_CONCLUSION._
Notwithstanding its bastioned enclosure and great outwork which was
still existing in 1870, exactly as Vauban had planned it, the town of La
Roche-Pont could not have held out forty-eight hours before the German
artillery. A few batteries to the north, on the plateau, and on the west
and east on the sides of the hills placed at nearly two miles distant
would have overwhelmed the place with projectiles without a possibility
of replying; for in September 1870 the small arsenal of La Roche-Pont
contained only six cast iron guns, and four bronze pieces with smooth
bore, two thousand pounds of powder and two or three hundred solid
balls.
It was not attacked, though bodies of the enemy showed themselves not
far from its walls.
Its garrison consisted then of a guard of the engineers and a brigade of
gendarmes.
The inhabitants of La Roche-Pont are, however, patriotic, and mention
with pride the numerous sieges they have experienced.
They had organized their national guard as early as August, including an
artillery corps. It is true they had not been able to supply these
National Guards with more than a hundred flint guns which were lying in
the citadel, and about thirty muzzle-loading guns. These brave people
were not less determined to defend themselves, and began to cast
bullets and make cartridges. They had not the pain of seeing the Germans
there.
In 1871, a French captain of engineers, having been in General
Bourbaki's army, had entered Switzerland with the _débris_ of the corps.
Captain Jean had received a bullet in his breast, not far from the
frontier, and had been taken up by some peasants in the environs of
Pontarlier, and saved by some Swiss custom house officers who had
conveyed him to Lausanne, where he had received the most careful
attention. We might give a touching account of that sad period of our
disasters; and indeed we must write it if it is to be on record at all,
for the Swiss are not the people to make a parade of the zealous
kindness they displayed on this occasion in saving our harassed,
famished, and frozen soldiers. Peasants and townspeople set out amid the
snows of the Jura, to guide and to give shelter to our disbanded and
wandering regiments. Some sacrificed their lives in this service of
humanity, and emulated each other in offering an asylum and giving
assistance to our exhausted soldiers. The behaviour of these excellent
people has excited universal admiration.
Captain Jean was living at Lausanne when Monsieur N.... an officer on
half pay happened to be there. His medical attendants thought that the
climate would contribute to the cure of the wounded man, who had
obtained a congé in the hope of regaining health under the clement skies
of this part of the lake of Geneva. His sister had come to join him and
was doing all for his cure that the tenderest affection could suggest.
His strength was however not returning and alarming symptoms continued.
Captain Jean was from La Roche-Pont; he was on intimate terms with
Monsieur N.... and the conversation often turned on the recent war and
the resources which through ignorance or inability had not been
employed; and they frequently spoke of this beautiful province of
Burgundy, placed on the flank of the invasion, and which was so well
adapted to mask and protect an offensive movement, if they had had an
army of reserve with its right supported by Besançon and its left by
Dijon, and abundantly supplied from the basins of the Rhône and the
Saône.
The Captain used to employ his leisure in studying the defence of his
dear little town whose history he knew so well and which he deemed a
strategic position of some importance.
Monsieur N.... spent nearly a month in the company of this amiable and
well-informed man, whose feelings were deeply affected by our disasters;
but whose active mind sought in these misfortunes themselves a means of
instruction, and an opportunity for developing the resources and
advantages peculiar to France. This was an inexhaustible subject of
conversation for the two friends, and they would continue talking till
the sister interposed her authority as nurse to enjoin silence and rest.
In December 1871, Monsieur N.... received the following letter at Paris,
accompanied by a bundle of papers.
"LAUSANNE, _December 10th, 1871_.
"SIR,
"My dearly loved brother died in my arms the day before yesterday, his
death being the result of his wound and also perhaps of grief for our
late disasters,--deeply affected as he was by the indelible recollection
of the sufferings he had witnessed.
"He retained his consciousness to the last, and I am fulfilling one of
his most urgent requests in sending you these papers. It is the only
souvenir he can bequeath to you--as he said to me the day before his
death--of the hours you so kindly devoted to a poor invalid.
"My brother often spoke to me of you; you were able to appreciate his
excellencies and noble character, and will receive his bequest, I doubt
not, as a mark of the profound esteem he had for you.
"As for myself I cannot quit a neighbourhood where I have lived with my
brother, and where we have met with so much sympathy."
_Extracts from Captain Jean's papers._
Attack implies a shock or onset; defence is a resistance to this onset.
Whether a piece of ordnance discharges a ball against a plate of iron,
or a casing of masonry, or an earthwork; or an assaulting column climbs
a breach, the problem is substantially the same; in either case we have
to oppose to the impulsive force a resistance that will neutralise its
effect.
When there were no projectile weapons, or their range was
inconsiderable, only a normal resistance had to be opposed to the
shock--a man to a man--or if the effect was to be rendered certain, two
men to one. But when projectile arms acquired a longer range, the
_position_ of the attack and defence became a question of importance.
Thus were evolved for combatants in open ground the elements of tactics,
and for fortification, arrangements of a more and more complicated
character.
It is evident, for example, that when it came to a close engagement--a
hand-to-hand struggle with an adversary; if the latter found himself
placed behind a circular enclosure, the obstacle that protected him
would give him a considerable advantage--an advantage that could only be
compensated for by renewing the attack.
[Illustration: FIG. 76.]
To make this very simple principle intelligible at a glance, suppose
(Fig. 76) a circular enclosure containing forty defenders separated from
each other about a yard apart; a hand-to-hand struggle can only be
carried on with a number equal to that of the defenders--or nearly
so--and these under cover. It is no use for the assailants to assemble
as at _A_, they can only present a front equal to that of the defence,
and if this is energetic, the triangle _a_, _b_, _c_, will be effective
only at _c_.
[Illustration: FIG. 77.]
But let us suppose the attacking body to possess projectile arms (Fig.
77), and instead of encountering the circular enclosure, the assailants
to set up their engines between _A_ and _B_ within fair range. They will
overwhelm the segment _d_, _c_, _e_, of the circle with projectiles,
while the defenders will be able to oppose only an inferior number of
engines to the convergent fire.
[Illustration: FIG. 78.]
To compensate in part for this inferiority the defending party adds
appendages to the enclosure (Fig. 78 A), which allow an almost equal
front of defence to be opposed to the attacking front, as regards the
number of projectile weapons, and very superior in point of elevation
and protection. But the attacking force will thus naturally arrange its
engines as seen at B. Thus the projectiles sent from _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_,
_e_, converge upon the salient C. The defence adds the new appendages D
D, and if the engines are well protected, it can make the projectiles
_g_, _h_, _i_, converge on the engine K and crush it, secondly the
projectiles _l_, _g_, _h_, on engine _m_ and destroy it, and so on.
Besides, these appendages have the further advantage of giving side
views over the circumvallation itself and masking its foot.
This principle regulates and will always regulate attack and defence;
distances alone modify its applications.
The more eccentric the defence is, the more distant must be the attack,
and the wider the perimeter it must occupy; but it should be observed,
that the more widely the defence is extended, the more open its flanks
are to attack; these flanks therefore must also be capable of being
defended, for every obstacle that offers only its own resisting force,
without being protected by the action of a neighbouring obstacle, is
soon destroyed.
Whether fortifications or plans of battle are in question, the same
principle comes into play. "Every part should defend its neighbour and
be defended by it." It is clear that the solution of the problem becomes
more and more difficult in proportion to the enlargement of the range of
projectile weapons, and the extent of fronts of fortification or lines
of battle.
Vauban, and most of the engineers who were his rivals and successors,
had resolved the problem in view of the range of the artillery of the
period.
Suppose a hexagon (Fig. 79), fortified according to Vauban's first
method, it is evident that all the parts of the circumference of one
thousand, and even one thousand eight hundred yards, are commanded by
the curtains, the faces of the bastions and the demi-lunes. If the
fortress stands in a level country, the enemy cannot occupy any point in
that circumference without being exposed to its fire.
To raise his first parallel and first batteries, he would have to begin
his works at the limit of the range of the rampart guns; and, as we saw
in Fig. 70, he must erect these batteries sufficiently near the place to
enable their fire to tell upon the defences--_i.e._, at eight or nine
hundred yards. At this distance the curtains could be swept, the faces
and flanks raked, and the parapets thrown down. As the projectiles
reached either point blank, or under an angle of about 10° when the ball
rebounded, the besieged could protect himself against it for a very
considerable time, and keep his own artillery intact.
[Illustration: FIG. 79.]
But as the range of siege pieces in the present day extends to eight or
nine thousand yards, the conditions both for the besieged and the
besieger are very different. Hence (Fig. 80) the enemy raises his
batteries on two or three fronts of the circumference, taking advantage
of the rise in the ground, a wall, or a wood to protect his works, and
when all is ready, he unmasks these batteries, and covers a segment of
the fortress with a quantity of explosive projectiles, which, reaching
it at an angle of 25° to 30° burst, no matter where--_dans le tas_, to
use a common expression--the distance not allowing an aim at flanks or
faces in particular--the besieger being in fact unable to distinguish
them. Supposing the besieged able to maintain his artillery and reply,
exposed as he is to the deluge of iron on his face and flanks, he has to
aim at eccentric points which may vary, to whose position he has no clue
but the smoke of the guns, and at an enemy, who, taking advantage of an
indefinite amount of space to make his arrangements and shelter his men,
is completely free. But to maintain his artillery and preserve his men
and munitions, the besieged has only a space relatively limited to move
in; he is soon encumbered with _débris_ of all kinds, every movement is
difficult for him, and he has not even room to repair damages. He tires
himself out to no great purpose. If the attack has maintained its fire
at a long range for several days, it has introduced such confusion into
a great part of the defences, that in two or three nights afterwards the
first parallel may be commenced at about one thousand yards, it may be
well armed and protected by batteries _en retraite_ and trench-shelters,
so as to discourage sorties and allow of an advance to crown the covered
ways. In what state are the works of the besieged by this time? The
flanks of the bastions are as much damaged as their faces, the
demi-lunes are untenable, and the ditches partly filled up; disorder and
confusion prevail on all sides. No breach is practicable, certainly; but
all the works are seriously injured on three or four fronts, and at one
thousand yards distance, a breach may be made, and that a wide one. The
garrison may sustain the assault to the last, and sell the possession of
the _débris_ of its work dearly; but in this case the final result is
not doubtful.
[Illustration: FIG. 80.]
In proportion to the length of the trajectory, therefore, the defence
must remove its defensive arrangement from the centre of the place.
[Illustration: FIG. 81.]
If each front of Vauban's defence was about four hundred yards in
length, it ought to be from thirteen to fourteen thousand yards now
(Fig. 81). That is to say, the side of the hexagon which was four
hundred yards--_i.e._, from one salient of a bastion to another--should
be fourteen hundred yards. Let A be the main body of the fortress--on a
plain suppose; forts will be erected at B and C, the zone of action of
each of these works being eight thousand yards, they will protect each
other and cross their fires without the possibility of their projectiles
falling into the fortress if any of them should be in the power of the
enemy.
[Illustration: FIG. 82.]
Fig. 82 presents the block plan of each of those forts B and C, to whose
interior arrangements we shall return. But by this excessive lengthening
of the _capitals_, the forts B (Fig. 81), may be swept along the whole
extent of the arc of a circle _a b_ (more than the third of the
circumference); they occupy the points of a triangle, and if one of them
were taken the enemy would be able to batter two of the forts C. It is
therefore necessary, with an extended radius, to multiply the defences,
and to enable them to protect each other in a more effective manner.
This is the method indicated in Fig. 83.
Here we have a dodecagon. The forts of the outer zone are seven thousand
yards apart, and the works, A, flank each other; a second zone of forts
B commands the latter, if required, and the zone of action of these
second works extends beyond the outer line of forts. Railways are
required to connect the forts of each zone, and to put them in
communication with the body of the place.
This extension of the fields of defence may, according to the nature of
the ground, be divided into two zones with a central nucleus.
[Illustration: FIG. 83.]
The interior zone would consist of permanent works, forming an _enceinte
de préservation_; a line of forts at intervals sufficiently
strengthened, in case of war, by field works.
The exterior zone would be fixed by occupying strategic points well
chosen and considered beforehand, forming small camps protected by
temporary works, and affording security to a numerous army, whose
manoeuvres the enemy could not espy.
The expenditure entailed by such a system of defence is unquestionably
enormous. But as respects this question there is to all appearance an
unwillingness to realize exactly the new state of things produced by
artillery of long range.
The expenditure involved in the successive systems of defence from
ancient times downwards has been a continually increasing one. The wall
built round Paris by Philippe-Augustus, would not cost, the running
yard, as much as that of Charles V.; the latter, again, must have been
less expensive than the bastioned fronts of Louis XIII., and these again
would be far from necessitating the outlay (_i.e._ estimated by the
running yard, and reckoning detached forts) occasioned by the
fortification of Paris under Louis Philippe. Similarly the mounting of
four or five trebuchets, and the movable towers required for attacking a
fortified place before fire artillery was employed, cost less than the
manufacture of the artillery used at the siege of Turin in 1535. The
latter again would be far less costly than the French and English
artillery at the siege of Sebastopol. Whereas at the time when
smooth-bore guns were used a place might be attacked with about sixty
pieces, five times the quantity are needed now; since it is necessary to
operate over a much more extensive area.
War is therefore a game which tends to become more and more costly, and
especially siege warfare. Are we then to conclude that nations will
become disgusted with warfare on account of the frightful expense it
involves? This is not probable.
At the present day, as in times past, that which costs most is defeat.
With forty millions well laid out in France, before the war of 1870, and
from forty to eighty millions spent in the war itself, we probably
should not have had to pay the four hundred millions which this war cost
us, and we should not have lost two provinces which are certainly worth
still more than that sum.
Parsimony in military preparations, in times of serious change, such as
ours, is ruinous.
The principles to be followed may be summed up as follows: Commit
yourself to no superfluous outlay, but spend all that is necessary.
Besides, is it after all certain that a good system of territorial
defence is so costly as some allege?
Is it a question of building something like a Chinese Wall on our
eastern frontier? Is it likely that if a few strong positions rendered
impregnable without unnecessary works enabled us to keep an army of
observation two hundred thousand strong, secure from any surprise in the
elevated valleys bounded by the ranges of hills which stretch from the
Jura along Belfort, Remiremont, Epinal, Langres and Dijon, and border
the right bank of the Saône as far as Lyons, the Germans would be in a
hurry to make their way a second time to Paris? If they experienced the
slightest check on such a route, if they were obliged even to halt, what
would become of them?
The essential consideration therefore is a good choice of positions;
shelter from the approach of an invasion on the flanks, and the
avoidance of enormous expenditure in the attempt to defend all points.
Let us suppose that Metz had been rendered impregnable, or at least so
provided with defences that it could have held out for six months; and
certainly the thing was possible. In the first place we should not have
lost that town, and secondly the war, notwithstanding our deficiencies
in soldiers and in artillery, might have taken quite another turn.
Greater sacrifices on the part of the enemy, more prudence, and a still
greater loss of men, would have been required to constrain us to a peace
accepted before the cannon's mouth.
War is made now a-days with armies a million strong; this is all very
well while the invading force meets no very serious obstacle, either in
front of it or on its flanks; when the combinations which such a vast
display of forces necessitates are not disturbed at any point, and when
the strategic operations upon the ground succeed each other with perfect
precision, as one might trace them on a map in our studies. But these
enormous agglomerations of men could give rise in a single day to
appalling perils, after a grave check on one of their flanks. Such
masses can be advanced, fed, and manoeuvred only by means of a very
complicated, and therefore delicate and easily deranged machinery. The
Germans asserted that by the possession of Alsace and a part of Lorraine
we had a hold upon Germany. Now their country is almost dove-tailed into
France. The future will show whether that will greatly benefit them.
In 1870 and 1871 we saw what could be accomplished by the little
fortress of Belfort; which was perhaps the only one among our strong
places possessing guns of long range, and a garrison well commanded and
determined to defend itself.
It persisted in maintaining the offensive over a circle of from twelve
to sixteen miles, thanks to a few rifled cannon with which the ramparts
were furnished, and which protected sorties through a radius of three to
four miles. For a month it hindered the planting of siege batteries;
and, in spite of a bombardment of seventy-three days, the town had only
four of its houses burned. This defence is instructive, and shows that
the old defensive system has had its day.
During the siege the batteries of the besieged hardly suffered at all,
and had recourse to indirect firing--that is, they fired over the
barracks from the gorge of the castle without seeing the mark, but
regulating by observation. This indirect firing, which took no account
of the plan of the crests of the defence, and which thus enabled a
powerful fire to be directed to any point, without regarding the faces,
produced a great effect on the batteries of the enemy, who, on his side,
could not see these guns, and did not know how to regulate his fire.
The question, therefore, remains undecided; and, though a long range
enables the attack to envelope each work more decidedly with its fires,
each battery of the besieger may be subjected to the fire of a greater
number of guns by the defence. At Paris, the forts which are by no means
planned in view of the present long range, enabled a weak and
inexperienced garrison, whose _morale_ was none of the firmest, to
execute sorties with success to a distance of two miles and a half.[65]
With good troops, then, we might have raised in one night, works which
would have enabled us to resume the offensive, and to push further on,
to break the line of contravallation, and seriously to embarrass the
besieger. It is not therefore proved that long ranges give a greater
advantage to the attack than to the defence, while, on the other hand,
the long range of rifled cannon may be affirmed to be favourable to the
defence; but it would be so only on the condition of the works being
planned in view of the new action of artillery, and not according to old
traditions, however glorious. The destructive power of explosive
projectiles puts obstacles in the way of the besieger's approaches; and,
in fact, during the late war we never saw employed that old mode of
approach with a view to attacking by breach and crossing the ditch.
The Germans were not so stupid as to employ these classical methods.
They took up their position on favourable and often commanding points,
at three thousand eight hundred to four thousand two hundred yards
around our fortresses, which adhered to the old defensive system adapted
to ranges of two thousand two hundred yards at most; and covered with
shells our works and the towns they were supposed to protect, without
risk to a single sapper. We thought that odious and unreasonable; like
those nobles of the fifteenth century, who thought it an abominable
shame that their feudal nests should be breached with bombards, and
declared that the trade of war was thereby damaged. But suppose we
should some day condescend to practical consideration, when these old
flanked fronts fall into disesteem, and the new generation of military
engineers determine to admit that we have to do with artillery of long
range, and to take advantage of the fact, a certain degree of
superiority might be doubtless given to defence over attack.
How ought these isolated forts, which are destined to replace the
salients of our old fortresses, to be planned? They should afford ample
space for a large number of fires--even indirect fires--in case of need;
consequently extended faces and short flankings--that is, as shallow as
possible, and perfectly open gorges. They should efficiently protect the
works of counter-approach, and consider defence at close quarters as a
question of only secondary importance; for very seldom would there be
occasion for it, if indeed the case ever presented itself, which is
doubtful.
[Illustration: FIG. 84.]
Referring to the general defensive system shown in Fig. 83, and required
the plan of one of the forts, A, the result will be Fig. 84, giving the
work at the lower level at C, and at the level of the batteries at D.
The counterscarp should be cased up to at least sixteen or seventeen
feet above the bottom of the ditch.
The escarp should be made with tipped earth. The masonry works should
all be covered and secured from being enfiladed; they form casemates
inside E. Beneath the terracings, powder magazines, F, and the passages
communicating with the _oiseaux_ or lower _orillons_, G, protected by
the counterscarp and the covered way, and which are used only if the
enemy attempts to pass the ditch. The faces and flanks on the outside
are planned on angles sufficiently obtuse to cross their fires. The two
faces in the plan (Fig. 84) may be armed with eight guns and the flanks
with six guns. This work is separated from that of the gorge by a
traverse that efficiently protects this gorge, which possesses its
flanks, armed with four guns and its orillons.
From the work of the gorge is a communication into the fort by a covered
caponnière, forming traverse in the direction of the _capital_ or centre
line. The gorge is defended by a curtain for the riflemen, and, at need,
for small pieces of artillery. At need also, on the terre-plein of the
work of the gorge may be mounted guns of long range, affording an
indirect fire in the circumference of a semi-circle, over the great
traverse H, if the parapets of the faces are damaged by the fire of the
enemy.
Fausse-braies consisting of palings are fixed in the ditch at ten feet
from the base of the escarp, to hinder the fallen _débris_ of the escarp
from filling up the ditch, and to enable its passage to be defended. The
well-covered internal masonry works prevent the accumulation of earth on
the interior platforms, and afford casemates, which enable the garrison
to take rest in perfect security; at any rate along the two faces and
the great traverse. Blindages can be set up on the traverses of the
batteries, and can be easily repaired every night, as well as the escarp
of tipped earth.
It would be difficult to say how many projectiles it would require to
render such a work untenable; since we have seen in the siege of Paris,
that a marine battery erected on tipped earth on the military road
between the forts of Rosny and de Noisy, armed with three guns, had been
a mark for the German shells during twenty-four days, without any of its
guns having been dismounted, or its escarp suffering more than could be
made good each night.
Permanent works should, however, only be established with the utmost
circumspection:--1. Because they require a very considerable outlay. 2.
Because they are necessarily familiar to, and for a long while studied
by the enemy, who takes his measures accordingly.
The important point is to possess an accurate acquaintance with the
ground to be defended, and only to establish permanent works in second
line, and on points incontestably favourable for defence, supposing an
artillery of even a still longer range than the present.
Every centre to be defended should therefore possess works sufficient to
prevent a surprise; and in addition at a distance of six to eight
thousand yards, a line of forts, crossing their fires if possible, or at
any rate connected by strong batteries; and lastly, at a distance of
about four thousand yards, positions previously examined and known,
suitable for placing very simple works of field fortification, but which
at a given moment may offer a resistance sufficient to permit movements
on a grand scale--and delay the formation of an enemy's batteries.
[Illustration: FIG. 85.--DEFENSIVE SYSTEM OF THE GREAT INTRENCHED CAMP.]
In applying these principles to the defence of the town of La
Roche-Pont, whose strategical position is one of major importance, since
it connects Besançon with Dijon, and forms a salient on the flanks of an
army which manoeuvres from Epinal and from Vesoul upon Langres and
Chaumont, it would be necessary to construct around this place, whose
old fortifications are no longer of any value (Fig. 85) eight forts, A,
on the brows of the plateaus which surround the town, and thirteen
batteries or redoubts, B, a little behind or to command the meeting of
the river Abonne with the Saône and enfilade the valleys. Thus the group
of roads which from the point C lead to Langres and Champlitte, from D
to Dijon and Beaune, from E to Besançon and Dôle, from F to Gray and
from G to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, would be occupied. A _tête du pont_ H,
protected by batteries which would dominate the Saône, would enable an
army to manoeuvre on both banks.
This passive defence would occupy a perimeter of forty miles, and the
zone of action of the permanent works, a perimeter of sixty miles.
The purely passive defence would require, for the eight forts, four
thousand eight hundred men; for the thirteen batteries two thousand men;
for the guard of the intermediary trenches and the service of the
_enceinte de préservation_, not including the forts and batteries,
eighteen thousand men; reserve in the fortress, two thousand five
hundred men; total, twenty-seven thousand three hundred men, whilst the
effective investment would require an army of one hundred thousand men.
But if this great intrenched camp contained an army of a hundred and
fifty thousand men in addition to the troops necessary for the passive
defence, this army could besides, on a very extended perimeter or on
some advantageous points, occupy within the zone of action of the forts,
an _enceinte de combat_ defended by field works, which would enable it
to assume the offensive at the opportune moment.
The armament of the forts would consist of a hundred and sixty guns of
large calibre, and that of the batteries of forty-five guns of long
range. With the reserve park this would give a total of two hundred and
thirty pieces of ordnance.
Harnessed guns would be also necessary to support the trenches of the
passive defence.
Each fort would cost about £48,900. The eight together £391,200
Each battery or redoubt would cost about £6,000. The
thirteen together 78,000
--------
Total £469,200
========
To make head against an invasion at all points at once has always been a
difficult problem to solve; and it is still more so if we confine
ourselves to the defensive, for the enemy starts from a base of
operation with a view to concentrating himself upon a point unknown to
the defenders. The latter has therefore only a line to oppose to the
apex of a triangle of action. He must limit himself to preserving the
heart of the country and certain districts that are already naturally
protected, and which allow him to operate on the flanks of the invading
forces; regions behind which lie extensive tracts of country from which
supplies may be drawn.
Let us suppose that on the zone of defence of which La Roche-Pont forms
the centre, an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men were assembled,
which was able to reach Belfort through Besançon or by the road from
Vesoul to Langres through Gray or Châtillon-sur-Seine through Dijon,
these towns of Besançon, Vesoul, Langres, and Dijon being themselves in
a condition to arrest the enemy's advance: the latter in attempting to
make his way to Paris would be obliged either to watch this zone with an
army of three hundred thousand men, or to move, and that with extreme
caution, along the Lunéville and Nancy routes.
If a defensive zone of the same importance is disposed on the north, a
point becomes very dangerous, especially if the capital is provided
with an _enceinte de préservation_, and an _enceinte de combat_ allowing
an army to manoeuvre.
Three hundred thousand men therefore would be required to watch the
defensive zone of Burgundy and the same number that of the north, and
four hundred thousand men to invest Paris; total, one million, without
reckoning the troops required for keeping open the communication between
the three armies and guarding the base of operations.
It follows that the slightest check might entail a serious disaster.
As the army of Metz under the ramparts of the town was not able to
manoeuvre, the two hundred thousand men employed in blockading it were
rendered inactive for two months.
If the French army had been able to move within a perimeter of 60 miles,
with a good supply of provisions, it would have reduced three hundred
thousand men to inaction; since the Germans, who leave nothing to
chance, reckon--and not unreasonably--that on the field it is desirable
to be at least two to one. It would seem then that the art of war
now-a-days--as far as resistance to an invader is concerned--consists
not in endeavouring to defend any extensive lines which may be taken or
outflanked, but in establishing a small number of centres of defence,
sufficiently remote from each other and connected by a system of
railways in the rear; which are capable of holding out long, and which
compel the enemy either to divide in order to watch them or to take
them, or to expose his flanks to an attack if he leaves them alone, or
to see himself cut off from his base of operations if he advances _en
masse_ against one of them without covering himself against the
others....
But we must confess to a limited confidence in fortifications on this
immense scale. It is certain that they are ruinous: it is not certain
that they are effective in proportion to the enormous expense they
occasion.
The men-at-arms of the fifteenth century cased themselves and their
horses in iron to resist crossbow bolts, lance-thrusts, and strokes of
axe or sword. Fire artillery, which at first aimed at nothing more than
substituting powder for the mechanism of engines worked by counterpoise
or ropes, and like these discharged only stone balls, becomes improved
and uses iron balls and leaden bullets; and instead of being ponderous
and fixed as formerly, moves on wheels and is rendered easily
manageable, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century places pistols
and arquebusses in the hands of foot-soldiers and horsemen. What plan do
the men-at-arms adopt? They thicken the plates of their armour and line
them so thoroughly that they are no longer fit for a charge. This method
lasts about fifty years, until it is perceived that the best way to
enable cavalry to face artillery, so as not to be crushed by it, is to
allow it to move rapidly.
Cannon are made whose balls pierce through and through the wooden planks
of a vessel. Immediately these planks are cased with iron. To-day's
balls are resisted by the vessel's sides. The plates of iron are doubled
... and forthwith the penetrating force of the projectiles is increased;
but those of the next day pierce them. Steel is made to take the place
of iron: but after thousands upon thousands have been spent the
projectile has always the best of it. But it happens in a naval
engagement that an Admiral steams at full speed right athwart an enemy's
ship and sinks it! In fact it is by rapidity of movement and facility in
manoeuvring that victories at sea are ensured much more than by
increased protective plating.
And in the art of fortification we are exactly at the same point as
were the men-at-arms of the end of the fifteenth century, who heaped
plates on plates to protect themselves from artillery. It is time the
art of fortification should be modified.
It will be objected that a vessel or a horseman can move about, but that
a fortress is immovable, and that consequently passive force cannot here
be replaced by active force or agility. This is a mistake. Though a
fortress cannot be moved, the defensive system of a district can and
ought to be studied, in view of various contingencies. In future warfare
the plan of temporary fortification ought to play a principal part and
may be made to do so. In other terms, an army ought to be able to
fortify itself everywhere, and take advantage of every position. It is
temporary fortification therefore which it is desirable to render easy,
prompt, and efficacious, in order to defeat the combinations studied
beforehand by the enemy, to reduce him in certain cases to the
defensive, when he was hoping to attack, and to embarrass his movements
on the great scale by unforeseen resistance at a point which he expected
to pass with ease, and oblige him incessantly to modify his plans by
rapidly executed arrangements for defence.
Vauban's fortresses have had their day; who can conjecture what may be
accomplished in a future war by the system of defence of which an
example has just been presented?
Still the most reliable fortress for a country is a good and
well-commanded army, and a well-educated, brave, and intelligent
population, resolved to make every sacrifice rather than undergo the
humiliation of a foreign occupation.
Captain Jean's papers contained many other critical remarks which cannot
be recorded here. These documents sufficiently indicate that, whatever
may have been said about the matter, there were among our officers some
who worked, and many who had anticipated the dangers to which we were
exposed by a blind confidence in our valour and an utter ignorance of
the progress made by our enemies. Indeed among these papers of Captain
Jean's, numerous notes, dated 1866, 1867, 1868, show the inefficiency of
the defensive system then recognised in France, and the necessity of
providing our strong places with works adapted to the recent progress in
artillery.
Will the town of La Roche-Pont witness the realisation of Captain Jean's
projects, or is its military history closed for ever? The future will
show.
In the meantime it is engaged in cultivating its vineyards, and its
suburbs are invading once more the slopes of the plateau on the south
and the west. The lower part of its donjon of the 12th century is still
visible above the escarpment of the little citadel, and antiquaries can
discover Roman basements at some points in its wall. When cellars are
excavated, Gallo-Roman coins are sometimes found with broken pieces of
red and black pottery, charred wood, and even flint hatchets.
These evidences of the antiquity of the cité are deposited in a small
museum which also contains sculptures taken from the abbey and the
castle.
If you go to La Roche-Pont, ascend the ruins of the donjon. From this
elevated point the view on a clear spring morning is very fine; towards
the south it extends as far as the Saône, showing the little river
Abonne, winding along the vale through meadows and orchards. On the
north spreads the plateau covered with clumps of trees, and bounded only
by the blue outlines of the hills of the Haute-Marne. At your feet the
town with its ramparts looks like a vessel moored at the extremity of a
promontory. We are reminded then of all the events which this little
nook of ground has witnessed, of the ruins that have been accumulated by
human passion, and the blood that has been so lavishly shed. We fancy we
hear the shouts with which these walls have so often echoed.
Nature however remains the same; the meadows continue to be enamelled
with flowers, and clothe with a mantle of beauty the ruins that have
been heaped up by the fury of men. A feeling of deep sadness comes over
us, and we say to ourselves: "What use is it all?" "What use!" replies
at once a voice in the depth of our our soul. "What is the use of
independence? What good is the love of our country? What use is the
memory of self-sacrifice?" Do not blaspheme, Egoistic Philosophy; be
silent before centuries of struggle--before that layer upon layer of the
bones of the dead, and those heaps of successive ruins which have formed
our country's soil. Though often ravaged, this hill has never been
abandoned by its inhabitants; the more affronts it has had to sustain,
the more its children have become attached to its side, the more they
hold to the soil that has been impregnated with the blood of their
ancestors, and the more hatred they feel towards those who would attempt
to detach them from this ancestral tomb. This is patriotism; and it is
the only human passion that can be dignified with the title of holy. War
makes nations, and war raises them again when they sink down under the
influence of material interests. War is struggle, and we find struggle
everywhere in nature; it secures greatness and duration to the best
educated, the most capable, the noblest, the most worthy to survive. And
in the present day more than ever, success in war is the result of
intelligence and of that which develops intelligence--Work.
Whenever what is called fraternity between nations shall become a
reality, the reign of senile barbarism and of shameful decay will not be
far distant.
Before this rock on which so many generations have fought to defend
their independence, to resist aggression and to keep the rapacious
foreigner at a distance, it is not an expression of regret that is
called for--it is rather of homage to the dead which hearts full of
gratitude cannot withhold. They do not ask for tears but for imitation.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 65: The battle of Champigny had extended our lines to four
thousand six hundred and twenty yards from the Fort de la
Faisanderie.]
EXPLANATION
OF SOME OF THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK.
AGGER (Latin), terrace, or platform, which the Romans raised before the
fronts attacked, for the purpose of setting up their projectile
machines, securing a commanding position, and masking the troops
assembled for an assault.
BAILEY, fore-court; court of the outer works, or yard. The stables and
the lodgings for the garrison were usually disposed in the bailey of the
strong castles of the Middle Ages (see p. 169).
BALISTA (Latin, _onager_), an engine for propelling stones, worked by
means of strongly-twisted cords.
BARBICAN, exterior defence protecting an entrance, and allowing a large
assemblage of men to prepare for sorties, or to protect a retreat.
Barbicans were either of masonry or earth, or constructed of a simple
palisade. They were always of a circular form (see p. 169).
BASTION, an earthwork, cased externally with masonry, salient beyond the
main body of the fortress, and possessing two faces, two flanks, and a
gorge, so as to sweep the ground without, to cross the fires, and to
flank the curtains. The gorge of bastions is open, closed, or
retrenched. Bastions are said to be full when their _terre-plein_ is
level with the curtains; empty, when their _terre-plein_ is beneath that
level; armed with a cavalier, when upon their _terre-plein_ is raised a
battery of earth which commands the country without over the parapets
(see p. 278, 310).
BOULEVARD, an earthwork--in use at the time when fire artillery had
attained a certain degree of importance--for placing cannon outside
ancient defences still preserved. Boulevards were of all forms--square,
circular, and triangular (see p. 229).
BRAIE, an exterior defence of trifling height, protecting the foot of
the ramparts, and hindering the enemy's approach.
BRETÈCHE, timber construction intended to strengthen and to flank a
front or a salient (see p. 184).
CAT, timber gallery, low and long, covered with a longitudinal very
pointed and strongly ironed roof. Placed on wheels, these galleries were
advanced to the foot of the walls, after the ditch was filled up, and
enabled the miners to begin working into the masonry under cover. The
name _rat_ was given to these galleries in some provinces.
CATAPULT, engine for shooting large darts by means of a powerful bow.
CAVALIER, earthwork raised in the middle of a bastion, or upon any point
of the defence, to command the exterior. In the sixteenth century the
besieging armies erected cavaliers around defences to mount cannon upon
them. Our siege batteries are the modern analogues of these works (see
p. 237, 312).
CHEMISE, exterior inclosure of a donjon; the chemise of the donjon
consists of a wall which leaves a space of some yards between it and the
donjon. A postern with a drawbridge gives a communication between one of
the rooms of the donjon and the rampart walk of the chemise (see p.
201).
CLAVICULA (Latin), exterior defence, raised outside the gates of a camp,
and which obliged those who endeavoured to enter to present their flank
to the defenders of the ramparts (see p. 92).
COVERED WAY, road formed on the counterscarp and protected by the relief
of the glacis (see p. 307).
COUNTERSCARP, is the casing of the ditch which is opposite to the
defence.
DEMI-LUNE, low work, disposed before a curtain between two bastions,
separated from the main body of the fortress by a ditch, and possessing
two faces and two short flanks (see p. 306).
DONJON OR KEEP, chief retreat of the defenders of a strong castle. The
donjon was always separated from the defences of the castle, and put in
direct communication with the exterior (see p. 169).
ESCARP is that part of a revetment of fortifications which fronts the
exterior, from the bottom of the ditch to the parapet or crenelation.
FAUSSE-BRAIE, palisade or trench, with parapet, defending the bottom of
the ditch, low enough to be masked by the relief of the counterscarp.
GLACIS, sloping ground which extends from the counterscarp of the ditch
towards the country, and masks the covered ways as well as the escarp.
HOARDING, wooden gallery which in time of war was put outside
crenelations to enable the defenders to see the foot of the ramparts and
towers, and to throw stones and materials of all kinds upon assailants
attempting to approach.
LIST, interval left between the exterior defences and those of the body
of the place (see p. 180).
MACHICOULIS--The wooden hoarding being easily set on fire, it was
replaced in France, about the end of the thirteenth century, by stone
corbels carrying a crenelation of masonry, and leaving intervals between
them for throwing materials upon the assailants who approached the foot
of the walls. In Syria, the Christians had adopted the machicoulis as
early as the beginning of the thirteenth century.
MANGONEL, engine for propelling large stones from a kind of sling
attached to the longer arm of a movable beam heavily weighted at its
other extremity.
MERLON, solid space in the parapet between two embrasures. During the
Middle Ages the merlons were usually perforated in the middle by a
loop-hole. In time of war the battlements were masked by mantelets of
wood, which could be raised at discretion by means of an axle turning in
two iron collars let into the upper angles of the merlons.
MOVABLE TOWER, timber tower which was mounted on rollers and was
advanced to the walls for the purpose of assault. The movable towers
were made to command the battlements, and the upper story was furnished
with a bridge which fell upon the crest of the ramparts of the towers
(see p. 218).
OISEAU, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a small masonry work
which, disposed at the salient angles in the ditch, swept the latter and
was intended to bar the passage. The _oiseaux_ were masked by the
counterscarp. In modern polygonal fortifications this plan has been
re-adopted (see p. 373).
OPPIDUM (Latin), a citadel or fortified strategical position, among the
Gallic populations. Many Roman camps were formed at the epoch of the
conquest of Gaul, on the Gallic _oppida_, which were only a kind of
intrenched camps formed upon elevated plateaux. Several of our French
towns occupy the sites of ancient _oppida_--Langres, Laon, Béziers,
Carcassone, Uzerche, Sainte-Reine (Alesia), Le Puy-en-Velay,
Semur-en-Auxois, Avalon, Puy d'Issolu, &c.
ORILLON, projecting part of faces of bastions, intended to mask the
flanks and to shield the guns which arm these flanks (see p. 280).
PARADOS, mound of earth disposed behind the guns in battery, to shelter
them as well as the servers from reverse firing.
PARALLEL, trench parallel to the sides of the polygon of a fortress,
supplying a covered communication for planting and serving the siege
batteries. Formerly these parallels were required for approaching and
planting the breach batteries. These parallels communicated with each
other by trench boyaux traced in zigzags, so as not to be raked by the
fires of the place (see p. 330).
PARÉCLAT, epaulment of earth, or formed with gabions raised on the
ramparts, or in the middle of bastions, to shelter the defenders from
the splinters of bombs and shells.
PLACE D'ARMES, space defended by an epaulment, intended to enclose a
body of men and to protect it from projectiles (see pp. 288, 307).
POSTERN, secondary gate, small gate, generally masked (see p. 170).
RAMPART, epaulment raised with the earth taken from the ditch sunk on
the outer side; also a wall crowned with a parapet and rampart walk. It
signifies a permanent defence.
RAVELIN, name originally given to demi-lunes. A work consisting of two
faces, open at the gorge, low, and intended to sweep the exterior
between two bastions (see p. 279).
REDAN, work presenting a salient angle and a re-entering angle (see p.
305).
RETRENCHMENT, a work made to augment the defensive strength of a place
within the permanent fortifications, so as to present a fresh obstacle
should the latter fall into the power of the enemy; the retrenchment
consists of an epaulment of earth raised with the material from the
ditch sunk on the outside.
STIMULUS (Latin), barbed iron crook, which, fixed on a short stake stuck
in the ground or in the bottom of conical holes, protected the
approaches of a defence (see p. 80).
TENAILLE, work consisting of a curtain having at each extremity two
demi-bastions (see pp. 278, 306).
TRAVERSE, a mound of earth disposed across covered ways, _terre pleins_,
bastions, and curtains, to shield the guns and the defenders against
enfilade, oblique, or ricochet fire (see p. 335).
TREBUCHET, engine for propelling large stones, very similar to the
mangonel, but whose counterpoise was suspended from the beam instead of
being fixed to it.
TRENCH, road sunk in the ground, the earth being thrown up on one side
only, or on both sides, for enabling the approach of places under cover.
TRENCH-SHELTER, temporary defence, consisting of an exterior epaulment
made with the earth taken from a trench, in a way to shield the soldiers
upon a front, around a camp or a post, and enable them to fire under
cover. The trench-shelter is destined to play an important part since
fire-arms have acquired a long range and a rapid discharge. The Romans,
in their day, made use of trench-shelters in the field.
VINEA (Latin), a wooden mantlet, also a timber gallery, set up
perpendicularly to the _agger_, and which affords approach to the
platform under cover. The wooden towers intended to attack the ramparts
of the besieged were rolled forward on these wooden galleries (see p.
83).
THE END.
End of Project Gutenberg's Annals of a Fortress, by E. Viollet-le-Duc