come into consideration. Besides my own ego there is another person in
whom I find something comic; if objects appear comical to me, it takes
place by means of a sort of personification which is not uncommon in our
notional life. The comic process is satisfied with these two persons,
the ego and the object person; there may also be a third person, but it
is not obligatory. Wit as a play with one’s own words and thoughts at
first dispenses with an object person, but already, upon the first step
of the jest, it demands another person to whom it can impart its result,
if it has succeeded in safeguarding play and nonsense against the
remonstrance of reason. The second person in wit does not, however,
correspond to the object person, but to the third person who is the
other person in the comic. It seems that in the jest the decision as to
whether wit has fulfilled its task is transferred to the other person,
as if the ego were not quite certain of its opinion in the matter. The
harmless wit is also in need of the other person’s support in order to
ascertain whether it has accomplished its purpose. If wit enters the
service of sexual or hostile tendencies, it can be described as a
psychic process among three persons, just as in the comic, with the
exception that there the third person plays a different rôle. The
psychic process of wit is consummated here between the first person—the
ego, and the third person—the stranger, and not, as in the comic,
between the ego and the object person.
Also, in the case of the third person of wit, the wit is confronted with
subjective determinations which can make the goal of the
pleasure-stimulus unattainable. As Shakespeare says in _Love’s Labor’s
Lost_ (Act V, Scene 2):
“A jest’s prosperity lies in the ear
Of him that hears it, never in the tongue
Of him that makes it.”
He whose thoughts run in sober channels is incompetent to declare
whether or not the jest is a good one. He himself must be in a jovial,
or at least indifferent, state of mind in order to become the third
person of the jest. The same hindrance is present in the case of both
harmless and tendency-wit; but in the latter the antagonism to the
tendency which wishes to serve wit, appears as a new hindrance. The
readiness to laugh about an excellent smutty joke cannot manifest itself
if the exposure concerns an honored kinsman of the third person. In an
assemblage of divines and pastors no one would dare to refer to Heine’s
comparison of Catholic and Protestant priests as retail dealers and
employees of a wholesale business. In the presence of my opponent’s
friends the wittiest invectives with which I might assail him would not
be considered witticisms but invectives, and in the minds of my hearers
it would create not pleasure, but indignation. A certain amount of
willingness or a certain indifference, the absence of all factors which
might evoke strong feelings in opposition to the tendency, are absolute
conditions for the participation of the third person in the completion
of the wit-process.
_The Third Person of the Witticism_
Wherever such hindrances to the operation of wit fail, we see the
phenomenon which we are now investigating, namely, that the pleasure
which the wit has provided manifests itself more clearly in the third
person than in the originator of the wit. We must be satisfied to use
the expression “more clearly” where we should be inclined to ask whether
the pleasure of the hearer is not more intensive than that of the wit
producer, because we are obviously lacking the means of measuring and
comparing it. We see, however, that the hearer shows his pleasure by
means of explosive laughter after the first person, in most cases with a
serious expression on his face, has related the joke. If I repeat a
witticism which I have heard, I am forced, in order not to spoil its
effect, to conduct myself during its recital exactly like him who made
it. We may now put the question whether from this determination of
laughter over wit we can draw conclusions concerning the psychic process
of wit-formation.
Now it cannot be our intention to take into consideration everything
that has been asserted and printed about the nature of laughter. We are
deterred from this undertaking by the statement which Dugas, one of
Ribot’s pupils, put at the beginning of his book _Psychologie du rire_
(1902). “Il n’est pas de fait plus banal et plus étudié que le rire, il
n’en est pas qui ait eu le don d’exciter davantage la curiosité du
vulgaire et celle des philosophes, il n’ent est pas sur lequel on ait
recueilli plus d’observations et bâti plus de théories, et avec cela il
n’en est pas qui demeure plus inexpliqué, on serait tenté de dire avec
les sceptiques qu’il faut être content de rire et de ne pas chercher à
savoir pourquoi on rit, d’autant que peut-être le réflexion tue le rire,
et qu’il serait alors contradictoire qu’elle en découvrit les causes”
(page 1).
On the other hand, we must make sure to utilize for our purposes a view
of the mechanism of laughter which fits our own realm of thought
excellently. I refer to the attempted explanation of H. Spencer in his
essay entitled _Physiology of Laughter_.[52]
According to Spencer laughter is a phenomenon of discharge of psychic
irritation, and an evidence of the fact that the psychic utilization of
this irritation has suddenly met with a hindrance. The psychological
situation, which discharges itself in laughter, he describes in the
following words: “Laughter naturally results only when consciousness is
unawares transferred from great things to small—only when there is what
we call a descending incongruity.”[53]
In an almost analogous sense the French authors (Dugas) designate
laughter as a “détente,” a manifestation of release of tension, and A.
Bain’s theory, “Laughter a relief from restraint,” seems to me to
approach Spencer’s conceptions nearer than many authors would have us
believe.
However, we experience the desire to modify Spencer’s thought; to give a
more definite meaning to some of the ideas and to change others. We
would say that laughter arises when the sum total of psychic energy,
formerly used for the occupation of certain psychic channels, has become
unutilizable so that it can experience absolute discharge. We know what
criticism such a declaration invites, but for our defense we dare cite a
pertinent quotation from Lipps’s treatise on _Komik und Humor_, an
analysis which throws light on other problems besides the comic and
humor. He says: “In the end individual psychological problems always
lead us fairly deeply into psychology, so that fundamentally no
psychological problem may be considered by itself” (p. 71). The terms
“psychic energy,” “discharge,” and the treatment of psychic energy as a
quantity have become habitual modes of thinking since I began to explain
to myself the fact of psychopathology philosophically. Being of the same
opinion as Lipps I have essayed to represent in my _Interpretation of
Dreams_ the unconscious psychic processes as real entities, and I have
not represented the conscious contents as the “real psychic
activity.”[54] Only when I speak about the “investing energy
(_Besetzung_) of psychic channels,” do I seem to deviate from the
analogies that Lipps uses. The knowledge that I have gained about the
fact that psychic energy can be displaced from one idea to another along
certain association channels, and about the almost indestructible
conservation of the traces of psychic processes, have actually made it
possible for me to attempt such a representation of the unknown. In
order to obviate the possibility of a misunderstanding I must add that I
am making no attempt to proclaim that cells and fibers, or the neuron
system in vogue nowadays, represent these psychic paths, even if such
paths would have to be represented by the organic elements of the
nervous system in a manner which cannot yet be indicated.
_Laughter as a Discharge_
Thus, according to our assumption, the conditions for laughter are such
that a sum of psychic energy hitherto employed in the occupation of some
paths may experience free discharge. And since not all laughter, (but
surely the laughter of wit), is a sign of pleasure, we shall be inclined
to refer this pleasure to the release of previously existing static
energy (_Besetzungsenergie_). When we see that the hearer of the
witticism laughs, while the creator of the same cannot, then that must
indicate that in the hearer a sum of damming energy has been released
and discharged, whereas during the wit-formation, either in the release
or in the discharge, inhibitions resulted. One can characterize the
psychic process in the hearer, in the third person of the witticism,
hardly more pointedly than by asserting that he has bought the pleasure
of the witticism with very little expenditure on his part. One might say
that it is presented to him. The words of the witticism which he hears
necessarily produce in him that idea or thought-connection whose
formation in him was also resisted by great inner hindrances. He would
have had to make an effort of his own in order to bring it about
spontaneously like the first person, or he would have had to put forth
at least as much psychic expenditure as to equalize the force of the
suppression or repression of the inhibition. This psychic expenditure he
has saved himself; according to our former discussion (p. 80) we should
say that his pleasure corresponds to this economy. Following our
understanding of the mechanism of laughter we should be more likely to
say that the static energy utilized in the inhibition has now suddenly
become superfluous and neutralized because a forbidden idea came into
existence on the way to auditory perception and is therefore ready to be
discharged through laughter. Essentially both statements amount to the
same thing, for the economized expenditure corresponds exactly to the
now superfluous inhibition. The latter statement is more obvious, for it
permits us to say that the hearer of the witticism laughs with the
amount of psychic energy which was liberated by the suspension of
inhibition energy; that is, he laughs away, as it were, this amount of
psychic energy.
_Why the First Person Does Not Laugh_
If the person in whom the witticism is formed cannot laugh, then it
indicates, as we have just remarked, that there is a deviation from the
process in the case of the third person which concerns either the
suspension of the inhibition energy or the discharge possibility of the
same. But the first of the two cases is inconclusive, as we must
presently see. The inhibition energy of the first person must have been
dissipated, for otherwise there would have been no witticism, the
formation of which had to overcome just such a resistance. Otherwise,
too, it would have been impossible for the first person to experience
the wit-pleasure which the removal of the inhibition forced us to
deduce. But there remains a second possibility, namely, that even though
he experienced pleasure the first person cannot laugh, because the
possibility of discharge has been disturbed. In the production of
laughter such discharge is essential; an interruption in the possibility
of discharge might result from the attachment of the freed occupation
energy to some immediate endopsychic possibility. It is well that we
have become cognizant of this possibility; we shall soon pay more
attention to it. But with the wit-maker still another condition leading
to the same result is possible. Perhaps, after all, no appreciable
amount of energy has been liberated, in spite of the successful release
of occupation energy. In the first person of the witticism wit-work
actually takes place which must correspond to a certain amount of fresh
psychic expenditure. Thus the first person contributes the power which
removes the inhibitions and which surely results in a gain of pleasure
for himself; in the case of tendency-wit it is indeed a very big gain,
since the fore-pleasure gained from the wit-work takes upon itself the
further removal of inhibitions. But the expenditure of the wit-work is,
in every case, derived from the gain which is the result of the removal
of inhibitions; it is the same expenditure which escapes from the hearer
of the witticism. To confirm what was said above it may be added that
the witticism loses its laughter effect in the third person as soon as
an expenditure of mental work is exacted of him. The allusions of the
witticism must be striking, and the omissions easily supplemented; with
the awakening of conscious interest in thinking, the effect of the
witticism is regularly made impossible. Here lies the real distinction
between the witticism and the riddle. It may be that the psychic
constellations during wit-work are not at all favorable to the free
discharge of the energy gained. We are not here in a position to gain a
deeper understanding; our inquiry as to why the third person laughs we
have been able to clear up better than the question why the first person
does not laugh.
At any rate, if we have well in mind these views about the conditions of
laughter and about the psychic process in the third person, we have
arrived at a place where we can satisfactorily elucidate an entire
series of peculiarities which are familiar in wit, but which have not
been understood. Before an amount of interlocked energy, capable of
discharge, is to be liberated in the third person, there are several
conditions which must be fulfilled or which at least are desirable. 1.
It must be definitely established that the third person really produces
this expenditure of energy. 2. Care must be taken that when the latter
becomes freed that it should find another psychic use instead of
offering itself to the motor discharge. 3. It can be of advantage only
if the energy to be liberated in the third person is first strengthened
and heightened. Certain processes of wit-work which we can gather
together under the caption of secondary or auxiliary techniques serve
all these purposes.
The first of these conditions determines one of the qualifications of
the third person as hearer of the witticism. He must throughout be so
completely in psychic harmony with the first person that he makes use of
the same inner inhibitions which the wit-work has overcome in the first
person. Whoever is focused on smutty jokes will not be able to derive
pleasure from clever exhibitionistic wit. Mr. N.’s aggressions will not
be understood by uncultured people who are wont to give free rein to
their pleasure gained by insulting others. Every witticism thus demands
its own public, and to laugh over the same witticisms is a proof of
absolute psychic agreement. We have indeed arrived at a point where we
are at liberty to examine even more thoroughly the process in the third
person’s mind. The latter must be able habitually to produce the same
inhibition which the joke has surmounted in the first person, so that,
as soon as he hears the joke, there awakens within him compulsively and
automatically a readiness for this inhibition. This readiness for the
inhibition, which I must conceive as a true expenditure analogous to the
mobilization of an army, is simultaneously recognized as superfluous or
as belated, and is thus immediately discharged in its nascent state
through the channel of laughter.[55]
The second condition for the production of the free discharge, a cutting
off of any other outlets for the liberated energy, seems to me of far
greater importance. It furnishes the theoretical explanation for the
uncertainty of the effect of wit; if the thoughts expressed in the
witticism evoke very exciting ideas in the hearer, (depending on the
agreement or antagonism between the wit’s tendencies and the train of
thought dominating the hearer), the witty process either receives or is
refused attention. Of still greater theoretical interest, however, are a
series of auxiliary wit-techniques which obviously serve the purpose of
diverting the attention of the listeners from the wit-process so as to
allow the latter to proceed automatically. I advisedly use the term
“automatically” rather than “unconsciously” because the latter
designation might prove misleading. It is only a question of keeping the
psychic process from getting more than its share of attention during the
recital of the witticism, and the usefulness of these auxiliary
techniques permits us to assume rightfully that it is just the
occupation of attention which has a large share in the control and in
the fresh utilization of the freed energy of occupation.
_The Automatism of the Wit-process_
It seems to be by no means easy to avoid the endopsychic utilization of
energy that has become superfluous, for in our mental processes we are
constantly in the habit of transferring such emotional outputs from one
path to another without losing any of their energy through discharge.
Wit prevents this in the following way. In the first place it strives
for the shortest possible expression in order to expose less points of
attack to the attention. Secondly, it strictly adheres to the condition
that it be easily understood (_v. s._), for as soon as it has recourse
to mental effort or demands a choice between different mental paths, it
imperils the effect not only through the unavoidable mental expenditure,
but also through the awakening of attention. Besides this, wit also
makes use of the artifice of diverting the attention by offering to it
something in the expression of the witticism which fascinates it so that
meanwhile the liberation of inhibition energy and its discharge can take
place undisturbed. The omissions in the wording of wit already carry out
this intention. They impel us to fill in the gaps and in this way they
keep the wit-process free from attention. The technique of the riddle,
as it were, which attracts attention is here pressed into the service of
the wit-work. The façade formations, which we have already discovered in
many groups of tendency-wit, are still more effective (see p. 155). The
syllogistical façades excellently fulfill the purpose of riveting the
attention by an allotted task. While we begin to ponder wherein the
given answer was lacking already we are laughing; our attention has been
surprised, and the discharge of the liberated emotional inhibition has
been effected. The same is true of witticisms possessing a comic façade
in which the comic serves to assist the wit-technique. A comic façade
promotes the effect of wit in more than one way; it makes possible not
only the automatism of the wit-process by riveting the attention, but
also it facilitates the discharge of wit by sending ahead a discharge
from the comic. Here the effect of the comic resembles that of a
fascinating fore-pleasure, and we can thus understand that many
witticisms are able to dispense entirely the fore-pleasures produced by
other means of wit, and make use of only the comic as a fore-pleasure.
Among the true techniques of wit it is especially displacement and
representation through absurdity which, besides other properties, also
develop the deviation of attention so desirable for the automatic
discharge of the wit-process.[56]
We already surmise, and later will be able to see more clearly, that in
this condition of deviation of attention we have disclosed no
unessential characteristic of the psychic process in the hearer of wit.
In conjunction with this, we can understand something more. First, how
it happens that we rarely ever know in a joke why we are laughing,
although by analytical investigation we can determine the cause. This
laughing is the result of an automatic process which was first made
possible by keeping our conscious attention at a distance. Secondly, we
arrive at an understanding of that characteristic of wit as a result of
which wit can exert its full effect on the hearer only when it is new
and when it comes to him as a surprise. This property of wit, which
causes wit to be short-lived and forever urges the production of new
wit, is evidently due to the fact that it is inherent in the surprising
or the unexpected to succeed but once. When we repeat wit the awakened
memory leads the attention to the first hearing. This also explains the
desire to impart wit to others who have not heard it before, for the
impression made by wit on the new hearer replenishes that part of the
pleasure which has been lost by the lack of novelty. And an analogous
motive probably urges the wit producer to impart his wit to others.
_Elements Favoring the Wit-process_
As elements favoring the wit-process, even if we can no longer consider
them essentials, I present in the third place three technical aids to
wit-work which are destined to increase the sums of energy to be
discharged and thus enhance the effect of the wit. These technical aids
also very often accentuate the attention directed to the wit, but they
neutralize its influence by simultaneously fascinating it and impeding
its movements. Everything that provokes interest and confusion exerts
its influence in these two directions. This is especially true of the
nonsense and contrast elements, and above all the “contrast of ideas,”
which some authors consider the essential character of wit, but in which
I see only a means to reinforce the effect of wit. All that is confusing
evokes in the hearer that condition of distribution of energy which
Lipps has designated as “psychic damming”; and, doubtless, he has a
right to assume that the force of the “discharge” varies with the
success of the damming process which precedes it. Lipps’s exposition
does not explicitly refer to wit, but to the comic in general, yet it
seems quite probable that the discharge in wit, releasing a gush of
inhibition energy, is brought to its height in a similar manner by means
of the damming.
At length we are aware that the technique of wit is really determined by
two kinds of tendencies, those which make possible the formation of wit
in the first person, and those guaranteeing that the witticism produces
in the third person as much pleasurable effect as possible. The
Janus-like double-facedness of wit, which safeguards its original
resultant pleasure against the impugnment of critical reason, belongs to
the first tendency together with the mechanism of fore-pleasure; the
other complications of technique produced by the conditions discussed in
this chapter concern the third person of the witticism. Thus wit in
itself is a double-tongued villain which serves two masters at the same
time. Everything that aims toward gaining pleasure is calculated by the
witticism to arouse the third person, as if inner, unsurmountable
inhibitions in the first person were in the way of the same. Thus one
gets the full impression of the absolute necessity of this third person
for the completion of the wit-process. But while we have succeeded in
obtaining a good insight concerning the nature of this process in the
third person, we feel that the corresponding process in the first person
is still shrouded in darkness. So far we have not succeeded in answering
the first of our two questions: Why can we not laugh over wit made by
ourselves? and: Why are we urged to impart our own witticisms to others?
We can only suspect that there is an intimate connection between the two
facts yet to be explained, and that we must impart our witticisms to
others for the reason that we ourselves are unable to laugh over them.
From our examinations of the conditions in the third person for pleasure
gaining and pleasure discharging we can draw the conclusion that in the
first person the conditions for discharge are lacking and that those for
gaining pleasure are only incompletely fulfilled. Thus it is not to be
disputed that we enhance our pleasure in that we attain the—to us
impossible—laughter in this roundabout way from the impression of the
person who was stimulated to laughter. Thus we laugh, so to speak, _par
ricochet_, as Dugas expresses it. Laughter belongs to those
manifestations of psychic states which are highly infectious; if I make
some one else laugh by imparting my wit to him, I am really using him as
a tool in order to arouse my own laughter. One can really notice that
the person who at first recites the witticism with a serious mien later
joins the hearer with a moderate amount of laughter. Imparting my
witticisms to others may thus serve several purposes. First, it serves
to give me the objective certainty of the success of the wit-work;
secondly, it serves to enhance my own pleasure through the reaction of
the hearer upon myself; thirdly, in the case of repeating a not original
joke, it serves to remedy the loss of pleasure due to the lack of
novelty.
_Economy and Full Expenditure_