"Proceedings of the Assembly of the State of California of 1851,
on the petition of the citizens of Yuba and Nevada Counties for the
impeachment of Wm. R. Turner, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District
of California." The simple reading of the record recalls vividly to my
mind all of the circumstances of the case and enables me to answer
your inquiry in regard to the indefinite postponement of the motion
to impeach Judge Turner.
A bill introduced by yourself, increasing and changing the numbers of
the judicial districts of the State, had passed the Legislature, and
became a law some weeks before the motion to impeach Judge Turner was
called up. By this law Judge Turner was banished to the Klamath--a
region inhabited almost exclusively by savage red-skins, the elk, and
grizzly bear, and as Turner was supposed by anthropologists to be a
resultant of that mysterious law of generation denominated atavism or
reversionary heredity, and bore the impression, in not only the
bodily form, but the instincts, passions, manners, and habits of the
"cave-dwellers" of the rough-stone age, there appeared to be a fitness
and adaptation in the new locality and its surroundings to the man,
which was at once appreciated and approved by all persons familiar
with him, and his conduct and behavior, both on and off the bench.
Under these circumstances the report obtained general credence, that
you and your constituents were satisfied with the removal of Judge
Turner from the bench of the Eighth Judicial District; and I have no
doubt influenced all or nearly all who voted to indefinitely postpone
his impeachment.
As for myself, having a personal knowledge of the truth of the charges
made against Judge Turner by the citizens of Yuba and Nevada Counties,
I am free to say that no consideration other than that you and your
constituents were satisfied with Judge Turner's removal from the
Eighth Judicial District, could have induced me to cast my vote for
the indefinite postponement of Judge Turner's impeachment.
Do you realize the fact, my dear Judge, that more than a quarter of a
century has elapsed since these events transpired? Though my respect
for you as a man, and my admiration for you as a jurist, have
increased since we were actors in these scenes; yet I am frank enough
to say to you, that if I had to play my part again, with my increased
experience, I would not vote to indefinitely postpone the impeachment
of a judge whom I knew to be guilty of the charges made against Judge
Turner by yourself and others, _even though the report were true_
that you and your constituents were satisfied with his simple removal
from your judicial district.
Respectfully and truly yours, &c.,
JOS. W. MCCORKLE.
* * * * *
_Letter of Mr. Bradford._
SPRINGFIELD, ILL, _May 8th, 1879_.
JUDGE FIELD.
MY DEAR FRIEND: Yours of the 27th April should have been answered ere
this, but before doing so I desired to get all the reminders that I
could. I looked carefully over the journal. All that I had
recollected in the whole matter was that I had an intense feeling in
favor of sustaining your position, and when you informed me that I
had voted to dismiss the proceedings I was profoundly astonished.
I thought you must be mistaken until I saw the journal....
Some very satisfactory assurance must have been given me that such
vote would be satisfactory to you, and I only wonder that I did not
have the assurance verified.... I assume that the Editor is correct in
the explanation as given.
Very truly, J.S. BRAFORD.
* * * * *
_Letter of Mr. Carr._
SAN FRANCISCO, _May 15th, 1879_.
MY DEAR JUDGE: I have received your letter and a printed copy of the
record of the proceedings of the Assembly of California of 1851, in
the matter of the impeachment of William R. Turner, Judge of the then
Eighth Judicial District of the State. In reply, I have to say,
that the statement of the Editor as to the vote on the motion to
indefinitely postpone the proceedings is correct, so far as I am
concerned.
It was distinctly understood by me, and to my knowledge by other
members of the Assembly, that you had consented to such postponement,
it being explained that the postponement was not to be taken as an
approval of the Judge's conduct. On no other ground could the motion
have been carried. If the vote had been taken on the charges made,
articles of impeachment against the Judge would undoubtedly have been
ordered.
Your consent to the postponement was understood to have been given,
because of the change in the judicial districts by an act introduced
into the Assembly by yourself, under which Judge Turner was sent to
a district in the northern part of the State, where there was at the
time scarcely any legal business, and which was removed to a great
distance from the district in which you resided, and because of the
general desire manifested by others to bring the session of the
Legislature to a speedy close. The impeachment of the Judge would have
necessitated a great prolongation of the session.
No member of the Assembly justified or excused the atrocious and
tyrannical conduct of the Judge towards yourself and others.
I am, very truly, yours,
JESSE D. CARR.
HON. STEPHEN J. FIELD.
[1] By mistake, there are two Exhibits H; they are, therefore,
marked No. I. and No. II.
* * * * *
EXHIBIT H, No. II.
_Letter of Judge Gordon N. Mott giving the particulars of the
difficulty with Judge Barbour._
SAN FRANCISCO, _Apr. 28th, 1876_.
HON. STEPHEN J. FIELD.
DEAR SIR: Your letter of the eleventh instant, in which you requested
me to give you, in writing, an account of the affair between yourself
and Judge W.T. Barbour, at Marysville in 1853, was duly received.
The facts in relation to that unpleasant affair are as fresh in my
memory as if they had happened yesterday; and I give them to you the
more willingly for the reason that you incurred the spite and malice
of Judge Barbour, by acts of personal and professional kindness to me,
which gave him no just or reasonable cause of offence; and though
the following statement of facts will place the character of Judge
Barbour, now deceased, in a very bad and even ludicrous light, the
events in mind are nevertheless a part of the history of our early
days in California, and I see no impropriety in complying with your
request. The facts are as follows: You and I were walking together
along D street in the city of Marysville, when we met Judge Barbour,
who, after using some offensive and insolent remarks, gave you a
verbal challenge to meet him in the way resorted to by gentlemen
for the settlement of their personal difficulties. You accepted the
challenge instantly, and referred him to me, as your friend, who
would act for you in settling the preliminaries of a hostile meeting.
In half an hour I was called upon by Hon. Chas. S. Fairfax as the
friend of Judge Barbour. He said Judge Barbour had told him that Judge
Field had challenged him to mortal combat, and requested him to meet
me for the purpose of arranging the terms of the meeting between them.
I told Mr. Fairfax at once that such was not my understanding of
the matter; that I was present when the challenge was given by Judge
Barbour and accepted by Judge Field. After further consultation with
you we agreed that it was better for you to accept the false position
in which Judge Barbour seemed determined to place you, and "to
fight it out on that line," than longer submit to the insolence and
persecution of a bitter and unscrupulous adversary. Mr. Fairfax
then claimed, in behalf of Judge Barbour, that, as he was the party
challenged, he had the right to the choice of weapons, and the time,
place, and manner of the combat; to which I assented. He then stated
that Judge Barbour proposed that the meeting should take place that
evening in a room twenty feet square; that each party was to be armed
with a Colt's navy revolver and a _Bowie-knife_; that they should be
stationed at opposite sides of the room, and should fire at the word,
and advance at pleasure, and finish the conflict with the knives. I
told Mr. Fairfax that the terms proposed by his principal were unusual
and inconsistent with the "code," and that I could not consent to them
or countenance a conflict so unprecedented and barbarous. Mr. Fairfax
agreed with me that Judge Barbour had no right to insist upon the
terms proposed, and said that he would consult with him and get him
to modify his proposition. Upon doing so he soon returned, and stated
that Judge Barbour insisted upon the terms he had proposed as his
ultimatum, and requested me to go with him and call on Judge Barbour,
which I did. I had now come to the conclusion that Barbour was playing
the role of the bravo and bully, and that he did not intend to fight,
and resolved on the course that I would pursue with him. Mr. Fairfax
and myself then called on Judge Barbour, and I repeated what I
had said to Mr. Fairfax, adding that it would be shameful for two
gentlemen, occupying such positions as they in society, to fall upon
each other with knives like butchers or savages, and requesting him to
dispense with the knives, which he still refused to do. I then looked
him straight in the eye and said, well, sir, if you insist upon those
terms, we shall accept. I saw his countenance change instantly. "His
coward lips did from their color fly;" and he finally stammered
out that he would "waive the knife." Without consulting you, I
had determined that if Barbour still insisted upon a conflict with
Bowie-knives I would take your place, believing that he would not
have any advantage over me in any fight he could make; and knowing,
moreover, that you had involved yourself in the difficulty on
my account, I thought it only just for me to do so. But it was
demonstrated in the sequel that Barbour was playing the game of bluff,
and that he did not intend to fight from the start. It was finally
settled, however, that the combat should take place as first proposed,
except that pistols only were to be used. Mr. Fairfax and myself then
commenced looking about for a room; but in the meantime the affair
had been noised about town and we found it impossible to get one.
Mr. Fairfax then, after consulting Judge Barbour, proposed that the
meeting should take place the next morning in Sutter County; to which
I assented; and all the terms and preliminaries were arranged and
agreed upon. At that time there were two daily lines of stages leaving
Marysville for Sacramento, and you and your friends were to go down
the Sacramento road to a point below Bear River in advance of the
stages, and I was to select a suitable place for the meeting. Judge
Barbour and his friends were to follow us in one of the coaches and I
was to hail the driver as he approached the place of meeting. You
and your adversary were to be stationed one hundred yards apart, each
armed with as many Colt's revolvers as he chose to carry; to fire
upon each other at the word, and to advance at pleasure and finish the
conflict. Our party was promptly on the ground according to agreement;
and when the first coach came in sight I hailed the driver and found
that Judge Barbour and his friends were not aboard, and the coach
passed on a little below us and turned out of the road and stopped.
Soon after the other coach came in sight, and I again hailed the
driver, who stopped the coach, and Judge Barbour instantly jumped out,
and in a very excited manner said that he was going forward to the
other coach, and called on the passengers "to take notice, that if
that d----d rascal" (pointing to you) "attacked him he would kill
him." I stepped in front of Judge Barbour and said: Hold! Judge Field
will not attack you, sir; remarking at the same time to Mr. Fairfax
that this was strange conduct on the part of his friend, and not in
accordance with our understanding and agreement; that each party was
to bear his portion of the responsibility of the meeting which was to
take place between them. Mr. Fairfax appeared both astonished and
mortified at the pusillanimous conduct of his principal, who seemed
determined to rush forward to the other coach; and I requested him to
wait until I could go back and consult you in the matter, for I was
afraid that you might possibly be provoked to make the attack. When
I returned to you and explained what had been said at the coach, you
asked if it would be proper for you to make the attack. I told you
most decidedly not; to let the coward go, and he would never annoy or
trouble you again. Mr. Fairfax, who possessed a nice sense of honor,
and was a gallant and accomplished gentleman, was so disgusted and
mortified at the conduct of his principal that he left him and came
over and joined our party, and after taking breakfast with us at
Nicolaus, returned with us to Marysville, while Judge Barbour went on
his way to Sacramento. Thus, what threatened in its inception to be
a sanguinary tragedy, ended in a ridiculous farce. The determined and
resolute stand which you assumed in this affair with Judge Barbour,
saved you from any farther insolence or persecution from men of his
class.
This letter has been drawn out to a most tedious length, and yet there
are many circumstances connected with our early life and times in
Marysville that I would add but for fear of trying your patience.
Please write to me on receipt of this, and tell me how my memory of
the facts contained in this letter agrees with yours.
Very respectfully and truly your friend,
GORDON N. MOTT.
* * * * *
EXHIBIT I.
_Letter of L. Martin, Esq., the friend of Judge Barbour in his street
attack._
MARYSVILLE, _Tuesday, March 21, '54_.
DEAR JUDGE: I was glad to hear a few days ago from our friend Filkins
that the trouble between you and Judge Barbour had been settled, and
that the hatchet was buried.
I wish now to explain my connection with the assault made upon you
about a year ago by Barbour.[1] You have always appeared to think me
in some way implicated in that affair, because I was seen by you at
that time not far off from him. The facts are these: Judge Barbour
told me the night before that he expected to have a street fight
with you, and wanted me to accompany him. I had heard of his conduct
in the affair of the intended duel in Sutter County, and knew there
was bad blood between you, but I was astonished at his saying there
was going to be a difficulty between you in the street. I consented
to accompany him, but I supposed of course that you had received
notice of his purpose, and that there would be no unfair advantage
taken by him. I was, therefore, surprised when I saw you in front of
your office with your arms partly filled with small pieces of board,
apparently to kindle a fire. Barbour's drawing a pistol upon you
under these circumstances, and calling upon you to draw and defend
yourself, was not what we call at the South very chivalric. It was
not justified by me then, and never has been in any way or manner,
and I told him he had acted badly. I was glad to hear you defy him
as you did, and dare him to shoot. I reckon he is not very proud of
his conduct. I have never approved of his action, and should never
have accompanied him had I believed or suspected he had not given
you notice of his purpose.
With great respect I am very truly yours,
L. MARTIN.
HON. JUDGE FIELD.
[1] It was February 21, 1863.
* * * * *
EXHIBIT J.
_Sections four, five, and seven of the act entitled "An act
to expedite the settlement of titles to lands in the State of
California," approved July 1st, 1864._
SEC. 4. _And be it further enacted_, That whenever the district judge
of any one of the district courts of the United States for California
is interested in any land, the claim to which, under the said act of
March third, eighteen hundred and fifty-one, is pending before him on
appeal from the board of commissioners created by said act, the said
district court shall order the case to be transferred to the Circuit
Court of the United States for California, which court shall thereupon
take jurisdiction and determine the same. The said district courts
may also order a transfer to the said circuit court of any other cases
arising under said act, pending before them, affecting the title to
lands within the corporate limits of any city or town, and in such
cases both the district and circuit judges may sit.
SEC. 5. _And be it further enacted_, That all the right and title of
the United States to the lands within the corporate limits of the
city of San Francisco, as defined in the act incorporating said city,
passed by the Legislature of the State of California, on the fifteenth
of April, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, are hereby
relinquished and granted to the said city and its successors, for the
uses and purposes specified in the ordinance of said city, ratified by
an act of the Legislature of the said State, approved on the
eleventh of March, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, entitled "An
act concerning the city of San Francisco, and to ratify and confirm
certain ordinances of the common council of said city," there being
excepted from this relinquishment and grant all sites or other parcels
of lands which have been, or now are, occupied by the United States
for military, naval, or other public uses, [or such other sites or
parcels as may hereafter be designated by the President of the
United States, within one year after the rendition to the General
Land-Office, by the surveyor-general, of an approved plat of the
exterior limits of San Francisco, as recognized in this section, in
connection with the lines of the public surveys: _And provided_, That
the relinquishment and grant by this act shall in no manner interfere
with or prejudice any bona fide claims of others, whether asserted
adversely under rights derived from Spain, Mexico, or the laws of
the United States, nor preclude a judicial examination and adjustment
thereof.]
SEC. 7. _And be it further enacted_, That it shall be the duty of the
Surveyor-General of California, in making surveys of the private land
claims finally confirmed, to follow the decree of confirmation as
closely as practicable whenever such decree designates the specific
boundaries of the claim. But when such decree designates only the
out-boundaries within which the quantity confirmed is to be taken, the
location of such quantity shall be made, as near as practicable, in
one tract and in a compact form. And if the character of the land, or
intervening grants, be such as to render the location impracticable
in one tract, then each separate location shall be made, as near
as practicable, in a compact form. And it shall be the duty of the
Commissioner of the General Land-Office to require a substantial
compliance with the directions of this section before approving any
survey and plat forwarded to him.--[13 Stats. at Large, pp. 333-4.]
That part of the fifth section, which is included within brackets,
was inserted at the suggestion of the Commissioner of the General
Land-Office.
* * * * *
_The act entitled "An act to quiet the title to certain lands within
the corporate limits of the city of San Francisco," approved March
8th, 1866._
_Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled_, That all the right
and title of the United States to the land situated within the
corporate limits of the city of San Francisco, in the State of
California, confirmed to the city of San Francisco by the decree of
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of
California, entered on the eighteenth day of May, one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-five, be, and the same are hereby, relinquished and
granted to the said city of San Francisco and its successors, and
the claim of the said city to said land is hereby confirmed, subject,
however, to the reservations and exceptions designated in said decree,
and upon the following trusts, namely, that all the said land, not
heretofore granted to said city, shall be disposed of and conveyed by
said city to parties in the bona fide actual possession thereof, by
themselves or tenants, on the passage of this act, in such quantities
and upon such terms and conditions as the legislature of the State
of California may prescribe, except such parcels thereof as may be
reserved and set apart by ordinance of said city for public uses:
_Provided, however_, That the relinquishment and grant by this act
shall not interfere with or prejudice any valid adverse right or
claim, if such exist, to said land or any part thereof, whether
derived from Spain, Mexico, or the United States, or preclude a
judicial examination and adjustment thereof.--[14 Stat. at Large, p.
4.]
* * * * *
EXHIBIT K.
_Letter of Judge Lake giving an account of the torpedo._
SAN FRANCISCO, _April 29, '80_.
Honorable STEPHEN J. FIELD.
MY DEAR SIR: In the winter of 1866 I was in Washington attending the
United States Supreme Court, and was frequently a visitor at your
room.
One morning in January of that year I accompanied you to your room,
expecting to find letters from San Francisco, as I had directed that
my letters should be forwarded to your care. I found your mail lying
on the table. Among other matter addressed to you was a small package,
about four inches square, wrapped in white paper, and bearing the
stamp of the Pioneer Photographic Gallery of San Francisco. Two
printed slips were pasted upon the face of the package and formed
the address: Your name, evidently cut from the title-page of the
"California Law Reports;" and "Washington, D.C.," taken from a
newspaper. You supposed it to be a photograph, and said as much to me,
though from the first you professed surprise at the receipt of it.
You were standing at the window, when you began to open it, and had
some difficulty in making the cover yield. When you had removed the
cover you raised the lid slightly, but in a moment said to me, "What
is this, Lake? It can hardly be a photograph." A sudden suspicion
flashed upon me, and stepping to your side, I exclaimed, "Don't open
it; it means mischief!"
When I had looked at it more nearly, I said, "It's an infernal
machine" or "a torpedo." I carried it over to the Capitol, opposite to
your rooms, where Mr. Broom, one of the clerks of the Supreme Court,
joined me in the examination of your mysterious looking present. It
was put in water, and afterwards we dashed off the lid of the box
by throwing it against the wall in the carriage way under the Senate
steps. About a dozen copper cartridges were disclosed--those used in a
Smith & Wesson pocket pistol, it appeared afterward--six of them lying
on each side of a bunch of friction matches in the centre. The sides
of the cartridges had been filed through, so that the burning of the
matches might explode the cartridges. The whole was kept in place in
a bed of common glue, and a strip of sand-paper lying upon the heads
of the matches was bent into a loop to receive the bit of thread,
whose other end, secured to the clasp of the box, produced that
tension and consequent pressure requisite to ignite the matches upon
the forcible opening of the lid. To make assurance doubly sure, a
paste of fulminating powder and alcohol had been spread around the
matches and cartridges.
There was a newspaper slip also glued to the inside of the lid, with
words as follows: "Monday, Oct. 31, 1864. The City of San Francisco
vs. United States. Judge Field yesterday delivered the following
opinion in the above case. It will be read with great interest by the
people of this city." Then followed several lines of the opinion. Even
that gave no clue to the source of the infernal machine, but from the
fact that it was evidently made by a scientific man, and that from its
size it must have been passed through the window at the post office,
instead of into the letter-box, it was thought [that there was] a
sufficiently conspicuous mode of action to expose the sender of the
torpedo to detection. Whoever it may have been took a late vengeance
for the decision of the Pueblo case--if such was the veritable motive
of the frustrated assassination--as the decision referred to was
rendered in 1864. On that account it was conjectured that the
contriver of the machine might be some guilty person, who had received
sentence from you, and who used the reference to the Pueblo case to
divert suspicion from himself.
So far as I know, all efforts to discover the author of the intended
mischief have been fruitless.
The box with its contents, was sent to the Secretary of War, who
directed an examination by the Ordnance Department. General Dyer, then
Chief of Ordnance, pronounced it a most cleverly combined torpedo,
and exploded one of the cartridges in a closed box, producing a deep
indentation upon its sides.
General Dyer added, among other analytical details, that the ball
weighed 52 grains.
All the circumstances connected with the reception of the infernal
machine were too singular and, at that time, ominous, not to remain
vividly impressed upon my memory.
Very truly, your friend,
DELOS LAKE.
* * * * *
EXHIBIT L.
_The following is an extract from the Report to the Commissioner
of the General Land-Office by the Register and Receiver of the
Land-Office in California, to whom the matter of the contests for
lands on the Soscol Ranch was submitted for investigation, showing the
condition and occupation of the lands previous to the rejection of the
grant by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the character of
the alleged pre-emption settlements which Julian undertook to defend._
A general report of the facts established by said evidence is briefly
as follows:[1] When the United States government took possession of
California, Don Mariana Guadaloupe Vallejo was in the occupancy of the
rancho of Soscol, claiming to own it by virtue of the grant from the
Mexican nation, which has recently (December term, 1861) been declared
invalid by the Supreme Court of the United States. His occupancy was
the usual one of the country and in accordance with the primitive
habits of the people. He possessed the land by herding stock upon it.
General Vallejo, as military commandante of his district, consisting
of all Alta California lying north of the bay of San Francisco, was
necessarily the leading personage of the country. His influence among
the rude inhabitants of the Territory was almost monarchical, and his
establishment was in accordance with his influence. His residence
at Sonoma was the capital of his commandancy, and the people of the
country for hundreds of miles around looked to General Vallejo for
advice and assistance in business and for protection and defence in
time of trouble. These things are part of the history of California.
He had other ranches besides that of Soscol, as that at Sonoma, which
was devoted to agriculture and residences.
The Soscol he especially devoted to the herding and grazing of stock,
for which purpose it was most admirably adapted. Wild oats grew in
great luxuriance all over this tract, from the water's edge to
the tops of the highest hills, and being surrounded on three sides by
the waters of the bays and rivers, required little attention in the
way of herdsmen.
On this rancho General Vallejo kept as many as fifteen thousand head
of horses and horned cattle running at will, attended only by the
necessary vaqueros employed to watch and attend them.
There was no other use to which the land could at that time be
devoted. The want of reliable labor and lack of a market both forbade
agricultural operations beyond personal or family necessities. It was
not practicable then, nor for years after, to put the land to any use
other than stock pasturing.
We have, therefore, to report that the possession that General Vallejo
had of "Soscol" in 1846 was the usual use and possession of the time
and the country, and that it was the best and most perfect use and
occupation of which the land was capable.
The rancho was, therefore, reduced to possession by General Vallejo
before the Americans took possession of the country.
Soon after the American occupation or conquest, General Vallejo began
to sell off portions of the "Soscol," and continued this practice
until about the year 1855, at which time he sold the last of it, and
does not appear to have had or claimed any interest since.
This sale and consequent dividing the land into small parcels produced
its usual effect in the way of improvements.
From 1855 to 1860 the "rancho of Soscol" was almost entirely reduced
to absolute and actual possession and control by his vendees, being by
them fenced up into fields, surrounded by substantial enclosures, and
improved with expensive farm-houses, out-buildings, orchards, and the
like, and was cultivated to grain wherever suitable for that purpose.
It had upon it two cities of considerable importance, viz: Benicia and
Vallejo, each of which had been at one time the capital of the State
of California.
No rural district of California was more highly improved than this,
and but a very small portion equal to it.
The title to "Soscol," before its rejection by the United States
Supreme Court, was considered the very best in all California. All the
really valuable agricultural land in California was held under Mexican
grants, and, as a consequence, all had to pass the ordeal of the Land
Commission.
From 1853 to about 1860 very few had been finally passed upon by
the courts, so that during that time the question for the farmer to
decide was not what title is perfect, but what title is most likely to
prove so by the final judgment of the Supreme Court.
Amongst the very best, in the opinion of the public, stood "Soscol."
One conclusive, unanswerable proof of that fact is this, that there
was not a single settler on the grant at the time it was rejected. Not
one person on it, except in subordination to the Vallejo title. Every
resident on the whole tract held his land by purchase from Vallejo,
or his assigns, and held just precisely the land so purchased, and
not one acre more or less. This fact was not even disputed during the
whole eight months of investigation through which we have just passed.
It is a notorious fact that of the grants in California which have
stood the test of the Supreme Court, very many have been entirely
in the possession of squatters, and all with more or less of such
possessions, and the final patent has alone succeeded in recovering
the long-lost possession to the grantholder. There were no settlers on
the "Soscol." The people had the most perfect confidence in the title.
It had been twice confirmed by tribunals of high authority and great
learning--first by the United States Land Commission, and then by the
District Court of the United States.
It only wanted the final confirmation by the Supreme Court, and none
doubted that it would follow of course. Business could not, and would
not, await the nine years consumed in adjudicating this title. Farmers
were obliged to have lands, and they bought them. Capital must and
would seek investment, and it was lent on mortgage. When all
titles required the same confirmatory decree, the citizen could not
discriminate, but exercised his best judgment.
The sales of lands upon the "Soscol" were made at prices which called
for perfect title; they brought the full improved value of the land.
Money was lent on mortgage in the same way.
The deeds and mortgages, which accompany the respective cases, are
the very best evidence of the opinion the public entertained of the
character of the Soscol grant title. The people were amazed when it
was announced that the Soscol grant had been rejected.
No fact developed by this examination has appeared so surprising
to the mind of the register and receiver as that there were no
pre-emption settlers on the "Soscol." This is so unusual in California
that we expected to find the contrary. There was no possession on the
tract adverse to the grant title.
Thus stood matters until early in the year 1862, when the intelligence
reached California that the grant had been rejected by the Supreme
Court. The struggle soon began. There was at that time employed upon
the United States navy-yard at Mare Island, and also upon the Pacific
Mail Company's works at Benicia, a large number of mechanics and
laborers. There was also in the towns of Benicia and Vallejo a large
floating population. Tempted by the great value of these lands in
their highly improved state, many of these persons squatted upon the
rancho.
The landholders in possession resisted.
The houses of the great majority of the settlers were erected in
the night time, as it was necessary to enter the enclosed fields
by stealth. These houses were built of rough redwood boards set up
edgewise, with shed roof, and without window, fire place, or floor.
They were about eight feet square, sometimes eight by ten feet, and
never over six feet high.
We have no hesitation in saying that they were utterly unfit for the
habitation of human beings, and further that they were never designed
for permanent residences. The mode of erecting these shanties was as
follows: The planks were sawed the right length in the town of Vallejo
or Benicia, in the afternoon of the day, and at nightfall were loaded
upon a cart. About eleven o'clock at night the team would start for
the intended settlement, reaching there about one or two o'clock in
the morning. Between that hour and daylight the house would be erected
and finished. Sometimes the house would be put together with nails,
but when too near the residence of the landholder in possession,
screws would be used to prevent the sound of the hammer attracting
attention. Very few of this class of settlers remained upon their
claims above a few days, but soon returned to their ordinary
occupations in the towns.
Generally after they would leave the landholders would remove the
shanties from the ground. In some cases they would pull them down with
force immediately upon discovering them, and in the presence of the
settlers.
A few of them got settlements near enough to their places of
employment to enable them to work in town, or at the navy-yard, and
to sleep in their shanties; some regularly, others only occasionally.
These generally remained longer than the others, but none of this
class remained up to the time of trial.
None of the settlers, who went on since the grant was rejected,
have attempted regular improvements or cultivation. A few have
harvested the grain planted by the landholders, as it grew on their 1/4
[quarter-section]; they would harvest it, and offer this as evidence
of good faith and cultivation.
We have no hesitation in pronouncing, from the evidence, that these
are not settlers within the spirit of the pre-emption laws, but are
mere speculators, desirous of getting the improvements of another to
sell and to make money.
[1] The evidence taken before those officers.
* * * * *
The preceding Personal Reminiscences of Early Days in California
by Judge Field, with other sketches, were dictated by him to a
stenographer in the summer of 1877, at San Francisco. They were
afterwards printed for a few friends, but not published. The edition
was small and soon exhausted, and each year since the Judge has been
asked for copies. The reprint is therefore made.
The history of the attempt at his assassination by a former associate
on the supreme bench of California is added. It is written by Hon.
George C. Gorham, a warm personal friend of the Judge for many years,
who is thoroughly informed of the events described.
* * * * *
THE STORY OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF JUSTICE FIELD
BY A FORMER ASSOCIATE ON THE SUPREME BENCH OF CALIFORNIA.
BY HON. GEORGE C. GORHAM.
NOTE BY THE PUBLISHERS.
Mr. Gorham is a life-long friend of Justice Field. He was his clerk
when the latter held the Alcalde's Court in Marysville, in 1850; and
was Clerk of the U. . Circuit Court of the District of California when
it was organized, after Judge Field's appointment to the U.S. Supreme
Bench. Subsequently, and for several years, he was Secretary of
the U.S. Senate. Since his retirement from office he has resided in
Washington. For a part of the time he edited a Republican paper in
that city, but of late years he has been chiefly engaged in literary
works, of which the principal one is the life and history of the late
Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton.
* * * * *
INDEX.
ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF JUSTICE FIELD BY A FORMER ASSOCIATE ON
THE STATE SUPREME BENCH
CHAPTER I The Sharon-Hill-Terry Litigation.
CHAPTER II Proceedings in the Superior Court of the State.
CHAPTER III Proceedings in the United States Circuit Court.
[Transriber's note: there is no Chapter IV]
CHAPTER V Decision of the Case in the Federal Court.
CHAPTER VI The Marriage of Terry and Miss Hill.
CHAPTER VII The Bill of Revivor.
CHAPTER VIII The Terrys Imprisoned for Contempt.
CHAPTER IX Terry's Petition to the Circuit Court for a
Release--Its Refusal--He Appeals to the Supreme
Court--Unanimous Decision against Him there.
CHAPTER X President Cleveland refuses to Pardon Terry--False
Statements of Terry Refuted.
CHAPTER XI Terry's continued Threats to Kill Justice Field--Return
of the Latter to California in 1889.
CHAPTER XII Further Proceedings in the State Court.--Judge
Sullivan's Decision Reversed.
CHAPTER XIII Attempted Assassination of Justice Field, Resulting in
Terry's own Death at the Hands of a Deputy United
States Marshal.
CHAPTER XIV Sarah Althea Terry Charges Justice Field and Deputy
Marshal Neagle with Murder.
CHAPTER XV Justice Field's Arrest and Petition for Release on
Habeas Corpus.
CHAPTER XVI Judge Terry's Funeral--Refusal of the Supreme Court
of California to Adjourn on the Occasion.
CHAPTER XVII Habeas Corpus Proceedings in Justice Field's Case.
CHAPTER XVIII Habeas Corpus Proceedings in Neagle's Case.
CHAPTER XIX Expressions of Public Opinion.
CHAPTER XX The Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and the Second Trial of Sarah Althea's Divorce Case.
CHAPTER XXI Concluding Observations.
* * * * *
ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF JUSTICE FIELD BY A FORMER ASSOCIATE ON THE
STATE SUPREME BENCH.
The most thrilling episode in the eventful life of Justice Field was
his attempted assassination at Lathrop, California, on the 14th day
of August, 1889, by David S. Terry, who had been Chief Justice of the
State during a portion of Justice Field's service on that bench.
Terry lost his own life in his desperate attempt, by the alertness and
courage of David S. Neagle, a Deputy United States Marshal, who
had been deputed by his principal, under an order from the
Attorney-General of the United States, to protect Justice Field
from the assassin, who had, for nearly a year, boldly and without
concealment, proclaimed his murderous purpose. The motive of Terry
was not in any manner connected with their association on the State
supreme bench, for there had never been any but pleasant relations
between them.
Terry resigned from the bench in 1859 to challenge Senator Broderick
of California to the duel in which the latter was killed. He entered
the Confederate service during the war, and some time after its close
he returned to California, and entered upon the practice of the law.
In 1880 he was a candidate for Presidential elector on the Democratic
ticket. His associates on that ticket were all elected, while he was
defeated by the refusal of a number of the old friends of Broderick to
give him their votes. It is probable that his life was much embittered
by the intense hatred he had engendered among the friends of
Broderick, and the severe censure of a large body of the people of the
State, not especially attached to the political fortunes of the
dead Senator. These facts are mentioned as furnishing a possible
explanation of Judge Terry's marked descent in character and standing
from the Chief-Justiceship of the State to being the counsel, partner,
and finally the husband of the discarded companion of a millionaire
in a raid upon the latter's property in the courts. It was during
the latter stages of this litigation that Judge Terry became enraged
against Justice Field, because the latter, in the discharge of his
judicial duties, had been compelled to order the revival of a decree
of the United States Circuit Court, in the rendering of which he had
taken no part.
A proper understanding of this exciting chapter in the life of Justice
Field renders necessary a narrative of the litigation referred to. It
is doubtful if the annals of the courts or the pages of romance can
parallel this conspiracy to compel a man of wealth to divide his estate
with adventurers. Whether it is measured by the value of the prize
reached for, by the character of the conspirators, or by the desperate
means to which they resorted to accomplish their object, it stands in
the forefront of the list of such operations.
CHAPTER I.
THE SHARON-HILL-TERRY LITIGATION.
The victim, upon a share of whose enormous estate, commonly estimated
at $15,000,000, these conspirators had set their covetous eyes, was
William Sharon, then a Senator from the State of Nevada. The woman
with whom he had terminated his relations, because he believed her
to be dangerous to his business interests, was Sarah Althea Hill.
Desirous of turning to the best advantage her previous connection
with him, she sought advice from an old negress of bad repute, and the
result was a determination to claim that she had a secret contract of
marriage with him. This negress, who during the trial gave unwilling
testimony to having furnished the sinews of war in the litigation to
the extent of at least five thousand dollars, then consulted G.W.
Tyler, a lawyer noted for his violent manner and reckless practices,
who explained to her what kind of a paper would constitute a legal
marriage contract under the laws of California. No existing contract
was submitted to him, but he gave his written opinion as to what kind
of a contract it would be good to have for the purpose. The pretended
contract was then manufactured by Sarah Althea in accordance with this
opinion, and Tyler subsequently made a written agreement with her by
which he was to act as her attorney, employ all necessary assistance,
and pay all expenses, and was to have one-half of all they could get
out of Sharon by their joint efforts as counsel and client. This
contract was negotiated by an Australian named Neilson, who was to
have one-half of the lawyer's share.
On the 7th of September, 1883, a demand was made upon Mr. Sharon for
money for Miss Hill. He drove her emissary, Neilson, out of the hotel
where he had called upon him, and the latter appeared the next day in
the police court of San Francisco and made an affidavit charging
Mr. Sharon with the crime of adultery. A warrant was issued for the
latter's arrest, and he was held to bail in the sum of $5,000.
This charge was made for the avowed purpose of establishing the
manufactured contract of marriage already referred to, which bore date
three years before. A copy of this alleged contract was furnished to
the newspapers together with a letter having Sharon's name appended to
it, addressed at the top to "My Dear Wife," and at the bottom to "Miss
Hill." This pretended contract and letter Mr. Sharon denounced as
forgeries.
On the 3d of October, 1883, Mr. Sharon commenced suit in the United
States Circuit Court at San Francisco against Sarah Althea Hill,
setting forth in his complaint that he was a citizen of the State of
Nevada, and she a citizen of California;
"that he was, and had been for years, an unmarried man; that
formerly he was the husband of Maria Ann Sharon, who died in
May, 1875, and that he had never been the husband of any other
person; that there were two children living, the issue of that
marriage, and also grandchildren, the children of a deceased
daughter of the marriage; that he was possessed of a large
fortune in real and personal property; was extensively engaged
in business enterprises and ventures, and had a wide business
and social connection; that, as he was informed, the defendant
was an unmarried woman of about thirty years of age, for some
time a resident of San Francisco; that within two months then
past she had repeatedly and publicly claimed and represented
that she was his lawful wife; that she falsely and fraudulently
pretended that she was duly married to him on the twenty-fifth
day of August, 1880, at the city and county of San Francisco;
that on that day they had jointly made a declaration of
marriage showing the names, ages, and residences of the
parties, jointly doing the acts required by the Civil Code of
California to constitute a marriage between them, and that
thereby they became and were husband and wife according to the
law of that State.
"The complainant further alleged that these several claims,
representations, and pretensions were wholly and maliciously
false, and were made by her for the purpose of injuring him in
his property, business, and social relations; for the purpose
of obtaining credit by the use of his name with merchants and
others, and thereby compelling him to maintain her; and for
the purpose of harassing him, and in case of his death, his
heirs and next of kin and legatees, into payment of large
sums of money to quiet her false and fraudulent claims and
pretensions. He also set forth what he was informed was a copy
of the declaration of marriage, and alleged that if she
had any such instrument, it was 'false, forged, and
counterfeited;' that he never, on the day of its date, or
at any other time, made or executed any such document or
declaration, and never knew or heard of the same until within
a month previous to that time, and that the same was null and
void as against him, and ought, in equity and good conscience,
to be so declared, and ordered to be delivered up, to be
annulled and cancelled."
The complaint concluded with a prayer that it be adjudged and decreed
that the said Sarah Althea Hill was not and never had been his wife;
that he did not make the said joint declaration of marriage with her,
or any marriage between them; that said contract or joint declaration
of marriage be decreed and adjudged false, fraudulent, forged, and
counterfeited, and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled and
annulled, and that she be enjoined from setting up any claims or
pretensions of marriage thereby. Sharon was a citizen of Nevada, while
Miss Hill was a citizen of California.[1]
Before the time expired in which Miss Hill was required to answer the
complaint of Mr. Sharon in the United States Circuit Court, but not
until after the federal jurisdiction had attached in that court, she
brought suit against him, November 1st, in a state Superior Court,
in the city and county of San Francisco, to establish their alleged
marriage and then obtain a decree, and a division of the property
stated to have been acquired since such marriage. In her complaint she
alleged that on the 25th day of August, 1880, they became, by mutual
agreement, husband and wife, and thereafter commenced living together
as husband and wife; that on that day they had jointly made a
declaration of marriage in writing, signed by each, substantially in
form as required by the Civil Code of California, and until the month
of November, 1881, had lived together as husband and wife; that
since then the defendant had been guilty of sundry violations of the
marriage contract. The complaint also alleged that when the parties
intermarried the defendant did not have in money or property more than
five millions of dollars, with an income not exceeding thirty thousand
dollars a month, but that since their intermarriage they had by their
prudent management of mines, fortunate speculations, manipulations of
the stock market, and other business enterprises, accumulated in money
and property more than ten millions of dollars, and that now he had in
his possession money and property of the value at least of fifteen
millions of dollars, from which he received an income of over one
hundred thousand dollars a month. The complaint concluded with a
prayer that the alleged marriage with the defendant might be declared
legal and valid, and that she might be divorced from him, and that an
account be taken of the common property, and that the same be equally
divided between them.
The campaign was thus fully inaugurated, which for more than six years
disgraced the State with its violence and uncleanness, and finally
ended in bloodshed. The leading combatants were equally resolute and
determined. Mr. Sharon, who was a man of remarkable will and energy,
would have expended his entire fortune in litigation before he would
have paid tribute to those who thus attempted to plunder him. Sarah
Althea Hill was respectably connected, but had drifted away from her
relations, and pursued, without restraint, her disreputable course.
She affected a reckless and daredevil character, carrying a pistol,
and exhibiting it on occasions in cow-boy fashion, to convey the
impression that those who antagonized her had a dangerous character
with whom to deal. She was ignorant, illiterate, and superstitious.
The forged document which she thought to make a passport to the
enjoyment of a share of Sharon's millions was a clumsy piece of work.
It was dated August 25, 1880, and contained a clause pledging secrecy
for two years thereafter. But she never made it public until September,
1883, although she had, nearly two years before that, been turned out
of her hotel by Sharon's orders. At this treatment she only whimpered
and wrote begging letters to him, not once claiming, even in these
private letters to him, to be his wife. She could then have published
the alleged contract without any violation of its terms, and claimed
any rights it conferred, and it is obvious to any sane man that she
would have done so had any such document then been in existence.
Although Sharon's case against Sarah Althea Hill was commenced in
the federal court before the commencement of Miss Hill's case against
Sharon in the state court, the latter case was first brought to trial,
on the 10th of March, 1884.
[1] NOTE.--A court of equity having jurisdiction to lay its hands
upon and control forged and fraudulent instruments, it matters
not with what pretensions and claims their validity may be
asserted by their possessor; whether they establish a marriage
relation with another, or render him an heir to an estate, or
confer a title to designated pieces of property, or create a
pecuniary obligation. It is enough that, unless set aside or
their use restrained, they may impose burdens upon the
complaining party, or create claims upon his property by which
its possession and enjoyment may be destroyed or impaired.
(Sharon vs. Terry, 13 Sawyer's Rep., 406.) The Civil Code of
California also declares that "a written instrument in respect
to which there is a reasonable apprehension that, if left
outstanding, it may cause serious injury to a person against
whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so
adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or cancelled" (Sec.
3412).
CHAPTER II.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE.
Mr. Sharon defended in the state court, and prosecuted in the federal
court with equal energy. In the former he made an affidavit that the
pretended marriage contract was a forgery and applied to the court for
the right to inspect it, and to have photographic copies of it made.
Sarah Althea resisted the judge's order to produce the document in
question, until he informed her that, if she did not obey, the paper
would not be admitted as evidence on the trial of the action.
On the second day of the trial in the state court Miss Hill reinforced
her cause by the employment of Judge David S. Terry as associate
counsel. He brought to the case a large experience in the use of
deadly weapons, and gave the proceedings something of the character
of the ancient "wager of battle." Numerous auxiliaries and
supernumeraries in the shape of lesser lawyers, fighters, and suborned
witnesses were employed in the proceedings, as from time to time
occasion required. The woman testified in her own behalf that upon
a visit to Mr. Sharon's office he had offered to pay her $1,000 per
month if she would become his mistress; that she declined his offer in
a business-like manner, without anger, and entered upon a conversation
about getting married; she swore at a subsequent interview she drafted
a marriage contract at Sharon's dictation. This document, to which she
testified as having been thus drawn up, is as follows:
"In the city and county of San Francisco, State of California,
on the 25th day of August, A.D., 1880, I, Sarah Althea Hill,
of the city and county of San Francisco, State of California,
aged twenty-seven years, do here, in the presence of almighty
God, take Senator William Sharon, of the State of Nevada, to
be my lawful and wedded husband, and do here acknowledge and
declare myself to be the wife of Senator William Sharon, of
the State of Nevada.
SARAH ALTHEA HILL.
AUGUST 25, 1880, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL."
* * * * *
"I agree not to make known the contents of this paper or its
existence for two years unless Mr. Sharon, himself, sees fit
to make it known.
SARAH ALTHEA HILL."
* * * * *
"In the city and county of San Francisco, State of California,
on the 25th day of August, A.D. 1880, I, Senator William
Sharon, of the State of Nevada, aged sixty years, do here, in
the presence of Almighty God, take Sarah Althea Hill, of the
city and county of San Francisco, California, to be my lawful
and wedded wife, and do here acknowledge myself to be the
husband of Sarah Althea Hill.
WILLIAM SHARON,
Nevada.
AUGUST 25, 1880."
In his testimony Mr. Sharon contradicted every material statement
made by Sarah Althea Hill. He denied every circumstance connected
with the alleged drawing up of the marriage contract.
He testified that on the 7th day of November, 1881, he terminated his
relations with and dismissed her, and made a full settlement with her
by the payment of $3,000 in cash, and notes amounting to $4,500. For
these she gave him a receipt in full. He charged her with subsequently
stealing that receipt at one of two or three visits made by her after
her discharge.
It is unnecessary to review the voluminous testimony introduced by
the parties in support of their respective contentions. The alleged
contract was clearly proven to be a forgery. A number of witnesses
testified to conversations had with Miss Hill long after the date of
the pretended marriage contract, in which she made statements entirely
inconsistent with the existence of such a document. She employed
fortune-tellers to give her charms with which she could compel Mr.
Sharon to marry her, and this, too, when she pretended to have in
her possession the evidence that she was already his wife. Not an
appearance of probability attended the claim of this bold adventuress.
Every statement she made concerning the marriage contract, and every
step she took in her endeavor to enforce it, betrayed its false
origin.
The trial of the case in the state court continued from March 10th
until May 28th, when the summer recess intervened. It was resumed
July 15th, and occupied the court until September 17th, on which
day the argument of counsel was concluded and the case submitted.
No decision was rendered until more than three months afterwards,
namely, December 24th. Nearly two months were then allowed to pass
before the decree was entered, February 19, 1885. The case was tried
before Judge Sullivan without a jury, by consent of the parties.
He decided for the plaintiff, holding the marriage contract to be
genuine, and to constitute a valid marriage. It was manifest that
he made his decision solely upon the evidence given by Sarah Althea
herself, whom he nevertheless branded in his opinion as a perjurer,
suborner of perjury, and forger. Lest this should seem an exaggeration
his own words are here quoted. She stated that she was introduced
by Sharon to certain parties as his wife. Of her statements to this
effect the Judge said:
"Plaintiff's testimony as to these occasions is directly
contradicted, and in my judgment her testimony as to these
matters is wilfully false."
Concerning $7,500 paid her by Sharon, which she alleged she had placed
in his hands in the early part of her acquaintance with him, the Judge
said:
"This claim, in my judgment, is utterly unfounded. No such
advance was ever made."
At another place in his opinion the Judge said:
"Plaintiff claims that defendant wrote her notes at different
times after her expulsion from the Grand Hotel. If such notes
were written, it seems strange that they have not been preserved
and produced in evidence. I do not believe she received any such
notes."
With respect to another document which purported to have been signed
by Mr. Sharon, and which Sarah Althea produced under compulsion, then
withdrew it, and failed to produce it afterwards, when called for,
saying she had lost it, Judge Sullivan said:
"Among the objections suggested to this paper as appearing on its
face, was one made by counsel that the signature was evidently a
forgery. The matters recited in the paper are, in my judgment,
at variance with the facts it purports to recite. Considering the
stubborn manner in which the production of this paper was at first
resisted and the mysterious manner of its disappearance, I am
inclined to regard it in the light of one of the fabrications for
the purpose of bolstering up plaintiff's case. I can view the
paper in no other light than as a fabrication."
In another part of his opinion Judge Sullivan made a sort of a general
charge of perjury against her in the following language:
"I am of the opinion that to some extent plaintiff has availed
herself of the aid of false testimony for the purpose of giving
her case a better appearance in the eyes of the court, but
sometimes parties have been known to resort to false testimony,
where in their judgment it would assist them in prosecuting a
lawful claim. As I understand the facts of this case, that was
done in this instance."
In another place Judge Sullivan said:
"I have discussed fully, in plain language, the numerous false
devices resorted to by the plaintiff for the purpose of
strengthening her case."
Miss Sarah and her attorneys had now come in sight of the promised
land of Sharon's ample estate. Regular proceedings, however, under
the law, seemed to them too slow; and besides there was the peril of
an adverse decision of the Supreme Court on appeal. They then decided
upon a novel course. Section 137 of the Civil Code of California
provides that while an action for divorce is pending, the court may,
in its discretion, require the husband to pay as alimony any money
necessary to enable the wife to support herself and to prosecute or
defeat the action. The enterprising attorneys, sharing the bold
spirit of their client, and presuming upon the compliance of a judge
who had already done so well by them, went into the court, on the 8th
of January, 1885, and modestly demanded for Sarah Althea, upon the
sole authority of the provision of law above quoted, $10,000 per
month, as the money necessary to enable her to support herself, and
$150,000 for attorneys' fees to prosecute the action. This was to
include back pay for thirty-eight months, making a sum of $380,000,
which added to the $150,000, attorneys' fees, would have made a grand
total of $530,000. This was an attempt, under the color of a
beneficent law, applicable only to actions for divorce, in which the
marriage was not denied, to extort from a man more than one-half
million dollars, for the benefit of a woman, seeking first to
establish a marriage, and then to secure a divorce, in a case in
which no decree had as yet been entered, declaring her to be a wife.
It was not merely seeking the money necessary to support the
plaintiff and prosecute the case; it was a request that the inferior
court should confiscate more than half a million dollars, in
anticipation of a decision of the Supreme Court on appeal. It was as
bold an attempt at spoliation as the commencement of the suit itself.
The Supreme Court of the State had decided that the order of a
Superior Court allowing alimony during the pendency of any action for
divorce is not appealable, but it had not decided that, under the
pretence of granting alimony, an inferior judge could apportion a
rich man's estate among champerty lawyers, and their adventurous
client, by an order from which there could be no appeal, made prior
to any decree that there had ever been a marriage between the
parties, when the fact of the marriage was the main issue in the
case. The counsel for Sharon insisted upon his right to have a decree
entered from which he could appeal, before being thus made to stand
and deliver, and the court entertained the motion.
Upon this motion, among other affidavits read in opposition, was one
by Mr. Sharon himself, in which he recited the agreement between Miss
Hill and her principal attorney, George W. Tyler, in which she was
to pay him for his services, one-half of all she might receive in any
judgment obtained against Sharon, he, Tyler, advancing all the costs
of the litigation. The original of this agreement had been filed by
Tyler with the county clerk immediately after the announcement of
the opinion in the case as an evidence of his right to half of the
proceeds of the judgment. It was conclusive evidence that Sarah Althea
required no money for the payment of counsel fees.
After the filing of a mass of affidavits, and an exhaustive argument
of the motion, Judge Sullivan rendered his decision, February 16,
1885, granting to Sarah Althea Hill an allowance of $2,500 per month,
to take effect as of the date of the motion, January 8, 1885, and
further sums of $2,500 each to be paid on the 8th day of April, and of
each succeeding month until further order of the court.
This the Judge thought reasonable allowance "in view of the
plaintiff's present circumstances and difficulties." For counsel fees
he allowed the sum of $60,000, and at the request of the victors, made
in advance, he divided the spoils among them as follows:
To Tyler and Tyler $25,000
To David S. Terry 10,000
To Moon and Flournoy 10,000
To W.H. Levy 10,000
To Clement, Osmond and Clement 5,000
By what rule $2,500 was awarded as a proper monthly allowance to the
woman whose services to Mr. Sharon had commanded but $500 per month it
is difficult to conjecture. It was benevolence itself to give $60,000
to a troop of lawyers enlisted under the command of Tyler, who had
agreed to conduct the proceedings wholly at his own cost, for one-half
of what could be made by the buccaneering enterprise. It seemed to be
the purpose of these attorneys to see how much of Mr. Sharon's money
they could, with Judge Sullivan's assistance, lay their hands upon
before the entry of the judgment in the case. From the judgment an
appeal could be taken. By anticipating its entry they thought that
they had obtained an order from which no appeal would lie.
It was not until three days after this remarkable order was made
that the decree was entered by Judge Sullivan declaring plaintiff and
defendant to be husband and wife; that he had deserted her, and that
she was entitled to a decree of divorce, with one-half of the common
property accumulated by the parties since the date of what he decided
to be a valid marriage contract.
Sharon appealed from the final judgment, and also from the order for
alimony. Notwithstanding this appeal, and the giving of a bond on
appeal in the sum of $300,000 to secure the payment of all alimony and
counsel fees, Judge Sullivan granted an order directing Mr. Sharon to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in failing to
pay alimony and counsel fees, as directed by the order.
The Supreme Court, upon application, granted an order temporarily
staying proceedings in the case. This stay of proceedings was
subsequently made permanent, during the pendency of the appeal.
Mr. Sharon died November 15, 1885. That very day had been set for a
hearing of Sharon's motion for a new trial. The argument was actually
commenced on that day and continued until the next, at which time the
motion was ordered off the calendar because meantime Mr. Sharon had
deceased.
CHAPTER III.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT.
While these proceedings were being had in the state courts the case
of Sharon vs. Hill in the federal court was making slow progress.
Miss Hill's attorneys seemed to think that her salvation depended upon
reaching a decision in her case before the determination of Sharon's
suit in the United States Circuit Court. They were yet to learn,
as they afterwards did, that after a United States court takes
jurisdiction in a case, it cannot be ousted of that jurisdiction by
the decision of a state court, in a proceeding subsequently commenced
in the latter. Seldom has "the law's delay" been exemplified more
thoroughly than it was by the obstacles which her attorneys were able
to interpose at every step of the proceedings in the federal court.
Sharon commenced his suit in the United States Circuit Court October
3, 1883, twenty-eight days before his enemy commenced hers in the
State Superior Court. By dilatory pleas her counsel succeeded in
delaying her answer to Sharon's suit until after the decision in
her favor in the state court. She did not enter an appearance in the
federal court until the very last day allowed by the rule. A month
later she filed a demurrer. Her counsel contrived to delay the
argument of this demurrer for seven weeks after it was filed. It
was finally argued and submitted on the 21st of January, 1884. On
the 3d of March it was overruled and the defendant was ordered to
answer in ten days, to wit, March 13th. Then the time for answering
was extended to April 24th. When that day arrived her counsel,
instead of filing an answer, filed a plea in abatement, denying the
non-residence of Mr. Sharon in the State of California, on which
depended his right to sue in the federal court. To this Mr. Sharon's
counsel filed a replication on the 5th of May. It then devolved upon
Miss Hill's counsel to produce evidence of the fact alleged in the
plea, but, after a delay of five months and ten days, no evidence
whatever was offered, and the court ordered the plea to be argued
on the following day. It was overruled, and thirty days were given
to file an answer to Sharon's suit. The case in the state court
had then been tried, argued, and submitted thirty days before, but
Miss Hill's counsel were not yet ready to file their answer within
the thirty days given them, and the court extended the time for answer
until December 30th. Six days before that day arrived Judge Sullivan
rendered his decision. At last, on the 30th of December, 1884,
fourteen months after the filing of Sharon's complaint, Sarah Althea's
answer was filed in the federal court, in which, among other things,
she set up the proceedings and decree of the state court, adjudging
the alleged marriage contract to be genuine and legal, and the parties
to be husband and wife, and three days later Sharon filed his
replication. There was at no time any delay or want of diligence on
the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting this suit to final judgment.
On the contrary, as is plainly shown in the record above stated,
the delays were all on the part of the defendant. The taking of the
testimony in the United States Circuit Court commenced on the 12th of
February, 1885, and closed on the 12th of August following.
The struggle in the state court was going on during all the time of
the taking of the testimony in the federal court, and intensified the
excitement attendant thereon. Miss Hill was in constant attendance
before the examiner who took the testimony, often interrupting the
proceedings with her turbulent and violent conduct and language, and
threatening the lives of Mr. Sharon's counsel. She constantly carried
a pistol, and on occasions exhibited it during the examination of
witnesses, and, pointing it at first one and then another, expressed
her intention of killing them at some stage of the proceedings. She
was constantly in contempt of the court, and a terror to those around
her. Her conduct on one occasion, in August, 1885, became so violent
that the taking of the testimony could not proceed, and Justice
Field, the presiding judge of the circuit, made an order that
she should be disarmed, and that a bailiff of the court should sit
constantly at her side to restrain her from any murderous outbreak,
such as she was constantly threatening. Her principal attorney,
Tyler, was also most violent and disorderly. Judge Terry, while less
explosive, was always ready to excuse and defend his client. (See
Report of Proceedings in Sharon vs. Hill, 11 Sawyer's Circuit Court
Reps., 122.)
Upon the request of counsel for the complainant, the examiner in one
case reported to the court the language and the conduct of Miss Hill.
Among other things, he reported her as saying:
"When I see this testimony [from which certain scandalous
remarks of hers were omitted] I feel like taking that man
Stewart[1] out and cowhiding him. I will shoot him yet; that
very man sitting there. To think that he would put up a woman
to come here and deliberately lie about me like that. I will
shoot him. They know when I say I will do it that I will do
it. I shall shoot him as sure as you live; that man that is
sitting right there. And I shall have that woman Mrs. Smith
arrested for this, and make her prove it."
And again:
"I can hit a four-bit piece nine times out of ten."
The examiner said that pending the examination of one of the witnesses,
on the occasion mentioned, the respondent drew a pistol from her
satchel, and held it in her right hand; the hand resting for a moment
upon the table, with the weapon pointed in the direction of Judge
Evans. He also stated that on previous occasions she had brought to
the examiner's room during examinations a pistol, and had sat for some
length of time holding it in her hand, to the knowledge of all persons
present at the time. After the reading of the examiner's report in
open court, Justice Field said:
"In the case of William Sharon versus Sarah Althea Hill, the
Examiner in Chancery appointed by the court to take the
testimony has reported to the court that very disorderly
proceedings took place before him on the 3d instant; that at
that day, in his room, when counsel of the parties and the
defendant were present, and during the examination of a
witness by the name of Piper, the defendant became very much
excited, and threatened to take the life of one of the
counsel, and that subsequently she drew a pistol and declared
her intention to carry her threat into effect. It appears also
from the report of the examiner that on repeated occasions the
defendant has attended before him, during the examination of
witnesses, armed with a pistol. Such conduct is an offense
against the laws of the United States punishable by fine and
imprisonment. It interferes with the due order of proceedings
in the administration of justice, and is well calculated to
bring them into contempt. I, myself, have not heretofore sat
in this case and do not expect to participate in its decision;
I intend in a few days to leave for the East, but I have been
consulted by my associate, and have been requested to take
part in this side proceeding, for it is of the utmost
importance for the due administration of justice that such
misbehavior as the examiner reports should be stopped, and
measures be taken which will prevent its recurrence. My
associate will comment on the laws of Congress which make the
offense a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment.
"The marshal of the court will be directed to disarm the
defendant whenever she goes before the examiner or into court
in any future proceeding, and to appoint an officer to keep
strict surveillance over her, in order that she may not carry
out her threatened purpose. This order will be entered. The
Justice then said that it is to be observed that this block,
embracing this building--the court-house--is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Every offense
committed within it is an offense against the United States,
and the State has no jurisdiction whatever. This fact seems to
have been forgotten by the parties."
The following is the order then entered as directed by Justice Field:
"Whereas it appears from the report to this court of the
Examiner in Chancery in this case appointed to take the
depositions of witnesses, that on the 3d day of August,
instant, at his office, counsel of the parties appeared,
namely, William M. Stewart, Esquire, and Oliver P. Evans,
Esquire, for the complainant, and W.B. Tyler, Esquire, for the
defendant, and the defendant in person, and that during the
examination before said examiner of a witness named Piper, the
defendant became excited and threatened the life of the
counsel of the complainant present, and exhibited a pistol
with a declared intention to carry such threat into effect,
thereby obstructing the order of the proceedings, and
endeavoring to bring the same into contempt; and
"Whereas it further appears that said defendant habitually
attends before said examiner carrying a pistol,
"_It is ordered_, That the marshal of this court take such
measures as may be necessary to disarm the said defendant, and
keep her disarmed, and under strict surveillance, while she is
attending the examination of witnesses before said examiner,
and whenever attending in court, and that a deputy be detailed
for that purpose."
[1] Senator Stewart, who was one of the counsel against her in the
suit.
CHAPTER V.
DECISION OF THE CASE IN THE FEDERAL COURT.
The taking of the testimony being completed, the cause was set for a
hearing on September 9th. After an argument of thirteen days the cause
was submitted on the 29th of September, 1885. On the 26th of December,
1885, the court rendered its decision, that the alleged declaration
of marriage and the letters purporting to have been addressed "My Dear
Wife" were false and forged, and that the contemporaneous conduct
of the parties, and particularly of the defendant, was altogether
incompatible with the claim of marriage or the existence of any such
declaration or letters.
A decree was ordered accordingly, and the court made the following
further order:
"As the case was argued and submitted during the lifetime of
the complainant, who has since deceased, the decree will be
entered nunc pro tunc, as of September 29, 1885, the date of
its submission and a day prior to the decease of the
complainant."
The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Deady, of the United
States District Court of Oregon, who sat in the case with Judge
Sawyer, the circuit judge.
Of the old negress under whose direction the fraudulent marriage
contract had been manufactured, and under whose advice and direction
the suit in the state court had been brought, the Judge said:
"Mary E. Pleasant, better known as Mammie Pleasant, is a
conspicuous and important figure in this affair; without her
it would probably never have been brought before the public.
She appears to be a shrewd old negress of some means.
"In my judgment this case and the forgeries and perjuries
committed in its support had their origin largely in the brain
of this scheming, trafficking, crafty old woman."
He found that the declaration of marriage was forged by the defendant
by writing the declaration over a simulated signature, and that her
claim to be the wife of the plaintiff was wholly false, and had been
put forth by her and her co-conspirators for no other purpose than
to despoil the plaintiff of his property. Judge Sawyer also filed
an opinion in the case, in which he declared that the weight of the
evidence satisfactorily established the forgery and the fraudulent
character of the instrument in question.
CHAPTER VI.
THE MARRIAGE OF TERRY AND MISS HILL.
Sarah Althea now received a powerful recruit, who enlisted for the
war. This was one of her lawyers, David S. Terry, whom she married on
the 7th day of January, 1886, twelve days after the decision of the
Circuit Court against her, and which he had heard announced, but
before a decree had been entered in conformity with the decision.
Terry seemed willing to take the chances that the decree of the
Superior Court would not be reversed in the Supreme Court of the
State. The decision of the federal court he affected to utterly
disregard. It was estimated that not less than $5,000,000 would be
Sarah Althea's share of Sharon's estate, in the event of success in
her suit. She would be a rich widow if it could be established that
she had ever been a wife. She had quarreled with Tyler, her principal
attorney, long before, and accused him of failing in his professional
duty. If she could escape from the obligations of her contract with
him, she would not be compelled to divide with him the hoped-for
$5,000,000.
Although Judge Terry had been Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
California, the crimes of perjury and forgery and subornation of
perjury which had been loudly charged in Judge Sullivan's opinion
against the woman, in whose favor he gave judgment, seemed to him
but trifles. Strangely enough, neither he nor Sarah Althea ever
uttered a word of resentment against him on account of these charges.
The marriage of Terry with this desperate woman in the face of an
adverse decision of the Circuit Court, by which jurisdiction was first
exercised upon the subject-matter, was notice to all concerned that,
by all the methods known to him, he would endeavor to win her cause,
which he thus made his own. He took the position that any denial of
Sarah Althea's pretense to have been the wife of Sharon was an insult
to her, which could only be atoned by the blood of the person who made
it. This was the proclamation of a vendetta against all who should
attempt to defend the heirs of Mr. Sharon in the possession of that
half of their inheritance which he and Sarah Althea had marked for
their own. His subsequent course showed that he relied upon the power
of intimidation to secure success. He was a man of powerful frame,
accustomed all his life to the use of weapons, and known to be always
armed with a knife. He had the reputation of being a fighting man. He
had decided that Sarah Althea had been the lawful wife of Sharon, and
that therefore he had married a virtuous widow. He had not often been
crossed in his purpose or been resisted when he had once taken a
position. By his marriage he virtually served notice on the judges of
the Supreme Court of the State, before whom the appeal was then
pending, that he would not tamely submit to be by them proclaimed to
be the dupe of the discarded woman of another. It was well understood
that he intended to hold them personally responsible to him for any
decision that would have that effect. These intentions were said to
have been made known to them.
His rule in life, as once stated by himself, was to compel
acquiescence in his will by threats of violence, and known readiness
to carry his threats into effect. This, he said, would in most cases
insure the desired result. He counted on men's reluctance to engage in
personal difficulties with him. He believed in the persuasiveness of
ruffianism.
Whether he thought his marriage would frighten Judges Sawyer and
Deady, who had just rendered their decision in the United States
Circuit Court, and cause them either to modify the terms of the decree
not yet entered, or deter them from its enforcement, is a matter of
uncertainty. He was of the ultra State's-rights school and had great
faith in the power of the courts of a State when arrayed against those
of the United States. He had always denied the jurisdiction of the
latter in the case of Sarah Althea, both as to the subject-matter and
as to the parties. He refused to see any difference between a suit for
a divorce and a suit to cancel a forged paper, which, if allowed to
pass as genuine, would entitle its holder to another's property. He
persisted in denying that Sharon had been a citizen of Nevada during
his lifetime, and ignored the determination of this question by the
Circuit Court.
But if Judge Terry had counted on the fears of the United States
judges of California he had reckoned too boldly, for on the 15th
of January, 1886, eight days after his marriage, the decree of the
Circuit Court was formally entered. This decree adjudged the
alleged marriage contract of August 25, 1880, false, counterfeited,
fabricated, and fraudulent, and ordered that it be surrendered to
be cancelled and annulled, and be kept in the custody of the clerk,
subject to the further order of the court; and Sarah Althea Hill
and her representatives were perpetually enjoined from alleging the
genuineness or the validity of the instrument, or making use of it in
any way to support her claims as wife of the complainant.
The execution of this decree would, of course, put an end to Sarah
Althea's claim, the hope of maintaining which was supposed to have
been the motive of the marriage. To defeat its execution then became
the sole object of Terry's life. This he hoped to do by antagonizing
it with a favorable decision of the Supreme Court of the State, on
the appeals pending therein. It has heretofore been stated that the
case against Sharon in the Superior Court was removed from the
calendar on the 14th day of November, 1885, because of the
defendant's death on the previous day. The 11th of February following,
upon proper application, the court ordered the substitution of
Frederick W. Sharon as executor and sole defendant in the suit in
the place of William Sharon, deceased. The motion for a new trial was
argued on the 28th of the following May, and held under advisement
until the 4th of the following October, when it was denied. From this
order of denial an appeal was taken by the defendant.
It must be borne in mind that there were now two appeals in this case
to the Supreme Court of the State from the Superior Court. One taken
on the 25th of February, 1885, from the judgment of Judge Sullivan,
and from his order for alimony and fees, and the other an appeal taken
October 4, 1886, from the order denying the new trial in the cause.
On the 31st of January, 1888, the Supreme Court rendered its decision,
affirming the judgment of the Superior Court in favor of Sarah Althea,
but reversing the order made by Judge Sullivan granting counsel fees,
and reducing the allowance for alimony from $2,500 per month to $500.
Four judges concurred in this decision, namely, McKinstry, Searles,
Patterson, and Temple. Three judges dissented, to wit, Thornton,
Sharpstein, and McFarland.
There then remained pending in the same court the appeal from the
order granting a new trial. It was reasonable that Terry should expect
a favorable decision on this appeal, as soon as it could be reached.
This accomplished, he and Sarah Althea thought to enter upon the
enjoyment of the great prize for which they had contended with such
desperate energy. Terry had always regarded the decree of the Circuit
Court as a mere harmless expression of opinion, which there would be
no attempt to enforce, and which the state courts would wholly ignore.
Whatever force it might finally be given by the Supreme Court of the
United States appeared to him a question far in the future, for he
supposed he had taken an appeal from the decree. This attempted appeal
was found to be without effect, because when ordered the suit had
abated by the death of the plaintiff, and no appeal could be taken
until the case was revived by order of the court. This order was never
applied for. The two years within which an appeal could have been
taken expired January 15, 1888. The decree of the Circuit Court had
therefore become final at that time.
CHAPTER VII.
THE BILL OF REVIVOR.
It was at this stage of the prolonged legal controversy that Justice
Field first sat in the case. The executor of the Sharon estate, on
the 12th of March, 1888, filed a bill of revivor in the United States
Circuit Court. This was a suit to revive the case of Sharon vs. Hill,
that its decree might stand in the same condition and plight in which
it was at the time of its entry, which, being _nunc pro tunc_, was of
the same effect as if the entry had preceded the death of Mr. Sharon,
the case having been argued and submitted during his lifetime. The
decree directed the surrender and cancellation of the forged marriage
certificate, and perpetually enjoined Sarah Althea Hill, and her
representatives, from alleging the genuineness or validity of that
instrument, or making any use of the same in evidence, or otherwise to
support any rights claimed under it.
The necessity for this suit was the fact that the forged paper had not
been surrendered for cancellation, as ordered by the decree, and the
plaintiff feared that the defendant would claim and seek to enforce
property rights as wife of the plaintiff, by authority of the alleged
written declaration of marriage, under the decree of another court,
essentially founded thereupon, contrary to the perpetual injunction
ordered by the Circuit Court. To this suit, David S. Terry, as husband
of the defendant, was made a party. It merely asked the Circuit Court
to place its own decree in a position to be executed, and thereby
prevent the spoliation of the Sharon estate, under the authority of
the decree of Judge Sullivan in the suit in the state court
subsequently commenced. A demurrer was filed by the defendant. It
was argued in July before Justice Field, Judge Sawyer, and District
Judge Sabin. It was overruled on the 3d of September, when the court
ordered that the original suit of Sharon against Hill, and the final
decree therein, stand revived in the name of Frederick W. Sharon as
executor, and that the said suit and the proceedings therein be in
the same plight and condition they were in at the death of William
Sharon, so as to give the executor, complainant as aforesaid, the
full benefit, rights, and protection of the decree, and full power
to enforce the same against the defendants, and each of them, at
all times and in all places, and in all particulars. The opinion
in the case was delivered by Justice Field. During its delivery
he was interrupted by Mrs. Terry with violent and abusive language,
and an attempt by her to take a pistol from a satchel which she held
in her hand. Her removal from the court-room by order of Justice
Field; her husband's assault upon the marshal with a deadly weapon
for executing the order, and the imprisonment of both the Terrys for
contempt of court, will be more particularly narrated hereafter.
The commencement of the proceedings for the revival of the suit was
well calculated to alarm the Terrys. They saw that the decree in the
Circuit Court was to be relied upon for something more than its mere
moral effect. Their feeling towards Judges Sawyer and Deady was one of
most intense hatred. Judge Deady was at his home in Oregon, beyond the
reach of physical violence at their hands, but Judge Sawyer was in
San Francisco attending to his official duties. Upon him they took an
occasion to vent their wrath.
It was on the 14th of August, 1888, after the commencement of the
revivor proceedings, but before the decision. Judge Sawyer was
returning in the railway train to San Francisco from Los Angeles,
where he had been to hold court. Judge Terry and his wife took the
same train at Fresno. Judge Sawyer occupied a seat near the center of
the sleeping-car, and Judge and Mrs. Terry took the last section of
the car, behind him, and on the same side. A few minutes after leaving
Fresno, Mrs. Terry walked down the aisle to a point just beyond Judge
Sawyer, and turning around with an ugly glare at him, hissed out, in a
spiteful and contemptuous tone: "Are you here?" to which the Judge
quietly replied: "Yes, Madam," and bowed. She then resumed her seat.
A few minutes after, Judge Terry walked down the aisle about the same
distance, looked over into the end section at the front of the car,
and finding it vacant, went back, got a small hand-bag, and returned
and seated himself in the front section, with his back to the engine
and facing Judge Sawyer. Mrs. Terry did not (at the moment) accompany
him. A few minutes later she walked rapidly down the passage, and as
she passed Judge Sawyer, seized hold of his hair at the back of his
head, gave it a spiteful twitch and passed quickly on, before he could
fully realize what had occurred. After passing she turned a vicious
glance upon him, which was continued for some time after taking her
seat by the side of her husband. A passenger heard Mrs. Terry say to
her husband: "I will give him a taste of what he will get bye and
bye." Judge Terry was heard to remark: "The best thing to do with
him would be to take him down the bay and drown him." Upon the arrival
of Judge Sawyer at San Francisco, he entered a street car, and was
followed by the Terrys. Mrs. Terry took a third seat from him, and
seeing him, said: "What, are you in this car too?" When the Terrys
left the car Mrs. Terry addressed some remark to Judge Sawyer in a
spiteful tone, and repeated it. He said he did not quite catch it,
but it was something like this: "We will meet again. This is not the
end of it."
Persons at all familiar with the tricks of those who seek human life,
and still contrive to keep out of the clutches of the law, will see
in the scene above recited an attempt to provoke an altercation
which would have been fatal to Judge Sawyer, if he had resented the
indignity put upon him by Mrs. Terry, by even so much as a word. This
could easily have been made the pretext for an altercation between the
two men, in which the result would not have been doubtful. There could
have been no proof that Judge Terry knew of his wife's intention to
insult and assault Judge Sawyer as she passed him, nor could it have
been proven that he knew she had done so. A remonstrance from Sawyer
could easily have been construed by Terry, upon the statement of his
wife, into an original, unprovoked, and aggressive affront. It is now,
however, certain that the killing of Judge Sawyer was not at that time
intended. It may have been, to use Mrs. Terry's words, "to give him a
taste of what he would get bye and bye," if he should dare to render
the decision in the revivor case adversely to them.
This incident has been here introduced and dwelt upon for the
purpose of showing the tactics resorted to by the Terrys during this
litigation, and the methods by which they sought to control decisions.
It is entirely probable that they had hopes of intimidating the federal
judges, as many believed some state judges had been, and that thus
they might "from the nettle danger, pluck the flower safety."
We have seen that they reckoned without their host. We shall now see
to what extent their rage carried them on the day that the decision
was rendered reviving the decree.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE TERRYS IMPRISONED FOR CONTEMPT.
On the day after Judge Sawyer's return from Los Angeles he called
the marshal to his chambers, and notified him of Mrs. Terry's violent
conduct towards him on the train in the presence of her husband, so
that he might take such steps as he thought proper to keep order
when they came into the court-building, and see that there was no
disturbance in the court-room. On the morning of September 3d, the
marshal was again summoned to Judge Sawyer's room, where Judge Field
was also present. They informed him that the decision in the revival
suit would be rendered that day, and they desired him to be present,
with a sufficient number of bailiffs to keep order in court. They told
him that judging from the action of the Terrys on the train, and the
threats they were making so publicly, and which were being constantly
published in the newspapers, it was not impossible that they might
create a disturbance in the court-room.
When the court opened that day, it found Terry and his wife already
seated within the bar, and immediately in front of the judges. As it
afterward appeared, they were both on a war-footing, he being armed
with a concealed bowie-knife, and she with a 41-calibre revolver,
which she carried in a small hand-bag, five of its chambers being
loaded. The judges took their seats on the bench, and very shortly
afterward Justice Field, who presided, began reading the opinion of
the court in which both of his associates concurred. A printed
pamphlet copy of this opinion contains 61 pages, of which 18 are
taken up with a statement of the case. The opinion commences at page
19 and covers the remaining 42 pages of the pamphlet.
From time to time, as the reading of the opinion progressed, Mrs.
Terry, who was greatly excited, was observed to unclasp and clasp
again the fastening of her satchel which contained her pistol, as if
to be sure she could do so at any desired moment. At the 11th page of
the opinion the following passage occurs:
"The original decree is not self-executing in all its parts;
it may be questioned whether any steps could be taken for its
enforcement, until it was revived, but if this were otherwise,
the surrender of the alleged marriage contract for
cancellation, as ordered, requires affirmative action on the
part of the defendant. The relief granted is not complete
until such surrender is made. When the decree pronounced the
instrument a forgery, not only had the plaintiff the right
that it should thus be put out of the way of being used in the
future to his embarrassment and the embarrassment of his
estate, but public justice required that it should be formally
cancelled, that it might constantly bear on its face the
evidence of its bad character, whenever or wherever presented
or appealed to."
When Mrs. Terry heard the above words concerning the surrender of the
alleged marriage contract for cancellation, she first endeavored for
a few seconds, but unsuccessfully, to open the satchel containing her
pistol. For some reason the catch refused to yield. Then, rising
to her feet, and placing the satchel before her on the table, she
addressed the presiding justice, saying:
"Are you going to make me give up my marriage contract?"
Justice Field said, "Be seated, madam."
She repeated her question:
"Are you going to take the responsibility of ordering me to deliver
up that contract?"
She was again ordered to resume her seat. At this she commenced
raving loudly and violently at the justice in coarse terms, using
such phrases as these:
"Mr. Justice Field, how much have you been bought for? Everybody
knows that you have been bought; that this is a paid decision."
"How big was the sack?"
"How much have you been paid for the decision?"
"You have been bought by Newland's coin; everybody knows you were
sent out here by the Newlands to make this decision."
"Every one of you there have been paid for this decision."
At the commencement of this tirade, and after her refusal to desist
when twice ordered to do so, the presiding justice directed the
marshal to remove her from the court-room. She said defiantly:
"I will not be removed from the court-room; you dare not remove me
from the court-room."
Judge Terry made no sign of remonstrance with her, had not endeavored
to restrain her, but had, on the contrary, been seen to nod
approvingly to her, as if assenting to something she had said to him
just before she sprang to her feet. The instant, however, the court
directed her removal from the room, of which she had thus taken
temporary possession, to the total suspension of the court
proceedings, his soul was "in arms and eager for the fray." As the
marshal moved toward the offending woman, he rose from his seat, under
great excitement, exclaiming, among other things, "No living man
shall touch my wife!" or words of that import, and dealt the marshal a
violent blow in the face,[1] breaking one of his front teeth. He then
unbuttoned his coat and thrust his hand under his vest, where his
bowie-knife was kept, apparently for the purpose of drawing it, when
he was seized by persons present, his hands held from drawing his
weapon, and he himself forced down on his back. The marshal,
with the assistance of a deputy, then removed Mrs. Terry from
the court-room, she struggling, screaming, kicking, striking, and
scratching them as she went, and pouring out imprecations upon
Judges Field and Sawyer, denouncing them as "corrupt scoundrels," and
declaring she would kill them both. She was taken from the room into
the main corridor, thence into the marshal's business office, and then
into an inner room of his office. She did not cease struggling when
she reached that room, but continued her frantic abuse.
While Mrs. Terry was being removed from the court-room Terry was held
down by several strong men. He was thus, by force alone, prevented
from drawing his knife on the marshal. While thus held he gave vent to
coarse and denunciatory language against the officers. When Mrs. Terry
was removed from the court-room he was allowed to rise. He at once
made a swift rush for the door leading to the corridor on which was
the marshal's office. As he was about leaving the room or immediately
after stepping out of it, he succeeded in drawing his knife. As he
crossed the threshold he brandished the knife above his head,
saying, "I am going to my wife." There was a terrified cry from the
bystanders: "He has got a knife." His arms were then seized by a
deputy marshal and others present, to prevent him from using it, and a
desperate struggle ensued. Four persons held on to the arms and body
of Terry, and one presented a pistol to his head, threatening at
the same time to shoot him if he did not give up the knife. To these
threats Terry paid no attention, but held on to the knife, actually
passing it during the struggle from one hand to the other. David
Neagle then seized the handle of the knife and commenced drawing it
through Terry's hand, when Terry relinquished it.
The whole scene was one of the wildest alarm and confusion. To use
the language of one of the witnesses, "Terry's conduct throughout this
affair was most violent. He acted like a demon, and all the time while
in the corridor he used loud and violent language, which could
be plainly heard in the court-room, and, in fact, throughout the
building," applying to the officers vile epithets, and threatening to
cut their hearts out if they did not let him go to his wife. The
knife which Terry drew, and which he afterwards designated as "a small
sheath knife," was, including the handle, nine and a quarter inches
long, the blade being five inches, having a sharp point, and is
commonly called a bowie-knife. He himself afterwards represented
that he drew this knife, not "because he wanted to hurt anybody, but
because he wanted to force his way into the marshal's office."
The presiding justice had read only a small portion of the opinion
of the court when he was interrupted by the boisterous and violent
proceedings described. On their conclusion, by the arrest of the
Terrys, he proceeded with the reading of the opinion, which occupied
nearly a whole hour. The justices, without adjourning the court,
then retired to the adjoining chambers of the presiding justice
for deliberation. They there considered of the action which should
be taken against the Terrys for their disorderly and contemptuous
conduct. After determining what that should be they returned to
the court-room and announced it. For their conduct and resistance
to the execution of the order of the court both were adjudged guilty
of contempt and ordered, as a punishment, to be imprisoned in the
county jail, Terry for six months and his wife for thirty days.
When Terry heard of the order, and the commitment was read to him,
he said, "Judge Field" (applying to him a coarse and vituperative
epithet) "thinks when I get out, when I get released from jail,
that he will be in Washington, but I will meet him when he comes
back next year, and it will not be a very pleasant meeting for him."
Mrs. Terry said that she would kill both Judges Field and Sawyer,
and repeated the threat several times. While the prisoners were being
taken to jail, Mrs. Terry said to her husband, referring to Judge
Sawyer: "I wooled him good on the train coming from Los Angeles. He
has never told that." To which he replied: "He will not tell that;
that was too good."
She said she could have shot Judge Field and killed him from where she
stood in the court-room, but that she was not ready then to kill the
old villain; she wanted him to live longer. While crossing the ferry
to Oakland she said, "I could have killed Judges Field and Sawyer; I
could shoot either one of them, and you would not find a judge or
a jury in the State would convict me." She repeated this, and Terry
answered, saying: "No, you could not find a jury that would convict
any one for killing the old villain," referring to Judge Field.
The jailer at Alameda testified that one day Mrs. Terry showed him the
sheath of her husband's knife, saying: "That is the sheath of that big
bowie-knife that the Judge drew. Don't you think it is a large knife?"
Judge Terry was present, and laughed and said: "Yes; I always carry
that," meaning the knife.
To J.H. O'Brien, a well-known citizen, Judge Terry said that "after
he got out of jail he would horsewhip Judge Field. He said he did not
think he would ever return to California, but this earth was not large
enough to keep him from finding Judge Field, and horsewhipping him,"
and said, "if he resents it I will kill him."
To a newspaper writer, Thomas T. Williams, he said: "Judge Field
would not dare to come out to the Pacific Coast, and he would have a
settlement with him if he did come."
J.M. Shannon, a friend of Terry's for thirty years, testified that
while the Terrys were in jail he called there with Mr. Wigginton,
formerly a member of Congress from California; that during the call
Mrs. Terry said something to her husband to the effect that they could
not do anything at all in regard to it. He said: "Yes, we can." She
asked what they could do. He said: "I can kill old Sawyer, damn him. I
will kill old Sawyer, and then the President will have to appoint some
one in his place." In saying this "he brought his fist down hard and
seemed to be mad."