THREATENING CLOUDS OF WAR
Sinister tension in the international air--The Hague
Treaties--Germany's opposition to satisfactory understandings--New
spirit of international good-will gains popular momentum--A
conference with Secretary Hay--The Senate jealous of its authority;
the treaties are not submitted--My address before the New York
Peace Society--Other addresses on world peace--Carnegie's notable
efforts--My lectures at the United States Naval War College at
Newport--Conflicts of sovereignty respecting naturalized
citizens--The Lake Mohonk Conferences--The American Society of
International Law is founded--Distinguished speakers at first
annual meeting--The Society's growth and permanence--Roosevelt
astounds the world by sending the fleet around the world--The
homecoming of the fleet--Opposition to free tolls for American
ships in coastwise trade--The Mexican problem and my suggestions to
the President as to how to meet it--Italy makes war on Turkey for
Tripoli--Other Powers fail to grasp their opportunity to effect
peaceful adjustment--My protests and warnings are published by "The
Outlook"--The outburst of wars in the Balkans--Germany's ruthless
aggressive policy is disclosed.
The ominous clouds, visible from time to time on the diplomatic horizon
during my last mission to Turkey, had latterly expanded from only local
significance into implications of greater and more sinister magnitude.
It had accordingly grown more and more apparent to me that the tinder
box of Europe, the Eastern Question, was likely to burst into flames at
almost any moment; and, in common with other close observers, I was not
unaware of an inscrutable and widespread tension in the international
air.
It seemed to many of us that America, which had so long remained wrapped
rather complacently in its cloak of isolation, might have a stern duty
to perform, not only to itself, but to the rest of the world. That duty
seemed to us to involve the immediate need of a more vigorous promotion
of world peace and of the specific and definite designing and
constructing of a proper machinery of enforcement.
In 1899, and again in 1907, to be sure, we had taken a leading part in
the two Hague Peace Conferences, at the first of which twenty-six, and
in the second of which forty-four, nations participated. These nations
had signed and ratified the various treaties formulated by the two
conferences. The first conference was called by the Emperor of Russia.
Its main purpose, as stated in the Russian note proposing the
conference, was by means of international discussion and agreement to
provide the most effective means for ensuring to all peoples the
benefits of a real and lasting peace, and, above all, to limit the
progressive development of armaments.
Soon after the conference assembled, it was found that no agreement
could be reached respecting the limitation of armaments, whereupon the
attention of the delegates was chiefly directed to formulating plans for
the peaceful settlement of international disputes. This resulted in the
adoption of a treaty of arbitration entitled: "Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes." The American, the
British, and the delegates of several other leading Powers favored an
agreement for compulsory arbitration of all matters of a juridical
nature; but this was opposed at the first conference by Germany,[2] and
again at the second conference. The treaty, however, in a modified and
purely optional form, was adopted, though it fell short, by reason of
Germany's opposition, of much that it was hoped to attain; yet it was a
distinct gain in providing definite machinery for the maintenance of
peace and the adjustment of international differences by peaceful means.
[Footnote 2: Andrew D. White, chairman of the American delegation,
states in his diary: "It now appears (June 9, 1899) that the German
Emperor is determined to oppose the whole scheme of arbitration, and
will have nothing to do with any plan for a regular tribunal whether as
given in the British or the American scheme. This news comes from
various sources and is confirmed by the fact that in the sub-committee
one of the German delegates, Professor Zorn of Koenigsberg, who had
become very earnest in behalf of arbitration, now says that he may not
be able to vote for it. There are also signs that the German Emperor is
influencing the minds of his allies, the sovereigns of Austria, Italy,
Turkey, and Roumania, leading them to oppose it." (_Autobiography of
Andrew Dickson White_, vol. II, pp. 293-94.)]
In the development of international relations, in case of the threat of
war or of actual war, it was regarded as an unfriendly act for outside
Powers to tender good offices or to mediate in the cause of peace. This
unfortunate and unrighteous condition was radically changed and indeed
reversed by the treaty; the signatories agreed not only to have recourse
to the good offices or mediation of friendly Powers, but agreed also
that such Powers should on their own initiative tender such good offices
to the States at variance, and that such overtures should never be
regarded as an unfriendly act by either of the parties in dispute.
Especially in our country and in Great Britain, these treaties awakened
anew the spirit of international justice and good-will, and there ensued
many meetings designed to inform and stimulate popular interest in the
cause of world peace.
* * * * *
John W. Foster, former Secretary of State, who had been in New York a
short time before as a member of a committee to provide for a public
meeting urging the ratification of the arbitration treaties, had made an
appointment for me to meet Secretary Hay for a conference regarding
them. I met Mr. Foster at the Cosmos Club and went with him to meet Mr.
Hay at the latter's residence. Hay, as usual, met us in his gracious way
and we discussed the subject from all sides. My main concern was that
these little arbitration treaties, which excepted questions of "vital
interest and national honor," should not have the effect of abridging
the broader provisions of the Hague Treaty. I had brought with me a
draft of a treaty which guarded against such contingencies, with which
Mr. Foster seemed to be in agreement.
Hay said he fully caught my idea, but that it had been desired to make
all of these treaties alike and to conform with the one between France
and Great Britain. He said it would be difficult enough, as it was, to
get these treaties through the Senate, as there was considerable
opposition, and therefore it was advisable to have these treaties with
the several Powers identical; otherwise separate arguments would be made
against each of the treaties. The Secretary asked me, however, to leave
with him the draft I had prepared, saying that it might prove very
useful to him.
The final upshot was that these treaties, to which Hay had devoted so
much care and thought during his last months in Washington, and by which
he hoped to lessen the likelihood of war throughout the world, were
violently opposed in the Senate on the ground that they deprived it of
its constitutional rights. Senators Knox and Spooner and their followers
took the view that every separate agreement to arbitrate under these
treaties must be submitted to the Senate. An amendment to this effect
emasculated the main purposes of the treaty and left the subject of
arbitration substantially as it would be without any treaties. As Hay
stated, Roosevelt saw the situation plainly enough and decided not to
submit the treaties for ratification by the other Powers.
* * * * *
On my return home from Turkey, the New York Peace Society, of which I
had been the president until I entered the Cabinet in 1906, and whose
membership and activities had been very much enlarged under my
successor, Andrew Carnegie, gave me a reception on January 7, 1910, at
the Hotel Plaza, in New York. Mr. Carnegie, who was earnestly and
intensely devoted to the cause of international peace, and who had
donated the necessary money for the construction of the Peace Palace at
The Hague, presided at this reception, and made one of his
characteristic addresses. The subject of my talk was "The Threatening
Clouds of War," as they appeared to me to be gathering in the Near East
and in the Balkans.
It seemed to me that the most timely public service I could possibly
render during this period was to help arouse public opinion to a sense
of the imperative need of a newer view of world relations, and a genuine
public demand for an international understanding and machinery with
which peace might be maintained.
"World Peace" was therefore my subject when, on April 13th of the same
year, the Authors' Club tendered me a dinner "in recognition of my
public services at home and abroad." It was presided over by the veteran
author and publisher, Henry Holt, who nominated Mr. Carnegie as
toastmaster. Speeches were made by our ambassador to Berlin, David Jayne
Hill, by Rev. Dr. Thomas R. Slicer, Edward M. Shepard, Professor William
P. Trent, of Columbia University, and several others.
Though the Authors' Club has a comparatively small membership, limited
to members of the craft, yet there have sprung from its ranks a number
of our most eminent diplomatists, such as John Hay, Andrew D. White,
General Horace Porter, David Jayne Hill, Dr. Henry van Dyke, Seth Low,
and Frederick W. Holls. The last two were delegates to the First Hague
Peace Conference.
Determined to make the most of the growing popular agitation for the
promotion of international arbitration and peace, Mr. Carnegie soon
afterwards organized a great peace meeting which was held in Carnegie
Hall, New York City. The big hall was packed from pit to dome, and
thousands were unable to gain admission. The meeting was opened by Mr.
Carnegie, as presiding officer, and he was followed by Baron
d'Estournelles de Constant. In my address I specially emphasized neutral
duties in time of war and the inhibition upon neutrals to lend money to
belligerents pending war as being quite as much an unneutral act as the
selling of ships of war and armaments, as had been usually the case in
the past when money thus borrowed was used for that very purpose.
During the years 1903, 1904, and 1905, I devoted much attention to
questions affecting international relations. I was invited by Admiral
Chadwick, president of the United States Naval War College at Newport,
to deliver several lectures during the summer of 1903, and took for my
subject the protection of our citizens abroad, and surveyed the entire
subject of citizenship, native-born and naturalized. I pointed out that
by the law of July 27, 1868, it was specifically provided that
naturalized citizens while in foreign states shall receive from our
Government the same protection as to their persons and property that is
accorded to native-born citizens in like circumstances. All the European
countries denied the right of expatriation, while America from the
beginning had insisted upon that right as one of its basic elements of
liberty.
In several notable instances, our Navy had taken prompt action to uphold
American rights. One such case was that of Martin Coszta, a Hungarian
insurgent in the revolution of 1848-49, who escaped to Turkey and from
there came to the United States and made the usual declaration
preparatory to being naturalized under our laws. He returned to Turkey
in 1854, and at Smyrna he was seized while on shore and taken up by the
crew of an Austrian frigate and put in irons. Before the boat got under
way, an American frigate arrived and threatened to sink the Austrian
vessel unless Coszta was released. This led to an agreement under which
he was put in the custody of the French consul-general.
It is of the highest importance that the men of our Navy, especially
those in command of ships, should be conversant with the principles of
international law, as they are frequently called upon to act promptly.
This conflict of sovereignty respecting naturalized citizens caused the
war between us and Great Britain in 1812. Beginning with 1868, we
concluded treaties of naturalization with the German States and
Austria-Hungary, and subsequently with most of the other States.
My address was subsequently published in the quarterly proceedings of
the College of March, 1904. The following year I delivered another
address before the College on international relations specifically with
reference to Russia and the United States. This address was likewise
published in the proceedings of the Naval War College, and with some
modifications appeared in the "North American Review" of August, 1905.
* * * * *
For a number of years many of the leading men of the country who were
interested in international relations were annually, at the beginning of
the summer, the guests of Messrs. Smiley at their noted hotel at Lake
Mohonk. These gatherings were known as the Lake Mohonk Conferences on
International Arbitration, lasted several days, and addresses were made
upon various international subjects.
At the conference of 1905, it occurred to some of the members who were
in attendance, who had long entertained the idea that an American
society devoted exclusively to the interests of international law should
be formed, that, in view of the large attendance that year of many
prominent men interested in the subject, it would be a propitious time
to organize. James Brown Scott, Professor of International Law at
Columbia University, and Professor George W. Kirchwey, Dean of the Law
School of the University, were most active in promoting the idea. A
preliminary meeting was called, and about fifty of the gentlemen in
attendance at the conference took part. They elected me as chairman,
Professor James Brown Scott as secretary, and appointed a committee of
twenty-one to effect a permanent organization. The committee so
appointed consisted of the following: Chandler P. Anderson, James B.
Angell, Professor Joseph H. Beale, Jr., David J. Brewer, Charles Henry
Butler, J. M. Dickinson, John W. Foster, George Gray, Professor Charles
Noble Gregory, John W. Griggs, Professor George W. Kirchwey, Robert
Lansing, Professor John Bassett Moore, W. W. Morrow, Professor Leo S.
Rowe, Professor James B. Scott, Oscar S. Straus, Everett P. Wheeler,
Andrew D. White, Professor George G. Wilson, and Theodore S. Woolsey.
The American Society of International Law was formally organized on
January 12, 1906. Back of its founding was the firm belief that the
influence of an association of publicists and others, organized along
the lines indicated, would count for much in the formation of a sound
and rational body of doctrine concerning the true principles of
international relations.
The following editorial comment regarding this organization is quoted
from the January, 1907, issue of "The American Journal of International
Law":
While the necessity of such a society was felt by many, no serious
steps were taken until the summer of 1905. It occurred to some of
the members of the Mohonk Lake conference on international
arbitration, that a society devoted exclusively to the interests of
international law as distinct from international arbitration might
be formed and that the members of the Mohonk Conference would
supply a nucleus membership. Accordingly a call was issued to the
members present at the conference, and as the result of the call
and meeting of those interested a committee was appointed with
Oscar S. Straus as chairman and James B. Scott as secretary, to
consider plans for a definite organization and for the publication
of a journal exclusively devoted to international law as the organ
of the Society. On December 9th, 1905, a meeting of the committee
was held at the residence of Oscar S. Straus in New York City, and
as the result of favorable reports of the members present it
appeared feasible to proceed immediately to the definitive
organization of the Society. Accordingly a call was issued by the
chairman for a meeting of those interested in international law and
its popularization, to be held at the New York Bar Association, on
Friday, January 12th, 1906.
At this meeting it was decided to organize upon a permanent basis a
society of those interested in the spread of international law with
its ideals of justice and therefore of peace; a constitution was
adopted; officers were elected and the Society took its place, it
is hoped, permanently among the learned and influential societies
of the world.
On April 19 and 20, 1907, was held the first annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law, at Washington, which was attended
by an unexpectedly large number of members. The society had grown, in
the short time since its organization, to a membership of over five
hundred. The various sessions were devoted to discussions of
international topics, and closed with a banquet presided over by
Secretary Root, and addresses were made by several speakers, including
two former Secretaries of State, namely, Richard Olney and John W.
Foster, as well as by James Bryce, General Horace Porter, and the
writer.
To-day the society has more than twelve hundred members, and since 1907
it has regularly held annual meetings and issued its quarterly
publication, "The American Journal of International Law." Since the
beginning, Elihu Root has been the president, with whom are associated
as vice-presidents and members of the executive council more than forty
of the leading writers and authorities, Senators and judges, including
the Chief Justice of the United States. I still am the chairman of the
executive committee, of which Professor Scott has from the beginning
been the recording secretary, as well as the editor-in-chief of the
"Journal." An analytical index of the fourteen volumes of the "Journal"
(1907-20) has recently been prepared by George A. Finch, secretary of
the board of editors.
* * * * *
While these various groups were pressing forward on their respective
avenues of approach to a better understanding between nations, President
Roosevelt was applying his energies to the problem in his own way. His
method was in this instance characterized by a strikingly objective and
dramatic treatment. He firmly believed that the greater power a peaceful
nation has to make war in a world threatened by war, the greater becomes
its power to command peace. The peace societies will not endorse this
contention; but the history of international relations gives force to
that proposition. Such are international amenities, paradoxical as it
may appear.
Roosevelt's terse message to a world threatened by war was to send a
great fleet of battleships on a voyage round the world.
The fleet was scheduled to return to Hampton Roads on Washington's
birthday, February 22, 1908. It was to be reviewed on its arrival by the
President. Admiral Adolph Marix, the chairman of the Lighthouse Board in
my Department, in the tender Maple took my wife and me, Mr. and Mrs.
Leonard Hockstader, my son-in-law and daughter, and several officials of
the Department to Hampton Roads, and we steamed out to the tail of the
Horse Shoe some ten miles from Old Point Comfort. At the appointed time,
eleven o'clock that day, Admiral Sperry in his flagship Connecticut
passed in review before the President, and following him came the
twenty-four battleships consisting of the sixteen ships that went around
the Horn, and eight additional ones, most of which had been completed
since the squadron had left the Atlantic on this voyage sixteen months
before. These ships had steamed 42,000 miles without any hitch or any
casualty, or any untoward circumstance.
When the President first decided that this trip should be made, all
kinds of hostile criticism bristled in the press of the country. But the
President, with his usual alertness, had several far-sighted purposes in
view. He says in his "Autobiography": "At that time, as I happened to
know neither the English nor the German authorities believed it possible
to take a fleet of great battleships around the world, I made up my mind
that it was time to have a show-down in the matter; because if it was
really true that our fleet could not get from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, it was much better to know it and be able to shape our policy
in view of the knowledge."
The great show of naval strength on the part of the United States that
this voyage illustrated naturally had its effect throughout the world. A
strength that is not menacing tends to allay menace. And in this
instance the visit of the fleet to Japan was promptly interpreted by
the Japanese as one of courtesy and good-will. The President, again and
again in his public utterances, as well as in his private statements at
Cabinet meetings, had emphasized his view that a strong navy makes for
peace. And toasting the admirals and captains in the cabin of the
Mayflower, he exclaimed:
"Isn't it magnificent? Nobody after this will forget that the American
coast is on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic!"
The home-coming of the fleet was a most imposing sight. The weather was
beautiful, and altogether the function appeared as calm and peaceful as
if it had been a magnificent pleasure excursion, which indeed it had
proved to be.
* * * * *
On my return to America in the fall of 1913, there were two notable
questions that occupied the attention of President Wilson and Congress,
in which as a private citizen I had taken some part. I was soon invited
by the National Republican Club to take part in a luncheon discussion of
"Present World Problems," and this enabled me to discuss a subject that
had resulted in a plank in the National Platform of the Progressive
Party, "that American ships engaged in coastwise trade shall pay no
tolls." As this question did not arise in the New York State campaign, I
had had no occasion to discuss it except on one occasion when I was
asked what my stand was upon that subject, and I plainly stated that I
did not favor the remission of tolls, as it conflicted with the spirit,
if not with the express wording, of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and that
I would only favor it in the event the question were left to arbitration
and decided in our favor. In this discussion I went somewhat fully into
the subject, making it clear why I was not in favor of free tolls, and
why I supported the President in the stand that he had taken for repeal
of the act that freed our coastwise ships from such tolls.
Others who spoke at this luncheon on various phases of the general
problem were William L. Mackenzie King, at this writing the Premier of
Canada, and Miss Mabel T. Boardman, representing the American Red Cross.
In April the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals held hearings upon
an act to amend the Panama Canal Act repealing the provision providing
for freeing coastwise American ships from tolls. Upon invitation I
appeared before this committee and supported the position that the
President had taken, in opposition to the provisions of the platform of
his party, for the repeal of the free tolls clause. Upon the urgent
request of the President, the repealing act was passed. Some of our
ablest Senators, regardless of party, took opposing sides upon this
question. Elihu Root, who was then Senator, presented, in my judgment,
the most convincing argument and the ablest speech of his distinguished
career in the Senate, advocating the repeal of the free tolls clause.
* * * * *
Another international subject which I was carefully studying at this
time was our relations with Mexico. I felt then, as I do now, that our
Government has often been badly served and wrongly advised in regard to
affairs in Mexico. I suggested to the President that he should send to
Mexico a commission of experienced men who could in a comparatively
short time lay before him the true conditions as a guide for our
governmental action. I pointed out that under circumstances different,
but no less perplexing, this plan had been adopted by Cleveland during
the Venezuela trouble, and that the appointment of that commission, of
which Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court was chairman, had hastened
the solution. When the idea of the United States sending a commission
such as I recommended became publicly known, it was favorably received
by General Huerta, the then President of Mexico, as well as by Carranza.
The appointment of such a commission would have had the additional
effect of offsetting the pressure in Congress for intervention, and
several of the leading Senators expressed themselves as favoring it.
* * * * *
When storm clouds are rushing across the sky, it is very difficult to
foretell where the lightning will strike. It is needless here to discuss
the professed but spurious reasons why Italy declared war upon Turkey in
1911. It was evident that no _casus belli_ existed in any international
sense. The naked fact was that Italy determined to have a slice of
northern Africa, and was favored in that craving by several of the Great
Powers, chiefly to prevent Germany from getting a foothold on the
Mediterranean. I knew from my observations in Turkey that this
aggressive action on the part of Italy would far transcend the interest
of either Italy or Turkey, and would inevitably arouse the restless
Balkan Powers to action.
In a communication that I sent to Secretary of State Knox on September
29, 1911, attention was directed to what would probably be the outcome
of this action on the part of Italy; also that the Hague Treaty not only
sanctioned, but made it morally incumbent upon Powers that were
strangers to the dispute, to tender their good offices for the purpose
of a peaceful adjustment. Just because the United States could not be
accused of having any direct interest, such an offer could have been
made with best grace by our country. If ever there had been a war of
conquest, that was one. One of the London papers had frankly criticized
Italy's precipitous act as that of "pirate, brigand, and buccaneer."
In an article written for "The Outlook" following a number of public
addresses upon the same subject, I pointed out that Turkey, both
immediately before and since hostilities began, had appealed to the
Christian nations of the world, who were co-signatories with her of the
Hague Treaty, to use their good offices for peace, but the Christian
nations had declined to act. In this article I stated:
So far as it opens an era possibly of the gravest menace to Europe,
it is primarily of European concern; but in so far as the
provisions of the Peace Treaty are disregarded by neutral Powers,
this is a grave moral loss no less for us than for all nations, the
magnitude of which is not lessened, but increased by the fact that
Christian Italy is making an unprovoked war upon a Mohammedan
Power. The efforts to bring about a peaceful adjustment under the
circumstances is not only a moral right, but a right under the
Convention in which Turkey, Italy, and the United States are
equally signatories with the other forty-one nations.
The international moral damage this war entails is the concern of
all nations. The manner in which it was precipitated without first
having recourse to the enlightened methods of peaceful adjustment,
combined with the concerted refusal of European Powers to attempt
mediation, will make peace treaties waste paper, and peace
professions of civilized nations sham and hypocrisy.
In quick succession this war was followed in 1912 by the first Balkan
war against Turkey, and then in 1913 by the second Balkan war, between
the Balkan nations themselves to divide the spoils. For thirty years the
Treaty of Berlin (1878) had served to maintain European peace. The first
breach was the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. The
second was the Italian-Turkish war, followed by the Balkan wars. The
toll of these latter wars entailed a sacrifice of 300,000 dead or
permanently disabled on the field of battle; and the immediate
consequence was to upset "the balance of power" so that the Great Powers
at once heavily extended their armies and navies, and their budgets ran
wild.
* * * * *
Probably the most illuminating document concerning the conditions that
led up to the World War is the Lichnowsky Memorandum which is entitled:
"My London Mission, 1912-1914." I had known Prince Lichnowsky when he
was one of the secretaries of the German Embassy during my first mission
to Turkey. He was appointed ambassador to England after the death of
Baron Marschall in September, 1912. This memorandum was prepared as a
personal record during the second year of the war, and, after being
privately circulated, was, by design or otherwise, published. It is the
most convincing indictment of Germany's ruthless aggressive policy, and
it naturally brought down upon its author the severest condemnation of
the Emperor and the militarists. Germany's reiterated claim that Great
Britain, having designed Germany's destruction, sought to justify the
large increase of her navy, was disproved by her own ambassador.
The events that resolved themselves into the World War, as well as the
World War itself, are most convincing proofs that the preservation of
peace is a matter of common interest to the entire family of nations,
and that it must not be left to a single member of this group to disturb
the world's peace at will.