But there is another religious tradition, which in Greece was almost

separated from the official and national cults, and among the Hebrews

was often in opposition to them. The Hebrew prophets certainly

proclaimed that 'the history of the world is the judgment of the world,'

and often assumed, too crudely as it seems to us, that national

calamities are a proof of national transgression; but the whole course

of development in prophecy was towards an autonomous morality based on a

spiritual valuation of life. Its quarrel with sacerdotalism was mainly

directed against the unethical _tabu_-morality of the priesthood; the

revolt was grounded in a lofty moral idealism, which found expression in

a half-symbolic vision of a coming state in which might and right should

coincide. The apocalyptic prophecies of post-exilic Judaism, which were

not based, like some political predictions of the earlier prophets, on a

statesmanlike view of the international situation, but on hopes of

supernatural intervention, had their roots in visions of a new and

better world-order. This aspiration, which had to disentangle itself by

degrees from the patriotic dreams of a stubborn and unfortunate race,

was projected into the near future, and was mixed with less worthy

political ambitions which had a different origin. The prophet always

foreshortens his revelation, and generally blends the city of God with a

vision of his own country transfigured. We see him doing this even

to-day, in his Utopian dreams of social reconstruction.

And so it has always been. We remember Condorcet foretelling a reign of

truth and peace just before he was compelled to flee from the storm of

calumny to die in a damp cell at Bourg la Reine; and Kant hailing the

approach of a peaceful international republic while Napoleon was

preparing to drown Europe in blood. Apocalyptism is a compromise between

the religion of rewards and punishments and the religion of spiritual

deliverance. It calls a new world into existence to redress the balance

of the old; but its discontent with the old is mainly the result of a

moral and spiritual valuation of life. Greek philosophy has really much

in common with Hebrew prophecy, though the Greek envisaged his ideal

world as the eternal background of reality, and not under the form of

history. In its maturest form, it is a transvaluation of all values in

accordance with an absolute ideal standard--that of the Good, the True,

and the Beautiful. This idealism appears in a still more drastic form in

the religions of Asia, which preach deliverance by demonetising at a

stroke all the world's currency. Spiritual values are alone accepted;

man wins peace and freedom by renouncing in advance all of which fortune

may deprive him.

We are apt to assume, in deference to our theories of human progress,

that the evolution of religion is normally from a lower to a higher

type. It would, indeed, be absurd to question that the religion of a

civilised people is usually more spiritual and more rational than that

of barbarians. But none the less, the history of religions is generally

a history of decline. In Judaism the prophets came before the Scribes

and the Pharisees. Brahmanism and Buddhism were both degraded by

superstitions and unethical rites. Christianity, which began as a

republication of the purest prophetic teaching, has suffered the same

fate. In each case, when the revelation has lost its freshness, and the

enthusiasm which it evoked has begun to cool, a reversion to older

habits of thought and customs takes place; and sometimes it may be said

that the old religion has really conquered the new.

Christianity, as taught by its Founder, is based on a transvaluation of

values even more complete than that of Stoicism and the later Platonism,

because, while it regards the objects of ordinary ambition as a positive

hindrance to the higher life, it accepts and gives value to those pains

of sympathy which Greek thought dreaded, as detracting from the calm

enjoyment of the philosophic life. This acceptance of the world's

suffering, from which every other spiritual religion and philosophy

promise a way of escape, is perhaps the most distinctive feature of

Christian ethics. In practice, it thus achieves a more complete conquest

of evil than any other system; and by bringing sorrow and sympathy into

the Divine life, it not only presents the character and nature of the

Deity in a new light, but opens out a new ideal of moral perfection.

This is not the place for a discussion of the main characteristics of

the Gospel of Christ, and they are familiar to us all. But, since we are

now considering the charge of failure brought against Christianity in

connexion with the present world-war, it seems necessary to emphasise

two points which are not always remembered.

The first is that there is no evidence that the historical Christ ever

intended to found a new institutional religion. He neither attempted to

make a schism in the Jewish Church nor to substitute a new system for

it. He placed Himself deliberately in the prophetic line, only claiming

to sum up the series in Himself. The whole manner of His life and

teaching was prophetic. The differences which undoubtedly may be found

between His style and that of the older prophets do not remove Him from

the company in which He clearly wished to stand. He treated the

institutional religion of His people with the independence and

indifference of the prophet and mystic; and the hierarchy, which, like

other hierarchies, had a sure instinct in discerning a dangerous enemy,

was not slow to declare war to the knife against Him. Such, He reminded

His enemies, was the treatment which all the prophets had met with from

the class to which those enemies belonged. This, then, is the first fact

to remember. Institutional Christianity may be a legitimate and

necessary historical development from the original Gospel, but it is

something alien to the Gospel itself. The first disciples believed that

they had the Master's authority for expecting the end of the existing

world-order in their own lifetime. They believed that He had come

forward with the cry of 'Hora novissima!' Whether they misunderstood Him

or not, they clearly could not have held this opinion if they had

received instructions for the constitution of a Church.

The second point on which it is necessary to insist is that Christ never

expected, or taught His disciples to expect, that His teaching would

meet with wide acceptance, or exercise political influence. 'The

world'--organised human society--was the enemy and was to continue the

enemy. His message, He foresaw, would be scorned and rejected by the

majority; and those who preached it were to expect persecution. This

warning is repeated so often in the Gospels that it would be superfluous

to give quotations. He made it quite plain that the big battalions are

never likely to be gathered before the narrow gate. He declared that

only false prophets are well spoken of by the majority. When we consider

the revolutionary character of the Christian idealism, its indifference

to nearly all that passes for 'religion' with the vulgar, and its

reversal of all current valuations, it is plain that it is never likely

to be a popular creed. As surely as the presence of high spiritual

instincts in the human mind guarantees its indestructibility, so surely

the deeply-rooted prejudices which keep the majority on a lower level

must prevent the Gospel of Christ from dominating mundane politics or

social life.

Moreover, the actual extent of its influence cannot be estimated. The

inwardness and individualism of its teaching make its apparent

effectiveness smaller than its real power, which works secretly and

unobserved. The vices which Christ regarded with abhorrence are

perversions of character--hypocrisy, hard-heartedness, and worldliness

or secularity; and who can say what degree of success the Gospel has

achieved in combating these? The method of Christianity is alien to all

externalism and machinery; it does not lend itself to those

accommodations and compromises without which nothing can be done in

politics. As Harnack says, the Gospel is not one of social improvement,

but of spiritual redemption. Its influence upon social and political

life is indirect and obscure, operating through a subtle modification of

current valuations, and curbing the competitive and acquisitive

instincts, which nearly correspond with what Christ called 'Mammon' and

St. Paul 'the flesh.' Christianity is a spiritual dynamic, which has

very little to do directly with the mechanism of social life.

It is, therefore, certain that when we speak of Christianity as a

factor in human life, we must not identify it with the opinions or

actions of the multitudes who are nominally Christians. We must not even

identify it, without qualification, with the types of character

exhibited by those who try to frame their lives in accordance with its

precepts. For these types are very largely determined by the ideals

which belong to the stage through which the life of the race is passing;

and these differ so widely in different ages and countries that the

historian of religion might well despair if he was compelled to regard

them all as typical manifestations of the same idea. There are times

when the disciple of Christ seems to turn his back upon society; he is

occupied solely with the relation of the individual soul to God. These

are periods when the opportunities for social service are much

restricted by a faulty structure of the body politic; periods when

secular civilisation is so brutal, or so servile, that the religious

life can only be led in seclusion from it. At another time the typical

Christian seems to be the active and valiant soldier of a militant

corporation. At another, again, he is a philanthropist, who devotes his

life to the redress of some great wrong, such as slavery, or the

promotion of a more righteous system of production and distribution. In

all these types we can trace the operation of the genius of

Christianity, but they are partial manifestations of it, with much alien

admixture. The spirit of the age, as well as the spirit of Christ, has

moulded the various types of Christian piety.

If there has ever been a time when organised Christianity was a concrete

embodiment of the pure principles of the Gospel, we must look for it in

the era of the persecutions, when the Church had already gained

coherence and discipline and a corporate self-consciousness, and was

still preserved from the corrupting influence of secularity by the

danger which attended the profession of an illicit creed. A vivid

picture of the Christian communities at this period has been given by

Dobschütz, whose learning and impartiality are unimpeachable. The Church

at this time demanded from its followers an unreserved confession, even

when this meant death. It was a brotherhood within which there was no

privileged class. Men and women, the free and the slave, had an equal

share in it. It abolished the fundamental Greek distinction of civilised

and barbarian. It looked with contempt on none. Its great organisation

was spread by purely voluntary means, till it gained a firm footing

throughout the Empire and beyond it. To a large extent it was an

association for mutual aid. Wherever anyone was in need, help was at

hand. The tangible advantages of belonging to such a guild were so great

that the Church had to enforce labour on all who could work, as a

condition of sharing in the benefits of membership. Social distinctions,

such as those of rich and poor, master and slave, were not abolished,

but they had lost their sting, because genuine affection, loyalty and

sympathy neutralised these inequalities. Great importance was laid on

truth, integrity in business, and sexual purity. A complete rupture with

pagan standards of morality was insisted on from new members. The human

body must be kept holy, as the temple of God. Revenge was forbidden, and

injustice was endured with meekness and pardon. This is no imaginary

picture. In that brief golden age of the Church, such were indeed the

characteristics of the Christian society. In the opinion of Dobschütz

the moral condition of the Church in the second century was much higher

than among St. Paul's converts in the first. The paucity of references

to sins of the flesh, and to fraud, is to be accounted for by the actual

rarity of such offences. For a short time, then, the artificial

selection effected by the persecutions kept the Church pure; and from

the happy pictures which we can reconstruct of this period we can judge

what a really Christian society would be like.

The history of institutional Catholicism must be approached from a

different side. Troeltsch argues with much cogency that the Catholic

Church must be regarded rather as the last creative achievement of

classical antiquity than as the beginning of the Middle Ages. Its growth

belongs mainly to the political history of Europe; the strictly

religious element in it is quite subordinate. There is, as Modernist

critics have seen, a real break between the Palestinian Gospel and the

elaborate mystery-religion, with its graded hierarchy, its Roman

organisation, its Hellenistic speculative theology, which achieved the

conquest of the Empire in the fourth century. The Church, as Loisy says,

determined to survive and to conquer, and adapted itself to the demands

of the time. It has travelled far from the simple teaching of the

earthly Christ; though we may, if we choose, hold that His spirit

continued to direct the growing and changing institution which, as a

matter of history, had its source in the Galilean ministry. In truth,

however, the extremely efficient organisation of the Roman Church began

in self-defence and was continued for conquest. It is one of the

strongest of all human institutions, so that it was said before the war

that it is one of the 'three invincibles,' the other two being the

German Army and the Standard Oil Trust.

But our admiration for the subtle and tenacious power of this

corporation must not blind us to its essentially political character.

Its policy has been always directed to self-preservation and

aggrandisement; it is an _imperium in imperio_, which has only checked

fanatical nationalism by the competing influence of a still more

fanatical partisanship. In the present war, the problem before the

Pope's councillors was whether the friendship of the Central Powers or

that of the Entente was best worth cultivating; and the unshaken loyalty

of Austria to the Church, together with a natural preference for German

methods of governing as compared with democracy, turned the scale

against us. In Ireland, in Canada and in Spain the Catholic priests have

been formidable enemies of our cause. As for the other Churches, they

have not the same power of arbitrating in national quarrels. The Russian

Church has never been independent of the secular government; and the

Anglican and Lutheran Churches can hardly be expected to be impartial

when the vital interests of England or Germany are at stake. Lovers of

peace have not much to hope for from organised religion. National

Christianity, as Mr. Bernard Shaw says, will only be possible when we

have a nation of Christs.

The downfall of the medieval European system, though in truth it was a

theory rather than a fact, has removed some of the restraints upon war.

The determining principle of the medieval political theory was the

conception of a 'lex Dei,' which included the 'lex Mosis,' the 'lex

Christi,' and the 'lex ecclesiae,' but which also, as 'lex naturæ,'

comprised the law, science, and ethics of antiquity. These laws were

super-national, and no nation dared explicitly to repudiate them. They

formed the basis of a real system of international law, resting, like

everything else in the Middle Ages, on supposed divine authority.

This theory, with its sanctions, was shattered at the Renaissance; and

the Machiavellian doctrine of the absolute State, accepted by Bacon and

put into practice by Frederick the Great, has prevailed ever since,

though not without frequent protests. The rise of nationalities, each

with an intense self-consciousness, has facilitated the adoption of a

theory too grossly immoral to have found favour except in the peculiar

circumstances of modern civilisation. The emergence of nationalities was

often connected with a legitimate struggle for freedom; and at such

times _esprit de corps_ seems to be almost the sum of morality, the

substitute for all other virtues. Loyalty is one of the most attractive

of moral qualities, and it necessarily inhibits criticism of its own

objects, which has the appearance of treason. But, unless the aims of

the corporate body which claims our absolute allegiance are right and

reasonable, loyalty may be, and often has been, the parent of hideous

crimes, and a social evil of the first magnitude. The perversion of

_esprit de corps_ does incalculable harm in every direction, destroying

all sense of honour and justice, of chivalry and generosity, of sympathy

and humanity. It involves a complete repudiation of Christianity, which

breaks down all barriers by ignoring them, and insists on love and

justice towards all mankind without distinction. The worship of the

State has during the last half-century been sedulously and artificially

fostered in Germany, until it has produced a kind of moral insanity.

Even philosophical historians like Troeltsch seem unable to see the

monstrosity of a political doctrine which has caused his country to be

justly regarded as the enemy of the whole human race. Eucken, writing

some years before the war, in a rather gingerly manner deprecates

_Politismus_ as a national danger; but he does not dare to grasp the

nettle firmly. It is possible that this deification of the State in

Germany may be in part due to an unsatisfied instinct of worship. In

Roman Catholic countries, where there must be a divided allegiance,

patriotism never, perhaps, assumes such sinister and fanatical forms.

But we shall not understand the attraction which this naked immoralism

in international affairs exercises over the minds of many who are not

otherwise ignoble, if we do not remember that the repudiation of the

Christian ethical standard has been equally thorough in commercial

competition. The German officer believes himself to have chosen a

morally nobler profession than that of the business-man; he serves (he

thinks) a larger cause, and he is content with much less personal

reward. Socialist assailants of our industrial system, much as they

dislike war, would probably agree with him. It is not necessary to

condemn all competition. The desire to excel others is not

reprehensible, when the rivalry is in rendering useful social service.

But it cannot be denied that the present condition of industry is such

that a heavy premium is offered to mere cupidity; that the fraternal

social life which Christianity enjoins is often literally impossible,

except at the cost of economic suicide; and that in a competitive system

a business man is, by the very force of circumstances, a warrior, though

war is an enemy of love and destructive of Christian society. When the

object of bargaining is to give as little and gain as much as possible,

the Christian standard of values has been rejected as completely as it

was by Machiavelli himself. The competition between two parties to a

bargain is often a competition in unserviceableness. Money is very

frequently made by creating a local and temporary monopoly, which

enables the vendor to squeeze the purchaser. In all such transactions

one man's gain is another man's loss. This state of things, the evils of

which are almost universally recognised and deplored, marks the end of

the glorification of productive industry which was one result of the

Reformation.

Hardly anything distinguishes modern from medieval ethics more sharply

than the emphasis laid by Protestant morality on the duty of making and

producing something tangible. Theoretically the Protestant may hold that

'doing ends in death,' and he may sing these words on Sunday; but his

whole life on week days is occupied in strenuous 'doing.' We find in

Calvinism and Quakerism the genuinely religious basis of the modern

business life, which, however, has degenerated sadly, now that the

largest fortunes are made by dealing in money rather than in

commodities. In the books of Samuel Smiles, and in Clough's poem

beginning 'Hope ever more and believe, O Man,' we find the Gospel of

productive work preached with fervour. It is out of favour now in

England; but in America we still see quaint attempts to make business a

religion, as in the Middle Ages religion was a business. In these

circles, it is productive activity as such to which value is attached,

without much enquiry as to the utility of the product. The result has

been an immense accumulation of the apparatus of life, without any

corresponding elevation in moral standards. The mischiefs wrought by

modern commercialism are largely the fruit of the purely irrational

production which it encourages. There are, says Professor Santayana,

Nibelungen who toil underground over a gold which they will never use,

and in their obsession with production begrudge themselves all

inclinations to recreation, to merriment, to fancy. Visible signs of

such unreason appear in the relentless and hideous aspect which life

puts on; for those instruments which emancipate themselves from their

uses soon become hateful. 'A barbaric civilisation, built on blind

impulse and ambition, should fear to awaken a deeper detestation than

could ever be aroused by those more beautiful tyrannies, chivalrous or

religious, against which past revolutions have been directed.' We

cannot, indeed, be surprised that this ideal of productive work as a

means of grace, precious for its own sake, has no attraction for the

masses, and that independent thinkers like Edward Carpenter should write

books on 'Civilisation, its Cause and Cure.'

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