We have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise that
everything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to be negatived
in reference to God, for all passiveness implies change; and the agent
producing that state is undoubtedly different from the object affected
by it; and if God could be affected in any way whatever, another being
beside Him would act on Him and cause change in Him. All kinds of
non-existence must likewise be negatived in reference to Him; no
perfection whatever can therefore be imagined to be at one time absent
from Him, and at another present in Him: for if this were the case, He
would [at a certain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality
always implies non-existence, and when anything has to pass from
potentiality into reality, another thing that exists in reality is
required to effect that transition. Hence it follows that all
perfections must really exist in God, and none of them must in any way
be a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise to be denied in
reference to God, is similarity to any existing being. This has been
generally accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of the Prophets;
e.g., “To whom, then, will you liken me?” (Isa. xl. 25); “To whom,
then, will you liken God?” (ib. 18); “There is none like unto Thee”
(Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind are frequent. In short, it is
necessary to demonstrate by proof that nothing can be predicated of God
that implies any of the following four things: corporeality, emotion or
change, non-existence,—e.g., that something would be potential at one
time and real at another—and similarity with any of His creatures. In
this respect our knowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural
Science. For he who is ignorant of the latter cannot understand the
defect implied in emotions, the difference between potentiality and
reality, the non-existence implied in all potentiality, the inferiority
of a thing that exists in potentiâ to that which moves in order to
cause its transition from potentiality into reality, and the
inferiority of that which moves for this purpose compared with its
condition when the transition has been effected. He who knows these
things, but without their proofs, does not know the details which
logically result from these general propositions; and therefore he
cannot prove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned above
are inadmissible in reference to God.
Having premised these remarks, I shall explain in the next chapter the
error of those who believe that God has essential attributes; those who
have some knowledge of Logic and Natural Science will understand it.