CHAPTER LXIII. THE LEAGUES AND THEIR WARS

Whilst the cultured Greeks of the long-established cities and

confederacies were being gradually absorbed into the Macedonian kingdom,

and the spirit of liberty was dying out amidst luxury and the fleeting

pleasures of sense, amidst theatrical shows and festivals, and amidst the

philosophy and culture of the day; two races, as yet little affected by

the influences of Hellenic life and culture, emerged into the foreground

of effective action. These were the Ætolians and the Achæans.

THE ÆTOLIANS

For centuries the Ætolian mountaineers, a branch of the Æolian race

but with a great admixture of foreign (barbarian) blood, had led in

peasant simplicity a quiet and unnoted existence in the open country,

dwelling in villages and scattered homesteads, remote from the culture

and refinement, as from the enervation and luxury of other Hellenic

peoples. Inured to a life of hardship by the character of their country,

which, bounded on the west by the torrent stream of the Achelous and on

the east by the Evenus, offered no fertile land for cultivation except

along the southern coast--the inland tracts being fit for nothing but

pasture and the chase--the Ætolians had preserved intact the warlike

spirit and savage freedom of primitive times “when the law ran just as

far as the sword could reach, and honourable pillage by sea and land was

every brave man’s trade.” Out of sheer valour and love of fighting they

undertook venturesome freebooting voyages under their native captains and

chiefs, penetrating even to the distant coasts of Italy and Asia Minor,

or entered the service of foreign states as mercenaries; while those who

remained at home provided for the few needs of their rude and simple

existence by field labour, cattle-tending, horse-breeding, and the chase.

Weapons were the pride and ornament of the free man, and he hardly ever

laid them aside. When the Ætolians took the field, armed with slings

and spears, and ranged, sometimes in serried phalanx, sometimes in

irregular hordes, their strength, agility, and desperate courage made

them formidable to all their enemies. Their national dress included the

_kausia_ or broad-brimmed white hat, the tunic, girded high and leaving

the arms free, and the high Cretan shoe. The right foot was left bare

in climbing or going up-hill, “to insure a firmer foothold.” In culture

and learning they were far behind other Greeks, who avoided and despised

the rude, haughty, and boastful “mountain peasants” in consequence. Yet

even they in time developed some artistic feeling and talent, for as

their power increased, Thermus the capital of their league, was richly

adorned with public buildings and temples, pictures and statues. In this

unfortified town, encircled by mountains and tracts of fertile country,

the districts belonging to the league celebrated their annual festival

and assembly with fairs, games, and feasts, for they were as ready to

enjoy life in every sort of turbulent and unbridled pleasure as to hazard

it in any bold venture.

THE ÆTOLIAN LEAGUE

From very early times the townships and districts under democratic

government had been united in some sort of loose confederacy, which

imposed but a very slight curb upon the independent action of each

community; but it was not until the Macedonian period, when the power of

other states was impaired by civil wars and their energy paralysed by the

effects of a higher state of civilisation, that the several confederacies

of kindred tribes united to form a general Ætolian League, its purpose

being rather to safeguard their predatory excursions than to strengthen

a political system based on moral or legal principles.[48] For although

the germ of a vigorous federal and communal life might lie dormant in

this hardy and primitive race, yet it was wanting in moral discipline,

the authority of law, and the habit of obedience. The first result of

the fresh unity and order brought into Ætolian enterprise by this closer

union was the extension of Ætolian supremacy westward over the Œniades

and eastward over Naupactus.

From this time forth we find the Ætolians mentioned in every military

achievement of importance; they manfully withstood the Macedonian greed

of domination; we see them defending Hellenic liberty and independence

against Antipater and Cassander; they formed the nucleus of the force

which checked the wild hordes of the Celts at Thermopylæ and overthrew

Brennus and his robber bands on the sacred soil of Delphi. Everywhere we

find their strong hand and resolute energy at work on the destinies of

the Greek nation in the mournful period of its decline and fall, staving

off and delaying the complete subjugation of Greece to the best of their

ability.

The supreme authority of the federated states was vested in the

_Panætolium_, or Diet of the League, which assembled in council

regularly every year at the autumnal equinox in the mountain city of

Thermus, and at which every free-born Ætolian was entitled to appear

and vote. In cases of urgency this assembly was sometimes held at

other times and places. The Diet of the League declared war and peace,

concluded alliances and treaties, and sent and received ambassadors. Its

proceedings were directed by a president (strategus) who was elected

annually. In administrative and judicial matters the supreme authority

was the Council called the _Apocleti_, the members or “assessors”

(synedri) of which were elected annually from amongst the members of

the Diet and the noble families of the several districts. Under the

presidency of the strategus the Council managed the ordinary course of

business and judicature for the league as a whole as well as for the

several districts or cantons, maintained the rights of the League and

the several confederated districts against attacks from within and from

without, and in certain cases appointed commissions consisting of not

more than thirty members.

At first all members of the League enjoyed full civil rights within it,

and accordingly might settle anywhere within its territory, acquire

landed property, contract marriages, take part in the public assemblies,

vote, and hold public office. These privileges of citizenship were

shared not only by all Ætolians, but by all other Greeks who joined the

League, whether voluntarily or under compulsion, such as the inhabitants

of certain towns and districts in Thessaly, Phocis, Locris, Messenia,

and others. Since the expulsion of Aristotimus, governor of Elis, the

Eleans had occupied a relation of independent defensive alliance with

the Ætolians; they gave and received help at need, but retained their

political autonomy. It was otherwise with the Cephallenians, who paid

tribute as Ætolian subjects, and were obliged to sue for justice in the

Ætolian law courts.

THE ACHÆAN LEAGUE AND ARATUS OF SICYON

In natural contrast with the Ætolian “peasant league,” the league of the

Achæan cities arose in the reign of Antigonus Gonatas. It was the last

vigorous shoot that sprang from the decaying root of the Hellenic tree of

liberty.

From primitive times the twelve towns of the coast of Achaia had been

joined in a loose confederacy for which the sanctuary of Zeus Homagyrius

or Homorius in the district of Helice served as a place of assembly and

council. It was a religious association based upon kinship--ancient

Greece has many such to show--a free union for the worship of tribal

divinities under traditional forms, and involved no restraint upon the

political independence of its members. Without exercising any great

influence upon the political and military life of Greece, Achaia was

notable for unostentatious virtues, for order, unity, and a patriarchal

form of government; while Croton, Sybaris, and other flourishing colonies

in lower Italy bore eloquent witness to the culture and creative energy

of the Achæan race. In so great honour were the uprightness and public

virtue of the simple and industrious coast dwellers held by the rest

of Greece that after the battle of Leuctra the great Hellenic states

besought them to arbitrate in their internal quarrels. This old-time

confederacy was broken up and destroyed by the Macedonian rulers, who

craftily sowed the seeds of discord, and then made use of the ensuing

dissensions to subjugate and oppress the several cities by foreign

garrisons and governors. But despotism could not obliterate the memory

of the happy past. Favoured by the weakness and confusion which followed

upon the Celtic invasion of Macedonia, four towns, Dyme, Patræ, Tritæa,

and Pharæ, having expelled their garrisons and tyrants, renewed the

confederacy, vowed mutual aid against external and internal enemies, and

pledged themselves faithfully to observe the decrees of the League. Five

years later they were joined by Ægium, thenceforth the capital. Others

soon followed: Burs, where the tyrant had been slain, Cerynea, where

the governor had voluntarily abdicated in fear of a like fate, Pellene,

Leontium, and Ægira.

But even in its rejuvenated form the Achæan League remained for years in

provincial isolation, until Aratus of Sicyon[49] induced his native city

to join it, and set before it a loftier aim in the deliverance of Greece

from the dismemberment and chaos due to the exclusive regard of local

interests, and the awakening of national spirit, unity, and vigour.

[Sidenote: [249 B.C.]]

Even in the days of Macedonian rule Sicyon had not forfeited her ancient

glories. Her gardens, fruitful fields, and flourishing villages, her

magnificent buildings and art collections, and the merchant vessels in

her sheltered harbour, bore testimony to the wealth, culture, and busy

trade of her citizens. But internal discord, fostered by Macedonian

guile, undermined the foundations of her prosperity. Party strife arose,

bringing revolutions and tyrannies. Clinias, a citizen of noble birth,

great wealth, and patriotic spirit, perished in the struggle against

the tyrant Abantidas. With difficulty his son Aratus, a child of seven

years old, was rescued and brought to Argos, where he grew up sound in

body and mind under the fostering care of friends, while his native city

fell under tyranny after tyranny, until, broken in spirit and shorn

of her noblest citizens, she ultimately came under the sway of the

wicked and violent Nicocles. For thirteen years Aratus dwelt in Argos,

in the society of the wealthy and cultured friends of his family, and

in intercourse with the numerous Sicyonians who sought refuge in this

neighbouring town from the wrath and persecution of their own tyrant,

and who turned eyes full of hope upon the vigorous and able youth who

combined courage with discretion and burned with desire to deliver his

native place and avenge his father’s murder. He contrived cunningly to

deceive the tyrant’s spies, to whom he seemed to spend all his days in

thoughtless gaiety with courtesans and boon companions.

When the auspicious moment seemed to have come, Aratus left Argos in

company with some fugitives and a band of mercenaries. They climbed the

walls during the night, surprised and disarmed the tyrant’s bodyguard,

and at daybreak summoned the citizens to rise for their liberties.

Nicocles escaped in the tumult, his palace was sacked and given to the

flames, his property confiscated to the commonwealth. Thus without

bloodshed was the liberation of Sicyon effected. But fresh disorders and

disturbances soon threatened, when some six hundred fugitives, who had

once been wealthy men, returned and demanded the restoration of property

which had long since passed into other hands. In order that he might not

be left without support in this difficult situation Aratus induced the

Dorian city, wealthy still in spite of all, to join the Achæan League

on an equality of laws and privileges, and then, by the help of a large

sum of money granted to him by the friendly king of Egypt, Ptolemy, upon

his personal application in Alexandria, he effected a settlement and

reconciliation among his contentious fellow-citizens.

The fame which he won by this prudent and patriotic act, combined with

the great service he had rendered to the League by inducing such an

important seaport to join it, smoothed the young commander’s way to

the highest office; but he modestly chose to work his way up. He first

enrolled himself in the Achæan cavalry, but by the end of six years

he had attained the dignity of strategus which was thenceforth seldom

conferred upon another until his death. Clear-minded, far-sighted,

and steeped in the philosophic and patriotic culture of his time,

Aratus soon turned his energies towards the great end of uniting all

Peloponnesians under the hegemony of Achaia. Without interfering with the

autonomy and freedom of the several states he established the principle

of equal rights for all members of the League. The road to office and

honours lay open to every man within it, without distinction of wealth

or social standing; and, though some towns or districts of those which

were gradually won over to the League might favour a different form

of government, yet the constitution of the Achæan confederacy, as it

developed by degrees under Aratus, retained the character of a moderate

democracy. Moreover, careful as he was to avoid rousing local jealousies

or wounding local self-esteem and prejudices by meddling with internal

administration, traditional privileges and customs, or the religious

peculiarities of different places or communities, he awakened the

sense of a common civilisation by introducing uniformity of weights

and measures, a common coinage, and equality of commercial rights, and

secured it by the bond of religion.

ARATUS CONTROLS THE LEAGUE

The government of the Achæan League which was formed under Aratus was

vested in the free Diet of the people, which met twice a year (in spring

and autumn) at their ancient place of council, not far from Ægium, and

at which every free citizen who had attained his thirtieth year was

qualified to appear and give his opinion and his vote. In spring, the

beginning of the civil year, the officers of the League were elected by

the Diet, the president, the secretary or chancellor, and the senate,

which, in concert with the demiurgi, or representatives of the ten

Achæan towns which originally composed the League, formed the supreme

executive authority, managing political affairs in conformity with the

decrees and ordinances of the Diet and under its control, directing the

discussion and voting of the great assemblies of the League, and making

the necessary preparations when they were to be held. In urgent cases

the strategus and senate acted on their own initiative, without the

authorisation of the Diet but subject to the obligation of rendering

account to it. There was a League Court, likewise appointed by the great

assembly, for the settlement of internal disputes. The strategus presided

at the Diet as in the greater and lesser council, and confirmed decrees

and ratified documents by his signature and the seal of the League.

Possessed of executive powers in external and internal affairs, he had

charge of the treasury, called in the contributions of the confederates

in money, ships, and men, and held supreme command of the army and fleet,

subject to the obligation of rendering account of his actions. In war

he was assisted by the captain of the cavalry (hipparch), and in home

affairs by the chancellor or secretary (grammateus).

[Sidenote: [249-242 B.C.]]

[Illustration: A SHIELD BEARER]

This admirable constitution was in the main the work of Aratus, always

the “moving spirit” of the League, and though his later years are in

many respects open to reproach, yet this practical application of his

philosophic and patriotic ideas is worthy of the highest commendation.

He is one of those characters whose portraits, distorted by the favour

and enmity of partisans, are but uncertainly discerned in history.

Strenuously as he strove in his _Memorabilia_ (the essentials of which

Plutarch has preserved in his biography) to guard his actions and motives

from misconception and to truly exhibit himself to his contemporaries and

to posterity, his record is nevertheless darkened by many shadows and

charged with many blunders. “Aratus had not a great Hellenic soul,” is

the verdict of Schorn, “his soul was narrow and Achæan.” As a man he was

distinguished by many fine and amiable qualities, as a citizen he merits

respect for his great love of his country, to which he dedicated his life

with an absolute devotion, and to the aggrandisement of which all his

efforts were directed with rare perseverance. To the state he sacrificed

himself without reserve, giving up his property, friendships, enmities,

and even the implacable hatred of tyrants with which he had been imbued

from his youth up; everything, indeed, except the ambition which cast a

doubt even upon his patriotism. He desired to shine on the Achæan horizon

alone, and he used his influence to keep down any who attempted to shine

beside him.

He regarded the Ætolian peasant-league, with its raids and savage feuds,

and the revolutionary attempts of the Spartan kings Agis and Cleomenes

with equal abhorrence; and by turning his arms against them alternately

he played into the hands of the common national foe, Macedonia. As

strategus his military talents were of a very inferior order. He was

admirably skilled in arranging sudden attacks and ambushes, and in the

carrying out of military surprises his boldness and daring were equal to

his subtlety and cunning, but as a commander his capacity was small, and

in his first campaign he proved diffident, timorous, and faint-hearted.

It was not his strong point to look danger boldly in the face, in battle

he lost self-control and presence of mind; and he consequently preferred

the privy and crooked ways of stratagem, dissimulation, and deceit to a

direct and valiant attack.

In his second period of office as strategus, Aratus increased the

reputation he had gained by the liberation of Sicyon, but had impaired

by a profitless campaign against the Ætolians in the first year of his

command, by his successful stratagem at Corinth. With mingled craft and

daring he succeeded in ridding the impregnable citadel of Acrocorinthus

of its Macedonian garrison, and persuaded this important city, one of the

three “fetters of Greece,” to join the League.[e]

ARATUS TAKES CORINTH

Three brothers, Syrian Greeks, had pilfered from the royal treasure at

Corinth, and one of them named Erginus, came to Sicyon from time to time

to exchange their plunder at the house of a banker well known to Aratus.

Through this channel Aratus learned that there was an accessible point

in the wall of the citadel; and Erginus, having engaged the concurrence

of a fourth brother who served in the garrison, undertook to conduct

Aratus to the place, where the wall was no more than fifteen feet

high. The brothers demanded a large reward. Sixty talents [£12,000 or

$60,000] were to be deposited with the banker, to be paid to them in

the event of success; and even in the case of failure, if they escaped,

each was to receive a house and a talent. Aratus could not immediately

raise so large a sum, and was forced to pledge his plate and his wife’s

ornaments, purchasing, as Plutarch observes, the privilege of a perilous

adventure for the good of his country, at a price which it would have

been accounted magnanimous to reject, if it had been offered as a bribe.

When the time came which had been fixed for the attempt, leaving the

main body of his forces under arms, he proceeded with four hundred men,

few of whom were in the secret, towards Corinth. As they approached the

wall, the light of the full moon, which would have rendered concealment

almost impossible, was intercepted by clouds which rose from the sea.

Several other propitious circumstances contributed to his success, though

he fully earned it by his courage. Erginus with seven others, disguised

as wayfarers, gained entrance at a gate and overpowered the guard, while

Aratus, with only a hundred of his men, scaled the wall, and advanced

towards the citadel with the scaling-ladders, ordering the rest to

follow. But on his way through the town he fell in with a patrol, one of

whom escaped, and soon raised a general alarm.

Aratus, again favoured by the moon which broke through the clouds as he

was entangled in the most intricate part of the ascent, reached the wall

of the citadel safely, and was soon engaged in a hard combat with the

garrison. As soon as the alarm was raised, Archelaus, finding that the

citadel was attacked, hastened with all his forces in that direction. But

he chanced to light on three hundred Achæans, who, unable to find the

track of their comrades, had cowered behind a projection of the rock.

They now sprang out as from an ambuscade, and completely routed and

dispersed his troops. But they were recalled from the pursuit by Erginus

to the succour of Aratus, and their arrival decided the struggle. By

sunrise he was in possession of the fortress, and the forces which had

followed him from Sicyon, making their appearance at the same time, were

joyfully admitted into the lower town by the Corinthians, who helped to

capture the royal soldiers.[d]

[Sidenote: [242-232 B.C.]]

By this act, in which he generously hazarded his private fortune, Aratus

gained such a degree of popular confidence that the Achæans thenceforth

committed the conduct of public affairs to his hands, and followed his

counsel even in the years when he was by law excluded from the office of

strategus. The towns of Trœzen, Epidaurus, Cleonæ, and Megara, presently

revolted from Macedonia and joined the Achæan League.

The rise of the Achæans stirred up the jealousy of other states, and

incited the Macedonians to fresh exertions to recover what they had

lost. The old king Antigonus concluded an alliance with the Ætolians for

a joint attack on Achaia, on the basis of a partition of the territory

to be acquired. But Aratus, who had chosen Ptolemy as patron of the

League, and thus secured the protection of Egypt in the event of possible

disaster, repulsed the Ætolian marauders before they could join hands

with the Macedonians, and dissuaded King Antigonus from the proposed

campaign by promising him the remaining dominions of the Peloponnesus.

The aged Antigonus Gonatas died soon afterwards, and his son and heir,

Demetrius II, was kept fully occupied by an invasion of his own country

by the Dardans.

Aratus contrived to make use of these circumstances for fresh

acquisitions. Secured from attack in the rear by an offensive and

defensive alliance with the Ætolians, he induced most of the states of

the Peloponnesus by force or subtlety to join the League. Thus Lydiades,

the young and accomplished prince who reigned at Megalopolis, was

prevailed upon to join, and the rich and extensive territory of that city

was won for the League. The tyrants, abandoned by Macedonia, were no

longer able to withstand the power of Achaia; they yielded voluntarily

or under compulsion to the tide of democracy; so that when Demetrius II

sank into his grave after ten years of feeble sovereignty, and Antigonus

Doson (the Promiser) undertook the government of Macedonia during the

minority of King Philip III, the Achæans ruled over Hermione, Phlius, and

the greater part of Arcadia, counted the rich island of Ægina among their

possessions, had induced Argos to join the League after a long struggle

with three successive tyrants, and had entered into an alliance with

Athens (whence, by the assistance of Aratus, the Macedonian garrisons

had been forced to withdraw) on equal terms though without reciprocal

civil rights. Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenos, and Elis were the only towns

that remained subject to the Ætolians, who, however, had meanwhile

extended their dominion over part of Thessaly; and Sparta, just awakened

from her long trance and invigorated by a new birth from within, was

striving to regain the ascendency which had been hers in the glorious

days of old. Out of these elements was bred the fatal conflict which

broke all that was left of the strength of Greece at the very moment

when the Romans began to intermeddle in the domestic concerns of warring

states.[e]

SPARTA UNDER CLEOMENES

[Sidenote: [232-227 B.C.]]

Lacedæmon had, by this time, exchanged poverty and hardy discipline for

opulence and voluptuous manners. The public meals, that last pledge of

Spartan frugality and temperance, were discountenanced by the rulers

of the state, and fell into disrepute and disuse. One or two princes,

who endeavoured to stem the torrent of corruption, suffered deposition,

exile, and even death. The laws of Lycurgus were totally disregarded. The

lands were all in possession of a few families, who lived in the greatest

splendour, whilst the rest of the Spartans, stripped of their patrimony,

were doomed to the greatest indigence. The efforts of Agis IV, the king,

to enforce the sumptuary laws, to cancel all debts, and to make a new

division of lands, were opposed by the rich, and at last punished with

death, on pretence of a design to alter the government.

In such a situation of affairs, Cleomenes ascended the Spartan throne, a

prince who united integrity of heart with martial spirit and a love of

glory. He found, on his accession, both the internal constitution and

the public affairs of Sparta in the utmost confusion. Domestic distress,

with its concomitant despondency of spirit, had caused throughout Laconia

a universal depopulation. Instead of natives sufficient to occupy the

thirty-nine thousand shares into which Lycurgus had originally divided

the land, only seven hundred families of the Spartan race were now to

be found; and, of these, about six hundred, sunk into abject penury and

wretchedness, were incapable of exerting any degree of vigour in the

public service. The slaves, too, had many of them perished through want

of employment and subsistence, while others had been carried off, in

great numbers, by the enemies of Sparta. Such was the miserable decay

of both public and private virtue! Cleomenes, actuated by his natural

disposition to arms, as well as by the representations already mentioned

of the Ætolians, in order to revive the martial spirit of the Spartans,

attacked Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos, cities of Arcadia. Having

reduced these under his obedience, he marched without delay against a

certain castle in the district of Megalopolis, which commanded on that

side the entrance into Laconia.

Immediately upon this act of hostility, the Achæan states declared war

against the Spartans. The Spartan king forthwith took the field, with

what troops he could muster, and ravaged the territories of the cities

in alliance with Achaia. With five thousand men he advanced against the

Achæan general Aratus, who, perceiving the resolution of the Spartans,

declined an engagement, though at the head of twenty thousand. The

retreat of Aratus, determined the Eleans, who had never been steady in

the interests of Achaia, openly to declare against her. The Achæans

attempted to chastise this defection; but they were routed by Cleomenes

at Lycæum, near the Elean borders; and totally overthrown by him in

the ensuing campaign, near Leuctra. Pursuing his good fortune, he

reduced several of the towns of Arcadia, which he garrisoned with his

Lacedæmonian troops.

[Sidenote: [227-223 B.C.]]

He returned to Sparta with the mercenaries only, and cut off the ephori,

whom he considered as troublesome to himself, and oppressive to the

Spartan subjects, by assassination; a course which he endeavoured to

justify, by arraigning the unconstitutional establishment of this order

of magistrates, and a recital of several acts of iniquity. He now seized

on the administration of justice, and re-established the agrarian and

sumptuary laws of Lycurgus, which he enforced by his own example.

Having thus made himself master of Sparta, he diverted that energy to

foreign enterprises, which might otherwise have broken out in domestic

sedition. He plundered the territories of Megalopolis, forced the Achæan

lines at Hecatombæum, and obtained a complete victory. The Achæan army,

composed of the flower of their nation, were almost all cut off. The

Mantineans, having slaughtered the Achæan garrison stationed in their

city, put themselves under the protection of the Spartans. The same

spirit of defection and revolt appeared in most of the other cities of

Peloponnesus. In this extremity, they sued for peace to Cleomenes; but

Aratus, who had for some time declined to take the lead in the public

affairs of Achaia, now resumed his authority; and, by insisting on such

terms as the high-spirited Cleomenes could not accept, contrived to

prevent that peace which his countrymen wished for.

Both Aratus and Cleomenes wished to unite all the nations of Peloponnesus

into one commonwealth, and by that means to form such a bulwark for the

liberties of Greece, as might set all foreign power at defiance. But to

what people the supreme direction of the common affairs should belong,

was the question. Even Aratus, so much above the love of money, showed

himself, on this occasion, the slave of ambition; and, rather than see a

superior in power, determined to involve everything in confusion.

The interruption of the negotiations for peace raised a general ferment

throughout Peloponnesus; the conduct of Aratus fired the martial ardour

of Cleomenes, and excited jealousies in different states; nor could the

Achæans obtain any assistance from the Athenians, the Ætolians, or the

Argives. Corinth was on the point of surrendering to the Spartan king;

and even Sicyon must have been lost, had not a timely discovery prevented

an intended conspiracy. Here we may remark the extreme quickness with

which the Grecian states entered into any confederacy that was formed for

humbling whatever power preponderated in Greece: a proof, that, however

their manners were corrupted, their sentiments of liberty and the balance

of power were not yet wholly subverted.

ANTIGONUS CALLED IN

[Sidenote: [223-221 B.C.]]

Resentment against Cleomenes induced Aratus to entertain the project

of calling in, for the destruction of Sparta, the aid of Antigonus of

Macedon. But in Greece this attempt was generally odious, and Antigonus

was averse from all interference in Grecian affairs, not being easily

dazzled by the splendour of ambition. But the last and greatest of these

difficulties Aratus surmounted by various artifices, and entered into

a compact with Antigonus, the conditions whereof were that the citadel

of Corinth should be delivered into the hands of the king; that he

should be at the head of the Achæan confederacy, superintend their

councils, and direct their operations; that his army should be supported

at their expense. From these articles it is evident, that the liberties

of Achaia were now no more, and that the sovereign of this country was

Antigonus.[50]

This transaction roused the indignation of the Peloponnesian states:

they looked to Cleomenes as the only protector of their liberties. That

hero, upon hearing that the Macedonians were in motion, took possession

of a pass on the Onean Mountains, which commanded the Corinthian Isthmus;

but the Achæans having surprised Argos, he was forced to abandon it,

and to leave it open for the Macedonians. The Achæans now resumed their

superiority in Peloponnesus, and most of the cities in that peninsula

were constrained to submit to their power. The efforts of Cleomenes to

restore the liberties of Peloponnesus, and to protect, of course, those

of the rest of Greece, equal the most famed exploits of antiquity. But

the wary Antigonus, rich in treasure, artfully protracted the war, and

suffered his impetuous adversary to waste his force in vain. Cleomenes

was forced to retreat to Sellasia, in order to cover Sparta.

[Illustration: GREEK CUIRASS AND HELMETS

(In the British Museum)]

Antigonus, therefore, encamped at a distance, on the plain below,

in order to watch the motions of the enemy, and to act according to

circumstances. Cleomenes, reduced to the greatest distress for want of

provisions, was forced to throw open his entrenchments, and, without

further delay, to come to an engagement. All his skill and valour, which

were eminently displayed on this occasion, could not save him from a

complete defeat (221 B.C.). He fled first to Sparta, and from thence to

Egypt; where, after various adventures, the loftiness of his spirit,

which could not brook the indignities offered to him by the ministers of

Ptolemy Philopator, brought him to an honourable but untimely end.[f]

Having eluded the vigilance of his guards he made a sally with his

friends, thirteen in number, all with drawn swords, and raised the cry

of liberty. The Alexandrian populace stared and applauded, as at a

scene on the stage, but with as little thought of taking any part in

the action. The Spartans killed the governor of the city, and another

courtier, but after an ineffectual attempt to break open the prison in

the citadel, finding themselves universally shunned, they abandoned their

forlorn hope, and turned their swords against their own hearts. Panteus,

the dearest of the king’s friends, consented at his request to survive

until he saw that the others had breathed their last. Ptolemy, as soon

as he had learned what had happened, ordered all the women and children

belonging to the deceased to be put to death; and the young wife of

Panteus is said to have paid the like pious offices to Cratesiclea, who

was forced to witness the butchery of her two grandsons, as Cleomenes had

received from her husband. The body of Cleomenes was flayed and hung on

a cross, until, if we may believe Plutarch, an extraordinary occurrence

awakened Ptolemy’s superstitious fears, gave occasion for new expiatory

rites in the palace, and induced the Alexandrians to venerate Cleomenes

as a hero.

Such indeed he was, when measured with them. As we turn from them to

the proper subject of this history, we feel, as it were, that we are

beginning again to breathe a healthier atmosphere: and we carry away

a strengthened conviction, that great as were the evils which Greece

suffered from the ill-regulated passion for liberty, it was still better

to live there, than under the sceptre of the Ptolemies--among a people

who can hardly be said to have a history, in any higher sense than a herd

of animals, always prone, unless when goaded into fury.[d]

[Sidenote: [221 B.C.]]

During the absence of Antigonus, a multitude of Illyrians, and other

barbarians, made an irruption into Macedon, and committed great

devastation. This irruption hastened his return into his own dominions.

In a decisive battle, the barbarians were defeated; but the Macedonian

king, by straining his voice during the engagement, burst a blood-vessel.

The consequent effusion of blood threw him into a languishing state, and

he died in the space of a few days, lamented by all Greece.

Antigonus II was succeeded by Philip, the son of Demetrius, the last of

the Macedonian kings of that name; a prince only in the seventeenth year

of his age, intelligent, affable, munificent, and attentive to all the

duties of the royal station. This excellent character was formed by a

good natural disposition, cultivated by the instructions and example of

Antigonus, who appointed him his successor on the Macedonian throne.

THE SOCIAL WAR

[Sidenote: [221-216 B.C.]]

The jealousy which the Ætolians had long entertained of the Achæan

states, was increased by the importance which they had assumed from

their alliance with Macedon. No sooner were they relieved from the

dread of Antigonus, than they ravaged the Achæan coast, and committed

depredations on all the neighbouring countries. Aratus having opposed

to them the Achæan forces in vain, invoked and obtained the aid of the

king of Macedon. Philip promised that as soon as he should have settled

the affairs of his own kingdom, he would repair to Corinth, in order to

meet the convention of the states in alliance with Achaia, that he might

have an opportunity of settling with them a plan of future operations. In

the meantime, the Ætolians, making a fresh irruption into Peloponnesus,

sacked Cynætha, a city of Arcadia, put most of the inhabitants to

the sword, and laid the place in ruins. The convention of the Achæan

confederates, now assembled at Corinth, unanimously agreed that unless

the Ætolians should make reparation, war should be declared against them,

and the direction of it committed to the king of Macedon. Hence the

origin of the Social War, so called from the association entered into by

the several states engaged against Ætolia.

Philip commenced his operations with the siege of Ambracas, a fortress

which commanded an extensive territory, belonging of right to Epirus,

but now in the hands of the Ætolians. Having reduced this fortress, he

restored it to the Epirots, and prepared to carry the war into Ætolia.

The Ætolian spirit was not daunted either by the loss of Ambracas or

the threats of Philip. They invaded Macedon, and made incursions into

Achaia, which they reduced to the greatest distress. The mercenaries

in the Achæan service had mutinied for want of pay; the Peloponnesian

confederates became spiritless or disaffected; even the Messenians, in

whose cause chiefly Achaia, had, at the beginning, taken up arms, were

afraid to act against the Ætolians: whilst the Spartans, notwithstanding

their engagements, at the late conventions, to Achaia, had now massacred,

or sent into exile, all such of their own citizens as were in the

interest of the Achæans, and openly declared against them. For the

Spartans, amidst their greatest humiliation, had ever been impatient of

the domination of Achaia, to which the haughtiness of that republic had,

in all probability, very much contributed.

[Sidenote: [216-208 B.C.]]

A year had elapsed since the alliance had been formed against Achaia,

when Philip of Macedon, in the depth of winter, set out with the utmost

secrecy to Corinth, where a part of his forces were stationed. He

surprised a party of Eleans, who had gone forth to ravage the Sicyonian

territories, and reduced Psophis, a stronghold within the confines of

Arcadia, of which the Eleans had taken possession. He plundered Elis,

one of the finest regions in Greece, in respect to cultivation, and

rich in every kind of rural wealth. He next subdued under his power

Triphylia, a district of Peloponnesus to the southward of Elis, and

wrested the Ætolian yoke from the necks of the Messenians. Philip made

a temperate use of all his victories. He granted peace to all who sued

for it; and the whole of his conduct seemed to be directed by the same

generous motives which had formerly directed that of Antigonus. But in

the midst of these fair appearances, Philip began to manifest latent

seeds of ambition. He restrained the pride and power of his ministers,

who had been appointed to their offices by his predecessor Antigonus; and

supported Eperatus in the election of general of Achaia, in opposition

to Aratus. In order to counterbalance this unpopular measure, and to

strengthen himself in the affections of the Achæan people, he besieged

Teichos, and having taken that fortress, restored it to the Achæans, to

whom it belonged. He also made an inroad into Elis, and presented the

Dymeans and the cities in the neighbourhood with all the plunder. He now

imagined that the wealth and vigour of the Achæan republic were at his

disposal; but the new general had not provided any magazines, and the

treasury was exhausted. Philip now affected to place great confidence

in Aratus. By the advice of this statesman, he made an attempt on the

island of Cephallenia, an island in the Ionian Sea, near the coast of

Peloponnesus, and the great resort of the Ætolian pirates. His attempt,

after it had been carried on almost to success, was baffled by the

treachery of his ministers.

He now, following the advice of Aratus, invaded and ravaged Ætolia

itself, returned into Peloponnesus, laid waste Laconia, and, flushed

with success, meditated the subjection of all Greece, and a junction

with Hannibal against the Romans. Aratus in vain attempted to dissuade

him from this project. He sent ambassadors to the Carthaginian general,

but they were intercepted, soon after their landing in Italy: as they

gave out, however, that they were going to Rome, they, in a little time,

obtained their release, and made their way to Hannibal, with whom they

concluded a treaty. On their return they were again intercepted, and sent

with all their papers to Rome. But Philip despatched other ambassadors,

and a ratification of the treaty was obtained. It was stipulated that

Philip should furnish a fleet of two hundred ships, to be employed in

harassing the Italian coasts; and that he should also assist Hannibal

with a considerable body of land-forces. In return for this assistance,

when Rome and Italy should be finally reduced, which were to remain in

the possession of the Carthaginians, Hannibal was to pass into Epirus at

the head of a Carthaginian army, to be employed as Philip should desire;

and, having made a conquest of the whole country, to give up to him such

parts of it as lay convenient for Macedon.

In consequence of this agreement, the Macedonian king entered the Ionian

Gulf, with a large fleet, fell down to the coast of Epirus, took Oricum,

on the coast of Epirus, a defenceless seaport, but from which there was

a short passage to Italy, and laid siege to Apollonia; but surprised and

defeated by the Romans, secretly retreated homeward across the mountains.

ALLIANCE WITH ROME

The Romans, humbled by the victorious arms of Hannibal, were not in

a condition in which they might prosecute a war with Macedon; they

therefore determined, if possible, to raise up enemies against Philip

in Greece, that he might be employed at home in the defence of his own

dominions. They accordingly made overtures for this purpose to the

Ætolians, who, confiding in the flattering declarations of the Roman

ambassador, hastened to conclude a treaty, of which the following were

the principal conditions: That the Ætolians should immediately commence

hostilities against Philip by land, which the Romans were to support by

a fleet of twenty galleys; that whatever conquests might be made, from

the confines of Ætolia to Corcyra, the cities, buildings, and territory,

should belong to the Ætolians, but every other kind of plunder to the

Romans. The Spartans and Eleans, with other states, were included in

this alliance; and the war commenced with the reduction of the island of

Zacynthus, which, as an earnest of Roman generosity and good faith, was

immediately annexed to the dominions of Ætolia. These transactions were

dated about 208 B.C.

[Sidenote: [208-205 B.C.]]

It has already been observed, that Philip aimed at the subjection of

all Greece. Aratus, who would have opposed him in this design, he took

off by poison.[51] His interest in Greece was now strengthened by the

introduction of the Romans: he was regarded by the Greeks as the champion

of freedom, and as their defence against the Romans, whom they still

considered and denominated barbarians. Not only the Greeks northward

of the Corinthian isthmus, but even the Achæan League, prepared to

take up arms in his support. Encouraged by these allies, he acted with

uncommon vigour: he carried the war into Illyricum with success; marched

to the relief of the Acarnanians, who were threatened by the Ætolians,

and fortified himself in Thessaly. The Ætolians, notwithstanding these

advantages gained over them by Philip, and that they were afterwards

defeated by him in two hot engagements, remained undaunted, and

prosecuted the war with an amazing obstinacy. The neighbouring states,

now jealous of the successes of Philip, endeavoured to mediate a peace;

nor did the Macedonian show himself unwilling to treat for that purpose.

A peace was ready to be concluded, when the Romans, deeply interested in

the prolongation of war, sent their fleet to support the Ætolians; who,

encouraged also by the prospect of acquiring another ally, Attalus, king

of Pergamus, boldly set Philip at defiance, and talked of terms to which

they knew he would not submit. The moderation of Philip strengthened

the indignation of his Greek confederates against the Ætolians; a

disposition which he soon found an opportunity of calling forth into

action. Intelligence being brought to him, whilst he was assisting at

the Nemean games, that the Romans had landed, and were laying waste

the country from Corinth to Sicyon, he instantly set out, attacked and

repulsed the enemy, and, before the conclusion of the games, returned

again to Argos; an achievement which greatly distinguished him in the

eyes of all Greece, assembled at that solemnity. After other vigorous,

though unsuccessful, exertions against the Romans, he was called back, by

domestic insurrections, to Macedon.

The Achæan states, though deprived of the powerful aid of the Macedonian

king, still carried on their military operations under the conduct of

Philopœmen of Megalopolis, in Arcadia, an enthusiast in the cause of

liberty from his earliest years, and one who had been active in bringing

over several of the Arcadians to join the Achæan League. Soon after

the death of Aratus, to whom he was as much superior in military, as

he was inferior in political abilities, he attained the chief sway in

the Achæan councils. He saw with concern the humiliating condition to

which a foreign yoke had reduced his countrymen, and conceived the

noble resolution of relieving them from it. In the character of general

of Achaia, he improved their discipline, inured them to hardship and

toil, and gave them weightier armour, and more powerful weapons. The

effect of this discipline soon appeared: the armies of Ætolia and

Elis, which attacked them in Philip’s absence, were totally defeated.

In the meantime, the Romans, supported by Attalus, attacked Eubœa,

of all the provinces of Greece, though an island, one of the most

considerable for fertility of soil, extent of territory, and advantage

of situation. Philip, on his part, kept a watchful eye on his enemies:

his military preparations were vigorous, and not without success. The

war was prolonged, with various success, for six years, when the Romans

and Attalus retired from Greece. A peace was now concluded between the

Ætolians and Romans, on the one part, and Philip on the other, whose

successful ambition led him, by a natural progress, to attack the

dominions of the king of Egypt.

[Sidenote: [205-199 B.C.]]

The Romans, whose policy it was never to have more enemies on their hands

than one at a time, had consented to a peace with Macedon, because they

were involved in a war with Carthage; but that war being now at an end,

they eagerly embraced the first pretexts they could find for a rupture

with the prince, whose successes had excited a jealousy of his growing

power. Complaints being brought before that political and powerful people

from Attalus, from the Rhodians, from the Athenians, and from Egypt, they

readily determined to improve so favourable a juncture. And first, they

declared themselves the guardians of the young king of Egypt. Marcus

Æmilius was despatched from Rome, to announce to Philip the intentions

of the Roman senate. The ambassador found the king before Abydos, at the

head of an army flushed with victory. Philip was not insensible of the

advantage of his situation; yet the Roman, undaunted by the deportment

of the monarch, charged him with dignity and firmness, not to attack

the possessions of the crown of Egypt; to abstain from war with any

of the Grecian states; and to submit the matters in dispute between

him, Attalus, and the Rhodians, to fair arbitration. “The boastful

inexperience of youth,” said the king, “thy gracefulness of person, and,

still more, the name of Roman, inspire thee with this haughtiness. It

is my wish, that Rome may observe the faith of treaties; but should she

be inclined again to hazard an appeal to arms, I trust that, with the

protection of the gods, I shall render the Macedonian name as formidable

as that of the Roman.” These things, with the cruel destruction of the

city and inhabitants of Abydos, happened about 199 B.C.

Philip, like other ambitious princes, was now on terms of hostility

with most of the neighbouring nations. Rome, on the contrary, was in a

situation the most favourable that could be imagined to her ambition:

Carthage was subdued; in Italy, all remains of insurrection had subsided;

Sicily, in fertility and opulence, at that time the pride of the western

world, with most of the adjacent islands, was annexed to her dominions;

and even those nations which had not yet felt the force of her arms,

heard, with terror, the fame of a people not to be subdued even by a

Hannibal. About three years, therefore, after peace had been made with

Philip, the Romans despatched a fleet, under the conduct of the consul

Sulpicius, for the relief of Athens, then besieged by the Macedonians.

Philip was moved with resentment, and attempted to wreak his vengeance

on Athens. Disappointed in his hope of surprising that city, he laid

waste the country around it, destroying even the temples, which he had

hitherto affected to venerate, and mangling and defacing every work of

art in such a manner, that there scarcely remained, according to the

Roman historian Livy, a vestige of symmetry or beauty. Here we have an

opportunity of remarking the contrast between the genius of Athens, in

the times of Philip, the father of Alexander, and that Philip who now

filled the throne of Macedon. The Athenians harassed by the arms of this

last mentioned prince, had recourse to the only weapons with which they

were now acquainted--the invectives of their orators, and the acrimony of

their popular decrees. It was resolved, that “Philip should forever be an

object of execration to the Athenian people; that whatever statues had

been raised to him, or to any of the Macedonian princes, should be thrown

down; that whatever had been enacted in their favour should be rescinded;

that every place in which any inscription, or memorial, had been set up

in praise of Philip, should be thenceforth held profane and unclean; that

in all their solemn feasts, when their priests implored a blessing on

Athens and her allies, they should pronounce curses on the Macedonian,

his kindred, his arms by sea and land, and the whole Macedonian name

and nation: in a word, that whatever had been decreed in ancient times

against the Pisistratidæ, should operate in full force against Philip;

and that whoever should propose any mitigation of the resolutions now

formed, should be adjudged a traitor to his country, and be punished

with death.” The flatteries of the Athenians to their allies were in

proportion to their impotent execrations of the Macedonian monarch. Such

is the connection between meanness of spirit and the loss of freedom!

GREEK FREEDOM PROCLAIMED

[Sidenote: [200-193 B.C.]]

A languid and indecisive war had been carried on for the space of two

years between the Macedonians and Romans, during the consulship of

Sulpicius and that of his successor Villius, not much to the honour of

these commanders, when the command of the Roman army devolved to the

new consul, Titus Quintius Flaminius, not indeed unacquainted, being a

Roman, with the science of war, but more remarkable for his skill and

address in negotiation than for military genius. The Roman consul, by the

vigour of his arms, but still more by the dexterity with which he carried

into execution the profound policy of his nation, brought Greece to the

lowest state of humiliation. By detaching the most considerable of the

Grecian states, particularly the Ætolians and the Achæans, from their

connection with Macedon; by ingratiating himself with the Grecian states,

whom he managed, after they had become his confederates, with infinite

artifice; by making a pompous but insidious proclamation of their freedom

at the Isthmian and Nemean games, he reduced the Macedonian king to the

necessity of first seeking a truce, and afterwards of accepting peace on

these mortifying conditions, which were entirely approved by the Roman

senate:

“That all the Greek cities, both in Asia and in Europe, should be free,

and restored to the enjoyment of their own laws.

“That Philip, before the next Isthmian games, should deliver up to the

Romans all the Greeks he had in any part of his dominions, and evacuate

all the places he possessed either in Greece or in Asia.

“That he should give up all the prisoners and deserters.

“That he should surrender all his decked ships of every kind; five small

vessels, and his galley of sixteen banks of oars, excepted.

“That he should pay the Romans a thousand talents [£200,000 or

$1,000,000], one half down, the rest in ten equal annual payments.

“And that, as a security for the performance of these regulations, he

should give hostages, his son Demetrius being one.” The date of this

peace was 198 B.C.

Flaminius having made various decrees in favour of the several Grecian

communities in confederacy with the Romans; having expelled Nabis, the

tyrant of Sparta, from Argos; and having obtained the freedom of the

Roman slaves in Greece, returned to Rome, to the great satisfaction of

all Greece; and withdrew, as he had promised, all the Roman garrisons.

THE ÆTOLIANS CRUSHED

[Sidenote: [193-187 B.C.]]

Antiochus, king of Syria, was renowned for the magnificence of his

court, great treasures, numerous armies, military talents, and political

wisdom. He had visited the coasts of the Hellespont, formerly subject to

the kings of Syria; he had even passed over into Thrace, where he had

likewise claims; and he was preparing to rebuild Lysimachia, in order to

make it again the seat of government in the countries anciently possessed

by Lysimachus. The pretensions of so powerful and politic a prince to

countries which the Romans had already marked as their own, excited the

jealousy of that ambitious people. They gave him repeated notification,

that, “by the treaty with Macedon, the Grecian cities in Asia, as well

as Europe, had been declared free; that Rome expected he would conform

to that declaration”; and further, “that henceforth Asia was to be the

boundary of his dominions; and that any attempt to make a settlement in

Europe, would be considered by Rome as an act of hostility.” Antiochus,

at first, manifested a disposition to peace, and, in order to obtain

it, would have made large concessions, could anything less than the

humiliation of the crown of Syria have satisfied Roman ambition.

But Hannibal, the sworn enemy of Rome, no sooner heard of his meditating

a war against the Romans, than he made his escape from Carthage to the

Syrian court, and urged him to arms. The Ætolians, too, solicited him

to vindicate the cause of Greece, notwithstanding the delusive show of

liberty granted by Rome, more enthralled in reality than at any former

period. Hannibal recommended an invasion of Italy, where alone, in his

judgment, Rome was vulnerable. With only eleven thousand land-forces, and

a suitable naval armament, he offered to carry the war into the heart of

that country; provided Antiochus would, at the same time, appear at the

head of an army on the western coast of Greece, that, by making a show of

an intended invasion from that quarter, he might divert the attention and

divide the strength of the Romans. The Ætolians, on the other hand, told

him, that if Greece were made the seat of war, there would be, throughout

all that country, a general insurrection against the power of the Romans.

Antiochus, having adopted the plan of the Ætolians in preference to that

of Hannibal, entered Greece with a small force, and being disappointed in

his expectations of succour from the Grecian states, was defeated at the

straits of Thermopylæ by Manlius Acilius Glabrio, the Roman consul. He

escaped with only five hundred men to Chalcis, from whence he retreated

with precipitation to his Asiatic dominions, 187 years before the

Christian era.

The Ætolians having rejected the terms of peace offered to them by the

Romans, the consul pressed forward the siege of Heraclea, which soon

surrendered at discretion. He was preparing to besiege Naupactas, a

seaport on the Corinthian Gulf, of the greatest importance to the Ætolian

nation, who now decided to submit themselves to the faith of the Roman

people, and sent deputies to intimate this determination to the Roman

consul. Acilius, catching the words of the deputies, said, “Is it then

true, that the Ætolians submit themselves to the faith of Rome?” Phæneas,

who was at the head of the Ætolian deputation, replied, that they did.

“Then,” continued the consul, “let no Ætolian, from henceforth, on any

account, public or private, presume to pass over into Asia; and let

Dicæarchus, with all who have had any share in his revolt, be delivered

into my hands.”

“The Ætolians,” interrupted Phæneas, “in submitting to the faith of

the Romans, meant to rely upon their generosity, but not to yield

themselves up to servitude: neither the honour of Ætolia, nor the customs

and laws of Greece, will allow us to comply with your requisition.”

“It is insolent prevarication,” answered the consul, “to mention the

honour of Ætolia and the customs and laws of Greece; you ought even

to be put in chains.” The Ætolians, exasperated even to madness at

this imperious treatment of their deputies and nation, were encouraged

in their disposition to vindicate their liberties by arms, by the

expectation of succours from Asia and from Macedon; but this expectation

was disappointed, and they were reduced to the necessity of sending

ambassadors to Rome, to implore the clemency of the Roman senate. The

only conditions they could obtain were, either to pay a thousand talents

[£200,000 or $1,000,000], a sum which, they declared, far exceeded their

abilities, and to have neither friend nor foe, but with the approbation

of Rome, or to submit to the pleasure of the senate. The Ætolians desired

to know, what they were to understand by “submitting to the pleasure of

the senate”: an explanation being refused, they were obliged to return

uncertain of their fate. The war with Rome was renewed; but the Roman

vigour and policy prevailed in the unequal contest, and the Ætolians were

again obliged to apply to the consul, in the most submissive manner, for

mercy. The conditions granted to them were extremely hard: they were

heavily fined, obliged to give up several of their cities and territories

to the Romans, and to deliver to the consul forty hostages, to be chosen

by him, none under twelve, or above forty years of age. But one express

condition comprehended everything that imperious power might think fit to

impose: the Ætolians were to “pay observance to the empire and majesty of

the Roman people.”

The predominant power of the Achæans in the Peloponnesus, now became the

object of Roman jealousy and ambition. Though confederated with Achaia,

the Peloponnesian cities retained each of them peculiar privileges, and

a species of independent sovereignty. No sooner was peace concluded

with Ætolia, than Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, to whom the conduct of the

Ætolian War had been committed on the expiration of the consulship of

Acilius, took up his residence in the island of Cephallenia, that he

might be ready, upon the first appearance of any dispute in Achaia,

to pass over into Peloponnesus, and improve every dissension, for the

aggrandisement of the Roman Republic. Such an opportunity soon presented

itself: the congress of the Achæan states had always been held at Ægium:

but Philopœmen, now the Achæan general, having determined to divide among

all the cities of the League the advantages of a general convention, had

named Argos for the next diet. This innovation the inhabitants of Ægium

opposed, and appealed to the Roman consul for his decision. Another

pretext for passing over into Greece was also soon offered to Fulvius.

The Lacedæmonian exiles, who had been banished in the days of the

tyrants, and never restored, resided in towns along the coast of Laconia,

protected by Achæan garrisons, cut off the inhabitants of Lacedæmon

from all intercourse with the seacoast. One of those maritime towns was

attacked by the Spartans in the night-time, but defended by the exiles,

with the assistance of the Achæan soldiery. Philopœmen represented

this attempt of the Spartans as an insult on the whole Achæan body. He

obtained a decree in favour of the exiles, commanding the Lacedæmonians,

on pain of being treated as enemies, to deliver up the authors of that

outrage. This decree the Lacedæmonians refused to obey. They dissolved

their alliance with Achaia, and offered their city to the Romans. In

revenge of this, Philopœmen, notwithstanding the advanced season, laid

waste the territories of Lacedæmon.[f]

GREECE AT THE MERCY OF “FRIENDLY” ROME

[Sidenote: [189-183 B.C.]]

The bond which had formerly existed between Macedonia and Greece, giving

the history of both, after the time of Philip and the Great Alexander,

a common road to travel, had in the course of time disappeared. The

Greeks had not desired this bond with Macedonia, though nothing else

could possibly have won the townships their independence. For, while the

kings of Macedonia proceeded rigorously in carrying out their desire

of building for themselves a suzerainty in Greece, yet for all that

the ultimate end of pursuit was not the enslaving of Greece, but her

amalgamation with Macedonia. The Greeks would have been as free as the

Macedonians were under the monarchy, and it was no mean degree of freedom

they enjoyed.

An Asiatic despotism could take no root on this soil, it could not spring

up spontaneously. Rome certainly was capable of exercising such power,

since she commanded forces such as would not have been at the disposal

of a king of Macedonia and Greece. But the Greeks had worked against

the amalgamation with Macedonia as though it had been the worst of all

fates. Now, as a reward, they accepted the rule of the cruel Romans,

who revealed their character even more and more clearly through the

veiling cloud of their friendship, their alliance, and their altruistic

enthusiasm for freedom.

There is a silence come over the land of Greece, since the result of the

Roman war against Syria, the silence of bondage. Zacynthus, Apollonia,

Epidamnus, and certain other points in the Greek world, might thereafter

at once be considered and treated as subject lands. Altogether the Romans

during this time moved nearer. Istria was conquered and made a province.

Even Ætolia was not talked of in Philip’s last years; here too, stillness

had come. Not one of the many little leagues, which now divided Greece

dared or could dare to refuse anything the Romans demanded--if, that is

to say, the Romans attached any importance to it. And of what kind these

commands were one may still judge from isolated facts appearing in the

detached fragments from which we have to construct the history of Greece

during this period. Thebes had to receive again within her walls the

murderer of the Bœotarch, Brachyllas, because he murdered for Rome’s sake

and was a friend of Rome.

[Illustration: BACCHUS

(After Hope)]

From only one quarter of Greece did there sound any note of life and

activity--from Achaia; and the Romans did, for an exception, think it

worth while to concern themselves about Achaia somewhat, and to take

action, when occasion offered, that her dissolution might be hastened.

But such life or activity as may still stir in the Achæan League is no

longer a cheering spectacle in any way. Those of its men who are best

calculated to win respect, because they are not in the pay of the Romans,

and still cherish thoughts of independence, prove themselves to be,

if not without real worth, yet certainly without caution or insight.

Philopœmen and Lycortas stand highest among them. Philopœmen himself

is said to have perceived that extinction under the Roman rule was

become altogether inevitable, and that the only thing left to do was to

endeavour to put it off as long as possible. That was the right view for

a man to take, unless he had determined to evade bondage by a voluntary

death. But Philopœmen, it would appear, did not hold the view attributed

to him. He thought the bond might grow stronger again some day, and, if

it were necessary, assert itself in arms against the Romans. For why

else, if this were not his idea, should there have been that madness and

murder in Sparta? The old Spartan life had to be stamped out, the new

citizens must be strangled, because the old Sparta and the strong Sparta

would not join the Achæans and so the Peloponnese remained divided. With

the idea that the unity of the Peloponnese was gained at last, and that

the bond was solid and complete, Philopœmen and his friends may have

rested from the festival of murder in Sparta, which now found herself

once more forced into the Achæan League.

Obviously the heads of the League thought they might move more freely.

They ventured to mention the League’s independence, they continued to

disobey Roman commands. In this they made one of two mistakes. Either

they thought the senate really desired their independence, or else they

imagined that they also were still something considerable and were

capable, if necessary, of defending themselves in arms. It would not have

suited the Romans just then to appear again in Greece with an army, and

so, for a time, though only a very short time, they permitted the high

and empty words of the Achæans. And in the end the sword was not in the

least required to bring them back to heel, only a stern command from the

senate, and at once the liberty craze of the Achæans tumbled pitifully

into nothing.

The trifling differences which sprang from the endeavours of the Achæans

and the counter endeavours of the Spartans, would be insignificant did

they not conduce to our knowledge of the Roman method. The arts which

were employed against Macedonia were also employed against the Achæans.

The small should be stricken like the great, so that in the end both

might be completely and easily taken. The Romans must have seen with

pleasure the perverse measures to which Philopœmen and the Achæans

resorted in order to force the Peloponnesus to the unity of the League.[g]

The Romans, thus invited to act as umpires in Greece, found means to

break the strength of the commonwealth of Achaia, by seducing its

confederate states--a conduct which, in the eyes of pure morality, must

appear enormously treacherous; but which if, in the ambitious designs of

states and princes, the certain attainment of the end be considered as

a sufficient justification of the means, must be deemed refined policy.

By the intrigues of Roman emissaries, too, a party of Messenians took

up arms against the Achæans; and Philopœmen, hastening to suppress the

insurgents, fell into their hands, and was put to death.

ROME AGAINST PHILIP

[Sidenote: [185-179 B.C.]]

During these transactions in Greece, the Romans, jealous of the

increasing power of their ally, Philip of Macedon, sought an occasion of

quarrelling with him, and, agreeably to their usual policy, encouraged

every complaint, and supported the pretensions of his enemies; prepared

to plunder them, too, in their turns, when the Macedonian power should no

longer be formidable. The small cantons or communities of Thessaly, in

which he had re-established his authority, were now encouraged to assert

their independence; and the Macedonian king was called to account for

those very outrages which he had committed on the side of the Romans.

Commissioners were appointed for the settlement of differences. Philip

was required by them to evacuate Ænus and Maronea, which were claimed

by Eumenes. These were cities on the Hellespont, which, from their

maritime situation, afforded many advantages. The complexion and designs

of the Roman commissioners were obvious; and Philip, judging it vain

to keep measures with men determined at any rate to take part with his

adversaries, expostulated with them with great boldness on the injustice,

treachery, and ingratitude of their nation.

In this temper of mind he wreaked his revenge on the Maroneans, whose

solicitations, he supposed, had been employed against him. A body of his

fiercest Thracian mercenaries being introduced into Maronea, on the night

before the Macedonian garrison was to march out, on pretence of a sudden

tumult, put to the sword all the inhabitants suspected of favouring the

Roman interest, without distinction of condition, age, or sex, and left

the place drenched in the blood of its citizens. The Romans threatened

to revenge this massacre, and Philip was obliged to send his second son,

Demetrius, to Rome, to make an apology. The Roman senate, with a view

to debauch the filial affection of Demetrius and to draw him over to

the interests of Rome, told him that, on his account, whatever had been

improper in his father’s conduct should be passed over; and that, from

the confidence they had in him, they were well assured Philip would, for

the future, perform everything that justice required: that ambassadors

should be sent to see all matters properly settled: and that, from the

regard they bore to the son, they were willing to excuse the father. This

message excited in the breast of Philip a suspicion of the connection

formed between Rome and Demetrius; which suspicion was inflamed by

the insinuations and dark artifices of his eldest son Perseus, a

prince, according to the Roman writers, of an intriguing and turbulent

disposition, sordid, ungenerous, and subtle.

Perseus and Demetrius were both in the bloom of life; the former aged

about thirty years when Demetrius returned from Rome, but born of a

mother of mean descent, a seamstress of Argos, and of so questionable a

character, as to make it doubtful whether he was really Philip’s son.

Demetrius was five years younger, born of his queen, a lady of royal

extraction. Hence Perseus had conceived a jealousy of his brother,

and was insidiously active to undermine him in the royal favour. He

accused Demetrius to the king of a design to assassinate him. Philip,

familiarised as he was to acts of blood, was struck with horror at the

story of Perseus. Retiring into the inner apartment of his palace, with

two of his nobles, he sat in solemn judgment on his two sons, being under

the agonising necessity, whether the charge could be proved or disproved,

of finding one of them guilty. Distracted by his doubts, Philip sent

Philocles and Apelles, two noblemen, to proceed as his ambassadors to

Rome, with instructions to find out, if possible, with what persons

Demetrius corresponded, and what were the ends he had in view.

Perseus, profoundly artful, and having the advantage of being the heir

apparent to the Macedonian crown, secretly gained over to his interest

his father’s ambassadors, who returned to the king with an account

that Demetrius was held in the highest estimation at Rome, and that

his views appeared to have been of an unjustifiable kind; delivering,

at the same time, a letter, which they pretended to have received from

Quintus Flaminius. The handwriting of the Roman, and the impression

of his signet, the king was well acquainted with; and the exactness

of the imitation induced him to give entire credit to the contents,

more especially as Flaminius had formerly written in commendation

of Demetrius. The present letter was written in a different strain.

The author acknowledged the criminality of Demetrius, who indeed, he

confessed, aimed at the throne; but for whom, as he had not meditated the

death of any of his own blood, he interceded with the monarch. The issue

of this atrocious intrigue was truly tragical: Demetrius, found guilty of

designs against the crown and the life of his father, was put to death.

Philip, when too late, discovered that he had been imposed upon by a

forgery, and died of a broken heart.

PERSEUS, KING OF MACEDONIA

[Sidenote: [179-168 B.C.]]

Perseus succeeded his father on the throne of Macedon, a hundred and

seventy-nine years before the birth of Christ. The first measures of his

government appeared equally gracious and political. He assumed an air

of benignity and gentleness. He not only recalled all those whom fear

or judicial condemnation had, in the course of the late reign, driven

from their country; but he even ordered the income of their estates,

during their exile, to be reimbursed. His deportment to all his subjects

was happily composed of regal dignity and parental tenderness. The same

temper which regulated his behaviour to his own subjects, he displayed

in his conduct towards foreign states. He courted the affections of the

Grecian states, and despatched ambassadors to request a confirmation of

the treaties subsisting between Rome and Macedon. The senate acknowledged

his title to the throne, and pronounced him the friend and ally of the

Roman people. His insinuations and intrigues with his neighbours were

the more effectual, that most of them began to presage what they had to

expect, should the dominion of Rome be extended over all Greece; and

looked upon Macedon as the bulwark of their freedom from the Roman yoke.

The only states that stood firm to the Roman cause, were Athens and

Achaia. But in this all of them now agreed, that foreign aid was on all

occasions necessary to prop the tottering remains of fallen liberty,

which, by this time, was little else than a choice of masters. Besides

all those advantages which Perseus might derive from the well-grounded

jealousy of Roman ambition, he succeeded to all those mighty preparations

which were made by his father. But all this strength came to nothing: it

terminated in discomfiture, and the utter extinction of the royal family

of Macedon. He lost all the advantages he enjoyed, through avarice,

meanness of spirit, and want of real courage. The Romans, discovering

or suspecting his ambitious designs, sought and found occasion of

quarrelling with him. A Roman army passed into Greece. This army, for the

space of three years, did nothing worthy of the Roman name; but Perseus,

infatuated, or struck with a panic, neglected to improve the repeated

opportunities which the incapacity or the corruption of the Roman

commanders presented to him. Lucius Æmilius Paullus, elected consul,

restored and improved the discipline of the Roman army, which, under

the preceding commanders, had been greatly relaxed. He advanced against

Perseus, drove him from his entrenchments on the banks of the river

Enipeus, and engaged and defeated him under the walls of Pydna.

On the ruin of his army, Perseus fled to Pella. He gave vent to the

distraction and ferocity of his mind, by murdering with his own hand two

of his principal officers, who had ventured to blame some parts of his

conduct. Alarmed at this act of barbarity, his other attendants refused

to approach him; so that, being at a loss where to hide himself, or

whom to trust, he returned from Pella, which he had reached only about

midnight, before break of day. On the third day after the battle he fled

to Amphipolis. Being driven by the inhabitants from thence, he hastened

to the seaside, in order to pass over into Samothrace, hoping to find

a secure asylum in the reputed holiness of that place. Having arrived

thither, he took shelter in the temple of Castor and Pollux. Abandoned by

all the world, his eldest son Philip only excepted, without a probability

of escape, and even destitute of the means of subsistence, he surrendered

to Octavius, the Roman prætor, who transported him to the Roman camp.

Perseus approached the consul with the most abject servility, bowing his

face to the earth, and endeavouring with his suppliant arms to grasp

his knees. “Why, wretched man,” said the Roman, “why dost thou acquit

Fortune of what might seem her crime, by a behaviour which evinces that

thou deservest not her indignation? Why dost thou disgrace my laurels,

by showing thyself an abject adversary, and unworthy of having a Roman

to contend with?” He tempered, however, this humiliating address, by

raising him from the ground, and encouraging him to hope for everything

from the clemency of the Roman people. After being led in triumph through

the streets of Rome, he was thrown into a dungeon, where he starved

himself to death. His eldest son, Philip, and one of his younger sons,

are supposed to have died before him. Another of his sons, Alexander, was

employed by the chief magistrates of Rome in the office of a clerk.

THE HUMILIATION OF GREECE

[Sidenote: [168-167 B.C.]]

Within the space of fifteen days after Æmilius had begun to put his

army in motion, all the armament was broken and dispersed; and, within

two days after the defeat at Pydna, the whole country had submitted to

the consul. Ten commissioners were appointed to assist that magistrate

in the arrangement of Macedonian affairs. A new form of government was

established in Macedon, of which the outlines had been drawn at Rome. On

this occasion the Romans exhibited a striking instance of their policy

in governing by the principle of division. The whole kingdom of Macedon

was divided into four districts; the inhabitants of each were to have no

connection, intermarriages, or exchange of possessions, with those of the

other districts, but every part to remain wholly distinct from the rest.

And among other regulations tending to reduce them to a state of the most

abject slavery, they were inhibited from the use of arms, unless in such

places as were exposed to the incursions of the barbarians. Triumphal

games at Amphipolis, exceeding in magnificence all that this part of the

world had ever seen, and to which all the neighbouring nations, both

European and Asiatic, were invited, announced the extended dominion of

Rome, and the humiliation not only of Macedon, but of Greece; for now the

sovereignty of Rome found nothing in that part of the world that was able

to oppose it.

The Grecian states submitted to various and multiplied acts of

oppression, without a struggle. The government which retained the

longest a portion of the spirit of ancient times, was the Achæan. In

their treatment of Achaia, the Romans, although they had gained over to

their interests several of the Achæan chiefs, were obliged to proceed

with great circumspection, lest the destruction of their own creatures

should defeat their designs. They endeavoured to trace some vestiges of

a correspondence between the Achæan body and the late king of Macedon;

and when no such vestiges could be found, they determined that fiction

should supply the place of evidence. Caius Claudius, and Cneius Domitius

Ahenobarbus, were sent as commissioners from Rome, to complain that some

of the first men of Achaia had acted in concert with Macedon. At the

same time they required, that all who were in such a predicament should

be sentenced to death: promising that, after a decree for that purpose

should be enacted, they would produce the names of the guilty. “Where,”

exclaimed the assembly, “would be the justice of such a proceeding?

First name the persons you accuse, and make good your charge.” “I name,

then,” said the commissioner, “all those who have borne the office of

chief magistrate of Achaia, or been the leaders of your armies.” “In that

case,” answered Xenon, an Achæan nobleman, “I too shall be accounted

guilty, for I have commanded the armies of Achaia; and yet I am ready to

prove my innocence, either here, or before the senate of Rome.” “You say

well,” replied one of the Roman commissioners, laying hold on his last

words, “let the senate of Rome then be the tribunal before which you

shall answer.”

A decree was framed for this end, and above a thousand Achæan chiefs

were transported into Italy, a hundred and sixty-seven years before

Christ.[f] Among these was Polybius,[b] who afterwards became famous as

the historian of the Roman Conquest, and whose work, though preserved

only in fragments beyond the fifth book of the original forty, is the

chief reliable source of information regarding some of the events of the

period we have just considered. Had fortune spared us the later books of

Polybius, our knowledge of the history of the Leagues would have been far

different from what it is; for this Greek of the “degenerate” Hellenistic

age is universally admitted to be the most philosophical and reliable of

all historical writers among his countrymen of any age, Thucydides alone

excepted. We shall see more of his work when we come to the history of

the Punic wars, where he is again the chief authority.[a]

FOOTNOTES

[48] [Freeman[i] comparing the two great Leagues says: “The political

conduct of the Achæan League with some mistakes and some faults, is, on

the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct of the Ætolian League

is, throughout the century in which we know it best, simply infamous.”]

[49] [Freeman[i] praises Marcus of Cerynea, as the probable founder or

“Washington of the original League,” though obscured later by Aratus.]

[50] [Freeman[i] calls Aratus “the Creator, the Preserver, and the

Destroyer” of the League and bitterly compares his surrender of Corinth

with Cavour’s delivery of Savoy and Nice to Napoleon III.]

[51] [“This infamous action,” says Polybius,[b] “was not for some time

discovered to the world; for the poison was not of that kind which

procures immediate death; but was one of those which weaken the habit

of the body, and destroy life by slow degrees. Aratus himself was very

sensible of the injury that he had received. ‘Such, Cephalo,’ he said to a

favourite servant, ‘is the reward of the friendship which I have had for

Philip.’ So great and excellent a thing is moderation, which disposed the

sufferer, and not the author of the injury, to feel the greatest shame

when he found that all the glorious actions which he had shared with

Philip, in order to promote the service of that prince, had been at last

so basely recompensed.

“Such was the end of this magistrate, who received after his death,

not from his own country alone, but from the whole republic of the

Achæans, all the honours that were due a man who had so often held the

administration of their government, and performed such signal services for

the State. For they decreed sacrifices to him, with the other honours that

belong to heroes, and, in a word, omitting nothing that could serve to

render his name immortal.”]

[Illustration]

[Illustration: THE PLAIN OF ARGOS]