_THE SEVENTH SIEGE._
On the 31st of December, 1813, the grand army of Bohemia, one hundred
and eighty thousand men strong, and commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg,
crossed the Rhine at Bâle, entered Switzerland, and penetrated into
France. Its right bore down on Belfort, Colmar, and Strasburg, its
centre marched for Langres, its left for Dijon. The same day the
Prussians were crossing the Rhine at Mayence. The invasion of the
eastern frontier had to be met by sixty thousand men, at most, echeloned
between Epinal and Langres; and this force consisted only of dispirited
soldiers and of recruits scarcely knowing how to use their arms. Prince
Schwartzenberg's army--which had some reason to fear being attacked on
the side of Savoy by the forces commanded by Prince Eugene, and knew
that the _débris_ of the army of Spain had orders to make for Lyons with
all speed--wishing to secure its base of operation, left detachments
before Bésançon, Dôle, along the Saône and between Dijon and Langres,
with injunctions to occupy the most favourable strategic position. La
Roche-Pont was to be taken; and the generalissimo of the Bohemian army
imagined that it was not in a condition to hold out eight-and-forty
hours, for he knew that it had no garrison, and that the citizens were
little disposed to defend themselves.
Among the inhabitants of La Roche-Pont were some royalist families,
whose emissaries had assured the commander-in-chief of the Bohemian army
that the whole population were impatiently awaiting the arrival of the
Allies to declare for the Bourbons. Prince Schwartzenberg was too
clear-sighted, and knew too well to what illusions the royalists were
ready to yield themselves, to place an unlimited faith in these
statements; and he was anxious not to encounter serious obstacles during
his first stages, that he might put himself as speedily as possible in
communication with his allies on their way from the north-east. He
therefore informed the royalists of La Roche-Pont that it was
undesirable to provoke a political manifestation on his march; that the
best means of assuring the success of the Allies was to remain quiet;
that his troops, in conformity with the proclamation issued by the
coalition on entering French territory, would respect property; that
they were not animated by a spirit of vengeance, and that their glory
would consist in concluding peace as quickly as possible, so as to
restore to Europe the repose it so much needed.
In the meantime Napoleon, on learning that the German troops had entered
France from the south through Basle, had sent pressing orders into the
Bourbonnais, Auvergne, and Burgundy, to make a levy of conscripts as
soon as possible and send them to Paris. At the same time the depôts of
Dauphiny and Provence, as also the conscripts in the eastern
departments, were to assemble at Lyons to close to the enemy the
approaches from Switzerland and Savoy, and if necessary to operate on
his rear.
The prefects of Burgundy, Picardy, and Normandy, and of Touraine and
Brittany, were to appeal to the communes to form companies of National
Guards _d'élite_, who were to march to Paris, Meaux, Montereau, and
Troyes.
These arrangements were hardly made in time to present a serious
obstacle to the invaders. The civil authorities and the regular troops
began to make a hasty retreat before the armies of the coalition, and
were leaving the inhabitants to themselves without arms or guidance. It
thus happened that some bodies of troops coming from the south found
themselves in an isolated position, and uncertain whether they ought to
continue their route or fall back. Such a case happened on the Saône;
three battalions of infantry, certain artillerymen called to Vincennes
to assemble at the great central depôt which the Emperor was organising
there, and some detachments of various arms making their way for Dijon,
to push on thence towards Troyes--found themselves on the flank of the
left column of the army of Bohemia. They retraced their steps, and made
a rather long détour, hoping to get beyond the enemy's right, and resume
the route for Troyes through Beaune, Sémur, Montbard, and
Châtillon-sur-Seine; but surprised by bad weather and snow, during a
night march in the mountains of the Côte-d'Or, they lost their way, and
found themselves in the morning at Saint-Seine, which was already
occupied by a body of Austrian pioneers. The French were much limited in
point of munitions, and had no artillery. They could not force the
passage, and were obliged to fall back into the valley of Suzon, hoping
still to find the road from Dijon to Langres clear. But at
Thil-le-Châtel they came upon another body of the enemy, and had to
retire towards the small town of La Roche-Pont, for it was evident that
they were cut off. The colonel who commanded this small column was
instructed, should it be impossible to reach Langres, to take up a
position at Auxonne or at La Roche-Pont, to keep his ground there, and
to form a nucleus of defence until the arrival of Augereau's force,
which was to march from Lyons through Macon, Châlon, and Gray, to fall
on the rear of Prince Schwartzenberg.
Such were the events that had happened at this juncture at La
Roche-Pont. Conformably to the last orders transmitted by the prefect,
companies of National Guards had been promptly organised. The
inhabitants of La Roche-Pont, like their neighbours of Auxonne, Dôle,
and Saint-Jean-de-Losne, preserve military habits; and sieges--not
without reason, as we have seen--are a tradition among them. There were
always companies of archers and arbalisters at La Roche-Pont during the
Middle Ages, and at a later date bombardiers and artillerymen. Under the
Consulate La Roche-Pont had been a depôt for the army concentrated
between Dijon and the Swiss frontier to pass the Saint-Bernard, and
munitions had been stored there; some siege pieces had also been placed
there, and still remained. At the approach of Prince Schwartzenberg's
army the population of La Roche-Pont was in agitation; and even before
the prefectoral instructions had arrived, three companies of National
Guards, one of which was of artillerymen, had been spontaneously formed.
All had old muskets of the time of the Revolution, or good hunting
weapons. The lower town, occupied in great part by rich families, of
which several were devoted to the royal cause, did not share in these
preparations for war. Some indiscreet revelations made the upper town
aware of the intrigues of the royalists. The mayor was a man who had
been conspicuous for his devotion to the Emperor while the Empire had
been in vigour; but who, seeing its fortunes decline, became daily more
and more of a royalist.
If he had not actively opposed, he had at least obstructed the formation
of a company of National Guards _d'élite_, endeavouring to gain time.
The little citadel of La Roche-Pont was occupied by a company of sixty
veterans, for the most part invalided, under the orders of an old
one-armed captain of engineers, who had served in almost all the
campaigns of the Empire. When it was known that the enemy had entered
France, Captain Allaud--that was his name--had asked for orders from
Dijon, but had not received them. However, he employed his men in
restoring and replenishing the arsenal. He enjoyed a certain amount of
authority in the upper town. The male population of the _cité_, composed
in great part of men who had been soldiers--all the youth had left in
the first months of 1813--never called Captain Allaud anything but "the
Governor," and had applied to him to form companies, only asking for
munitions. Now the arsenal of La Roche-Pont contained a good supply of
powder and balls, about twenty old bronze pieces of small calibre, six
twenty-four pounders, two howitzers, four small mortars, and about a
hundred muskets past service. The six gendarmes remaining till then at
La Roche-Pont had been summoned to Dijon at the beginning of January.
Captain Allaud asked for co-operation in repairing the arms, making
cartouches and cartridges, repairing the parapets, the traverses, and
epaulements, and fabricating gabions and fascines; and the women made
bags for earth,--as if it had been possible to sustain a siege with the
sixty veterans and the three companies of National Guards, forming a
total of two hundred and sixty men. The Prefect of Dijon had transmitted
the order for these select companies of National Guards to fall back
upon Langres, but the order had not arrived. The royalists shrugged
their shoulders on seeing these two hundred and sixty National Guards
exercising on the platform of the outwork, and went so far as to joke in
the places of public resort about Captain Allaud's _garrison_. He could
not put up with raillery, and talked aloud to his men about running
their swords through the jokers. High words and even blows were
exchanged in the _cafés_. The mayor ventured to interpose his authority;
he was insulted and called a traitor, and the captain was informed of
the intrigues set on foot by the royalists. At night the captain had the
gates of the _cité_ shut, and the antagonism between the upper and lower
town was increasing in violence. "If the Austrians come," said the
captain, "the houses of these royalist traitors will be the first marks
for our balls!" Both parties became excited, and the mayor had the
impudence to ask the captain on whose authority he was acting. "I am the
_commandant de place_," replied the veteran, "since there is no other
officer here, and La Roche-Pont is a defensible place.... To prove it to
you I arrest you!" And he had the mayor conducted to the citadel.
Great was the excitement in the town, but the royalists were in a feeble
minority, and dared not stir. They cried "Vive le Gouverneur!" in the
taverns. The mob attempted to plunder the mayor's house, which was
situated on the _cité_, and the captain had great difficulty in putting
down the disturbance. "Rascals!" cried he to the fellows who were
already breaking in the doors of the house, "I will have you shot like
dogs. Sacrebleu! you can break open doors; we shall see whether you have
so much pluck when the Germans come! Here," added he, turning to a dozen
veterans, who were following him, "clear the place of this _canaille_!"
and, setting the example, he dealt blows in abundance with the flat of
his sword on the backs of the plunderers.
It was the morning following this riot when the French corps above
spoken of presented itself before La Roche-Pont. It was welcomed in the
upper town with every demonstration of joy. An army come to their help
magnificently accoutred and provided would not have been better
received. But this troop, exhausted by fatigue, and having eaten nothing
for twenty-four hours, without artillery or munitions, had all the
appearance of a band of fugitives. Covered with mud, and scantily
clothed, these poor soldiers seemed scarcely able even to defend
themselves. But in such times of distress, so much do people cling to
any semblance of hope, that the sight of a friendly uniform revives
every heart. Seeing themselves so well received, these brave fellows
made their entrance into the city in good order, and presented when
defiling through the streets, in spite of their exhaustion, a martial
appearance which redoubled the enthusiasm of the inhabitants. A colonel,
three chiefs of battalions, and some captains, of whom one belonged to
the artillery, composed the staff. Two hours after their arrival, these
soldiers, most of whom had seen much service, having rested well and
brushed themselves up, presented a very different appearance.
The news brought by this small corps proved clearly enough that there
was no time to lose, if they wanted to put the town of La Roche-Pont in
a condition to defend itself with honour, if not with hope of success.
The colonel, of course, took the command; his name was Dubois. He had
been in the campaign in Portugal, then in Russia, whence he had returned
captain, and having been appointed _chef de bataillon_ in the Saxon
campaign, he had distinguished himself at Dresden, and had been a
colonel from the date of the battle of Leipzig. He was a man of about
thirty, but appeared to be much older. He had scarcely seen anything but
the disastrous side of French glory. His countenance, therefore, did not
bear that impress of confidence which was exhibited by many of his
brethren in arms, who had been less tried than himself by the
misfortunes of the times. Of the war in Spain he had seen only the
miseries, the privations, the failure of order, the utter
disintegration. With Ney on the return from Moscow he had learned what
the performance of duty is without the prestige of glory. At Dresden,
the regiment to which he was attached had lost half its men; and the
disaster of Leipzig had followed. With each grade in his promotion was
associated a mournful date.
Colonel Dubois had an appearance of coldness that served to hide his
natural timidity and profound distrust of his fellow-men. It must be
allowed that there were reasons for his distrust of men and things.
Entering the service at the age of twenty as a common soldier, though he
belonged to an honourable family in Poitou and had spent his earliest
years in the bosom of his family, he had seen only the sinister side of
warfare, and his first companions in arms did not respond to his ideal
of the soldier's character. It was still worse when he went to Spain.
His delicate nature had fallen back on itself, and allowed no sign of
pity or even sympathy for anyone to be visible. Yet so profoundly does
what we call "heart" imprint itself on every action, even when its
possessor attempts to conceal its slightest manifestation, that this
man, in appearance so cold, and who was not known to have a friend,
exercised a moral authority over his soldiers which was very rare at
that time.
The soldier--an infallible judge in this matter--is able to discover the
weak side of the officer; but he only esteems him and confides entirely
in him when he recognises besides military talents a soul of energetic
vigour and a heart that beats in unison with his own. The soldier's
glance can penetrate without difficulty a cold and harsh exterior, and
soon discovers whether this appearance conceals insufficiency,
stupidity, or pride; or whether it is only the countenance of a man
accustomed to command--the exterior of a soul really accessible to all
human sentiments.
In an action Dubois could see his men fall without the slightest show of
emotion, and would not permit a soldier to leave his place to help them;
but after the battle he was the first and the most attentive in
relieving the wounded, and would take no rest till they were carried to
the ambulances.
Of the three battalions (they were not complete) which he commanded, two
belonged to his own regiment; the third was composed of fragments drawn
from all sides. Nevertheless, after two or three days' march, all these
men, as well as the companies of various arms which he was to lead to
Troyes, knew Colonel Dubois better perhaps than he knew himself. These
brave men, after some hours' rest were well satisfied to submit to
circumstances and remain under the orders of their Colonel de _Bois_, as
they used to call him--and thought it a fine joke to defend themselves
in this _nest_ of La Roche-Pont, cut off from all help.
Though in concert with Captain Allaud he made the most needful
preparations for defence--were it only to save his own honour--Colonel
Dubois wished to ascertain whether it was possible to reach Langres and
Troyes without compromising his troops. He therefore instructed a young
orderly officer of energy and intelligence, by whom he was
accompanied--giving him two attendants and two guides from the town and
known to the captain, all mounted--to reconnoitre the route and return
as quickly as possible.
We have seen that before the colonel's arrival the defenders numbered
three hundred and twenty men, of whom sixty were veterans. Among these
men about fifty were capable of serving the guns, having been
artillerymen. The troop brought by the colonel consisted of three
battalions, in all one thousand four hundred and fifty men, twenty-five
artillerymen, and thirty dismounted horsemen; total, one thousand eight
hundred and twenty-five men, including officers.
Provisions were the first question. The colonel, having learned the
arrest of the mayor, summoned him into his presence, and soon heard the
confession of the municipal magistrate. He gave him to understand that
the proofs of his royalist intrigues were sufficient to justify his
being shot there and then, and that the only means of avoiding this
unpleasant necessity was to set about provisioning the city without a
moment's delay. He added that he only commanded the vanguard of a _corps
d'armée_, marching from Lyons in the rear of the enemy, while the
Emperor was to take them in front: it was important therefore for the
town of La Roche-Pont to be in a position to resist for some days, and
if it were obliged to surrender for want of provisions, the Emperor's
Government would lay blame on the mayor, as having an understanding with
the enemy, and then it was all over with him.
The poor mayor, more dead than alive, promised everything, and swore by
all the saints that he was devoted to the Emperor, and that in
four-and-twenty hours the fortress should be supplied with all the
provisions that could be found in the neighbourhood. "I don't know what
there may be in the neighbourhood," replied the colonel; "you probably
_do_; but I have to tell you that by four o'clock to-morrow
afternoon--it is now a quarter-past six--there must be on this spot,
first, rations of meal, meat, and wine for a garrison of two thousand
men for twenty-five days at least; secondly, the inhabitants of the town
must also be provisioned for thirty days; and that if this is not done,
I shall be unfortunately obliged to send you back to your place of
confinement, where you will await the decision of the Emperor's
Government; I am going to give you twenty men to accompany you and help
you. Planton! ask the major to come here!" "But, colonel," said the
mayor, "you must be aware that at this time of the year I shall have
great difficulty--" "You prefer then to return to prison immediately?"
interrupted the colonel. "Major!" said he when this officer was
introduced, "Monsieur le maire de la Roche-Pont engages to provision the
town within twenty-four hours. Here is a list of what is required. You
will accompany him, and have twenty pressed men with you--thirty if you
want them. You must begin at once. I wish you good luck, Monsieur le
maire." Addressing himself to the major, while the mayor was retiring,
pale and covered with perspiration, in spite of the cold: "Do not suffer
this man to go out of your sight, he is a Royalist; keep him at work,
and bring him back here with the provisions." "I understand, colonel."
It was many years since the upper and lower town of La Roche-Pont had
been so animated. The upper town resounded with the noise of arms, of
the excavators going to the works, of guns being taken from the arsenal
and mounted in the batteries, and of the repairing of the carriages. In
another part the carpenters were at work making platforms. As in former
times, women mingled with the workmen and brought bundles of willows cut
from the side of the pool to make gabions. Behind every window some were
to be seen sewing bags for earth. Wheelwrights were repairing wheels;
and all engaged were singing and laughing as if they were preparing for
a fête. The meal and forage carts were coming in, while pigs, cows, and
sheep were rendering the streets almost impassable.
The lower town presented a different aspect: the _cafés_ were full, and
all were talking at once and very loud. The mayor, followed by the
major, who kept close to his elbow, and by his staff of assistants, was
making his visits to the shops and houses.
The whole of the population was at the windows or at the door-sills.
Carts were got ready, and the twenty pressed men filled them in no time;
if horses could not be found to draw them, the workmen pushed at the
wheels. Some large houses, however, remained closely shut.
They had to go through the valley and visit the farmers and millers of
the neighbourhood. Many inhabitants of the upper town went down in
search of hams, meal, and grains. The grocers' shops and the pork shops
were emptied one after the other; provisions were rising in price, so
that the last ham was sold, at three o'clock in the afternoon, for sixty
francs.
At four o'clock the mayor, followed like his shadow by the major,
presented himself before the colonel and gave him the list of all the
provisions he had been able to bring into the upper town. The colonel
bade him sit down, and examined the account carefully, asking many
questions and appealing to the major's testimony respecting the
correctness of the statements. The twenty-five days' rations for the two
thousand men were found complete, thanks to a good stock of un-ground
corn which made up for what was wanting in meal.
The colonel expressed himself satisfied, especially as they had found in
the castle some few hundred-weight of biscuit in good condition. "Thank
you, Monsieur le maire," said he; "you must be fatigued, and may return
home; but as I am not unaware of the ill-feeling of some bad sort of
people towards you, you shall have a man on guard posted at your door;
and I must beg you not to quit your house except to go to your office,
which fortunately is situated in the upper town, which will enable you,
when we are invested, to fulfil your functions with the zeal you have
just manifested.
"I will also beg you to make arrangements without delay for an ambulance
with fifty beds duly furnished--suppose we say to-night--and to send me
the surgeons of the town, if there are any at La Roche-Pont, this very
evening.... Major! accompany Monsieur le maire while he attends to this
business, so that no harm may befal him...."
That same day, at eight o'clock in the evening, the reconnaissance
returned and reported what they had seen.
The enemy was at Gray near Champlitte, and was occupying the roads
between Gray and Thil-le-Châtel. His force had been seen at Bèze, about
eighteen miles from La Roche-Pont. Communication between Dijon and
Langres was cut off: and although the enemy had not occupied that town,
he was forming a curtain between it and the north to mask his ulterior
movements.
The circumstantial details given by his orderly officer confirmed the
colonel in the idea that the army of Bohemia was paying but little
attention to what was taking place in his rear, but was pushing on
towards the capital by the basin of the Seine. "Ah!" said the colonel,
when he had heard every particular from the young officer, "if we only
had twenty thousand of those men who were lost in Russia, we could make
these German and Russian gentlemen pay dearly for their temerity, and
few of them would see the other side of the Rhine again."
Colonel Dubois therefore determined to follow the second part of his
instructions. He sent a reliable man, selected by Captain Allaud, to
Auxonne to inform the governor of the place--if the town was not already
occupied--that he was holding La Roche-Pont, that he was in a condition
to defend himself there for some time, and that he should wish all
isolated detachments and any provisions or munitions that had no
particular destination to be sent to him.
Up to the 15th of January the town of La Roche-Pont had not seen a
single enemy. The centre column of Prince Schwartzenberg's army was
marching in the direction of Gray along the heights of the Seine and
Marne basins, and avoiding the Lower Saône. This delay had allowed
additional munitions to be brought into the town, and the garrison
increased by some recruits who, not being able to join their regiments,
were wandering about without orders. Four pieces of field artillery,
whose carriages were out of repair, had also been got into the town. The
colonel had put himself in communication with Lyons; and Marshal
Augereau, still hoping to commence offensive operations, had confirmed
the previous orders that had been given--that is to say, to hold La
Roche-Pont, and to gain all possible information respecting the enemy's
movements in the north.
Towards the end of January the great army of Bohemia had some grounds
for apprehending an attack on its rear; and Prince Schwartzenberg knew
that from Macon along the ascent of the Saône, and as far as the
countries intersected by hills which form a part of Upper Burgundy, a
nucleus of resistance was being formed which might at any moment take
the offensive and embarrass him greatly. After the battle of Brienne
(29th of January), as the result of which the Prussians were thrown back
by Napoleon on La Rothière, the sovereigns assembled in Prince
Schwartzenberg's neighbourhood deliberated as to whether they should
stop short at Langres or risk advancing alone against the troops
commanded by the Emperor.
This indecision with regard to ulterior operations led to a more
effective concentration and the occupation of a circle of wider radius
around Langres.
Orders were then given to a body of four thousand of the allied
Bavarians and Austrians to invest La Roche-Pont, and to guard the route
from Lyons to Langres.
It was not till the 1st of February that the front of this corps showed
itself before La Roche-Pont.
Colonel Dubois had not been wasting time: the garrison was provisioned
for more than six weeks, and munitions were not wanting. This superior
officer had put everything in order; and his troops, motley in
appearance, certainly, but well rested and full of confidence, amounted
at that time to more than nineteen hundred men, of whom twelve hundred
were experienced soldiers who might be relied upon. The works on the
north were well armed and the defences in good condition, duly furnished
with palisades, traverses, and appliances for shelter.
On the evening of the 2nd of February, some of the enemy's horse were
caracoling at a distance of about two hundred yards from the works; this
bravado cost them about a dozen men.
The enemy, however, did not seem desirous of undertaking a regular
siege, but took up a position about a mile from the northern salient; he
sent detachments to occupy the faubourg on the left bank, and raised an
encampment on the eastern hills.
The colonel had blown up the stone-bridge and destroyed the
foot-bridges.
On the morning of the 4th of February an envoy appeared on the glacis
and handed on to the governor of the place a summons from General
Werther, demanding the surrender of La Roche-Pont to the troops of the
allied princes. The garrison would be allowed to retire southwards with
arms, baggage, and field artillery.
The colonel replied that the place was sufficiently strong and well
provided; it would not capitulate till the moment when the breaches were
no longer tenable; and he judged that the defence could not be prolonged
to any purpose.
The following night Colonel Dubois sent out a hundred men to try the
strength of the enemy's outposts and reconnoitre their positions.
By the end of the two following days--the 5th and 6th--the investment
was almost complete, and the communication with the surrounding country
interrupted. On the evening of the 9th there came another summons from
the enemy's general, declaring that if the place were not surrendered
within twenty-four hours the bombardment would commence. The colonel
replied as before.
In fact, on the 10th of February a mortar battery opened fire, first on
the northern salient, about eight o'clock in the evening. The bombs
produced no effect, and in ten hours' bombardment only eight men had
been struck, the roof of one of the barracks broken in, and two
gun-carriages damaged.
The pieces of large calibre mounted on the cavaliers of the bastions of
the work did not begin to fire on the mortar battery until daybreak, and
silenced it about noon. The enemy appeared then to limit his efforts to
the investment; and it was not till the 17th of February, probably in
consequence of news received from the north, that he appeared to decide
on a regular siege. Perhaps until this moment he had not the needful
appliances.
On the night of the 17th, the first parallel was commenced about six
hundred yards from the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_ (Fig.
70), as also the communications between this parallel and the depôts.
About two o'clock in the morning the governor sent out a hundred and
fifty men, who charged the advanced posts protecting the workmen on the
western side of the plateau, and forced their passage through to the
trench; put the sappers to rout, took some of their tools, and then,
seeing themselves taken in flank, rushed up the slopes of the plateau,
and re-entered by the postern of the lower town, protected by the fires
of the demi-bastion.
On the 18th of February those who worked by day finished what their
comrades, told off for night work, had commenced; and the engineers
fixed in the parallel the prolongations of the works of the place, which
they were intending to ricochet, with a view to planting the first
batteries. By the method in which the besieger was proceeding, Colonel
Dubois and Captain Allaud had no difficulty in perceiving that they had
to do with a methodical enemy, who would conduct his attack according to
the rules of the art, and would employ the acknowledged methods of
approach against the main work of La Roche-Pont. The commander of the
Bavarian engineers, in fact, had drawn out the plan of siege as
exhibited in Fig. 70.
On the night of the 18th of February he commenced the ricochet batteries
of the first parallel, and the boyaux of communication that were to lead
to the second parallel; the works were continued by day. He was
intending to direct the siege in the method we are going to describe.
On the third night the batteries of the first parallel were completed so
as to fire in concert at daybreak.
The fourth night, supposing the artillery of the besieged to be
silenced, they would commence the second parallel, and the fifth night
the counter-batteries parallel and perpendicular to the faces to be
cannonaded.
The sixth night would be occupied with the continuation of the
counter-batteries and the commencement, by sap, of the zigzags about as
far as one hundred and sixty yards from the crest of the salient angles
of the covered way.
During the seventh night the construction of the counter-batteries would
be finished, and they would dig the demi-parallels.
On the eighth night they would continue to advance by sap in zigzag, and
arm the demi-parallel with howitzers and mortars, to commence their fire
at daybreak at the same time as the counter-batteries.
On the ninth night the sap-fronts would reach the glacis fifty or sixty
yards from the salient angles of the covered way, and the zigzags would
enter the third parallel, which they would continue by day.
On the tenth night the works would be completed, the third parallel
should be finished, and batteries of stone mortars planted there.
On the eleventh night they were to drive two saps a length of twenty-six
or thirty yards, right and left, of the capital (Fig. 71). They would
dig the circular trenches, and then advance straight on the capital by
double sap to within range of hand-grenades; twenty-six to thirty yards
from the salient of the _places d'armes_. Protected by the fire of the
third parallel, this work would be continued by day.
The twelfth night would be employed in tracing the trench cavalier by
means of two saps; these works were to be terminated by day.
The thirteenth night, starting from the extremities of the trench
cavaliers near the capitals, by double sap, they would crown the salient
angles of the covered way. At daybreak these crownings would be
finished, and the construction of the counter-batteries commenced. They
would get down by means of two saps (Fig. 71) to the _place d'armes_,
to establish a lodgment parallel to the rounding of the ditches.
If necessary, they would drive right and left of the crowning two saps
which would meet each other in the middle of this crowning. A fourth
parallel would, if necessary, be established, on which they would then
place the stone mortars of the third parallel. If this fourth parallel
was not needed, they would advance from the third parallel by means of a
double sap directly upon the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_.
The fourteenth night the crowning was to be extended along the branches
of the covered way as far as the first traverse. The construction of the
counter-batteries, and that of the fourth parallel, would be continued.
If this fourth parallel were not required, the saps would reach to the
salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_, which they would crown. At
daybreak the breach batteries would be commenced.
On the fifteenth night these works would be completed; then, if they had
been obliged to dig a fourth parallel, they would diverge from that in
two saps which would unite to form a strong traverse, under shelter of
which these saps would reach as far as the salient of the re-entering
_place d'armes_, which they would crown by extending that crowning right
and left. They would then have to commence the descent of the ditch.
During the sixteenth night the breach batteries would be terminated, and
would begin firing. They would work at the descent of the ditch. If
possible, they would get down into the _place d'armes_ to install
themselves and plant a battery of stone mortars there.
The seventeenth night would be occupied in finishing the descent to the
ditch, and they would commence the epaulement of the passage.
During the eighteenth night they would begin to make a breach, and
advance the passage of the ditch of the breach, which should be effected
in the morning.
During the nineteenth night they would reconnoitre the breach, and the
sappers would render it practicable. They would terminate the
epaulements of the passage of the ditch, that the assault might be made
next day.
Thus, according to the plan of the siege, in nineteen times twenty-four
hours the place would be in the power of the enemy.
The lines were fixed upon, and General Werther did not doubt of success,
as he did not imagine that La Roche-Pont could be succoured, and was
aware of the weakness of the garrison and the inefficient character of
its artillery.
Nevertheless, these theoretic calculations were somewhat disconcerted by
the energy of the defence.
Colonel Dubois had not men enough to act efficiently at a distance; he
did his utmost to economise his strength, and contented himself with
impeding the works at the commencement with his artillery. This
consisted, as we have seen, of--
Guns of various calibre 20
Twenty-four pounders 6
Howitzers 2
Mortars 4
Field-pieces 4
--
Total of ordnance 36
==
A dozen stone mortars and rampart rifles formed the rest of the
artillery. The arsenal contained also a certain supply of hand-grenades
and fireworks.
At length, on the 20th of February, the batteries of the first parallel,
to the number of ten, opened their fire. Each of them was armed with
three guns; the first on the right (of the besieger), à ricochet, raked
the covered way in front of the right face of the left bastion (of the
besieged). The second swept the right face of the left demi-lune; the
third, the left face of the middle demi-lune; the fourth, à ricochet,
raked the covered way in front of the left face of the left bastion; the
fifth swept the salient of the demi-lune; the sixth swept the right face
of that demi-lune; the seventh, à ricochet, raked the covered way in
front of the left face of the right bastion; the eighth, à ricochet,
raked the left face of the demi-lune in the centre; the ninth swept the
left face of the right demi-lune; and the tenth, à ricochet, raked the
covered way before the left face of the right bastion. Four mortars were
mounted between the batteries 4 and 5, 6 and 7. Captain Allaud did not
doubt that the principal attack would be directed to the left bastion;
he had the gorge of this bastion therefore retrenched during the night.
The six twenty-four pounders were placed in battery on the cavaliers of
the bastions of the main defence, and well sheltered by traverses and
blindages. These six pieces concentrated their fire on the fourth and
fifth batteries of the besieger, and succeeded in silencing their fire
about noon. Then they fired on battery No. 3, and before night silenced
its three guns also. The guns in battery on the cavaliers of the
bastions of the work were sufficiently well sheltered not to be in
danger from the enemy's projectiles, to which they responded only
feebly. But on the night of the 20th February the plans of the besieger
had to be modified. At midnight the colonel ordered five hundred men to
arm, put horses to his four field-pieces, whose wheels had been covered
with rags and wool, and going out by the left demi-lune, he had two
pieces placed on the right and two on the left of the road, two hundred
yards in front of the glacis, and, on the road itself, the two
howitzers, a hundred yards behind. Then he advanced resolutely towards
the communicating boyau, between the third and fourth of the enemy's
batteries, whose fire had been silenced. The posts offered but a slight
resistance; the sappers fled, abandoning the trench, and were pursued to
the batteries at the point of the bayonet.
[Illustration: FIG. 70.
THE THEORETICAL ATTACK ON VAUBAN'S WORK.]
The reinforcements then arrived, and the colonel drew back his men
quietly, by echelons, to the guns. These then opened a simultaneous fire
on the enemy with grape; and the five hundred men advanced once more,
and brought back some prisoners, but seeing themselves again attacked by
a superior force, fell back. This time the Germans did not go beyond
their trenches, but contented themselves with a few volleys of grape at
random. This skirmish did not last more than half an hour. At one
o'clock A.M. Captain Allaud placed two hundred workmen at a distance of
two hundred and fifty yards in front of the face of the left demi-lune
No. 1, crossed by the road, to commence a trench at this point (Fig.
72). These workmen were protected by a post of one hundred men, and the
two howitzers left on the road. This work consisted of two redans, with
massive traverse-shelters (see A). It was sufficiently advanced at
daybreak to be able to shelter the workmen. When the enemy, who had
begun his work again at the trench boyaux, B and C, in order to commence
the second parallel, perceived at early dawn the new work executed by
the besieged, he hastened to bring the fire of battery No. 1 upon it,
for batteries 2, 3, and 4 had not yet been remounted. But from the
cavaliers of the bastions No. I. and V., six guns in two hours silenced
this battery, No. 1, in spite of the besieger's batteries, 5 and 6. The
day thus passed in cannonading, and the Germans could not continue their
boyau of communication, B, which was raked by one of the howitzers which
the besieged had placed behind the great traverse of the salient of
the redan on the left. They had to modify the direction of the trench,
and follow the dotted line, _a b_.
[Illustration: FIG. 71.
THE THIRD PARALLEL AND CROWNING OF THE COVERED-WAY.]
[Illustration: FIG. 72.]
During the night of the 21st of February, Captain Allaud completed his
redans, enlarged the traverses, and set up blindages for seven guns; and
in the morning the work presented on the inner side the appearance
(Fig. 73). The gun on the left, A, directed its fire on battery No. 1;
the two guns on the left return, B C, on battery No. 4; the pieces D E,
of the right return, on battery No. 1; and the two pieces F G, of the
right face, on battery No. 6.[61] But this did not hinder the
bastions V., VI., I., II., and III. from firing on these batteries.
[Illustration: FIG. 73.]
That same night, however, the besieger had been able to start his second
parallel; but he was evidently embarrassed on his right, and was
modifying his plan on this side. He seemed to be giving up an attempt on
the place by the salient of bastion No. 2, and was working actively on
his left.
During the 22nd of February, the besiegers could not restore battery No.
1, because the besieged kept up a constant discharge on this point. They
succeeded only at nightfall in remounting their guns in batteries 2 and
3; and having determined the range before night, discharged the balls of
two guns on the salients of the redans. About midnight Colonel Dubois
sent out five hundred men, who, traversing the western ridge of the
plateau, attacked battery No. 1. A few moments afterwards, a second
troop of four hundred men attacked the two batteries, 2 and 3; and the
besieger having been dislodged from battery No. 1, the first troop of
the besieged came and formed in line of musketry between battery No. 2
and the salient of the redan on the right; while fusiliers posted at the
trench, A,[62] and one of the howitzers, swept the ground as far as
battery No. 1, in order to hinder the enemy from taking the sortie in
the rear.
This operation was completely successful; not only were the works of
battery No. 1 damaged, and the three guns with which it was armed (the
carriages belonging to these guns, as stated above, were already
broken), but around batteries 2 and 3 there was a very sharp struggle
which resulted in the Germans being repulsed, the guns rendered useless,
the munitions scattered, and the gabions and earth-bags thrown down. A
body of a hundred men had also been posted by the colonel on the slopes
of the plateau to hinder the enemy from making his way along that
escarpment to attack the work A.
Under favour of this sortie, two hundred workmen had been placed by
Captain Allaud along the western ridge of the plateau, to raise a new
work, B C D (Fig. 74), which consisted of three new redans presenting
three batteries each for two guns, traced _en crémaillère_, and
separated by strong traverses. By the morning of the 23rd of February
the first battery, B, was sufficiently strong to resist projectiles.
Moreover, this battery could not be immediately attacked by battery No.
1, which was abandoned, and whose guns were useless. Forty-eight hours
at least were required to enable the besieger to restore batteries 2 and
3. Batteries 4 and 5 must change their embrasures to direct their fire
on this battery B, and only batteries 6 and 7 could sweep the redans A
and B. Now these batteries, 6 and 7, received the fire of the two guns
of the right face of the right-hand redan, of the two guns of the right
face of the bastion II., of the two guns of the left face of the bastion
III., and of a gun of the right face of the demi-lune 2. Every moment it
was necessary to repair the gabionades, and replace the earth-bags; and
since the beginning of the day the enemy had had ten artillerymen
killed, and as many more wounded, in these two batteries.
The German engineer, who had so methodically traced the successive
operations of the siege, was evidently embarrassed by the strategy of
the besieged. It was in his opinion barbarous, absolutely contrary to
rules, and showed an ignorance of, and contempt for the art of
fortification, which must end in disaster.
[Illustration: FIG. 74.]
During the night of the 23rd of February the Germans were finishing
their second parallel, except in the north-west side. They gave the
eastern branch of this parallel an inclination towards the south,[63]
and commenced the batteries 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. Battery 13, of two
guns, was to rake the work A.
But that same night Captain Allaud terminated the second battery, C,
started the third, D, had an intrenchment made on the ridge of the
plateau, and raised an epaulement, E, to sweep the slopes, with a good
parados.
If the besieged succeeded in finishing and arming these works, the
batteries 11 and 12 of the besieger would be taken obliquely, the boyaux
of communication would be for the most part raked, and the siege would
have to be recommenced. The German general was in a very bad humour, and
blamed the commander of the engineers, who, with his plan on the table,
endeavoured to show that his siege had been duly arranged, according to
all the rules of the art; that the ignorant temerity of these Frenchmen
could not be foreseen, and that if the Germans acted with vigour, they
would be made bitterly to repent of thus advancing wedge-like on the
flank of the attack; that such a thing had never been seen, and that if
they concentrated three batteries on this salient in the air, they would
soon crush it.
On the morning of the 24th of February two twenty-four pounders, placed
in battery on the left face of bastion VIII., opened fire on batteries
13, 14, and 15 of the besieger, which they raked, and damaged greatly
before they were completely finished. This time the German general
proceeded from ill-humour to passion and even menaces; so that the
unfortunate officer of the engineers, repairing to these batteries after
a violent scene to raise traverses and rectify the line, which he
asserted had not been executed conformably to his instructions, had his
head broken by a splinter from a gun-carriage.
The direction of the engineering was then given to a young officer, who,
after a conference with General Werther, modified the plan of the
attack. During the 24th of the month there was scarcely any firing on
either side, the besieger firing only at long intervals. The French
garrison, which was anxious to economise its munitions, scarcely
replied, but worked with ardour at perfecting its advanced works on the
west.
A sortie effected during the night of the 24th, to ascertain whether the
enemy was re-taking possession of batteries 1, 2, and 3, only
encountered advanced posts, which retired after a feeble resistance.
These three batteries were in the condition to which they had been
reduced by the preceding sortie.
Captain Allaud employed the whole of the night in strengthening the
batteries B, C, D. They were armed with six guns, which on the morning
of the 25th swept the boyaux of communication and a whole branch of the
second parallel.
The Germans scarcely replied, and seemed to be abandoning their works.
They were probably going to try another attack. The colonel was somewhat
disquieted at Captain Allaud's novel strategy, which, in face of a bold
assailant, presented grave perils. The calmness of the enemy made him
fear some unexpected design; perhaps a strenuous attack on that salient
which, if it were taken, would furnish the besiegers with an excellent
position for rapidly establishing breach batteries against demi-lune No.
I, and bastion II. This salient therefore must be defended at any cost,
since they had been led to establish it in order to disconcert the
systematic attack of the Germans. Moreover, if they lost it, they would
probably lose at the same time most of the guns that armed it; and the
defence had only a restricted number.
Thirteen guns armed the advanced work. The two howitzers were placed in
battery, one at the extremity of the salient D, pointed at battery No.
1, the other in the right re-entering _place d'armes_ of the demi-lune
No. 1. Two guns were also placed on the right face of the demi-lune; two
guns on the front, between the bastions I. and II., and two guns on the
right and left faces of this bastion, to sweep the advanced works if
they were taken. In all, nineteen guns and two howitzers. Besides, the
ridge of the plateau was well defended by a good trench-shelter with
traverses, that the work might not be able to be taken by assault in
rear by the escarpment. One of the twenty-four pounders was placed in
battery in the bastion V. of the main work, in the direction of its
capital, to sweep this slope.
On the 25th of February only a few cannon-shots were exchanged. The
mortar batteries of the besieger concentrated their fire on the western
redan, without doing much damage; but during the night of the 25th the
fire of the bombs was so incessant that it became difficult to labour at
these works. It continued during the 26th, but the besieged dismounted
three of these mortars with the guns left on the bastions II. and III.
The besieged on his side placed the two mortars in battery on the front
between these two bastions, and sent projectiles into the batteries 11
and 12.
During the 26th of the month (the weather being clear) the enemy was
seen to be erecting three batteries on the north-west, evidently
directed against the batteries A, B, C, D, to crush them. They could not
reply to their fire; the colonel therefore decided that they should
bring back into the town temporarily the six guns of the batteries B, C,
D. The bombs continued to fall into the works during the whole night of
the 26th; and on the morning of the 27th the fire of the three batteries
of the enemy, erected six hundred and fifty yards behind the abandoned
battery No. 1, was opened against the redans B, C, D; it lasted the
whole night of the 27th, damaged the blindages very severely, and threw
down the traverses. On the morning of the 28th the _crémaillère_ ceased
to be tenable, but the work A had not been seriously injured. The
howitzer placed at D had been brought back behind the great traverse F
surmounted with a banquette.
About nine o'clock the enemy resumed possession of the battery No. 1,
installed four field-pieces there in spite of the fire of the bastions
I. and II., and threw an assaulting column against the damaged works D,
C, B. This was what the colonel anticipated. The column encountered the
fire of the three guns left in the redans A, the howitzer, and a front
of fusiliers posted on the great traverse F. Bending to the right and
defiling below the crest of the plateau, this column was able to seize
the work B, C, D, without excessive loss; and, sheltered behind the
ruins of the earthworks, it was able to keep its ground there while the
field-pieces of the battery No. 1 cleared off the defenders of the great
traverse F. The colonel, however, had brought in again the guns left in
work A, and gave orders to his men to fall back. But at this juncture,
from the demi-lune No. 1, the bastions I. and II. and the curtain
between these bastions, twenty-two guns and some stone mortars poured a
tremendously heavy fire into the abandoned work, inflicting very serious
loss on the besieger, who was endeavouring to hold his ground there.
This cannonade lasted till noon. The colonel, supposing the enemy to be
giving way, sallied forth at the head of eight hundred men and fell on
the posts which the Germans had begun to fortify. He had his attack
sustained by the two howitzers. The work was retaken, but not without
the loss of about a hundred men. The great point was to keep it. About
two o'clock two field-pieces conveyed behind the ruined epaulements of
batteries 2 and 3, and the four of battery No. 1, once more overwhelmed
the salient with small bombs, balls, and grape. The bastions I., II.,
and III. replied immediately, and dismounted some of the enemy's pieces,
which were ill-protected by the battered-down epaulements. The colonel
made his men lie down behind the traverses C, B, F, and awaited a second
assault; which was in fact attempted about four o'clock, as the enemy
believed the outwork was once more abandoned. The assaulting columns
passed the first epaulement; but as soon as they found themselves in the
last redan, D, they were received by a discharge of muskets almost at
arm's length, from behind the traverse C (Fig. 75), followed by a
bayonet charge; this time two hundred Germans remained on the field, and
the remains of the assaulting column fell back in disorder to the
batteries, which recommenced firing and went on till nightfall.
The besieged remained masters of the place, but under the converging
fire of the enemy they could not maintain this wedge-shaped and badly
flanked position. There was no advantage in keeping it, sufficient to
compensate for the loss they would suffer in resisting fresh attacks.
However, the colonel was unwilling to abandon the redans without cost to
the enemy. The evening was employed in charging three powder-mines under
the salients A and B, and raising earthworks to protect themselves as
well as they could. All this night of the 28th of February the bombs
fell thick on the outwork: the men were still tolerably protected on the
_débris_ of the blindages. On the morning of the 1st of March the German
artillery recommenced firing on the redans more briskly than the day
before, from the three batteries behind and from battery No. 6.
The colonel withdrew his men into the town, and left only one platoon,
well sheltered, with orders to fire the mines only when the enemy
thought himself covered by the epaulement of the redan A, and was
endeavouring to take up his position there.
[Illustration: FIG. 75.--ATTACK ON THE WORKS OF COUNTER-APPROACH.]
The 1st of March passed by without a new assault being attempted by the
besiegers. "They will try it to-night," thought Colonel Dubois. He went
back about seven o'clock in the evening into the salient, to make
certain that the train was well laid; and to encourage his men, he
reinforced them with twenty fusiliers, enjoining upon them, when they
saw their enemy, to make such a pretence of defending themselves as
should be sufficient to draw him on; but to fall back promptly after
setting fire to the train.
The bombardment was recommenced about eight o'clock, but at ten ceased
for a time; and the colonel, who had ascended the cavalier of bastion
II., thought the enemy was about to make a fresh attempt. In fact,
notwithstanding the darkness of the night, he saw black masses spreading
successively through the works D, C, and B[64]. On arriving at the
traverse F, they were received by a volley of musketry, to which they
responded by a well-sustained fire. A mass of the enemy might be seen
moving along the traverse F, and halting outside the redans A. At this
moment three successive explosions were heard which made the ground
tremble, succeeded by loud cries. The order was given: from the
demi-lune No. 1. and bastions I. and II., all the pieces fired together
on the outwork for half an hour; after which two hundred men of the
garrison sallied forth and rushed on the enemy. The outwork contained
only dead and wounded. Captain Allaud then went out in his turn with two
hundred volunteer workmen, to fill up the trenches and destroy obstacles
as far as possible. About midnight the bombs fell once more on the
corner of the defence, and orders were given to retire within the
fortress, so as to avoid unnecessary loss.
The siege had lasted twelve days, and the second parallel, which ought
to have been terminated on the sixth day, was not finished. The garrison
reckoned about a hundred and fifty men killed and wounded; but they had
inflicted more serious losses on the besiegers.
General Werther found the affair a very tedious one, and was much
annoyed. Some royalists, who had mansions in the faubourg on the other
side of the river Abonne, were on very friendly terms with the troops of
the coalition, and manifested their impatience and anger against "this
handful of _brigands_" who were holding the upper town and prolonging a
useless struggle. The German general was very anxious to come to terms
with the garrison: four hundred of his men were already _hors de
combat_, and he thought this a great expenditure in taking this "nest,"
which was supposed to be without a garrison or munitions. The news he
had lately received from the north was more encouraging, but he was
urged to finish the business.
One of the most zealous of the royalists, who were constantly in the
German camp, proposed therefore to pay a visit to the governor, to
inform him that Napoleon's armies were retreating at every point, that
the capture of Paris was imminent, that the Bourbons would soon return
amid the acclamations of the whole of France, and to urge the
uselessness of a longer defence.
General Werther readily acceded to the proposal, and on the 2nd of
March, Baron de X*** presented himself at the outpost with a German
envoy. The colonel received the German officer and the baron in a room
in one of the ruined barracks. The German envoy first asked for an
exchange of prisoners. This was readily granted by the colonel. Then
the Baron de X*** began in his turn to explain the object of his visit.
Scarcely had he begun when the colonel stopped him: "I do not know, and
do not desire to know, sir, whether you come here to speak for yourself
alone or as the representative of a certain number of your countrymen;
but I will answer you briefly and clearly. I am here on the authority of
superior orders to defend the place against the enemies of the country.
The political inducements which you urge have not the slightest weight
with me. I utterly ignore them. I shall not surrender the place unless
compelled by force or ordered to do so by the Emperor's Government.
Permit me to add, sir, that the part you are performing to-day is not an
honourable one. What do you think of it, _Monsieur le capitaine_?" added
he, turning to the German officer. The latter merely bowed slightly.
"The prisoners shall be exchanged this very day, if you desire it, man
for man," said the colonel, rising. "As to you, sir, if you had not come
here protected by a flag of truce, I should have you tried, and probably
shot before the garrison, ere sunset." And dismissing his two visitors,
the governor enjoined on the officer commissioned to accompany them back
to the outposts not to allow them to have any communication with anyone.
The besieger from this day forwards was but slow in carrying on his
approach works; he contented himself with terminating the second
parallel and setting up three batteries of six pieces each, which opened
fire on the 6th of March upon the faces right and left of bastions II.
and III., and on the left face of demi-lune No. 2, with the evident
intention of making a breach at four hundred yards' distance. Three
mortar batteries covered the works with bombs. The Germans were
evidently intending to keep the garrison occupied, and put it out of
heart; waiting the chance of political events to put the place in their
hands. Of the four thousand men under General Werther's command, and who
had been reduced to three thousand four hundred by the losses sustained,
it was necessary to send one thousand to Troyes; only two thousand five
hundred men therefore remained before La Roche-Pont. Besides, the
general had received orders to run no risks, but limit himself to a
surveillance of the passages from the Saône to the Marne, and blockading
the garrison of La Roche-Pont, keeping it sufficiently employed to
prevent its taking the offensive, but without losing men in the capture
of so insignificant a place. On the other hand, the royalists of the
lower town were constantly predicting the end of hostilities and the
return of the Bourbons.
On the 12th of March news was received at headquarters that Napoleon had
received a check before Laon, that Marmont's force had been routed, and
that the allied troops were in full march on Paris. The royalists
thought that the moment had come for another application to General
Werther to induce him to complete the capture. They were anxious to be
the first in Burgundy to declare for the Bourbons, and the cautious
deliberation of the general of the allied troops exasperated them. He,
too, would have liked to get possession of the place before the
anticipated cessation of hostilities. He therefore sent another envoy to
Colonel Dubois, to give him the latest news of the armies of the
coalition, to inform him that the Allies were just about to enter Paris,
which was now without defence, and to summon him to surrender in order
to avoid a useless effusion of blood; and to say that if he refused to
capitulate he must expect rigorous measures, which he, General Werther,
would rather avoid, and of which the governor alone would have to bear
the responsibility. Colonel Dubois' answer was exactly the same as
before. He said he could not capitulate, as his defences remained
entire.
During the night of the 12th of March, two mortar batteries were planted
on the hill slopes of the right bank, and opened fire in the evening on
the faubourg of the left bank. The _flèche_ which served as a _tête du
pont_ was broken down by the shells. The German general thought he
should thus induce the townspeople to insist on the governor's promptly
capitulating. Some of the houses in this faubourg caught fire, and the
inhabitants took refuge in the upper town. The garrison could not
respond to the fire of the mortar batteries, as they had no more guns of
large calibre. The six twenty-four pounders were employed to oppose the
enemy's batteries on the north, and they could not disarm the bastions
on this side. To complete their distress typhus broke out among the
wounded in the _cité_.
Provisions, too, were becoming scarce, and the garrison was placed on
half rations.
On the plateau the cannonade on both sides was continuing, and the
escarpments of the two bastions II. and III. were much damaged. As the
enemy found nothing more to destroy or burn in the lower town on the
right bank, he began his approaches on the 15th of March, and
established a demi-parallel with two fresh batteries during the night
(of the 15th and following day), of four guns each. This was, however,
not accomplished without difficulty, for these batteries were only three
hundred yards from the faces of bastions II. and III., whose cavaliers
still preserved three guns of large calibre. But on the 18th and 19th of
March twenty-six guns were brought to bear against the works, and
succeeded in throwing down the parapets and dismounting the guns of the
besieged.
During the night of the 19th of March, the colonel endeavoured to mount
the cannon that still remained to him; but these pieces of small calibre
could effect nothing against the enemy's works. However, the breaches
made in the salients of demi-lune No. 2 and of bastion II., were not
practicable; and the colonel, wishing to reserve the little artillery he
had left, for the moment of assault, retrenched the gorge of bastion
II., withdrew its cannon within the fortification and waited the issue.
Not to keep his soldiers idle he occupied them at night in trifling
sorties which fatigued the besieger. He kept the covered ways in good
repair as far as the enemy's fire allowed, and prepared camouflets and
_chicanes_ for the moment when the assailant should try to ascend the
counterscarp.
On the 25th of March the third parallel was finished. The place was
thenceforth only defended by musketry, and a few stone mortars, and
grenades, which small sallying parties threw into the trenches at night.
The approaches to crown the covered way and set up breach batteries were
advancing but slowly, thanks to the activity of the garrison, whose
courage seemed redoubled in seeing the enemy approaching and which
defended its glacis foot by foot.
On the 1st of April came the news of the capitulation of Paris, the
abdication of the Emperor, and the order to suspend hostilities. The
garrison was allowed to retire to Nevers, through Auxonne, Beaune, Autun
and Château-Chinon.
On the 5th of April Colonel Dubois quitted La Roche-Pont at the head of
seven hundred soldiers of all arms, who were all the able-bodied men
left him.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 61: See for the numbers of the enemy's batteries, Fig. 72.]
[Footnote 62: See Fig. 72.]
[Footnote 63: See Fig. 74.]
[Footnote 64: See Fig. 74.]