This Puritan ideal is not so much unchristian as narrow and

unintelligent; but the money-making life has of late become more and

more frankly predatory and anti-social. The great trusts, and the arts

of the company-promoter, can hardly be said to perform any social

service; they exist to levy tribute on the public. We may say therefore

that, though war between the leading nations of the world had become a

strange idea and a far-off memory, we had by no means risen above the

principles and practices of war in our internal life. The immunity from

militarism hitherto enjoyed by Britain and the United States was a

fortunate accident, not a proof of higher morality. Our fleet protected

both ourselves and the Americans from the necessity of maintaining a

conscript army; but we had drifted into a condition in which civil war

seemed not to be far off, and in which violence and lawlessness were

increasing. By a strange inconsistency, many who on moral or religious

grounds condemned wars between nations were found to condone or justify

acts of war against the State, organised by discontented factions of its

citizens. Revolutionary strikes, prepared long in advance by forced

levies of money which were candidly called war-funds, had as their

avowed aim the paralysis of the industries of the country and the

reduction of the population to distress by withholding the necessaries

of life. These acts of civil war, and disgraceful outbreaks of criminal

anarchism, were justified by persons who professed a conscientious

objection to defending their homes and families against a foreign

invader. This state of mind proves how little essential connexion there

is between democracy and peace. It discloses a confusion of ideas even

greater than the antithesis between industrialism and militarism in the

writings of Herbert Spencer. On this latter fallacy it is enough to

quote the words of Admiral Mahan; 'As far as the advocacy of peace rests

on material motives like economy and prosperity, it is the service of

Mammon; and the bottom of the platform will drop out when Mammon thinks

that war will pay better.' This is notoriously what has happened in

Germany. A short war, with huge indemnities, seemed to German financiers

a promising speculation. If such were the rotten foundations upon which

anti-militarism in this country was based, the Churches cannot be blamed

for giving the peace-movement a rather lukewarm support.

In Germany there was no internal anarchy, such as prevailed in England;

there was also no illusion about the imminence of war. Our politicians

ought to have read the signs of the times better; but they were too

intent on feeling the pulse of the electorate at home to attend to

disturbing and unwelcome symptoms abroad. The causes of the war are not

difficult to determine. War has long been a national industry of

Germany, and the idea of it evoked no moral repugnance. The military

virtues were extolled; the military profession enjoyed an astonishing

social prestige; the learned class proclaimed the biological necessity

of international conflicts. The army believed itself to be invincible,

and it had begun to control the policy of the country; where these two

conditions exist, no diplomacy can avert war. Professionalism always has

a selfish and anti-social element in its code, and the professionalism

of the soldier is always prone to override the rights and disdain the

scruples of civilians.

The dominant classes in Germany also found that their power was being

undermined by the growing industrialisation. The steady increase in the

social-democratic vote was a portent not to be disregarded. A letter

from a German officer to a friend in Roumania, which found its way into

the newspapers, tells a great deal of truth in a few words. 'You cannot

conceive,' he wrote, 'what difficulty we had in persuading our Emperor

that it was necessary to let loose this war. But it has been done; and I

hope that for a long time to come we shall hear no more in Germany of

pacifism, internationalism, democracy, and similar pestilent doctrines.'

Sir Charles Walston, in his thoughtful book 'Aristodemocracy,' lays

great stress on this. 'It appeared to me,' he says, 'ever since 1905,

that in the immediate future it was all a question as to whether the

labour-men, the practical pacifists, would arrive at the realisation of

their power before the militarists had forced a war upon us, or whether

the military powers would anticipate this result, and within the next

few years force a war upon the world.' To the influence of the military

was added the cupidity of the commercial and financial class. The law of

diminishing returns was driving capital further and further afield; and

large profits, it was hoped, might be made by the exploitation of

backward countries and the reduction of their inhabitants to serfdom. To

a predatory and parasitic class war seems only a logical extension of

the principles upon which it habitually acts; and for this reason

privileged orders seldom feel much moral compunction about a war-policy.

Lastly, among the causes of the war must be reckoned one which has

received far too little attention from social and political

philosophers--the tenacious and half-unconscious memories of a race.

Injustice comes home to roost, sometimes after an astonishingly long

interval. The disaffection of Catholic Ireland would be quite

unintelligible without the massacres of the sixteenth century and the

unjust trade-legislation of the seventeenth and eighteenth. The

bitterness of the working class in England has its roots in the earlier

period of the industrial revolution (about 1760-1832), when the

labourer, with his wife and children, was treated as the 'cannon-fodder'

of industry. Similarly, the seeds of Prussian brutality and

aggressiveness were sown at Jena and in the raiding of Prussia for

recruits before the Moscow expedition. If such were the causes of the

great world-war, how little can be hoped from courts of international

arbitration!

These considerations have, perhaps, made it clear that the main causes

of international conflicts are what the Epistle of St. James declares

them to be--'the lusts that war in your members,' the pugnacious and

acquisitive instincts which pervade our social life in times of peace,

and not least in those nations which pride themselves on having advanced

beyond the militant stage. There are some who accept this state of

things as natural and necessary, and who blame Christianity for carrying

on a futile campaign against human nature. This is a very different

indictment from that which condemns Christianity for tolerating a

preventible evil; and it is, in our opinion, even less justified. The

argument that, because war has always existed, it must always continue

to exist, is justly ridiculed by Mr. Norman Angell. 'It is commonly

asserted that old habits of thought can never be shaken; that, as men

have been, so they will be. That, of course, is why we now eat our

enemies, enslave their children, examine witnesses with the thumbscrew,

and burn those who do not attend the same church.'

The long history of war as a racial habit explains why a ruinous and

insane anachronism shows such tenacity; for the conditions which

established the habit among primitive tribes demonstrably no longer

exist. It is probably true, as William James says, that 'militarist

writers without exception regard war as a biological or sociological

necessity'; lawyers might say the same about litigation. But laws of

nature 'are not efficient causes, and it is open to any one to prove

that they are not laws, if he can break them with impunity. It would be

the height of pessimistic fatalism to hold that men must always go on

doing that which they hate, and which brings them to misery and ruin.

Man is not bound for ever by habits contracted during his racial nonage;

his moral, rational, and spiritual instincts are as natural as his

physical appetites; and against them, as St. Paul says, 'there is no

law,' Huxley's Romanes Lecture gave an unfortunate support to the

mischievous notion that the 'cosmic process' is the enemy of morality.

The truth seems to be that Nature presents to us not a categorical

imperative, but a choice. Do we prefer to pay our way in the world, or

to be parasites? War, with very few exceptions, is a mode of parasitism.

Its object is to exploit the labour of other nations, to make them pay

tribute, or to plunder them openly, as the Germans have plundered the

cities of Belgium. War is a parasitic industry; and Christianity forbids

parasitism. Nature has her own penalties for the lower animals which

make this choice, and they strike with equal severity 'the peoples that

delight in war,' The bellicose nations have nearly all perished.

There remains, however, a class of wars which escapes this

condemnation; and about them difficult moral problems may be raised. We

can hardly deny to a growing and civilised nation the right to expand at

the expense of barbarous hunters and nomads. No one would suggest that

the Americans ought to give back their country to the Indians, or that

Australia should be abandoned to the aborigines. But were the

Anglo-Saxons justified in expropriating the Britons, and the Spaniards

the Aztecs? There is room for differences of opinion in these cases; and

a very serious problem may arise in the future, as to whether the

European races are morally justified in using armed force to restrict

Asiatic competition. As a general principle, we must condemn the

expropriation of any nation which is in effective occupation of the

soil. The popular estimate of superior and inferior races is thoroughly

unchristian and unscientific, as is the prejudice against a dark skin.

The opinion that a nation which is increasing in population has a right

to expel the inhabitants of another country to make room for its own

emigrants is surely untenable. If it justifies war at all, it sanctions

a war of extermination, which would attain its objects most completely

by massacring girls and young women. The pressure of population is a

real cause of war; but the moral is, not that war is right, but that a

nation must cut its coat according to its cloth, and limit its numbers.

Unless we justify wars of extermination, war has no biological sanction,

and Christianity is not flying in the face of nature by condemning it.

On the contrary, by condemning every form of parasitism, it indicates

the true path of evolution. It is equally right in rejecting the purely

economic valuation of human goods. The 'economic man' does not exist in

nature; he is a fictitious creature who is responsible for a great deal

of social injustice. Some modern economists, like Mr. Hobson, would

substitute for the old monetary standards of production and distribution

an attempt to estimate the 'human costs' of labour. Creative work

involving ingenuity and artistic qualities is not 'costly' at all,

unless the hours of labour, or the nervous strain, exceed the powers of

the worker. More monotonous work is not costly to the worker if the

day's labour is fairly short, or if some variety can be introduced. The

human cost is greatly increased if the worker thinks that his labour is

useless, or that it will only benefit those who do not deserve the

enjoyment of its fruits. Work which only produces frivolous luxuries is

and ought to be unwelcome to the producer, even if he is well paid. It

must also be emphasised that worry and anxiety take the heart out of a

man more than anything else. Security of employment greatly reduces the

'human cost' of labour. These considerations are comparatively new in

political economy. They change it from a highly abstract science into a

study of the conditions of human welfare as affected by social

organisation. The change is a victory for the ideas of Buskin and

Morris, though not necessarily for the practical remedies for social

maladjustments which they propounded. It brings political economy into

close relations with ethics and religion, and should induce economists

to consider carefully the contribution which Christianity makes to the

solution of the whole problem. For Christianity has its remedy to

propose, and it is a solution of the problem of war, not less than of

industrial evils.

Christianity gives the world a new and characteristic standard of

values. It diminishes greatly the values which can accrue from

competition, and enhances immeasurably the non-competitive values. 'A

man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he

possesseth.' 'Is not the life more than meat, and the body than

raiment?' 'The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness

and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.' Passages like these are found in

every part of the New Testament. This Christian idealism has a direct

bearing on the doctrine of 'human costs.' Work is irksome, not only when

it is excessive or ill-paid, but when the worker is lazy, selfish,

envious or discontented. There is one thing which can make almost any

work welcome. If it is done from love or unselfish affection, the human

cost is almost _nil_, because it is not counted or consciously felt.

This is no exaggeration when it is applied to the devoted labour of the

mother and the nurse, or to that of the evangelist conscious of a divine

vocation. But in all useful work the keen desire to render social

service, or to do God's will, diminishes to an incalculable extent the

'human cost' of labour. This principle introduces a deep cleavage

between the Christian remedy and that of political socialism, which

fosters discontent and indignation as a lever for social amelioration.

Men are made unhappy in order that they may be urged to claim a larger

share of the world's wealth. Christianity considers that, measured by

human costs, the remedy is worse than the disease. The adoption of a

truer standard of value would tear up the lust of accumulation by the

roots, and would thus effect a real cure. It would also stop the

grudging and deliberately bad work which at present seriously diminishes

the national wealth.

The Christian cure is the only real cure. It is the fashion to assume

that militarism and cupidity are vices of the privileged classes, and

that democracies may be trusted neither to plunder the minority at home

nor to seek foreign adventures by unjust wars. There is not the

slightest reason to accept either of these views. Political power is

always abused; an unrepresented class is always plundered. Nor are

democracies pacific, except by accident. At present they do not wish to

see the capital which they regard as their prospective prey dissipated

in war; and for this reason their influence in our time will probably be

on the side of peace. But, as soon as the competition of cheap Asiatic

labour becomes acute, we may expect to see the democracies bellicose and

the employing class pacific. This is not guess-work; we already see how

the democracies of California and Australia behave towards immigrants

from Asia. Readers of Anatole France will remember his description of

the economic wars decreed by the Senate of the great republic, at the

end of 'L'Île des Pingouins.' It would, indeed, be difficult to prove

that the expansion of the United States has differed much, in methods

and morals, from that of the European monarchies; and the methods of

trade-unions are the methods of pitiless belligerency. Democracy and

socialism are broken reeds for the lover of peace to lean upon.

In conclusion, our answer to the indictment against Christianity is

that institutional religion does not represent the Gospel of Christ, but

the opinions of a mass of nominal Christians. It cannot be expected to

do much more than look after its own interests and reflect the moral

ideas of its supporters. The real Gospel, if it were accepted, would

pull up by the roots not only militarism but its analogue in civil life,

the desire to exploit other people for private gain. But it is not

accepted. We have seen that the Founder of Christianity had no illusions

as to the reception which His message of redemption would meet with. The

'Prince of this World' is not Christ, but the Devil. Nevertheless, He

did speak of the 'whole lump' being gradually leavened, and we shall not

exceed the limits of a reasonable and justifiable optimism if we hope

that the accumulated experience of humanity, and perhaps a real though

very slow modification for the better of human nature itself, may at

last eliminate the wickedest and most insane of our maleficent

institutions. The human race has probably hundreds of thousands of years

to live, whereas our so-called civilisation cannot be traced back for

more than a few thousand years. The time when 'nation shall not lift up

sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more,' will

probably come at last, though no one can predict what the conditions

will be which will make such a change possible.

The signs are not very favourable at present for internationalism. The

great nations, bankrupt and honey-combed with social unrest, will be

obliged after the war to organise themselves as units, with governments

strong enough to put down revolutions, and directed by men of the

highest mercantile ability, whose main function will be to increase

productiveness and stop waste. We may even see Germany mobilised as one

gigantic trust for capturing markets and regulating prices. A

combination so formidable would compel other nations, and our own

certainly among the number, to adopt a similar organisation. This would,

of course, mean a complete victory for bureaucratic state-socialism, and

the defeat of democracy and trade-union syndicalism. Such a change,

which few would just now welcome, will occur if no other form of state

is able to survive; and this is what we may live to see. But there is

no finality about any experiments in government. A period of

internationalism may follow the intense nationalism which historical

critics foresee for the twentieth century. Or perhaps the international

labour-organisations may be too strong for the centralising forces. It

is just possible that Labour, by a concerted movement during the violent

reaction against militarism which will probably follow the war, will

forbid any further military or naval preparations to be made.

Whatever forms reconstruction may take, Christianity will have its part

to play in making the new Europe. It will be able to point to the

terrible vindication of its doctrines in the misery and ruin which have

overtaken a world which has rejected its valuations and scorned its

precepts. It is not Christianity which has been judged and condemned at

the bar of civilisation; it is civilisation which has destroyed itself

because it has honoured Christ with its lips, while its heart has been

far from Him. But a spiritual religion can win a victory only within its

own sphere. It can promise no Deuteronomic catalogue of blessings and

cursings to those who obey or disobey its principles. Social happiness

and peace would certainly follow a whole-hearted acceptance of Christian

principles; but they would not certainly bring wealth or empire.

'Philosophy,' said Hegel, 'will bake no man's bread'; and it is only in

a spiritual sense that the meek-spirited can expect to possess the

earth. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to suppose that a Christian nation

would be unable to hold its own in the struggle for existence. A nation

in which every citizen endeavoured to pay his way and to help his

neighbour would be in no danger of servitude or extinction. The mills of

God grind slowly, but the future does not belong to lawless violence. In

the long run, the wisdom that is from above will be justified in her

children.

SURVIVAL AND IMMORTALITY

(1917)

The recrudescence of superstition in England was plain to all observers

many years before the war; it was perhaps most noticeable among the

half-educated rich. Several causes contributed to this phenomenon. The

craving for the supernatural, a very ancient and deeply rooted

thought-habit, had been suppressed and driven underground by the

arrogant dominance of a materialistic philosophy, and by the absorption

of society in the pursuit of gain and pleasure. Modern miracles were

laughed out of court. But materialism has supernaturalism for its

nemesis. An abstract science, erecting itself into a false philosophy,

leaves half our nature unsatisfied, and becomes morally bankrupt before

its intellectual errors are exposed. Supernaturalism is the refuge of

the materialist who wishes to make room for ideal values without

abandoning the presuppositions of materialism. By dovetailing acts of

God into the order of nature, he materialises the spiritual, but brings

the Divine will into the world of experience, from which it had been

expelled, and produces a rough scheme of providential government, by

which he can live.

The revolt against scientific materialism was made much easier by the

disintegration of the mechanical theory itself. Biology found itself

cramped by the categories of inorganic science, and claimed its

autonomy. The result was a fatal breach in the defences of materialism,

for biology is being driven to accept final causes, and would be glad to

adopt some theory of vitalism, if it could do so without falling back

into the old error of a mysterious 'vital force.' Biological truth, it

is plain, cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative categories of

mathematics and physics. Then psychology aspired to be a philosophy of

real existence, and attacked both absolutism and materialism. The

pretensions of psychology rehabilitated subjectivism and founded

pragmatism, till reactionary theology took heart of grace and defended

crude supernaturalism, with the whole apparatus of sacerdotal magic, as

the 'Gospel for human needs.' All protection against the grossest

superstitions was thus swept away. With no fixed standard of reference

to distinguish fact from fiction, it was possible to argue that

'whatever suits souls is true.'

In this atmosphere many old habits of thought reasserted themselves.

While we enjoyed peace and prosperity, the credulity of the public found

its chief outlet in various systems of faith-healing and in the

time-honoured pretensions of priest-craft. But the devastation which the

war has brought into countless loving families has turned the current of

superstition strongly towards necromancy. The 'will to believe,' no

longer inhibited and suspected as a reason for doubt, has been allowed

to create its own logic. A few highly educated men, who have long been

playing with occultism and gratifying their intellectual curiosity by

exploring the dark places of perverted mysticism, have been swept off

their feet by it, and their authority, as 'men of science,' has

dispelled the hesitation of many more to accept what they dearly wished

to believe. The longing of the bereaved has created for itself a

spurious and dreary satisfaction.

One cause of this strange movement cannot be emphasised too strongly. It

proves that the Christian hope of immortality burns very dimly among us.

Those who study the utterances of our religious guides must admit that

it is so. References to the future life had, before the war, become rare

even in the pulpit. The topic was mainly reserved for letters of

condolence, and was then handled gingerly, as if it would not bear much

pressure. Working-class audiences and congregations listened eagerly to

the wildest promises of an earthly utopia the day after tomorrow, but

cooled down at once when they were reminded that 'if in this life only

we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.' Accordingly,

the clerical demagogue showed more interest in the unemployed than in

the unconverted. Christianity, which began as a revolutionary idealism,

had sunk into heralding materialistic revolution. Such teachers have no

message of hope and comfort for those who have lost their dearest. And

they have, in fact, been deserted. Their secularised Christianity was

received with half-contemptuous approval by trade unions, but far deeper

hopes, fears, and longings have now been stirred, which concern all men

and women alike, and on the answers to which the whole value of

existence is now seen to depend. Christianity can answer them, but not

the Churches through the mouths of their accredited representatives. And

so, instead of 'the blessed hope of everlasting life,' the bereaved have

been driven to this pathetic and miserable substitute, the barbaric

belief in ghosts and dæmons, which was old before Christianity was

young. And what a starveling hope it is that necromancy offers us! An

existence as poor and unsubstantial as that of Homer's Hades, which the

shade of Achilles would have been glad to exchange for serfdom to the

poorest farmer, and with no guarantee of permanence, even if the power

of comforting or terrifying surviving relations is supposed to persist

for a few years. Such a prospect would add a new terror to death; and

none would desire it for himself. It is plainly the dream of an aching

heart, which cannot bear to be left alone.

Outspoken Essays · 第 23 / 25 段