concerns the internal affairs of each; they are practically dependent
or subject only as regards the common policy of the “realm” or
“empire.” And it has been said, and that not by an opponent of
“Imperial Federation,” that
“These two opposing principles, subordination on the one hand,
and self-government on the other--we might almost say subjection
and freedom--cannot long co-exist. This imperfect, incomplete,
one-sided federation must end either in disintegration or
incomplete and equal and perfect federation.”
The only question is whether a federation thus limited is federation
at all, and not really subjection. When we speak of “imperfect,
incomplete, one-sided federation,” the adjectives destroy the
substantive; they show that the relation spoken of is not a federal
relation at all. All the elements of a federation are wanting. There
is no voluntary union of independent states, keeping some powers to
themselves and granting other powers to a central authority of their
own creation. There is instead a number of dependent bodies, to which
a central authority older than themselves has been graciously pleased
to grant certain powers. This state of things is not federation, but
subjection. It is perfectly true that an American State, as such, has
no more direct voice in the foreign affairs of the American Union than
a British colony has in the foreign affairs of the British “empire.”
But why? The colony has no such voice, because it is a subject
community and never had a voice in such matters. The American State has
no such voice, because the direction of foreign affairs is one of the
powers which the States have ceded to the Federal authority. But, more
than this, not only has the colony no direct voice in ordering foreign
affairs, itself and its citizens have no voice, direct or indirect,
in choosing those who have the ordering of them. But the American
State and its citizens have a direct voice in choosing those who have
the ordering of the foreign affairs of the Union. The citizens of the
several States, as citizens of the United States, choose the [electors
of the] President, by whom foreign affairs are actually ordered. The
States themselves in their Legislatures choose the Senators, by whom
the acts of the President are approved or annulled. Here are two very
different stories; the difference between the position of the American
State and the position of the British colony is nothing short of the
difference between federation and subjection.
In truth the relation between the United Kingdom and the colonies does
not answer my old definition of federation which it has been said to
answer. The colonies are not “states” in the sense of that definition.
The “states” there spoken of are communities like the cities of Achaia,
the cantons of Switzerland, the states of America, sovereign and
independent communities, which, while keeping to themselves certain
of the attributes of sovereignty, have by their own act ceded certain
other of its attributes to a central authority[4]. The colonies
are not states in this sense; instead of having granted any powers
to a central authority, they have only such powers as the central
authority chose to grant to them. They are not states; they are only
municipalities on a great scale. I shall doubtless be told that the
colonies can alter their criminal law, their marriage law, and a crowd
of other laws, which a municipality at home cannot alter. But why? The
colonies can do all these things, simply because Parliament has given
them the power to do them; and Parliament can, if it chooses, give the
same power to the Common Council of London or to the parish vestry of
Little Peddlington.
* * * * *
Thus far we have been dealing with a state of things which may very
likely be “imperial,” but which is assuredly very far from “federal.”
It is a state which--we have good authority for so saying--cannot last
very long, but which must soon be exchanged either for disintegration
or for federation. The question in truth comes to this; Shall an
“empire” break up or shall it be changed into a federation? To speak
of changing an imperfect federation into a perfect one gives a false
idea of the case. What is really proposed to be done is not to change a
lax confederation into a closer one or an imperfect confederation into
a perfect one. It is to bring in federation, as a perfectly new thing,
where at present there is no federation, but its opposite, subjection.
And it is proposed to bring in federation, not only as a perfectly new
thing, but under circumstances utterly unlike those under which any of
the present or past confederations of the world ever came into being.
The proposal that a ruling state--if any one chooses to call it so, an
“imperial” state--should come down from its position of empire, and
enter into terms of equal confederation with its subject communities,
is a very remarkable proposal, and one which has perhaps never before
been made in the history of the world. It may therefore be well to take
a glimpse at the causes which have led to so unprecedented a proposal
and to the unprecedented dilemma of which it forms one horn.
It is this subjection of the colonies to the mother-country which
is, as I have fully argued elsewhere, the great point of difference
between modern European colonies and those colonies of the elder
world which have in other respects so much in common with them. While
the relations between metropolis and colony are the brightest facts
of Greek or Phœnician political life, in modern times the relations
between mother-country and colony have often been among the darkest.
The subjection of the colony is, as none see more clearly than some
advocates of Imperial Federation, an unnatural thing, at the very least
a thing which becomes unnatural as soon as the colony has outgrown its
childhood. Then comes the alternative, “disintegration” or federation.
That is, Shall the colonies part from the mother-country and become
independent, or shall they remain united to the mother-country on
some terms other than those of subjection? In the Greek system the
alternative could not occur; where the colony was independent from
the beginning, there was no room for “disintegration.” And though we
are sure that the mother-country, taught by experience, would not now
think of trying to keep by force any colony that wished to separate,
yet “disintegration” is a process which is perhaps not to be desired in
itself. It must be better either never to have been united or never to
separate. The separation may be needful, but it must be something of an
unpleasant wrench. The Greek system made it needless. Metropolis and
colony were all the better friends because the relation of subjection
had never existed between them.
But it is the other alternative of federation which we have now to
discuss. Is that alternative, the substitution of federation for
empire, possible? Let us at least remember that what is proposed
is unlike anything that ever happened in the world before. That
certainly does not of itself prove that the proposed scheme is either
impossible or undesirable; still it is a fact worth bearing in mind.
It is always dangerous to imagine a precedent where there is none. A
perfectly new scheme should stand forth as a perfectly new scheme, as
something which may commend itself by its abstract merits, but which
has nothing in the way of experience to recommend it. And such is the
scheme of federation between the mother-country and the colonies.
No ruling state has ever admitted its subject states into a federal
relation[5]. Ruling states have often admitted subject states to equal
privileges with themselves; but the promotion has taken the shape, not
of federation but of absorption; that is, subjects were raised to the
rank of citizens. Of this Rome is the great example; her citizenship
was gradually extended, first to the Italian allies--fruit of their
war of independence--and then by slow degrees to the provinces also.
Now the people of our colonies need no admission to citizenship. They
are already British subjects; the essence of the modern colonial
relation is that they remain British subjects. The inhabitants of the
colonies, each man by himself, are the equals of the inhabitants of the
United Kingdom; this or that colonist may be an elector in the United
Kingdom; let him come and live in the United Kingdom and he may become
a member of Parliament, a cabinet minister, a peer of the realm. It is
only the communities, as communities, that are subject. Now it would
be quite possible to unite the mother-country and the colonies in a
way that might be called at pleasure the removal of subjection or its
aggravation. They might be united as Rome and her Italian allies were
united, as Scotland, and Ireland were united to England. They might
send members to the Parliament of the United Kingdom in fair proportion
to their numbers. They would then have exactly the same control over
the general affairs of the kingdom, “realm,” “empire,” whatever it is
to be called, which the inhabitants of the United Kingdom have now.
And, considering the geography of the case, it may be that, instead
of Westminster, some point, some island perhaps, more central for the
whole “empire” might be chosen as the place of assembly. But, with
such an union as this, the local Legislatures of the colonies must be
abolished. The Parliament of the whole “empire” must legislate for
the whole “empire.” The colony, in short, must rise or sink to the
level of a county. The soil of the colony, the people of the colony,
would receive the most perfect equality with the soil and the people
of the mother-country. Subjection would be utterly done away with.
Canada would be no more subject than York. But a share in the control
of the affairs of the whole empire would be bought by the loss of all
special control over the affairs of the colony itself. Some might
think that such a price would be too dear. Self-government, the kind
of self-government which the colonies have hitherto enjoyed, would
come to an end. There would be only that lesser self-government which
belongs to an English county or borough; the internal affairs of any
colony would be legislated for by an assembly in which the members
for that colony might be outvoted. Subjection, in short, formally
abolished, would practically be made more complete.
I believe that nobody proposes anything like this. I feel sure that
every colony would at once reject such a scheme. Still such a scheme
would be the consistent carrying out of one form of union, and that the
most perfect form. But it may be said, We wish to preserve the colonial
Parliaments, and at the same time to have members for the colonies in
the Imperial Parliament. The question would then arise, the question
which arises also in the case of Ireland, Are the colonial members to
have votes in the affairs of the United Kingdom? If the Parliaments
of the colonies are to remain, while members for the colonies have
votes in the Imperial Parliament which, it is to be supposed, is still
to settle the affairs of the United Kingdom, one of two results must
come. If, while the affairs of the colonies are discussed in their
own assemblies, the affairs of the United Kingdom are discussed in an
assembly in which the representatives of the colonies have votes, then
the mother-country will in truth become dependent on the colonies.
The other alternative is that the dormant power of the Imperial
Parliament to legislate for the colonies, a power which has never been
formally laid aside, will be called into new being whenever it suits
the purposes of the members for the United Kingdom. The difficulties
and confusions of such a state as this would be endless; so would
be those that would follow on the scheme which would doubtless be
proposed as their remedy. That would be something like this. As the
colonial Parliaments settle the affairs of the colonies, so let the
Parliament of the United Kingdom still settle the affairs of the
United Kingdom; let the colonial members who are added to it in its
“Imperial” character vote only on “Imperial” questions, and leave the
affairs of Great Britain and Ireland to be settled by the members for
Great Britain and Ireland. But to say nothing of the odd position of
men who would be members of Parliament on one division and not members
of Parliament on another, how is the distinction to be drawn? Even in
a real federal constitution, where the States surrender certain named
powers to the federal authority and keep all other powers, questions
will arise whether this or that point is of federal or cantonal
competence. How much more will such questions arise when it may be
asked in almost every case of legislation, Does this matter concern the
colonies or not? Would, for instance, such a question as Irish Home
Rule, or any change in any direction in the relations between Ireland
and Great Britain, be looked on as an “Imperial” question, or as one
touching Great Britain and Ireland only[6]? It is often hard enough
to settle rules for assemblies called into being for the first time;
but how much harder will it be, when an assembly has had for ages an
absolutely boundless range of powers, and where every member has always
had an equal voice on all subjects, to bring in a new class of members
who shall have votes on certain classes of subjects only, and those
classes of subjects which it will be practically impossible to define.
* * * * *
But, be any scheme of this kind good or bad, possible or impossible,
it is not Federation. We have seen elsewhere what Federation means
and how federations grow. A federal union involves a certain loss of
power and position on the part of the states which unite to form it.
But, as federations have been formed hitherto, that loss of power and
position has either been merely nominal or else has been fully made up
in other ways. When the Achaian cities, the Swiss cantons, the Batavian
provinces, the American States, were threatened by enemies, whom they
could resist only by union, it was worth their while to give up the
independent power of peace and war; for each city or state to cleave
to it would have meant for each city or state to be subdued singly.
In some of these cases many of the states had never really exercised
the independent powers of peace and war. There was no moment when
Aargau or Indiana could have made war on its own account; and, if we
say that there was a moment when Massachusetts or Pennsylvania might
have done so, it was only an ideal moment which had no real historical
being. In each of the great federal unions some of the members, in
some of them all the members, distinctly gained in political position
by entering the Union. Federation is a check on independence; but many
of the states had never known separate independence. But it will be
quite another thing to ask a great power, a ruling power, a mighty
and ancient kingdom, which has for ages held its place among the
foremost nations of the earth, to give up its dominion, to give up its
independence, to sink of its own will to the level of a new State or
Canton. It will be quite another thing to ask the Parliament of such
a kingdom, a Parliament which has for ages been a sovereign assembly,
which has for a very long time believed itself to be the first of all
assemblies, a Parliament whose range of functions has been boundless,
whose will has known no limit save the limits which the laws of nature
impose on all wills--to ask such a Parliament as this to come down from
its seat, to give up to some other assembly not yet in being the widest
and greatest of its powers. In any real federation between the United
Kingdom and the colonies, the Parliament of the United Kingdom would be
no more than the Legislature of an American state or a Swiss canton; it
would have to content itself with those lesser powers which it would
not be called upon to surrender, with mere local powers over the mere
local affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. No
voice, direct or indirect, in the great business of the world could
be allowed to such a purely local body, any more than it is at this
moment allowed to the Legislature of Bern or of New York. We must look
things in the face, and this is what we have to look in the face.
Perhaps not one man in a thousand who has chattered about “Imperial
Federation” has ever stopped to think what “federation” means, any
more than he has stopped to think what “empire” means. Most likely he
means something quite different from the picture which has just been
drawn. Most likely he thinks that Great Britain and the Parliament
of Great Britain will somehow become greater by becoming parts of an
“Imperial Federation.” All this confusion comes of using words without
thinking of their meaning. If by “federation” is meant some wholly new
device, something the like of which is not to be found either in the
existing world or in any past age of the world, we can better discuss
the merits of the new device if it is called by some new name of its
own, rather than if it uses old names like “empire” and “federation”
in some strange sense. But if by federation is meant a known political
system, a system which has existed in the past and which does exist
in the present, if is meant such a constitution as once was in Achaia
and Lykia, as actually is in Switzerland and America, then we may
undoubtedly answer that such a demand was never yet made on any ruling
people or any ruling assembly, and that the Parliament and people of
Great Britain will assuredly not be the first to set the world the
example of accepting it. Every man of us will feel his back set up if
we are asked that the Houses of Lords and Commons shall become the
Senate and House of Representatives, not of “Greater Britain,” which
might haply be promotion, but of a mere canton of Greater Britain,
a canton keeping for its Legislature powers somewhat larger, it may
be, than those of a Town Council or a Court of Quarter Sessions, but
powers as essentially local and secondary in their nature. This or
that American or Australian colony may be naturally glad to meet the
mother-country half-way; but will the mother-country be equally glad to
go and meet them? To rise to the political level of Bern and New York
in the existing world[7], of Megalopolis and Xanthos in a past world,
would be undoubted promotion for Victoria or New Zealand. It would
hardly be promotion for Great Britain, for England or Scotland, or for
Wales either, to sink to that political level.
Now some votaries of the federal scheme seem to see all this, which
its more enthusiastic partisans seem not to have thought of. Such
disputants do not argue for the perfect form of Federation, the
_Bundesstaat_, the constitution of Achaia as it was, of Switzerland and
America as they are. They would have us fall back on something more
like the mere _Staatenbund_, the type of imperfect Federation which the
Seven United Provinces never threw off, but which Switzerland, after
a long experience, and the United States after a short one, did throw
off in favour of those more perfect forms of Federation which they at
present possess. It does not perhaps quite settle the question to say
that this would be indeed a step backwards. It might be argued, at
least as a specimen of ingenuity in disputation, that such a lax kind
of union might possibly suit a confederation whose members lie at vast
distances from one another, though it has been proved not to suit
confederations whose members lie close together. And then one might
argue back again that the physical disunion needed of itself to be,
as far as might be, counterbalanced by the closest political union.
In a mere _Staatenbund_ all difficulties about the relations of the
British Parliament to the new Federal Parliament would be got rid of;
for there would be no need of any Federal Parliament. But either the
union would have to be so lax as to be really no confederation at all,
or else, even in this less perfect union, the British Parliament would
still have to give up some of its chiefest and most cherished powers.
Instead of a Federal Assembly, there would be a mere congress[8] or
conference of representatives from each member of the Union, a congress
meeting to discuss the foreign affairs of the Union, perhaps with power
to settle them, perhaps not. At present the foreign affairs of the
kingdom, and of the “empire” too, are settled by the advisers of the
Crown, subject to the indirect control of the British Parliament. And
in a perfect federation, a _Bundesstaat_, this indirect system might go
on, the indirect control being of course transferred from the British
Parliament to the Parliament of the whole “empire.” But in a mere
_Staatenbund_ it is hard to see how an indirect control can be brought
to bear upon anybody. If the Congress is to have authority to decide
in foreign affairs, it must consist of representatives of the several
members of the Union. Only then where would be the authority of the
Crown and the responsibility of the ministers of the Crown? And with
the authority of the Crown, the authority of Parliament, of all the
Parliaments, will have vanished also. The only way of giving them, or
leaving them, any authority, would be the helpless plan of making the
congress merely consultative. It might be a body which should simply
recommend measures, and leave them to be approved and carried out by
the Legislatures and Executives of the several States, or possibly of
some majority of them. This is in theory a possible form of union; but
it is not exactly the form most likely to lead to speedy and energetic
action, if a confederation scattered over every corner of the globe
should be called on to strike a sudden blow for its political being.
In short, if the _Bundesstaat_ is out of the question, the
_Staatenbund_ is yet more out of the question. The _Bundesstaat_ is a
form of constitution which has worked well in those cases where it has
suited the circumstances of the time and place in which it has been
introduced. Only it is not suited to the circumstances of Great Britain
and her colonies, and it is not likely to work well among them. But
it is not too much to say that the _Staatenbund_ has never yet really
worked well under any circumstances, and that it is certainly not
likely to work well for the first time when applied to circumstances
yet more unfavourable than any under which it has hitherto been tried.
* * * * *