Most of the subjects have been already touched upon in the sixth book,
and by their mere reflection, throw sufficient light on the attack.
Moreover, the conception of an enclosed theatre of war, has a nearer
relation to the defence than to the attack. Many of the leading points,
_the object of attack, the sphere of action of victory_, etc., have
been already treated of in that book, and that which is most decisive
and essential on the nature of the attack, cannot be made to appear
until we get to the plan of war: still there remains a good deal to say
here, and we shall again commence with the campaign, _in which a great
decision is positively intended_.
1. The first aim of the attack is a victory. To all the advantages
which the defender finds in the nature of his situation, the assailant
can only oppose superior numbers; and, perhaps, in addition, the slight
advantage which the feeling of being the offensive and advancing side
gives an army. The importance of this feeling, however, is generally
overrated; for it does not last long, and will not hold out against
real difficulties. Of course, we assume that the defender is as
faultless and judicious in all he does as the aggressor. Our object in
this observation is to set aside those vague ideas of sudden attack and
surprise, which, in the attack, are generally assumed to be fertile
sources of victory, and which yet, in reality, never occur except under
special circumstances. The nature of the real strategic surprise, we
have already spoken of elsewhere.—If, then, the attack is inferior in
physical power, it must have the ascendancy in moral power, in order to
make up for the disadvantages which are inherent in the offensive form;
if the superiority in that way is also wanting, then there are no good
grounds for the attack, and it will not succeed.
2. As prudence is the real genius of the defender, so boldness and
self-confidence must animate the assailant. We do not mean that the
opposite qualities in each case may be altogether wanting, but that the
qualities named have the greatest affinity to the attack and defence
respectively. These qualities are only in reality necessary because
action in war is no mere mathematical calculation; it is activity which
is carried on if not in the dark, at all events in a feeble twilight,
in which we must trust ourselves to the leader who is best suited to
carry out the aim we have in view.—The weaker the defender shows
himself morally, the bolder the assailant should become.
3. For victory, it is necessary that there should be a battle between
the enemy’s principal force and our own. This is less doubtful as
regards the attack than in regard to the defence, for the assailant
goes in search of the defender in his position. But we have maintained
(in treating of the defensive) that the offensive should not seek the
defender out if he has placed himself in a _false_ position, because he
may be sure that the defender will seek _him_ out, and then he will
have the advantage of fighting where the defender has not prepared the
ground. Here all depends on the road and direction which have the
greatest importance; this is a point which was not examined in the
defence, being reserved for the present chapter. We shall, therefore,
say what is necessary about it here.
4. We have already pointed out those objects to which the attack should
be more immediately directed, and which, therefore, are the ends to be
obtained by victory; now, if these are within the theatre of war which
is attacked, and within the probable sphere of victory, then the road
to them is the natural direction of the blow to be struck. But we must
not forget that the object of the attack does not generally obtain its
signification until victory has been gained, and therefore the mind
must always embrace the idea of victory with it; the principal
consideration for the assailant is, therefore, not so much merely to
reach the object as to reach it a conqueror; therefore the direction of
his blow should be not so much on the object itself as on the way which
the enemy’s army must take to reach it. This way is the immediate
object of the attack. To fall in with the enemy before he has reached
this object, to cut him off from it, and in that position to beat
him—to do this is to gain an intensified victory.—If, for example, the
enemy’s capital is the object of the attack, and the defender has not
placed himself between it and the assailant, the latter would be wrong
in marching direct upon the capital, he would do much better by taking
his direction upon the line connecting the defender’s army with the
capital, and seeking there the victory which shall place the capital in
his hands.
If there is no great object within the assailant’s sphere of victory,
then the enemy’s line of communication with the nearest great object to
him is the point of paramount importance. The question, then, for every
assailant to ask himself is, If I am successful in the battle, what is
the first use I shall make of the victory? The object to be gained, as
indicated by the answer to this question, shows the natural direction
for his blow. If the defender has placed himself in that direction, he
has done right, and there is nothing to do but to go and look for him
there. If his position is too strong, then the assailant must seek to
turn it, that is, make a virtue of necessity. But if the defender has
not placed himself on this right spot, then the assailant chooses that
direction, and as soon as he comes in line with the defender, if the
latter has not in the mean time made a lateral movement, and placed
himself across his path, he should turn himself in the direction of the
defender’s line of communication in order to seek an action there; if
the defender remains quite stationary, then the assailant must wheel
round towards him and attack him in rear.
Of all the roads amongst which the assailant has a choice, the great
roads which serve the commerce of the country are always the best and
the most natural to choose. To avoid any very great bends, more direct
roads, even if smaller, must be chosen, for a line of retreat which
deviates much from a direct line is always perilous.
5. The assailant, when he sets out with a view to a great decision, has
seldom any reason for dividing his forces, and if, notwithstanding
this, he does so, it generally proceeds from a want of clear views. He
should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width of front
as will admit of their all coming into action together. If the enemy
himself has divided his forces, so much the better for the assailant,
and to preserve this further advantage small demonstrations should be
made against the enemy’s corps which have separated from the main body;
these are the strategic _fausses attaques;_ a detachment of forces _for
this purpose_ would then be justifiable.
Such separation into several columns as is indispensably necessary must
be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the
enveloping form, for that form is natural to the attack, and must not
be disregarded without good reason. But it must be only of a tactical
nature, for a strategic envelopment when a great blow takes place, is a
complete waste of power. It can only be excused when the assailant is
so strong that there can be no doubt at all about the result.
6. But the attack requires also prudence, for the assailant has also a
rear, and has communications which must be protected. This service of
protection must be performed as far as possible by the manner in which
the army advances, that is, _eo ipso_ by the army itself. If a force
must be specially detailed for this duty, and therefore a partition of
forces is required, this cannot but naturally weaken the force of the
blow itself.—As a large army is always in the habit of advancing with a
front of a day’s march at least in breadth, therefore, if the lines of
retreat and communication do not deviate much from the perpendicular,
the covering of those lines is in most cases attained by the front of
the army.
Dangers of this description, to which the assailant is exposed, must be
measured chiefly by the situation and character of the adversary. When
everything lies under the pressure of an imminent great decision, there
is little room for the defender to engage in undertakings of this
description; the assailant has, therefore, in ordinary circumstances
not much to fear. But if the advance is over, if the assailant himself
is gradually passing into the defensive, then the covering of the rear
becomes every moment more necessary, becomes more a thing of the first
importance. For the rear of the assailant being naturally weaker than
that of the defender, therefore the latter, long before he passes over
to the real offensive, and even at the same time that he is yielding
ground, may have commenced to operate against the communications of the
assailant.