world through

angels, we mean such angels as are identical with the Intelligences. In

some passages the plural is used of God, e.g., “Let us make man in our

image” (Gen. i. 26); “Go to, let us go down, and there confound their

language” (ibid. xi. 7). Our Sages explain this in the following

manner: God, as it were, does nothing without contemplating the host

above. I wonder at the expression “contemplating,” which is the very

expression used by Plato: God, as it were, “contemplates the world of

ideals, and thus produces the existing beings.” In other passages our

Sages expressed it more decidedly: “God does nothing without consulting

the host above” (the word familia, used in the original, is a Greek

noun, and signifies “host”). On the words, “what they have already

made” (Eccles. ii. 12), the following remark is made in Bereshit Rabba

and in Midrash Koheleth: “It is not said ‘what He has made,’ but ‘what

they have made’; hence we infer that He, as it were, with His court,

have agreed upon the form of each of the limbs of man before placing it

in its position, as it is said, ‘He hath made thee and established

thee’” (Deut. xxxii. 6). In Bereshit Rabba (chap. li.) it is also

stated, that wherever the term “and the Lord” occurred in Scripture,

the Lord with His court is to be understood. These passages do not

convey the idea that God spoke, thought, reflected, or that He

consulted and employed the opinion of other beings, as ignorant persons

have believed. How could the Creator be assisted by those whom He

created! They only show that all parts of the Universe, even the limbs

of animals in their actual form, are produced through angels; for

natural forces and angels are identical. How bad and injurious is the

blindness of ignorance! Say to a person who is believed to belong to

the wise men of Israel that the Almighty sends His angel to enter the

womb of a woman and to form there the fœtus, he will be satisfied with

the account; he will believe it, and even find in it a description of

the greatness of God’s might and wisdom; although he believes that the

angel consists of burning fire, and is as big as a third part of the

Universe, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tell

him that God gave the seed a formative power which produces and shapes

the limbs, and that this power is called “angel,” or that all forms are

the result of the influence of the Active Intellect, and that the

latter is the angel, the Prince of the world, frequently mentioned by

our Sages, and he will turn away; because he cannot comprehend the true

greatness and power of creating forces that act in a body without being

perceived by our senses. Our Sages have already stated—for him who has

understanding—that all forces that reside in a body are angels, much

more the forces that are active in the Universe. The theory that each

force acts only in one particular way, is expressed in Bereshit Rabba

(chap. l.) as follows: “One angel does not perform two things, and two

angels do not perform one thing”; this is exactly the property of all

forces. We may find a confirmation of the opinion that the natural and

psychical forces of an individual are called angels in a statement of

our Sages which is frequently quoted, and occurs originally in Bereshit

Rabba (chap. lxxviii.): “Every day God creates a legion of angels; they

sing before Him, and disappear.” When, in opposition to this statement,

other statements were quoted to the effect that angels are eternal—and,

in fact, it has repeatedly been shown that they live permanently—the

reply has been given that some angels live permanently, others perish;

and this is really the case; for individual forces are transient,

whilst the genera are permanent and imperishable. Again, we read (in

Bereshit Rabba, chap. lxxxv.), in reference to the relation between

Judah and Tamar: “R. Jochanan said that Judah was about to pass by

[without noticing Tamar], but God caused the angel of lust, i.e., the

libidinous disposition, to present himself to him.” Man’s disposition

is here called an angel. Likewise we frequently meet with the phrase

“the angel set over a certain thing.” In Midrash-Koheleth (on Eccles.

x. 7) the following passage occurs: “When man sleeps, his soul speaks

to the angel, the angel to the cherub.” The intelligent reader will

find here a clear statement that man’s imaginative faculty is also

called “angel,” and that “cherub” is used for man’s intellectual

faculty. How beautiful must this appear to him who understands it; how

absurd to the ignorant!

We have already stated that the forms in which angels appear form part

of the prophetic vision. Some prophets see angels in the form of man,

e.g., “And behold three men stood by him” (Gen. xviii. 2); others

perceive an angel as a fearful and terrible being, e.g., “And his

countenance was as the countenance of an angel of God, very terrible”

(Judges xiii. 6); others see them as fire, e.g., “And the angel of the

Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire” (Exod. iii. 2). In Bereshit

Rabba (chap. 1.) the following remark occurs: “To Abraham, whose

prophetic power was great, the angels appeared in the form of men; to

Lot, whose power was weak, they appeared as angels.” This is an

important principle as regards Prophecy; it will be fully discussed

when we treat of that subject (chap. xxxii. sqq.). Another passage in

Bereshit Rabba (ibid.) runs thus: “Before the angels have accomplished

their task they are called men, when they have accomplished it they are

angels.” Consider how clearly they say that the term “angel” signifies

nothing but a certain action, and that every appearance of an angel is

part of a prophetic vision, depending on the capacity of the person

that perceives it.

There is nothing in the opinion of Aristotle on this subject contrary

to the teaching of Scripture. The whole difference between him and

ourselves is this: he believes all these beings to be eternal,

co-existing with the First Cause as its necessary effect; but we

believe that they have had a beginning, that God created the

Intelligences, and gave the spheres the capacity of seeking to become

like them; that in creating the Intelligences and the spheres, He

endowed them with their governing powers. In this point we differ from

him.

In the course of this treatise we shall give his theory as well as the

theory of Creatio ex nihilo taught in Scripture.

CHAPTER VII

We have already explained that the term “angel” is a homonym, and is

used of the intellectual beings, the spheres, and the elements; for all

these are engaged in performing a divine command. But do not imagine

that the Intelligences and the spheres are like other forces which

reside in bodies and act by the laws of nature without being conscious

of what they do. The spheres and the Intelligences are conscious of

their actions, and select by their own free will the objects of their

influence, although not in the same manner as we exercise free will and

rule over other things, which only concern temporary beings. I have

been led to adopt this theory by certain passages in Scripture; e.g.,

an angel says to Lot: “For I cannot do anything,” etc. (Gen. xix. 21);

and telling him to deliver himself, the angel says: “Behold I have

accepted thee concerning this thing” (ver. 21). Again: “Take heed

before him, and listen to his voice,” etc. (Exod. xxiii. 21). These

passages show that angels are conscious of what they do, and have free

will in the sphere of action intrusted to them, just as we have free

will within our province, and in accordance with the power given to us

with our very existence. The difference is that what we do is the

lowest stage of excellence, and that our influence and actions are

preceded by non-action; whilst the Intelligences and the spheres always

perform that which is good, they contain nothing except what is good

and perfect, as will be shown further on, and they have continually

been active from the beginning.

CHAPTER VIII

It is one of the ancient beliefs, both among the philosophers and other

people, that the motions of the spheres produced mighty and fearful

sounds. They observed how little objects produced by rapid motion a

loud, shrilling, and terrifying noise, and concluded that this must to

a far higher degree be the case with the bodies of the sun, the moon

and the stars, considering their greatness and their velocity. The

Pythagoreans believed that the sounds were pleasant, and, though loud,

had the same proportions to each other as the musical notes. They also

explained why these mighty and tremendous sounds are not heard by us.

This belief is also widespread in our nation. Thus our Sages describe

the greatness of the sound produced by the sun in the daily circuit in

its orbit. The same description could be given of all heavenly bodies.

Aristotle, however, rejects this, and holds that they produce no

sounds. You will find his opinion in the book The Heavens and the World

(De Cœlo). You must not find it strange that Aristotle differs here

from the opinion of our Sages. The theory of the music of the spheres

is connected with the theory of the motion of the stars in a fixed

sphere, and our Sages have, in this astronomical question, abandoned

their own theory in favour of the theory of others. Thus, it is

distinctly stated, “The wise men of other nations have defeated the

wise men of Israel.” It is quite right that our Sages have abandoned

their own theory; for speculative matters every one treats according to

the results of his own study, and every one accepts that which appears

to him established by proof.

CHAPTER IX

We have stated above that in the age of Aristotle the number of spheres

was not accurately known; and that those who at present count nine

spheres consider a sphere containing several rotating circles as one, a

fact well known to all who have a knowledge of astronomy. We need,

therefore, not reject the opinion of those who assume two spheres in

accordance with the words of Scripture: “Behold the heaven and the

heaven of heavens are the Lord’s” (Deut. x. 14). They reckon all the

spheres with stars, i.e., with all the circles in which the stars move,

as one; the all-encompassing sphere in which there are no stars, is

regarded by them as the second; hence they maintain that there are two

spheres.

I will here introduce an explanation which is necessary for the

understanding of our view on the present subject. There is a difference

among ancient astronomers whether the spheres of Mercury and Venus are

above or below the sun, because no proof can be given for the position

of these two spheres. At first it was generally assumed that they were

above the sun—note this well; later on Ptolemy maintained that they

were below the sun; because he believed that in this manner the whole

arrangement of the spheres would be most reasonable; the sun would be

in the middle, having three stars below and three above itself. More

recently some Andalusian scholars concluded, from certain principles

laid down by Ptolemy, that Venus and Mercury were above the sun. Ibn

Aflaḥ of Seville, with whose son I was acquainted, has written a famous

book on the subject; also the excellent philosopher Abu-Bekr

ibn-Alẓaig, one of whose pupils was my fellow-student, has treated of

this subject and offered certain proofs—which we have copied—of the

improbability of Venus and Mercury being above the sun. The proofs

given by Abu-Bekr show only the improbability, not the impossibility.

In short, whether it be so or not, the ancients placed Venus and

Mercury above the sun, and had, therefore, the following five spheres:

that of the moon, which is undoubtedly the nearest to us; that of the

sun, which is, of course, above the former; then that of the five

planets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and the outermost sphere, which

does not contain any star. Consequently there are four spheres

containing figures, i.e., stars, which were called figures by the

ancients in their well-known works—viz., the spheres of the fixed

stars, of the five planets, of the sun, and of the moon; above these

there is one sphere which is empty, without any star. This number is

for me of great importance in respect to an idea which none of the

philosophers clearly stated, though I was led to it by various

utterances of the philosophers and of our Sages. I will now state the

idea and expound it.

CHAPTER X

It is a well-known fact that the philosophers, when they discuss in

their works the order of the Universe, assume that the existing order

of things in this sublunary world of transient beings depends on forces

which emanate from the spheres. We have mentioned this several times.

In like manner our Sages say, “There is no single herb below without

its corresponding star above, that beats upon it and commands it to

grow.” Comp. “Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven? Canst thou set the

dominion thereof in the earth?” (Job xxxviii. 33). The term mazzal,

literally meaning a constellation in the Zodiac, is also used of every

star, as may be inferred from the following passage in the beginning of

Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.): “While one star (mazzal) completes its

circuit in thirty days, another completes it in thirty years.” They

have thus clearly expressed it, that even each individual being in this

world has its corresponding star. Although the influences of the

spheres extend over all beings, there is besides the influence of a

particular star directed to each particular species; a fact noticed

also in reference to the several forces in one organic body; for the

whole Universe is like one organic body, as we have stated above. Thus

the philosophers speak of the peculiar influence of the moon on the

particular element water. That this is the case is proved by the

increase and decrease of the water in the seas and rivers according to

the increase and decrease of the moon; also by the rising and the

falling of the seas according to the advance or return of the moon,

i.e., her ascending and her descending in the several quarters of her

course. This is dear to every one who has directed his attention to

these phenomena. The influence of the sun’s rays upon fire may easily

be noticed in the increase of heat or cold on earth, according as the

sun approaches the earth or recedes or is concealed from it. All this

is so clear that I need not explain it further. Now it occurred to my

mind that the four spheres which contain stars exercise influence upon

all beings on earth that come into existence, and, in fact, are the

cause of their existence; but each of the four spheres is the exclusive

source of the properties of one only of the four elements, and becomes

by its own motion the cause of the motion and changes of that element.

Thus water is set in motion by the moon-sphere, fire by the sun-sphere,

air by the other planets, which move in many and different courses with

retrogressions, progressions, and stations, and therefore produce the

various forms of the air with its frequent changes, contractions, and

expansions; the sphere of the other stars, namely, the fixed stars,

sets earth in motion; and it may be that on this account, viz., on

account of the slow motion of the fixed stars, earth is but slowly set

in motion to change and to combine with other elements. The particular

influence which the fixed stars exercise upon earth is implied in the

saying of our Sages, that the number of the species of plants is the

same as that of the individuals included in the general term “stars.”

The arrangement of the Universe may therefore be assumed to be as

follows: there are four spheres, four elements set in motion by them,

and also four principal properties which earthly beings derive from

them, as has been stated above. Furthermore, there are four causes of

the motion of every sphere, namely, the following four essential

elements in the sphere; its spherical shape, its soul, its intellect,

by which the sphere is capable of forming ideas, and the Intelligence,

which the sphere desires to imitate. Note this well. The explanation of

what I said is this: the sphere could not have been continuously in

motion, had it not this peculiar form; continuity of motion is only

possible when the motion is circular. Rectilinear motion, even if

frequently repeated in the same moment, cannot be continuous; for when

a body moves successively in two opposite directions, it must pass

through a moment of rest, as has been demonstrated in its proper place.

The necessity of a continuous motion constantly repeated in the same

path implies the necessity of a circular form. The spheres must have a

soul; for only animate beings can move freely. There must be some cause

for the motion, and as it does not consist in the fear of that which is

injurious, or the desire of that which is profitable, it must be found

in the notion which the spheres form of a certain being, and in the

desire to approach that being. This formation of a notion demands, in

the first place, that the spheres possess intellect; it demands further

that something exists which corresponds to that notion, and which the

spheres desire to approach. These are the four causes of the motion of

the spheres. The following are the four principal forces directly

derived from the spheres: the nature of minerals, the properties

peculiar to plants, the animal faculties, and the intellect. An

examination of these forces shows that they have two functions, namely,

to produce things and to perpetuate them; that is to say, to preserve

the species perpetually, and the individuals in each species for a

certain time. These are also the functions ascribed to Nature, which is

said to be wise, to govern the Universe, to provide, as it were, by

plan for the production of living beings, and to provide also for their

preservation and perpetuation. Nature creates formative faculties,

which are the cause of the production of living beings, and nutritive

faculties as the source of their temporal existence and preservation.

It may be that by Nature the Divine Will is meant, which is the origin

of these two kinds of faculties through the medium of the spheres.

As to the number four, it is strange, and demands our attention. In

Midrash Tanḥuma the following passage occurs: “How many steps were in

Jacob’s ladder?—Four.” The question refers to the verse, “And behold a

ladder set upon the earth,” etc. (Gen. xxviii. 12). In all the

Midrashim it is stated that there were four hosts of angels; this

statement is frequently repeated. Some read in the above passage: “How

many steps were in the ladder?—Seven.” But all readings and all

Midrashim unanimously express that the angels whom Jacob saw ascending

the ladder, and descending, were only four; two of whom were going up

and two coming down. These four angels, the two that went up and the

two that came down, occupied one step of the ladder, standing in one

line. Hence it has been inferred that the breadth of the ladder in this

vision was four-thirds of the world. For the breadth of an angel in a

prophetic vision is equal to one-third of the world; comp. “And his

body was like tarshish (two-sixths)” (Dan. x. 6); the four angels

therefore occupied four-thirds of the world.—Zechariah, in describing

the allegorical vision of “the four chariots that came out from between

two mountains, which mountains were mountains of brass” (Zech. vi. 1),

adds the explanation, “These are the four spirits of the heavens which

go forth from standing before the Lord of all the earth” (ibid. ver.

5). By these four spirits the causes are meant which produce all

changes in the Universe. The term “brass” (neḥoshet), employed here,

and the phrase “burnished brass” (neḥoshet kalal), used by Ezekiel (i.

7), are to some extent homonymous, and will be discussed further on.

The saying of our Sages, that the angel is as broad as the third part

of the Universe, or, in the words of Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.), that

the angel is the third part of the world, is quite clear; we have

already explained it in our large work on the Holy Law. The whole

creation consists of three parts, (1) the pure intelligences, or

angels; (2) the bodies of the spheres; and (3) the materia prima, or

the bodies which are below the spheres, and are subject to constant

change.

In this manner may those understand the dark sayings of the prophets

who desire to understand them, who awake from the sleep of

forgetfulness, deliver themselves from the sea of ignorance, and raise

themselves upward nearer the higher beings. But those who prefer to

swim in the waters of their ignorance, and to “go down very low,” need

not exert the body or heart; they need only cease to move, and they

will go down by the law of nature. Note and consider well all we have

said.

CHAPTER XI

When a simple mathematician reads and studies these astronomical

discussions, he believes that the form and the number of the spheres

are facts established by proof. But this is not the case; for the

science of astronomy does not aim at demonstrating them, although it

includes subjects that can be proved; e.g., it has been proved that the

path of the sun is inclined against the equator; this cannot be

doubted. But it has not yet been decided whether the sphere of the sun

is excentric or contains a revolving epicycle, and the astronomer does

not take notice of this uncertainty, for his object is simply to find

an hypothesis that would lead to a uniform and circular motion of the

stars without acceleration, retardation, or change, and which is in its

effects in accordance with observation. He will, besides, endeavour to

find such an hypothesis which would require the least complicated

motion and the least number of spheres; he will therefore prefer an

hypothesis which would explain all the phenomena of the stars by means

of three spheres to an hypothesis which would require four spheres.

From this reason we adopt, in reference to the circuit of the sun, the

theory of excentricity, and reject the epicyclic revolution assumed by

Ptolemy. When we therefore perceive that all fixed stars move in the

same way uniformly, without the least difference, we conclude that they

are all in one sphere. It is, however, not impossible that the stars

should have each its own sphere, with a separate centre, and yet move

in the same way. If this theory be accepted, a number of Intelligences

must be assumed, equal to that of the stars, and therefore Scripture

says in reference to them, “Is there any number of his armies?” (Job

xxv. 3); for the Intelligences, the heavenly bodies, and the natural

forces, are called the armies of God. Nevertheless the species of the

stars can be numbered, and therefore we would still be justified in

counting the spheres of the fixed stars collectively as one, just as

the five spheres of the planets, together with the numerous spheres

they contain, are regarded by us as one. Our object in adopting this

number is, as you have noticed, to divide the influences which we can

trace in the Universe according to their general character, without

desiring to fix the number of the Intelligences and the spheres. All we

wish to point out is this: in the first place, that the whole Creation

is divided into three parts, viz. (1) the pure Intelligences; (2) the

bodies of the spheres endowed with permanent forms—(the forms of these

bodies do not pass from one substratum to another, nor do their

substrata undergo any change whatever); and (3) the transient earthly

beings, all of which consist of the same substance. Furthermore, we

desire to show that the ruling power emanates from the Creator, and is

received by the Intelligences according to their order; from the

Intelligences part of the good and the light bestowed upon them is

communicated to the spheres, and the latter, being in possession of the

abundance obtained of the Intelligences, transmit forces and properties

unto the beings of this transient world. We must, however, add that the

part which benefits the part below it in the order described does not

exist for the sole purpose of producing that benefit. For if this were

the case it would lead to the paradox that the higher, better, and

nobler beings existed for the sake of beings lower in rank, whilst in

reality the object should be of greater importance than the means

applied for attaining it. No intelligent person will admit that this is

possible. The nature of the influence which one part of the Creation

exercises upon another must be explained as follows: A thing perfect in

a certain way is either perfect only in itself, without being able to

communicate that perfection to another being, or it is so perfect that

it is capable of imparting perfection to another being. A person may

possess wealth sufficient for his own wants without being able to spare

anything for another, or he may have wealth enough to benefit also

other people, or even to enrich them to such an extent as would enable

them to give part of their property to others. In the same manner the

creative act of the Almighty in giving existence to pure Intelligences

endows the first of them with the power of giving existence to another,

and so on, down to the Active Intellect, the lowest of the purely

spiritual beings. Besides producing other Intelligences, each

Intelligence gives existence to one of the spheres, from the highest

down to the lowest, which is the sphere of the moon. After the latter

follows this transient world, i.e., the materia prima, and all that has

been formed of it. In this manner the elements receive certain

properties from each sphere, and a succession of genesis and

destruction is produced.

We have already mentioned that these theories are not opposed to

anything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages. Our nation is wise and

perfect, as has been declared by the Most High, through Moses, who made

us perfect: “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding

people” (Deut. iv. 6). But when wicked barbarians have deprived us of

our possessions, put an end to our science and literature, and killed

our wise men, we have become ignorant; this has been foretold by the

prophets, when they pronounced the punishment for our sins: “The wisdom

of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent

men shall be hid” (Isa. xxix. 14). We are mixed up with other nations;

we have learnt their opinions, and followed their ways and acts. The

Psalmist, deploring this imitation of the actions of other nations,

says, “They were mingled among the nations, and learned their works”

(Ps. cvi. 35). Isaiah likewise complains that the Israelites adopted

the opinions of their neighbours, and says, “And they please themselves

in the children of strangers” (Isa. ii. 6); or, according to the

Aramaic version of Jonathan, son of Uzziel, “And they walk in the ways

of the nations.” Having been brought up among persons untrained in

philosophy, we are inclined to consider these philosophical opinions as

foreign to our religion, just as uneducated persons find them foreign

to their own notions. But, in fact, it is not so.

Since we have repeatedly spoken of the influence emanating from God and

the Intelligences, we will now proceed to explain what is the true

meaning of this influence, and after that I will discuss the theory of

the Creation.

CHAPTER XII

It is clear that whenever a thing is produced, an efficient cause must

exist for the production of the thing that has not existed previously.

This immediate efficient cause is either corporeal or incorporeal; if

corporeal, it is not the efficient cause on account of its

corporeality, but on account of its being an individual corporeal

object, and therefore by means of its form. I will speak of this

subject later on. The immediate efficient cause of a thing may again be

the effect of some cause, and so on, but not ad infinitum. The series

of causes for a certain product must necessarily conclude with a First

Cause, which is the true cause of that product, and whose existence is

not due to another cause. The question remains, Why has this thing been

produced now and not long before, since the cause has always been in

existence? The answer is, that a certain relation between cause and

product has been absent, if the cause be corporeal; or, that the

substance has not been sufficiently prepared, if the cause be

incorporeal. All this is in accordance with the teachings of natural

science. We ignore for the present the question whether to assume the

Eternity of the Universe, or the Creatio ex nihilo. We do not intend to

discuss the question here.

In Physics it has been shown that a body in acting upon another body

must either directly be in contact with it, or indirectly through the

medium of other bodies. E.g., a body that has been heated has been in

contact with fire, or the air that surrounds the body has been heated

by the fire, and has communicated the heat to the body; the immediate

cause of the heat in this body is the corporeal substance of the heated

air. The magnet attracts iron from a distance through a certain force

communicated to the air round the iron. The magnet does therefore not

act at all distances, just as fire does not act at every distance, but

only as long as the air between the fire and the object is affected by

the fire. When the air is no longer affected by the fire which is under

a piece of wax, the latter does not melt. The same is the case with

magnetism. When an object that has previously not been warm has now

become warm, the cause of its heat must now have been created; either

some fire has been produced, or the distance of the fire from the

object has been changed, and the altered relation between the fire and

the object is the cause now created. In a similar manner we find the

causes of all changes in the Universe to be changes in the combination

of the elements that act upon each other when one body approaches

another or separates from it. There are, however, changes which are not

connected with the combination of the elements, but concern only the

forms of the things; they require likewise an efficient cause; there

must exist a force that produces the various forms. This cause is

incorporeal, for that which produces form must itself be abstract form,

as has been shown in its proper place. I have also indicated the proof

of this theorem in previous chapters. The following may, in addition,

serve to illustrate it: All combinations of the elements are subject to

increase and decrease, and this change takes place gradually. It is

different with forms; they do not change gradually, and are therefore

without motion; they appear and disappear instantaneously, and are

consequently not the result of the combination of corporeal elements.

This combination merely prepares matter for receiving a certain form.

The efficient cause which produces the form is indivisible, because it

is of the same kind as the thing produced. Hence it may be concluded

that the agent that has produced a certain form, or given it to a

certain substance, must itself be an abstract form. The action of this

incorporeal agent cannot depend on a certain relation to the corporeal

product; being incorporeal, it cannot approach a body, or recede from

it; nor can a body approach the incorporeal agent, or recede from it,

because there is no relation of distance between corporeal and

incorporeal beings. The reason why the action has not taken place

before must be sought in the circumstance that the substance has not

been prepared for the action of the abstract form.

It is now clear that the action of bodies upon each other, according to

their forms, prepares the substance for receiving the action of an

incorporeal being, or Form. The existence of actions of purely

incorporeal beings, in every case of change that does not originate in

the mere combination of elements, is now firmly established. These

actions do not depend on impact, or on a certain distance. They are

termed “influence” (or “emanation”), on account of their similarity to

a water-spring. The latter sends forth water in all directions, has no

peculiar side for receiving or spending its contents; it springs forth

on all sides, and continually waters both neighbouring and distant

places. In a similar manner incorporeal beings, in receiving power and

imparting it to others, are not limited to a particular side, distance,

or time. They act continually; and whenever an object is sufficiently

prepared, it receives the effect of that continuous action, called

“influence” (or “emanation”). God being incorporeal, and everything

being the work of Him as the efficient cause, we say that the Universe

has been created by the Divine influence, and that all changes in the

Universe emanate from Him. In the same sense we say that He caused

wisdom to emanate from Him and to come upon the prophets. In all such

cases we merely wish to express that an incorporeal Being, whose action

we call “influence,” has produced a certain effect. The term

“influence” has been considered applicable to the Creator on account of

the similarity between His actions and those of a spring. There is no

better way of describing the action of an incorporeal being than by

this analogy; and no term can be found that would accurately describe

it. For it is as difficult to form an idea of that action as to form an

idea of the incorporeal being itself. As we imagine only bodies or

forces residing in bodies, so we only imagine actions possible when the

agent is near, at a certain distance, and on a particular side. There

are therefore persons who, on learning that God is incorporeal, or that

He does not approach the object of His action, believe that He gives

commands to angels, and that the latter carry them out by approach or

direct contact, as is the case when we produce something. These persons

thus imagine also the angels as bodies. Some of them, further, believe

that God commands an action in words consisting, like ours, of letters

and sound, and that thereby the action is done. All this is the work of

the imagination, which is, in fact, identical with “evil inclination.”

For all our defects in speech or in character are either the direct or

the indirect work of imagination. This is not the subject of the

present chapter, in which we only intended to explain the term

“influence” in so far as it is applied to incorporeal beings, namely,

to God and to the Intelligences or angels. But the term is also applied

to the forces of the spheres in their effects upon the earth; and we

speak of the “influence” of the spheres, although the spheres are

corporeal, and the stars, being corporeal, only act at certain

distances, i.e., at a smaller or a greater distance from the centre, or

at a definite distance from each other, a circumstance which led to

Astrology.

As to our assertion that Scripture applies the notion of “influence” to

God, compare “They have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters”

(Jer. ii. 13), i.e., the Divine influence that gives life or existence,

for the two are undoubtedly identical. Further, “For with Thee is the

fountain of life” (Ps. xxxvi. 10), i.e., the Divine influence that

gives existence. The concluding words of this verse, “in Thy light we

see light,” express exactly what we said, namely, that by the influence

of the intellect which emanates from God we become wise, by it we are

guided and enabled to comprehend the Active Intellect. Note this.

CHAPTER XIII

Among those who believe in the existence of God, there are found three

different theories as regards the question whether the Universe is

eternal or not.

First Theory.—Those who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, hold that

the whole Universe, i.e., everything except God, has been brought by

Him into existence out of non-existence. In the beginning God alone

existed, and nothing else; neither angels, nor spheres, nor the things

that are contained within the spheres existed. He then produced from

nothing all existing things such as they are, by His will and desire.

Even time itself is among the things created; for time depends on

motion, i.e., on an accident in things which move, and the things upon

whose motion time depends are themselves created beings, which have

passed from non-existence into existence. We say that God existed

before the creation of the Universe, although the verb existed appears

to imply the notion of time; we also believe that He existed an

infinite space of time before the Universe was created; but in these

cases we do not mean time in its true sense. We only use the term to

signify something analogous or similar to time. For time is undoubtedly

an accident, and, according to our opinion, one of the created

accidents, like blackness and whiteness; it is not a quality, but an

accident connected with motion. This must be clear to all who

understand what Aristotle has said on time and its real existence.

The following remark does not form an essential part of our present

research; it will nevertheless be found useful in the course of this

discussion. Many scholars do not know what time really is, and men like

Galen were so perplexed about it that they asked whether time has a

real existence or not; the reason for this uncertainty is to be found

in the circumstance that time is an accident of an accident. Accidents

which are directly connected with material bodies, e.g., colour and

taste, are easily understood, and correct notions are formed of them.

There are, however, accidents which are connected with other accidents,

e.g., the splendour of colour, or the inclination and the curvature of

a line; of these it is very difficult to form a correct notion,

especially when the accident which forms the substratum for the other

accident is not constant but variable. Both difficulties are present in

the notion of time: it is an accident of motion, which is itself an

accident of a moving object; besides, it is not a fixed property; on

the contrary, its true and essential condition is, not to remain in the

same state for two consecutive moments. This is the source of ignorance

about the nature of time.

We consider time a thing created; it comes into existence in the same

manner as other accidents, and the substances which form the substratum

for the accidents. For this reason, viz., because time belongs to the

things created, it cannot be said that God produced the Universe in the

beginning. Consider this well; for he who does not understand it is

unable to refute forcible objections raised against the theory of

Creatio ex nihilo. If you admit the existence of time before the

Creation, you will be compelled to accept the theory of the Eternity of

the Universe. For time is an accident and requires a substratum. You

will therefore have to assume that something [beside God] existed

before this Universe was created, an assumption which it is our duty to

oppose.

This is the first theory, and it is undoubtedly a fundamental principle

of the Law of our teacher Moses; it is next in importance to the

principle of God’s unity. Do not follow any other theory. Abraham, our

father, was the first that taught it, after he had established it by

philosophical research. He proclaimed, therefore, “the name of the Lord

the God of the Universe” (Gen. xxi. 33); and he had previously

expressed this theory in the words, “The Possessor of heaven and earth”

(ibid. xiv. 22).