explained by means of the jest. We may follow the development of the
jest until it reaches its height in the tendency-wit. The jest gives
tendency a prior position when it is a question of supplying us with
pleasure, and it is content when its utterance does not appear utterly
senseless or insipid. But if this utterance is substantial and valuable
the jest changes into wit. A thought, which would have been worthy of
our interest even when expressed in the most unpretentious form, is now
invested in a form which must in itself excite our sense of
satisfaction. Such an association we cannot help thinking certainly has
not come into existence unintentionally; we must make effort to divine
the intention at the bottom of the formation of wit. An incidental
observation, made once before, will put us on the right track. We have
already remarked that a good witticism gives us, so to speak, a general
feeling of satisfaction without our being able to decide offhand which
part of the pleasure comes from the witty form and which part from the
excellent thought contained in the context (p. 131). We are deceiving
ourselves constantly about this division; sometimes we overvalue the
quality of the wit on account of our admiration for the thought
contained therein, and then again we overestimate the value of the
thought on account of the pleasure afforded us by the witty investment.
We know not what gives us pleasure nor at what we are laughing. This
uncertainty of our judgment, assuming it to be a fact, may have given
the motive for the formation of wit in the literal sense. The thought
seeks the witty disguise because it thereby recommends itself to our
attention and can thus appear to us more important and valuable than it
really is; but above all because this disguise fascinates and confuses
our reason. We are apt to attribute to the thought the pleasure derived
from the witty form, and we are not inclined to consider improper what
has given us pleasure, and in this way deprive ourselves of a source of
pleasure. For if wit made us laugh it was because it established in us a
mood most unfavorable to reason, which in turn has forced upon us that
state of mind which was once contented with mere playing and which wit
has attempted to replace with all the means at its command. Although we
have already established the fact that such wit is harmless and does not
yet show a tendency, we may not deny that, strictly speaking, it is the
jest alone which shows no tendency; that is, it serves to produce
pleasure only. For wit is really never purposeless even if the thought
contained therein shows no tendency and merely serves a theoretical,
intellectual interest. Wit carries out its purpose in advancing the
thought by magnifying it and by guarding it against reason. Here again
it reveals its original nature in that it sets itself up against an
inhibiting and restrictive power, or against the critical judgment.
The first use of wit, which goes beyond the mere production of pleasure,
points out the road to be followed. Wit is now recognized as a powerful
psychic factor whose weight can decide the issue if it falls into this
or that side of the scale. The great tendencies and impulses of our
psychic life enlist its service for their own purposes. The original
purposeless wit, which began as play, becomes related in a _secondary_
manner to tendencies from which nothing that is formed in psychic life
can escape for any length of time. We already know what it can achieve
in the service of the exhibitionistic, aggressive, cynical, and
sceptical tendencies. In the case of obscene wit, which originated in
the smutty joke, it makes a confederate of the third person who
originally disturbed the sexual situation, by giving him pleasure
through the utterance which causes the woman to be ashamed in his
presence. In the case of the aggressive tendency, wit by the same means
changes the original indifferent hearers into active haters and
scorners, and in this way confronts the enemy with a host of opponents
where formerly there was but one. In the first case it overcomes the
inhibitions of shame and decorum by the pleasure premium which it
offers. In the second case it overthrows the critical judgment which
would otherwise have examined the dispute in question. In the third and
fourth cases where wit is in the service of the cynical and sceptical
tendency, it shatters the respect for institutions and truths in which
the hearer had believed, first by strengthening the argument, and
secondly by resorting to a new method of attack. Where the argument
seeks to draw the hearer’s reason to its side, wit strives to push aside
this reason. There is no doubt that wit has chosen the way which is
psychologically more efficacious.
_The Development into Tendency-wit_
What impressed us in reviewing the achievements of tendency-wit was the
effect it produced on the hearer. It is more important, however, to
understand the effect produced by wit on the psychic life of the person
who makes it, or more precisely expressed, on the psychic life of the
person who conceives it. Once before we have expressed the intention,
which we find occasion to repeat here, that we wish to study the psychic
processes of wit in regard to its apportionment between two persons. We
can assume for the present that the psychic process aroused by wit in
the hearer is usually an imitation of the psychic processes of the wit
producer. The outer inhibitions which are to be overcome in the hearer
correspond to the inner inhibitions of the wit producer. In the latter
the expectation of the outer hindrance exists, at least as an inhibiting
idea. The inner hindrance, which is overcome in tendency-wit, is evident
in some single cases; for example, in Mr. N.’s joke (p. 28) we can
assume that it not only enables the hearer to enjoy the pleasure of the
aggression through injuries but it also makes it possible for him to
produce the wit in the first place. Of the different kinds of inner
inhibitions or suppressions one is especially worthy of our interest
because it is the most far-reaching. We designate that form by the term
“repression.” It is characterized by the fact that it excludes from
consciousness certain former emotions and their products. We shall learn
that tendency-wit itself is capable of liberating pleasure from sources
that have undergone repression. If the overcoming of outer hindrances
can be referred, in the manner indicated above, to inner inhibitions and
repressions we may say that tendency-wit proves more clearly than any
other developmental stage of wit that the main character of wit-making
is to set free pleasure by removing inhibitions. It reinforces
tendencies to which it gives its services by bringing them assistance
from repressed emotions; or it puts itself at the disposal of the
repressed tendencies directly.
One may readily concede that these are the functions of tendency-wit,
but one must nevertheless admit that we do not understand in what manner
these functions can succeed in accomplishing their end. The power of
tendency-wit consists in the pleasure which it derives from the sources
of word-plays and liberated nonsense, and if one can judge from the
impressions received from purposeless jests, one cannot possibly
consider the amount of the pleasure so great as to believe that it has
the power to annul deep-rooted inhibitions and repressions. As a matter
of fact we do not deal here with a simple propelling power but rather
with a more complicated mechanism. Instead of covering the long
circuitous route through which I arrived at an understanding of this
relationship, I shall endeavor to demonstrate it by a short synthetic
route.
G. Th. Fechner has established the principle of æsthetic assistance or
enhancement which he explains in the following words: “_From the
unopposed meeting of pleasurable states (Bedingungen) which individually
accomplish little, there results a greater, often much greater resultant
pleasure than is warranted by the sum of the pleasure values of the
separate states, or a greater result than could be accounted for as the
sum of the individual effects; in fact the mere meeting of this kind can
result in a positive pleasure product which overflows the threshold of
pleasure when the factors taken separately are too weak to accomplish
this. The only condition is that in comparison to others they must
produce a greater sense of satisfaction._”[50] I am of the opinion that
the theme of wit does not give us the opportunity to test the
correctness of this principle which is demonstrable in many other
artistic fields. But from wit we have learned something, which at least
comes near this principle, namely, that in a co-operation of many
pleasure-producing factors we are in no position to assign to each one
the resultant part which really belongs to it (see p. 131). But the
situation assumed in the principle of assistance can be varied, and for
these new conditions we can formulate the following combination of
questions which are worthy of a reply. What usually happens if in one
constellation there is a meeting of pleasurable and painful conditions?
Upon what depends the result and the previous intimations of the result?
Tendency-wit particularly shows these possibilities. There is one
feeling or impulse which strives to liberate pleasure from a certain
source and under unrestricted conditions certainly would liberate it,
but there is another impulse which works against this development of
pleasure, that is, which inhibits or suppresses it. The suppressing
stream, as the result shows, must be somewhat stronger than the one
suppressed, which however is by no means destroyed.
_The Fore-pleasure Principle_
But now there appears another impulse which strives to set free pleasure
by this identical process, even though from different sources it thus
acts like the suppressed stream. What can be the result in such a case?
An example can make this clearer than this schematization. There is an
impulse to insult a certain person; but this is so strongly opposed by a
feeling of decorum and æsthetic culture that the impulse to insult must
be crushed. If, for example, by virtue of some changed emotional state
the insult should happen to break through, this insulting tendency would
subsequently be painfully perceived. Therefore the insult is omitted.
There is a possibility, however, of making good wit from the words or
thoughts which would have served in the insult; that is, pleasure can be
set free from other sources without being hindered by the same
suppression. But the second development of pleasure would have to be
foregone if the insulting quality of the wit were not allowed to come
out, and as the latter is allowed to come to the surface, it is
connected with the new release of pleasure. Experience with tendency-wit
shows that under such circumstances the suppressed tendency can become
so strengthened by the aid of wit-pleasure as to overcome the otherwise
stronger inhibition. One resorts to insults because wit is thereby made
impossible. But the satisfaction thus obtained is not produced by wit
alone; it is incomparably greater, in fact it is by so much greater than
the pleasure of the wit, that we must assume that the former suppressed
tendency has succeeded in breaking through, perhaps without the need of
an outlet. Under these circumstances tendency-wit causes the most
prolific laughter.
Perhaps the investigation of the determinations of laughter will aid us
in forming a clearer picture of the process of the aid of wit against
suppression. But we see even now that the case of tendency-wit is a
special case of the principle of aid. A possibility of the development
of pleasure enters into a situation in which another pleasure
possibility is so hindered that individually it would not result in
pleasure. The result is a development of pleasure which is greater by
far than the added possibility. The latter acted, as it were, as an
_alluring premium_; with the aid of a small sum of pleasure a very large
and almost inaccessible amount is obtained. I have good grounds for
thinking that this principle corresponds to an arrangement which holds
true in many widely separated spheres of the psychic life, and I
consider it appropriate to designate the pleasure serving to liberate
the large sum of pleasure as _fore-pleasure_ and the principle as the
_principle of fore-pleasure_.
_Play-pleasure and Removal-pleasure_
The effect of tendency-wit may now be formulated as follows: It enters
the service of tendencies in order to produce new pleasure by removing
suppressions and repressions. This it does, using wit-pleasure as
fore-pleasure. When we now review its development we may say that wit
has remained true to its nature from beginning to end. It begins as play
in order to obtain pleasure from the free use of words and thoughts. As
soon as the growing reason forbids this senseless play with words and
thoughts, it turns to the jest or joke in order to hold to these sources
of pleasure and in order to be able to gain new pleasure from the
liberation of the absurd. In the rôle of harmless wit it assists the
thoughts and fortifies them against the impugnment of the critical
judgment, whereby it makes use of the principle of intermingling the
pleasure-sources. Finally, it enters into the great struggling
suppressed tendencies in order to remove inner inhibitions in accordance
with the principle of fore-pleasure. Reason, critical judgment, and
suppression, these are the forces which it combats in turn. It firmly
holds on to the original word-pleasure-sources, and beginning with the
stage of the jest opens for itself new pleasure-sources by removing
inhibition. The pleasure which it produces, be it play-pleasure or
removal-pleasure, can at all times be traced to the economy of psychic
expenditure, in so far as such a conception does not contradict the
nature of pleasure, and proves itself productive also in other
fields.[51]
V
THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL PROCESS
It seems superfluous to speak of the motives of wit, since the purpose
of obtaining pleasure must be recognized as a sufficient motive of the
wit-work. But on the one hand it is not impossible that still other
motives participate in the production of wit, and on the other hand, in
view of certain well-known experiences, the theme of the subjective
determination of wit must be discussed.
Two things above all urge us to it. Though wit-making is an excellent
means of obtaining pleasure from the psychic processes, we know that not
all persons are equally able to make use of it. Wit-making is not at the
disposal of all, in general there are but a few persons to whom one can
point and say that they are witty. Here wit seems to be a special
ability somewhere within the region of the old “psychic faculties,” and
this shows itself in its appearance as fairly independent of the other
faculties such as intelligence, phantasy, memory, etc. A special talent
or psychic determination permitting or favoring wit-making must be
presupposed in all wit-makers.
I am afraid that we shall not get very far in the exploration of this
theme. Only now and then do we succeed in proceeding from the
understanding of a single witticism to the knowledge of the subjective
determinations in the mind of the wit-maker. It is quite accidental that
the example of wit with which we began our investigation of the
wit-technique permits us also to gain some insight into the subjective
determination of the witticism. I am referring to Heine’s witticism, to
which also Heymans and Lipps have paid attention.
“_I was sitting next to Solomon Rothschild and he treated me just as an
equal, quite famillionaire_” (“Bäder von Lucca”).
_Subjective Determination of the “Famillionaire” Witticism_
Heine put this word in the mouth of a comical person, Hirsch-Hyacinth,
collector, operator and tax appraiser from Hamburg, and valet of the
aristocratic baron, Cristoforo Gumpelino (formerly Gumpel). Evidently
the poet has experienced great pleasure in these productions, for he
allows Hirsch-Hyacinth to talk big and puts in his mouth the most
amusing and most candid utterances; he positively endows him with the
practical wisdom of a Sancho Panza. It is a pity that Heine, as it
seems, had no liking for this dramatic figure and that he drops the
delightful character so soon. From many passages it would seem that the
poet himself is speaking behind the transparent mask of Hirsch-Hyacinth,
and we are quite convinced that this person is nothing but a parody of
the poet himself. Hirsch tells of reasons why he has discarded his
former name and now calls himself Hyacinth. “Besides I have the
advantage,” he continues, “of having an H on my seal already, and
therefore I am in no need of having a new letter engraved.” But Heine
himself resorted to this economy when he changed his surname “Harry” to
“Heinrich” at his baptism. Every one acquainted with the life of the
poet will recall that in Hamburg, where one also meets the personage
Hirsch-Hyacinth, Heine had an uncle of the same name, who played the
greatest rôle in Heine’s life as the wealthy member of the family. The
uncle’s name was likewise Solomon, just like the elderly Rothschild who
treated the impecunious Hirsch on such a famillionaire basis. What seems
to be merely a jest in the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth soon reveals a
background of earnest bitterness when we attribute it to the nephew
Harry-Heinrich. For he belonged to the family, nay, more, it was his
earnest wish to marry a daughter of this uncle, but she refused him, and
his uncle always treated him on a somewhat famillionaire basis, as a
poor relative. His rich relatives in Hamburg always dealt with him
condescendingly. I recall the story of one of his old aunts by marriage
who, when she was still young and pretty, sat next to some one at a
family dinner who seemed to her unprepossessing and whom the other
members of the family treated shabbily. She did not feel herself called
upon to be any more condescending towards him. Only many years later did
she discover that the careless and neglected cousin was the poet
Heinrich Heine. We know from many a record how keenly Heine suffered
from these repulses at the hands of his wealthy relatives in his youth
and during later years. The witticism “famillionaire” grew out of the
soil of such a subjective emotional feeling.
One may suspect similar subjective determinations in many other
witticisms of the great scoffers, but I know of no other example by
which one can show this in such a convincing way. It is therefore
hazardous to venture a more definite opinion about the nature of this
personal determination. Furthermore, one is not inclined in the first
place to claim similar complicated conditions for the origin of each and
every witticism. Neither are the witty productions of other celebrated
men better suited to give us the desired insight into the subjective
determination of wit. In fact, one gets the impression that the
subjective determination of wit production is oftentimes not unrelated
to persons suffering from neurotic diseases, when, for example, one
learns that Lichtenberg was a confirmed hypochondriac burdened with all
kinds of eccentricities. The great majority of witticisms, especially
those produced from current happenings, are anonymous; one might be
inquisitive to know what kind of people they are who originate them. The
physician occasionally has an opportunity to make a study of persons
who, if not renowned wits, are recognized in their circle as witty and
as originators of many passable witticisms; he is often surprised to
find such persons showing dissociated personalities and a predisposition
to nervous affections. However, owing to insufficient data, we certainly
cannot maintain that such a psychoneurotic constitution is a regular or
necessary subjective condition for wit-making.
A clearer case is afforded by Jewish witticisms which, as before
mentioned, are made exclusively by Jews themselves, whereas Jewish
stories of different origin rarely rise above the level of the comical
strain or of brutal mockery (p. 166). The determination for the
self-participation here, as in Heine’s joke “famillionaire,” seems to be
due to the fact that the person finds it difficult to express directly
his criticism or aggression and is thus compelled to resort to by-ways.
Other subjective determinations or favorable conditions for wit-making
are less shrouded in darkness. The motive for the production of harmless
wit is usually the ambitious impulse to display one’s spirit or to “show
off.” It is an impulse comparable to the impulse toward sexual
exhibition. The existence of numerous inhibited impulses whose
suppression retains some weakness produces a state favorable for the
production of tendency-wit. Thus certain single components of the sexual
constitution may appear as motives for wit-formation. A whole series of
obscene witticisms lead one to the conclusion that a person who gives
origin to such wit conceals a desire to exhibit. Persons having a
powerful sadistical component in their sexuality, which is more or less
inhibited in life, are most successful with the tendency-wit of
aggression.
_The Impulse to Impart Wit_
The second fact which impels one to examine the subjective determination
of wit is the common experience that nobody is satisfied with making wit
for himself. Wit-making is inseparably connected with the desire to
impart it; in fact this impulse is so strong that it is often realized
after overcoming strong objections. In the comic, too, one experiences
pleasure by imparting it to another person; but this is not imperative;
one can enjoy the comic alone when one happens on it. Wit, on the other
hand, must be imparted. Apparently the process of wit-formation does not
end with the conception of wit. There remains something which strives to
complete the mysterious process of wit-formation by imparting it.
We cannot conjecture, in the first place, what may have motivated the
impulse to impart wit. But in wit we notice another peculiarity which
again distinguishes it from the comic. If I encounter the latter I can
laugh heartily over it alone; I am naturally pleased if by imparting it
to some one else I make him laugh too. In the case of wit, however,
which occurs to me or which I have made, I cannot laugh over it in spite
of the unmistakable feeling of pleasure which I experience in the
witticism. It is possible that my need to impart the witticism to
another is in some way connected with the resultant laughter, which is
manifest in the other, but denied to me.
But why do I not laugh over my own joke? And what rôle does the other
person play in it?