are founded on a mistaken belief of the passages referred to;
particularly of the passage in which Christ is thought to forbid Mary
Magdalene to touch him; of another, in which he calls to Thomas to
examine his wounds; and probably of a third, relating to Christ's
conversation with his disciples on the road, without being known by
them.
As to other passages which relate his appearing and disappearing,
and coming in when the doors were shut, it is said, that no conclusion
can be drawn from them against the reality of Christ's body: that these
things might happen many ways, and yet the body be real; which is the
only point to which the present objection extends: that there might be
in this, and probably was, something miraculous; but nothing more
wonderful than what happened on another occasion in his lifetime, where
the Gentleman who makes the objection allows him to have had a real
body.
I mention these things but briefly, just to bring the course of
the argument to your remembrance.
The next objection is taken from hence, That Christ did not
appear publickly to the people, and particularly to the chief priests
and rulers of the Jews. It is said, that his commission related to
them in an especial manner; and that it appears strange, that the main
proof of his mission, the resurrection, should not be laid before them;
but that witnesses should be picked and culled to see this mighty
wonder. This is the force of the objection.
To which it is answered, First, That the particular commission to
the Jews expired at the death of Christ; and therefore the Jews had, on
this account, no claim for any particular evidence. And it is
insisted, that Christ, before his death, declared, the Jews should not
see him, till they were better disposed to receive him.
Secondly, That as the whole world had a concern in the
resurrection of Christ, it was necessary to prepare a proper evidence
for the whole world; which was not to be done by any particular
satisfaction given to the people of the Jews, or their rulers.
Thirdly, That as to the chosen witnesses, it is a mistake to
think that they were chosen as the only persons to see Christ after the
resurrection; and that in truth many others did see him: but that the
witnesses were chosen as proper persons to bear testimony to all
people; an office to which many others who did see Christ, were not
particularly commissioned. That making choice of proper and credible
witnesses, was so far from being a ground of just suspicion, that it is
in all cases the most proper way to exclude suspicion..
The next objection is pointed against the evidence of the angels,
and the women. It is said, That history reports, that the women saw
young men at the sepulchre; that they were advanced into angels, merely
through the fear and superstition of the women: that, at the best, this
is but a story of an apparition; a thing in times of ignorance much
talked of, but in the days of knowledge never heard of.
In answer to this, it is said, That the angels are not properly
reckoned among the witnesses of the resurrection; they were not in the
number of the chosen witnesses, or sent to bear testimony in the world:
that they were indeed ministers of God appointed to attend the
resurrection: that God has such ministers, cannot be reasonably
doubted; nor can it be objected, that they were improperly employed, or
below their dignity, in attending on the resurrection of Christ: that
we believe them to be angels, not on the report of the women, but upon
the credit of the evangelist who affirms it: that what is said of
apparitions on this occasion, may pass for wit and ridicule, but yields
not reason or argument.
The objection to the women was, I think, only that they were
women; which was strengthened by calling them silly women.
It was answered, That women have eyes and ears as well as men,
and can tell what they see and hear. And it happened in this case,
that the women were so far from being credulous, that they believed not
the angels, and hardly believed their own report. However, that the
women are none of the chosen witnesses; and if they were, the evidence
of the men cannot be set aside, because women saw what they saw..
This is the substance of the objections and the answers.
The council for the apostles insisted further, That they gave the
greatest assurance to the world that possibly could be given, of their
sincere dealing, by suffering all kinds of hardship, and at last death
itself, in confirmation of the truth of their evidence.
The council for Woolston, in reply to this, told you, That all
religions, whether true or false, had had their martyrs; that no
opinion, however absurd, can be named, but some have been content to
die for it; and then concluded, that suffering is no evidence of the
truth of the opinions for which men suffer.
To clear this matter to you, I must observe how this case stands.
You have heard often, in the course of this argument, that the apostles
were witnesses chosen to bear testimony to the resurrection; and, for
that reason, had the fullest evidence themselves of the truth of it;
not merely by seeing Christ once or twice after his death, but by
frequent conversations with him for forty days together, before his
ascension. That this was their proper business, appears plainly from
history; where we find, that to ordain an apostle, was the same thing
as ordaining one to be a witness of the resurrection.[Acts 1:22] If
you look further, to the preaching of the apostles, you will find this
was the great article insisted on [Acts 2:22, 3:15, 4:10, 5:30]. And
St. Paul knew the weight of this article, and the necessity of teaching
it, when he said, If Christ be not risen, our faith is vain. You see,
then, that the thing which the apostles testified, and the thing for
which they suffered, was the truth of the resurrection; which is a mere
matter of fact.
Consider now how the objection stands. The council for Woolston
tells you, that it is common for men to die for false opinions; and he
tells you nothing but the truth. But even in those cases their
suffering is an evidence of their sincerity; and it would be very hard
to charge men who die for the doctrine they profess, with insincerity
in the profession. Mistaken they may be; but every mistaken man is not
a cheat. Now, if you will allow the suffering of the apostles to prove
their sincerity, which you cannot well disallow; and consider that they
died for the truth of a matter of fact which they had seen themselves,
you will perceive how strong the evidence is in this case. In
doctrines, and matters of opinion, men mistake perpetually; and it is
no reason for me to take up with another man's opinion, because I am
persuaded he is sincere in it. But when a man reports to me an uncommon
fact, yet such an one as in its own nature is a plain object of sense;
if I believe him not, it is not because I suspect his eyes, or his
sense of feeling, but merely because I suspect his sincerity: for if I
was to see the same thing myself, I should believe myself; and
therefore my suspicion does not arise from the inability of human
senses to judge in the case, but from a doubt of the sincerity of the
reporter. In such cases, therefore, there wants nothing to be proved,
but only the sincerity of the reporter: and since voluntary sufferings
for the truth, is at least a proof of sincerity; the sufferings of the
apostles for the truth of the resurrection, is a full and
unexceptionable proof.
The council for Woolston was sensible of this difference; and
therefore he added, that there are many instances of men's suffering
and dying in an obstinate denial of the truth of facts plainly proved.
This observation is also true. I remember a story of a man who endured
with great constancy all the tortures of the rack, denying the fact
with which he was charged. When he was asked afterwards, how he could
hold out against all the tortures? He answered, I had painted a gallows
upon the toe of my shoe, and when the rack stretched me, I looked on
the gallows, and bore the pain, to save my life. This man denied a
plain fact, under great torture; but you see a reason for it. In other
cases, when criminals persist in denying their crimes, they often do
it, and there is a reason to suspect they do it always, in hopes of a
pardon or reprieve. But what are these instances to the present
purpose? All these men suffer against their will, and for their
crimes; and their obstinacy is built on the hope of escaping, by moving
the compassion of the government. Can the Gentleman give any instances
of persons who died willingly in attestation of a false fact? We have
had in England some weak enough to die for the Pope's supremacy; but do
you think a man could be found to die in proof of the Pope's being
actually on the throne of England?
Now, the apostles died in asserting the truth of Christ's
resurrection. It was always in their power to quit their evidence and
save their lives. Even their bitterest enemies, the Jews, required no
more of them than to be silent. [Acts 4:17, 5:28] Others have denied
facts, or asserted facts, in hopes of saving their lives, when they
were under sentence of death: but these men attested a fact at the
expence of their lives, which they might have saved by denying the
truth. So that between criminals dying, and denying plain facts, and
the apostles dying for their testimony, there is this material
difference: criminals deny the truth in hopes of saving their lives;
the apostles willingly parted with their lives, rather than deny the
truth.
We are come now to the last, and indeed the most weighty
consideration.
The council for the apostles having in the course of the argument
allowed, that more evidence is required to support the credit of the
resurrection, it being a very extraordinary event, than is necessary in
common cases, in the latter part of his defence sets forth the
extraordinary evidence upon which this fact stands. That is, the
evidence of the Spirit, the Spirit of wisdom and power, which was given
to the apostles, to enable them to confirm their testimony by signs and
wonders, and mighty works. This part of the argument was well argued
by the Gentleman, and I need not repeat all he said.
The council for Woolston, in his reply, made two objections to
this evidence.
The first was this: That the resurrection having all along been
pleaded to be a matter of fact, and an object of sense, to recur to
miracles for the proof of it, is to take it out of its proper evidence,
the evidence of sense; and to rest it upon a proof which cannot be
applied to it: for seeing one miracle, he says, is no evidence that
another miracle was wrought before it; as healing a sick man, is no
evidence that a dead man was raised to life.
To clear this difficulty, you must consider by what train of
reasoning miracles come to be proofs in any case. A miracle of itself
proves nothing, unless this only, that there is a cause equal to the
producing the effect we see. Suppose you should see a man raise one
from the dead, and he should go away and say nothing to you, you would
not find that any fact, or any proposition, was proved or disproved by
this miracle. But should he declare to you, in the name of him, by
whose power the miracle was wrought, that image-worship was unlawful,
you would then be possessed of a proof against image-worship. But how?
Not because the miracle proves anything as to the point itself, but
because the man's declaration is authorised by him who wrought the
miracle in confirmation of his doctrine; and therefore miracles are
directly a proof of the authority of persons, and not of the truth of
things.
To apply this to the present case: If the apostles had wrought
miracles, and said nothing of the resurrection, the miracles would have
proved nothing about the resurrection one way or another. But when as
eye-witnesses they attested the truth of the resurrection, and wrought
miracles to confirm their authority; the miracles did not directly
prove the resurrection; but they confirmed and established beyond all
suspicion the proper evidence, the evidence of eye-witnesses. So that
here is no change of the evidence from proper to improper; the fact
still rests upon the evidence of sense, confirmed and strengthened by
the authority of the Spirit. If a witness calls in his neighbors to
attest his veracity, they prove nothing as to the fact in question, but
only confirm the evidence of the witness. The case here is the same;
though between the authorities brought in confirmation of the evidence,
there is no comparison.
The second objection was, That this evidence, however good it may
be in its kind, is yet nothing to us. It was well, the Gentleman says,
for those who had it; but what is that to us, who have it not?
To adjust this difficulty, I must observe to you, that the
evidence now under consideration, was not a private evidence of the
Spirit, or any inward light, like to that which the Quakers in our time
pretend to; but an evidence appearing in the manifest and visible works
of the Spirit: and this evidence was capable of being transmitted, and
actually has been transmitted to us upon unquestionable authority. And
to allow the evidence to have been good in the first ages, and not in
this, seems to be to be a contradiction to the rules of reasoning: for
if we see enough to judge that the first ages had reason to believe, we
must needs see at the same time, that it is reasonable for us also to
believe. As the present question only relates to the nature of the
evidence, it was not necessary to produce from history the instances to
shew in how plentiful a manner this evidence was granted to the church.
Whoever wants this satisfaction, may easily have it.
Gentlemen of the jury, I have laid before you the substance of
what has been said on both sides. You are now to consider of it, and
to give your verdict.
The jury consulted together, and the Foreman rose up.
Foreman. My Lord, We are ready to give our verdict.
Judge. Are you all agreed?
Jury. Yes.
Judge. Who shall speak for you?
Jury. Our Foreman.
Judge. What say you? Are the apostles guilty of giving
false evidence in the case of the resurrection of Jesus, or not guilty?
Foreman. Not guilty.
Judge. Very well. And now, Gentlemen, I resign my commission
and am your humble servant.
The company rose up, and were beginning to pay their compliments
to the judge and the council; but were interrupted by a Gentleman, who
went up to the judge, and offered him a fee. What's this? Says the
judge. A fee, Sir, said the Gentleman. A fee to a judge is a bribe,
said the judge. True, Sir, said the Gentleman; but you have resigned
your commission, and will not be the first judge who has come from the
bench without any diminution of honour. Now, Lazarus's case is to come
on next, and this fee is to retain you on his side. There followed a
confused noise of all speaking together, to persuade the judge to take
the fee: but as the trial had lasted longer than I expected, and I had
lapsed the time of an appointment for business, I was forced to slip
away; and whether the judge was prevailed on to undertake the cause of
Lazarus, or no, I cannot say.
FINIS