Decision
1. Although there is neither the will nor the power sufficient for a
great decision, there may still exist a decided view in a strategic
attack, but it is directed against some secondary object. If the attack
succeeds, then, with the attainment of this object the whole falls
again into a state of rest and equilibrium. If difficulties to a
certain extent present themselves, the general progress of the attack
comes to a standstill before the object is gained. Then in its place
commences a mere occasional offensive or strategic manœuvring. This is
the character of most campaigns.
2. The objects which may be the aim of an offensive of this description
are:—
(_a._) _A strip of territory;_ gain in means of subsistence, perhaps
contributions, sparing our own territory, equivalents in negotiations
for peace—such are the advantages to be derived from this procedure.
Sometimes an idea of the credit of the army is attached to it, as was
perpetually the case in the wars of the French Marshals in the time of
Louis XIV. It makes a very important difference whether a portion of
territory can be kept or not. In general, the first is the case only
when the territory is on the edge of our own theatre of war, and forms
a natural complement of it. Only such portions come into consideration
as an equivalent in negotiating a peace, others are usually only taken
possession of for the duration of a campaign, and to be evacuated when
winter begins.
(_b._) _One of the enemy’s principal magazines_. If it is not one of
considerable importance, it can hardly be looked upon as the object of
an offensive determining a whole campaign. It certainly in itself is a
loss to the defender, and a gain to the assailant; the great advantage,
however, from it for the latter, is that the loss may compel the
defender to retire a little and give up a strip of territory which he
would otherwise have kept. The capture of a magazine is therefore in
reality more a means, and is only spoken of here as an object, because,
until captured, it becomes, for the time being, the immediate definite
aim of action.
(_c._) _The capture of a fortress._—We have made the siege of
fortresses the subject of a separate chapter, to which we refer our
readers. For the reasons there explained, it is easy to conceive how it
is that fortresses always constitute the best and most desirable
objects in those offensive wars and campaigns in which views cannot be
directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy or the conquest of an
important part of his territory. We may also easily understand how it
is that in the wars in the Low Countries, where fortresses are so
abundant, everything has always turned on the possession of one or
other of these fortresses, so much so, that the successive conquests of
whole provinces _never once appear as leading features;_ while, on the
other hand, each of these strong places used to be regarded as a
separate thing, which had an intrinsic value in itself, and more
attention was paid to the convenience and facility with which it could
be attacked than to the value of the place itself.
At the same time, the attack of a place of some importance is always a
great undertaking, because it causes a very large expenditure; and, in
wars in which the whole is not staked at once on the game, this is a
matter which ought to be very much considered. Therefore, such a siege
takes its place here as one of the most important objects of a
strategic attack. The more unimportant a place is, or the less
earnestness there is about the siege, the smaller the preparations for
it, the more it is done as a thing _en passant_, so much the smaller
also will be the strategic object, and the more it will be a service
fit for small forces and limited views; and the whole thing then often
sinks into a kind of sham fight, in order to close the campaign with
honour, because as assailant it is incumbent to do something.
(_d._) _A successful combat, encounter, or even battle_, for the sake
of trophies, or merely for the honour of the arms, sometimes even for
the mere ambition of the commanders. That this does happen no one can
doubt, unless he knows nothing at all of military history. In the
campaigns of the French during the reign of Louis XIV., the most of the
offensive battles were of this kind. But what is of more importance for
us is to observe that these things are not without objective value,
they are not the mere pastime of vanity; they have a very distinct
influence on peace, and therefore lead as it were direct to the object.
The military fame, the moral superiority of the army and of the
general, are things, the influence of which, although unseen, never
ceases to bear upon the whole action in war.
The aim of such a combat of course presupposes; (_a_) that there is an
adequate prospect of victory, (_b_) that there is not a very heavy
stake dependent on the issue.—Such a battle fought in straitened
relations, and with a limited object, must naturally not be confounded
with a victory which is not turned to profitable account merely from
moral weakness.
3. With the exception of the last of these objects (_d_) they may all
be attained without a combat of importance, and generally they are so
obtained by the offensive. Now, the means which the assailant has at
command without resorting to a decisive battle, are derived from the
interests which the defensive has to protect in his theatre of war;
they consist, therefore, in threatening his lines of communications,
either through objects connected with subsistence, as magazines,
fertile provinces, water communications, etc., or important points
(bridges, defiles, and such like,) or also by placing other corps in
the occupation of strong positions situated inconveniently near to him
and from which he cannot again drive us out; the seizure of important
towns, fertile districts, disturbed parts of the country, which may be
excited to rebellion, the threatening of weak allies, etc., etc. Should
the attack effectually interrupt the communications, and in such a
manner that the defender cannot re-establish them but at a great
sacrifice, it compels the defender to take up another position more to
the rear or to a flank to cover the objects, at the same time giving up
objects of secondary importance. Thus a strip of territory is left
open; a magazine or a fortress uncovered: the one exposed to be
overrun, the other to be invested. Out of this, combats greater or less
may arise, but in such case they are not sought for and treated as an
object of the war but as a necessary evil, and can never exceed a
certain degree of greatness and importance.
4. The operation of the defensive on the communications of the
offensive, is a kind of reaction which in wars waged for the great
solution, can only take place when the lines of operation are very
long; on the other hand, this kind of reaction lies more in accordance
with the nature of things in wars which are not aimed at the great
solution. The enemy’s lines of communication are seldom very long in
such a case; but then, neither is it here so much a question of
inflicting great losses of this description on the enemy, a mere
impeding and cutting short his means of subsistence often produces an
effect, and what the lines want in length is made up for in some degree
by the length of time which can be expended in this kind of contest
with the enemy: for this reason, the covering his strategic flanks
becomes an important object for the assailant. If, therefore, a contest
(or rivalry) of this description takes place between the assailant and
defender, then the assailant must seek to compensate by numbers for his
natural disadvantages. If he retains sufficient power and resolution
still to venture a decisive stroke against one of the enemy’s corps, or
against the enemy’s main body itself, the danger which he thus holds
over the head of his opponent is his best means of covering himself.
5. In conclusion, we must notice another great advantage which the
assailant certainly has over the defender in wars of this kind, which
is that of being better able to judge of the intentions and force of
his adversary than the latter can in turn of his. It is much more
difficult to discover in what degree an assailant is enterprising and
bold than when the defender has something of consequence in his mind.
Practically viewed, there usually lies already in the choice of the
defensive form of war a sort of guarantee that nothing positive is
intended; besides this, the preparations for a great reaction differ
much more from the ordinary preparations for defence than the
preparations for a great attack differ from those directed against
minor objects. Finally, the defender is obliged to take his measures
soonest of the two, which gives the assailant the advantage of playing
the last hand.