Ti-ping Operations.--Chinese Apathy.--The Ti-ping
Difficulty.--Popular Feeling.--Opposed to the
Ti-pings.--England's Policy.--Her Motives.--Dr. Bridgman
describes Ti-pingdom.--His Description of the Ti-pings.--X. Y.
Z.--Ti-pingdom in 1857.--Its Internal Economy.--Lord Elgin at
Nankin.--Gallant Exploit.--Its Interpretation.--Hung-jin arrives
at Nankin.--Hung-jin's Adventures.--Mr. Hamberg's
Narrative.--Hung-jin's Pamphlet.--Hung-jin Prime
Minister.--Nankin Invested.--Resumption of
Hostilities.--"Indemnity" demanded.--Conditions of Peace.--Cause
of Wars with China.--England's Foreign Policy.--The Opium Wars.
Towards the close of 1854, the detached armies of Ti-pings were
gradually compelled to abandon their isolated positions, and retire
closer upon their capital. During October, after forwarding all the
supplies obtainable to the treasury and granaries of Nankin, the Western
armies evacuated the important cities of Wu-chang, Han-yang, and Hankow,
and collecting the garrisons of the many others between them and Nankin,
retired quickly upon the latter, the siege of which the Imperialists
were beginning to press with a vigour encouraged by the weakness of the
garrison. This army falling rapidly upon the rear of the enemy's works,
put them to flight with great slaughter, and completely raised the
siege. After this, another force was marched to the relief of
Chin-kiang, which was also invested by a considerable Imperialist army.
At the close of the year, both Nankin and Chin-kiang were effectually
relieved, and the besieging armies driven back upon the cities of
Soo-chow and Shanghae in confusion. With the exception of the Northern
army, in occupation of the north side of the Yang-tze from Ngan-king to
Kwei-chow, nearly all the Ti-ping forces were concentrated in and about
the cities of Nankin and Chin-kiang, when, again committing the error
former experience should have taught him to avoid, the Tien-wang
separated his forces, and despatched several armies upon widely
divergent courses.
The principal operations were conducted towards the south, in the
provinces of Kiang-su, Ngan-whui, and the borders of Che-kiang and
Kiang-si, and towards the west, along the old route of the Yang-tze and
beyond the Tung-ting lake. Early in 1855 the Western division,
successful in all its operations, reached the city of Hankow, and
Wu-chang, the provincial capital, was for the third time carried by
storm, the Manchoo defenders suffering fearful loss. The Ti-pings now
held the three cities for a longer period than before; but, although
they obtained numerous recruits, they were unable to occupy the
adjoining provinces permanently and rescue them from the Manchoo rule.
The people at large, finding the revolution was to a certain extent
stationary, naturally waited for some grand and combined movement likely
to overthrow the Manchoo rule, and, however much they would have
rejoiced at the change, were careful to avoid implicating themselves
against the government until the prospect of success became more
apparent. The fearful experience of former failures warned the nation to
be cautious--in fact, the cautious alone remained in the land of the
living, the indiscriminate massacres after the slightest attempt at
rebellion having exterminated nearly every noble and patriotic spirit in
China. Besides, many who might otherwise have hazarded the venture held
back on account of the Ti-ping profession of Christianity (a change of
the ancient national train of custom and ideas what they not only looked
upon with suspicion, but with actual abhorrence). The hatred of the
Manchoo must indeed have been intense--or rather, the hand of God
powerful--to overcome the old and jealous prejudices of more than 2,000
years, and give the Tien-wang even any adherents.
The Southern army, breaking into several divisions during 1855, was
mostly victorious; many cities were captured, and large supplies of
every necessary and war material taken. Partisans were sent into all the
southern provinces and many local insurrections stimulated, but all too
feeble and desultory to be of any real assistance to the cause; though
the prompt and savage punishments inflicted by the Manchoo authorities
undoubtedly proved very damaging, the fear they inspired awing the
people into submission, and terrifying them from rising in rebellion
again.
For more than a year the Southern and Western armies maintained their
position; but early in 1856 they were again forced to retire upon
Nankin, which had become reinvested by the Imperialists. It will thus be
seen that, while the Ti-pings were detaching small armies just able to
overcome the local Manchoo authorities, the Imperialists, after
reinforcing the provincial troops so as to enable them to dispute the
ground with varying success, invariably concentrated all their reserves
and spare forces before Nankin. Considering that the Imperialists had
vastly superior numbers, and, moreover, held the whole of the revenue,
and completely surrounded the insurgents upon every side, the greatly
superior organization and courage of the Ti-pings is sufficiently proved
by the fact that they were able to compete with their more
advantageously situated enemy so successfully.
In the middle of the year, the Imperialists were attacked by the
recalled Ti-ping forces, before the city of Chin-kiang, and were
defeated with heavy loss; about the same time, their lines before Nankin
were assaulted by another division and completely broken up.
In this year an event took place, the consequences of which have proved
almost fatal to the Ti-ping revolution. From a period long anterior to
the commencement of the movement, the position of Europeans in China
was most unsatisfactory. The growing dread the Manchoos entertained of
foreign intercourse urged them to the adoption of the most repulsive and
arrogant behaviour upon all occasions, and it was just at the period
this was becoming almost unbearable that the Ti-ping insurrection took
place. It was therefore only natural that Europeans should regard the
rising power favourably. Directly the organization and professions of
the Tien-wang became fully known, it was almost the universal practice
to warmly advocate his cause, and sound thrilling pæans in his praise.
The clergy and religious world went half mad with joy; the societies for
providing Bibles for the naked savages who could not read them, almost
feared their work was coming to an end; and the mercantile part of the
foreign world entered into the wildest speculations (excepting the opium
smugglers). Eagerly the clerical expounders of mercy and goodwill wrote
home glowing accounts of the success of their teaching--blessed by an
overruling Providence!--eagerly the whole body of merchants, officials,
adventurers, &c., watched for some favourable prospect of _profit_, or,
as the thing is speciously termed, of "placing our commercial and
political relations upon a satisfactory basis"! All these benevolent and
large-minded Europeans waited a little, and when they found the
profitable change would probably take a long time to perfect, while in
the interval their gain _might_ be diminished, it was absolutely
wonderful how their sympathy--like Bob Acre's courage--oozed out at
their fingers' ends. Events soon occurred that extinguished the last
remnant of philanthropy. The missionaries (only a certain portion of
them, be it remembered) found out they could not take all the credit of
the rebellion to themselves,--or rather the religious element of it;
therefore they gradually cooled down, and some of them began to revile
it, at the same time taking precious good care not to put themselves to
inconvenience by going to teach the Ti-pings where they were in error.
The political and commercial body also found they would have to wait for
their ambitious and profitable projects, which did not suit them at all.
It was at such a crisis, the seizure of the opium-smuggling lorcha
_Arrow_ afforded a pretext for an appeal to arms; and this furnished all
those favourable circumstances, hitherto expected from the Ti-ping
movement, by a shorter and more direct road. It was sufficient for a
portion of the body mercantile, that they would get their nefarious
opium traffic legalized, and their general trade increased; it was
sufficient for the body politic that they would be able to place their
diplomatic affairs upon a satisfactory standing, and so humble the power
of the Chinese government as to be able to do with it whatever they
liked, _compelling_ it to conform to their will in every way--and all
for nothing, as the Manchoo government would be made pay the expenses
England would incur by an aggressive war. The Ti-pings were at once
thrown overboard. It mattered not that their cause was righteous and
holy; it was no longer _profitable_ to the British _trader_ or his
_government_, and with the usual error of mean selfishness, they took it
for granted that the Manchoos would always remain powerless, or else
forget to retaliate when they became able, for the gross treatment they
had received; neither could they perceive that although delays might
interpose before the final success of the Ti-pings, yet that, after a
short probation, the willing and unrestricted commerce the latter would
encourage, would be more profitable than the unwilling and forced trade
the Manchoos were _coerced_ into. Although meanness is generally the
result of ignorance, it seems almost a fatality that so large a portion
of Englishmen should have acted so wrongfully, and have been so
forgetful of their national fair-play. The whole affair speaks too
plainly of avarice and incompetent statesmanship.
Commander Brine, R.N., in his valuable and fairly-expressed work, "The
Taeping Rebellion," at pages 271-2, very truthfully observes:--
"The principal reason for the decline of the popularity of the
rebellion amongst Europeans may be found in the great change
that has occurred in our political relations with the Manchoo
government."
Again, speaking of the treaty settled after the "lorcha _Arrow_ war," he
says:--
"Two of its clauses, noted below, not only made the further
progress of the Taepings _unprofitable_, but absolutely made
their simple existence most objectionable to all Europeans who
hoped to open _trade_ with those provinces lying adjacent to the
upper waters of the Yang-tze. When Lord Elgin proceeded to
Han-kow, _he_ evidently looked upon them as a mere body of
rebels, sooner or later to be suppressed by government, and that
they in the interval interfered with the due carrying into
execution the terms of his treaty. Consequently he was not
inclined to show them much favour."
In this perfectly true conclusion is concealed the real motive of the
conduct the British _Government_ has pursued towards the Ti-pings. Not
only in China, but over the whole world--from Denmark to America, from
Abyssinia to Brazil, from New Zealand to Japan,--the policy of England
has been derogatory to her dignity, and would be calculated to elicit
merely feelings of contempt were it not so dangerous to her future
welfare. It seems, however, that the majority of Englishmen are
satisfied with a course of administration which advocates "peace at any
price," except when war can be undertaken with impunity, and some
aggression committed upon a weak neighbour, who is then compelled to pay
all the expenses. I, for one, protest against such lowering of England's
dignity and "just influence." I protest against the sacrifice of
national honour to mercenary interest,--of principle to profit.
Commander Brine's opinion has been amply verified--he wrote it early in
1862; since which period England, regardless of all pledges of
neutrality, has deliberately upheld the Manchoo dynasty, and made war
upon the Ti-pings, not to support any high principle, but prompted by
regard for the indemnity money to be wrested from the Imperialists,
influenced by the profits of the opium trade, and anxious to support the
Elgin treaty, which otherwise would have become inoperative.
It is no less singular than true, that the wars with the Manchoo
government in reality weakened it but very little:--in the first place,
the British troops were always met by the local forces, none being
withdrawn from opposition to the internal danger, which was dreaded much
more than any arising from the foreign expeditions;--in the second, the
indemnity money being deducted from the increased duties levied upon the
foreign trade, instead of impoverishing the Manchoo exchequer, was taken
directly from the pockets of the foreign merchants; and although the
exchequer was so much less in hand, it could hardly be looked upon as a
loss, considering that only one-fifth of the gross customs revenue of
the ports open to foreign trade was taken, and that the trade has
enlarged amply enough to make the returns, minus the indemnity, more
than equal to what they were before the war.
Subsequent to the visit of H.M.S. _Hermes_, and the French steamer
_Cassini_, the next communication between the Ti-pings and Europeans
took place a little more than a year later, when the American minister
visited Nankin in the U.S. frigate _Susquehanna_. The few extracts I
give from the accounts of the Rev. Dr. Bridgeman, and another writer,
X.Y.Z., each members of the expedition, coincide exactly with all
opinions ever given of the Ti-pings by credible people who have held
personal intercourse with them; and it is a singular, if not a sinister
circumstance, that these accounts are _all totally different_ from the
dispatches of Sir F. Bruce (British minister at Pekin), and consuls of
similar tendencies, who have either never seen the Ti-pings, or at all
events know nothing of their government, life, and manners.
The following are extracts from the Rev. Dr. Bridgeman:--
"1. Their government is a theocracy, the development apparently
of what is believed by them to be a new dispensation. As in the
case of the Israelites under Moses, they regard themselves as
directed by one who has been raised up by the Almighty to be the
executor of his will on earth.
"5. Their government is administered with _remarkable energy_.
"Far in the distance, hovering over the hill-tops--southward
from Chin-kiang-foo, the guardian city of the Great Canal, and
northward from Nankin, we saw encamped small bands of the
Imperialists, while all the armed multitudes in, and immediately
around these two cities, wrought up almost to frenzy, seemed
eager to rush forth and take vengeance on them as their deadly
foes,--'fat victims,' said they, 'fit only for slaughter.' They
exulted as they exhibited to us the scars and the wounds they
had received in bloody conflicts with the Manchoo troops, always
called by them, 'monster imps.'
"6. Their _order_ and _discipline_ are no less remarkable than
their energy. Under this new _régime_, both tobacco and opium
are prohibited.
"Every kind of strong drink, too, would seem to come into the
same category, and if any is used, it is only by special
permission."
At the city of Wuhu:--
"The people had returned:--whole families,--men, women, and
children,--were seen in their own houses, merchants in their
shops, and market people going and coming with provisions; all
most submissive to the officers and police, as they passed along
the streets.
"It was at their 'holy city,' however, as they frequently called
their new capital, that their _order_ and _discipline_ were
observed in the greatest perfection. Parts of the city were
appropriated exclusively for the uses of the wives and daughters
of those men who were abroad, as their armies, or elsewhere
employed in the public service.
"Everywhere else, as well as in the 'holy city,' extreme
watchfulness was observed in the maintenance of order; and all
irregularities, and infractions of the laws, were rebuked or
punished with a promptitude seldom seen among the Chinese. All
persons, without exception, had their appointed places and their
appropriate duties assigned, _and all moved like clockwork_."
Their unity of purpose Dr. Bridgeman speaks of as follows:--
"There is no community separate from their one body politic; at
least none appears, and no traces of any could we find."
Of their religion he reported:--
"Christians they may be in name; and they are, in very deed,
iconoclasts of the strictest order. They have in their
possession probably the entire Bible, both the Old and New
Testaments; and are publishing what is usually known as
'Gutzlaff's Version' of the same.
"Their ideas of the Deity are exceedingly imperfect. Though they
declare plainly that there is 'only One True God,' yet the
inspiration of the Holy Scriptures,[28] the equality of the Son
with the Father,[29] and many other doctrines generally received
by Protestant Christians, as being clearly revealed in the
Bible, are by them wholly ignored. True, they have formulas in
which some of these doctrines are taught; but then they are
borrowed formulas, and they have used them without comprehending
their true import. So I believe; and I think this is made
manifestly plain in the new version of their Doxology, or Hymn
of Praise, where Yang-sen-tsing, the Eastern King, is proclaimed
the Paraclete--the Holy Spirit."[30]
Dr. Bridgeman continues:--
"Our Saturday we found observed by them as a Sabbath-day; but
they appeared not to have any houses for public worship, nor any
Christian teachers, ministers of the Gospel so called. Forms of
domestic worship, forms of prayer, of thanksgiving, &c. &c.,
they have; and all their people, even such as cannot read, are
required to learn and use these. We saw them repeatedly at their
devotions; some of them were exceedingly reverent and devout,
while others were quite the reverse. Most, who were asked to do
it, promptly recited that form of the Decalogue which is given
in their tracts.
"A form of baptism was spoken of by them; but no allusion was
made by them to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper.
"We found them, according to their reformed calendar, discarding
the old notions of lucky places, times, &c."
Speaking of the public notices seen on the walls, he says:--
"The distribution of food, of clothes, and of medicines; the
payment of taxes, the preservation of property, the observance
of etiquette and decorum; and injunctions to repair to certain
quarters for vaccination,--these were among the topics discussed
in them. One document announced the names of sundry candidates
who had been successful in winning honours at a recent literary
examination in the Heavenly capital."
Thus, it appears, the "ignorant coolies" were literary coolies. It was
late in 1854 when Dr. Bridgeman visited Nankin, and thus wrote
concerning the power and extent of the rebellion:--
"Their _numerical strength, and the extent of territory under
their control_, are by no means inconsiderable. They said they
had undisputed control from Chin-kiang-foo, four hundred miles
up the Great River; and that besides the large numbers of troops
garrisoned and intrenched about Chin-kiang, Kwa-chow, and the
'Heavenly capital,' they had _four armies_ in the field,
carrying on active aggressive operations; two of these had gone
northward, one along the Grand Canal, and one farther westward;
they were designed to co-operate, and after storming and
destroying Pekin, to turn westward and march through Shansi,
Shensi, Kians-oo, into Sze-chuen, where they are expected to
meet their other two armies, which from Kiang-si and the Lake
provinces, are to move up the Great River, and along through the
regions on its southern bank.
"The _personal appearance_ of their men in arms, and of their
women on horseback, was novel. They formed a very heterogeneous
mass, having been brought together from several different
provinces, principally from Gnang-wui, Keang-si, Hoopeh,
Kwang-si, and Kwang-tung. The finest men we saw were from the
hills of Kiang-si, and those from Hoonan were the meanest and
least warlike. Their arms and accoutrements were quite after the
old fashion of the Chinese; but their red and yellow turbans,
their _long hair_, and their silk and satin robes, so unlike the
ordinary costume of the 'black-haired' troops, made the
insurgents appear like a new race of warriors. All the people we
saw were very well clad, well fed, and well provided for in
every way. They all seemed content, and in high spirits, _as if
sure of success_."
It will be seen that Dr. Bridgeman thought--as every one else did until
the arbitrary interference of the British _Government_--that the
"progress, and ultimate success," of the Ti-pings was certain, "under
the inscrutable providence of God."
The following are extracts from the communication written by X.Y.Z., and
published in the _North China Herald_ at that time.
"There is no change of policy or of feeling towards foreigners
since the visit of the _Hermes_. On the part of the people the
same _friendly_ feeling was manifested that was observed a year
ago.
"The visit of the _Susquehanna_ has put us in possession of
facts which prove that the insurgents have undisturbed control
of a large extent of country, so large as to furnish a guarantee
to their ultimate success. There seems to be nothing that can
prevent their triumph, but internal dissensions, of which at
present no symptoms appear.
"The city itself (Nankin) is under strict martial law, and
indeed is at present a mere military camp. The _most rigid
discipline and perfect order are maintained_.
"In passing through the city, little was seen to distinguish it
from other Chinese cities, except that some of the streets are
very wide, and appear to be kept in a state of cleanliness not
often seen in China.
"Whatever Hung-sui-tshuen may mean by calling himself the
brother of Jesus, it is but justice to say that no evidence was
found of its being insisted on as an essential article of faith
among the mass of his followers. And several officers who
subsequently visited the steamer, when asked what was meant by
it, professed themselves unable to give any information upon the
subject. They were so _evidently puzzled_, that it was plain
their attention had _never been called to the matter before_."
Speaking of the composition of the Ti-pings, X.Y.Z. says:--
"A few were from Kwang-se. These latter were all young men of
unusually fine appearance and more than ordinary intelligence,
and they were distinguished by some peculiarities of dress."
Of the civil administration he says:--
"The expedition reached the city of Wuhu on Thursday morning.
Here _the most cordial feeling was manifested_ by the
authorities and people. The visit to this place was of great
interest, as it afforded an opportunity of learning from
personal observation the character of the insurgent rule over
the people in districts which are no longer the seat of war. The
state of things is entirely different from that at Nankin. _The
people are engaged in their ordinary avocations, shops are
opened and trade carried on, as under the old régime_, though
the former prosperity of the place is by no means restored."
Upon perusing such statements, the British public will doubtless wonder
at the nature of the reports which emanated from their government, that
"the Ti-pings destroyed everything and restored nothing,"--were
"ruthless desolaters," "bloodthirsty marauders," "hordes of banditti,"
&c. It must, however, be remembered, that the authors of these
statements knew nothing about the Ti-pings; in some cases had never seen
one, and in all cases were anxious to meet the views of their official
superiors by prejudicing the public mind against the Ti-pings, and
thereby in some degree justifying the unwarrantable line of policy which
the British Government had decided on.
The year 1857 passed over without any important military movement, and
the Ti-ping Government was engaged in consolidating its power in the
districts and cities it held. The extent of territory and amount of
population entirely under their control was very considerable. They held
possession of about three-fourths of the large province of Ngan-whui,
one-third of Kiang-su, one-third of Kiang-si, and parts of Hoonan and
Hoopeh. In Kwang-si, Kwang-tung, Fo-keen, and Yun-nan, Ti-ping agents
were actively at work inciting the people to rise.
In the meanwhile, the administration of their territory was being
perfected;--the title "Wang" was reduced into a sort of feudal rank,
into which all governors of cities, lieutenant-governors, and governors
of provinces, and generalissimos, were admitted. The whole of their land
was divided into departments, or circles, each department into four
districts, and each district into twenty-five parishes. After the
governors of departments, or provinces, came the district chiefs, or
magistrates; then the parish magistrates; and then the five village
magistrates, or authorities, appointed over each circle of twenty-five
families. The Ti-ping territory included at this period not less than
70,000 square miles, with a population of about 25,000,000. At parts
where the Manchoo troops had been driven out of the country, a regular
system of monthly taxation was established, considerably more moderate
than the old. A tariff for the whole empire was published; while
throughout all their cities, the machinery of a regular government was
constituted, and the whole conducted with considerable energy and
success. The "Land Regulations of Political Economy of the Ti-ping
Dynasty" were put into force, and a large part of China reclaimed to
native administration. By these regulations, all land was divided into
nine classifications, and arranged according to produce. Divisions of
fields were arranged according to the number of persons in a family, and
the whole property was regulated as the document states, "so that all
the people in the empire may together enjoy the abundant happiness
provided by the Great God, our Heavenly Father and Universal Lord."
Periodical seasons were appointed for the examinations of literary
candidates, and filling of vacant offices. Harvest regulations and
community of interest were thus provided for:--
"As soon as harvest arrives, every vexillary must see to it,
that the five-and-twenty parishes under his charge have a
sufficient supply of food; and what is over and above of the new
grain he must deposit in the public granary. This must be done
with respect to wheat, pulse, flax, hemp, silk cloth, fowls, and
money; for the whole empire is the universal property of our
Heavenly Father, and when all the people of the empire avoid
selfishness, and consecrate everything to the Supreme Lord, then
the sovereign will have sufficient to use, and all the families
in the empire, in every place, will be equally provided for,
while every individual will be well fed and clothed."
From this system, and the vice-royalty of the governors, or wangs, the
Ti-ping government assumed a patriarchal feudal constitution. The
following regular conscription was levied:--
"If any man throughout the empire has a family, including wife
and children, amounting to three, four, five, six, seven, eight,
or nine individuals, he must give up one to be a soldier. With
regard to the rest, the widowers, widows, orphans, and
childless, together with the sick and feeble, shall be excused
from service, and shall all be fed from the public granary."
Religious observances were thus enjoined, in a manner which evinces a
spirit far different from that which the world was led to suppose
actuated the Ti-pings:--
"In every circle of five-and-twenty families, the youths must
every day go to the church, where the vexillary is to teach them
to read the holy books of the Old and New Testaments, as well as
the proclamations of the duly-appointed sovereign. Every
sabbath the five cinquevirs in the circle must lead the men and
women under their charge to the church, where the males and
females are to sit in separate rows. On these occasions there
will be preaching, thanksgivings, and offerings to our Heavenly
Father, the Great God and Supreme Lord. All officers and people,
both within and without the court, must every sabbath go to hear
the expounding of the Holy Book, reverently present their
offerings, and praise our Heavenly Father." "All the officers
throughout the empire, every sabbath day, must, according to
their rank, reverently and sincerely provide animals, with meat
and drink-offerings, for worship, in order to praise our
Heavenly Father; they must also explain the Holy Book. Should
any fail in this, they shall be degraded to the level of
plebeians."
During 1858 the Ti-pings continued their work of organization, and
undertook no military movement of importance. In consequence of so large
a concentration of their forces, supplies began to run short, and the
city of Chin-kiang was promptly abandoned, and a considerable force
detached into the province of Kiang-si. They still retained possession
of both banks of the Yang-tze for a distance of about 400 miles, and
large reinforcements were sent from Nankin to all their possessions upon
the northern side of that river.
In the meanwhile, Canton had been taken by the English and French
forces, the Taku forts had been captured on the 20th of May, and on the
3rd of July the Elgin treaty was concluded; a treaty that in all
respects proved nearly the death-warrant of the patriots.
On the 8th of November, Lord Elgin started from Shanghae upon the
expedition up the Yang-tze-kiang as far as Hankow.
On approaching Nankin, the squadron came into collision with the
Ti-pings in a similar, though more serious manner, than on the occasion
of the visit of the _Hermes_. Lord Elgin, with the characteristic
arrogance of Englishmen in foreign lands, disregarded the frequently
repeated and urgent request of the Ti-ping authorities; namely, that to
avoid misunderstandings as to men-of-war approaching their
fortifications during a time of battle and blockade (especially
considering the Manchoos had engaged some foreign vessels, and reported
continually that foreign war-steamers were preparing to attack Nankin,
&c.), "a small boat should be detached, to communicate with the
garrison; in which case there would be no chance of collision." By
referring to the visit of the _Hermes_, and the correspondence that took
place, it will be seen that she was followed by the Manchoo flotilla,
which took advantage of her presence to engage the Ti-ping forts, the
anxiety of the Ti-ping authorities upon which point pervades all their
communications to Sir George Bonham. Perfectly indifferent, then, to the
observance of a courtesy which any powerful belligerent in like
circumstances to those of the Ti-pings would have _compelled_, Lord
Elgin sent the gunboat _Lee_ ahead of the squadron,--"to communicate if
possible," as he reported. But instead of attempting the only correct
mode of communication in the case, by sending a boat in first, the
_Lee_, by her backing and filling in front of the batteries and
fortified positions, aided by the presence of a powerful squadron in the
rear, apparently awaiting the result of her reconnoitre, naturally led
the Ti-pings to suppose she was on the scout from a hostile fleet. In
consequence of this, the batteries opened fire on the _Lee_, and the
rest of the squadron, _prepared_ for the event, steamed up and opened
upon them with "considerable effect." Not satisfied with this, "they on
the following morning re-descended the stream to Nankin and bombarded
the forts, with but little reply for an hour and a half." What a gallant
exploit for British seamen! To silence forts which were perfectly
harmless, and slaughter the inmates at their ease.
The _Church Missionary Intelligencer_ of December, 1860, gives the
following account of the transaction:--
"In the latter end of 1858, a British squadron, with Lord Elgin,
passed up the river as far as Hankow, not without exchanging
shots, on more than one occasion, with the Tai-pings, and a
consequent loss of life was caused, which, by due precautions,
might have been avoided. On approaching Nanking, the capital
city of Ngan-hwui, the insurgents and Imperialists were found to
be in action. The British vessels were not recognized by the
Tai-pings: they were the first bearing the British flag which
had ascended the stream so far. Under the misapprehension that
they were acting in concert with the Imperialist fleets of junks
which commanded the river, the Tai-pings fired a shot at the
leading vessel, the _Lee_, and was replied to by the _Furious_,
_Cruiser_, _Dove_, and _Lee_, in full chorus. The garrison of
the forts was soon in flight, the guns abandoned. A little
timely explanation might have prevented this collision. On the
return voyage, when these forts were again approached, such an
explanation was resorted to. The water had fallen so low that
the two large vessels had been left behind, and the two
gun-boats were alone on their way to the river's mouth. To
engage the forts on going up, when the force was strong, was a
pleasant _divertissement_; but to venture on the same experiment
with two gun-boats, was, if possible, to be avoided; and that
the more so, as the nature of the channel compelled them to
steer immediately under the city walls, so that the decks could
easily have been swept by gingalls. On this occasion, therefore,
that was done which should have been done before--a
communication was opened with the insurgents, and the gun-boats
passed the forts unmolested."
The first act of the wolf and lamb drama was thus performed, and "those
outlaws," the Ti-pings, who _might_ possibly "interfere with the
carrying into due effect the terms of his treaty," were reported to
head-quarters, as not only having insulted and fired upon the British
ensign, but having actually violated a flag of truce--but it was _not_
reported that said flag of truce was unknown to the Ti-pings, and
therefore could not be recognized.
The affair is thus reported by Secretary Wade:--
"My orders were to inform the rebels that _we took no part_
(_?_) in the civil war, and interfered with no one who did not
molest us. (?) That a gun-boat had been detached from the
squadron before it passed Nankin, for the express purpose of
explaining the object of our expedition _had the rebels desired
to ask it_; that they had fired eight shots at the little vessel
so detached without a single shot being returned by her; that
the forts which had so fired had been made an example of, and
that the fact, together with the lesson they had themselves
received, might satisfy them of the absurdity of provoking our
men-of-war to hostility."
At the time the expedition passed Nankin it was generally supposed the
four principal chiefs besides Hung-sui-tshuen, the Tien-wang, were dead.
The Southern and Western Princes had fallen in action, and it was
rumoured the Eastern and Northern Princes had lost their lives in the
capital, in consequence of their attempt to rebel against the authority
of their king. I can only say that the report of the execution of the
Northern and Eastern Princes, together with large numbers of their
particular followers, has been very much exaggerated. The princes, and
some who supported them, seem to have been put to death for treason.
The earlier half of 1859 was unmarked by any important military movement
upon the part of the Ti-pings. The most interesting event of this period
was the arrival of the Tien-wang's relative, Hung-jin, at Nankin, after
many fruitless attempts to reach that place.
It will be remembered that upon the capture of the first city in
Kwang-si, Hung-sui-tshuen had sent messengers into Kwang-tung calling
all his and Fung-yun-san's remaining friends and relatives to join his
standard. Before this could be effected he was compelled to abandon the
position. Hung-jin, in the meanwhile, had started upon the journey with
some fifty friends of the two chiefs. Upon approaching the neighbourhood
of the place appointed to effect a junction, they ascertained that the
"God Worshippers" had raised their camp and marched away, and that the
Manchoo authorities were seizing and cruelly murdering every one
connected with them. Hung-jin now sent back into Kwang-tung all his
friends, excepting three, who, with him, made their way deeper into the
country, and endeavoured to join the army of "God-worshippers." The
Mandarins were, however, so strictly upon the watch for all travellers
or suspected persons, that he found himself under the necessity of
abandoning his attempt and returning home. Upon reaching the Hwa-hien
district, Hung-jin found that from henceforth home to him was but a
name. The Manchoo butchers were already in his native village, and he
was compelled to seek a refuge amongst strangers. In a short time he
again set forth, with several relatives of Fung-yun-san, to join the
Ti-pings; but finding the vigilance and cruelty of the Mandarins still
more severe than before, they were obliged to return unsuccessful. After
another fruitless attempt in the beginning of 1852, the chosen messenger
of Hung-sui-tshuen and his relatives in Kwang-tung, again arrived with
letters calling upon all faithful adherents of the two clans, Hung and
Fung, to join him at the city of Yung-gnan. Upon this, the old
rendezvous at Paddy-hill was selected as a place for assembling. Before
the day appointed for a general meeting, and when only some two hundred
members of the respective clans had arrived, Kiang-lung-chong, the
messenger, who had grown too bold and reckless after the easy triumphs
he had been accustomed to with the Ti-pings, acted without precaution in
the gathering, and involved those already present in destruction. With
these insufficient numbers he raised the standard of insurrection, which
being instantly reported to the district Mandarin, a considerable body
of soldiers were sent against them. The insurgents went bravely to the
fight, but being few and wholly unaccustomed to warfare, were soon
thrown into confusion. Kiang-lung-chong and a few others were killed, a
considerable number made captive by the troops, and the rest dispersed.
Hung-jin with about a dozen friends arrived at Paddy-hill just after the
defeat, being totally ignorant of the disaster. He and his companions
were seized by the people of the neighbourhood and imprisoned in a
house, previously to being delivered up to the Mandarins. As the Rev.
Mr. Hamberg's narrative states:--
"Hung-jin, lively and enthusiastic, desirous to lead his friends
to honour and to glory, now sat down in the midst of them in
deep sorrow and despair, and would gladly have given his own
life to save those whom he had brought with him into distress.
Feeling the cords wherewith his hands were tied together give
way a little, after some effort he got them free, and proceeded
to unloose those of his friends who were accessible, and
succeeded in liberating six of his companions from their bonds.
After it had become dark, they opened the door, and in the rainy
night hastened away to the mountains.
"Hung-jin, whose liveliest hopes had been so suddenly
frustrated, who had drawn upon himself the hatred and revenge of
so many involved in the present disaster, and who had no place
of refuge left to himself, now felt his own guilt and despair
too hard to bear. He therefore unloosed his girdle and was going
to strangle himself, when one of the fugitives came up to him.
Hung said, 'Try to escape and save your life, I will put an end
to my existence in this place.' The other then seized his hand
and drew him forward, exhorting him to continue his flight in
company with him, which he did. The next day, when Hung awoke
from a short rest in the bush, he missed his companion. He now
prayed to God, the Heavenly Father, to spare his life and
protect him amidst so many dangers. During the daytime he lay
concealed in the bush, and during the night-time he went on.
Once the people in search of fugitives passed very close to him
without observing him. Finally, after having passed four days
and four nights in the mountains without any food, he arrived at
the house of some near relatives in a very exhausted state. Here
he was concealed six days in a mountain cavern, and afterwards
his relatives gave him some money, with which he went on board a
passage-boat to go to another district, and seek refuge with
more distant relatives of the Hung clan. But even among these,
new trials awaited him; for also from their place a few of the
Hung clan had gone to Paddy-hill, whose further fate was
unknown. Some of the relatives of those missing were now
inclined to revenge the supposed death of their brethren, and
deliver Hung-jin to the Mandarins, but an old venerable headman
took him under his protection, and gave one of his grandsons to
Hung-jin as a guide, and this young man, being a Christian
convert, conducted him to Hong-kong in the end of April, 1852,
and introduced him to me. I was astonished to hear a person from
the interior of China speak with such interest of, and display
so much acquaintance with, the Christian religion. I liked to
listen to his animated narratives about Hung-sui-tshuen,
Fung-yun-san, and their followers, though at the time I could
form no clear conception of the whole matter, which then was
little known and still less believed. He wrote a few sheets of
paper, containing a short account of himself and
Hung-sui-tshuen, which I put into my desk, until I should have
further evidence as to their contents. I expected that Hung-jin,
who wished to study the Christian doctrine and be baptized,
would remain for some time at Hong-kong; but upon my return from
a tour on the mainland he had departed, as he had no means of
support in that place. In November, 1853, Hung-jin, who up to
that time had been engaged as schoolmaster at some place in the
interior, again visited me. He was still very desirous to be
baptized, and seemed to be sincere in his wish to serve God. He
declared himself willing to leave all matters in the hands of
Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will,
and to seek above all the Kingdom of God and His righteousness.
Hung-jin, with three of his friends from Clear-far, have since
been _baptized_, and are still studying the Holy Scriptures,
with the hope, in the Providence of God, hereafter to be enabled
to instruct their countrymen in the way of salvation."
Early in 1854, with the funds from the sale of his little work, which
Mr. Hamberg kindly gave him, Hung-jin embarked for Shanghae, _en route_
for Nankin; he also carried with him a number of religious books. After
remaining at Shanghae several months, during which he was neither able
to reach Nankin nor communicate with his friends, he returned to
Hong-kong. In the mean time Mr. Hamberg had died, and Hung-jin was
received by members of the London Mission Society, and by them employed
as a catechist and preacher during the years 1855 to 1858. In the
_Missionary Magazine_ he was soon after spoken of thus:--
"He soon established himself in the confidence and esteem of the
members of the mission, and the Chinese Christians connected
with it. His _literary attainments_ were respectable; his temper
amiable and genial; his mind was characterized by a versatility
unusual in a Chinese. His knowledge of Christian doctrine was
largely increased, and of the sincerity of his attachment to it
_there could be no doubt_."
Similar opinions were entertained by many devout and earnest
missionaries who were intimately acquainted with Hung-jin for a period
extending over six years; but Mr. Frederick Bruce, the British minister
at Pekin (who never saw Hung-jin, or, I believe, any other Ti-ping in
his life), true to the policy of his employers, thus writes from amidst
his Manchoo friends at Shanghae:--
DISPATCH TO LORD RUSSELL.
"Shanghae, September 4th, 1860.
"Hung-jin has sent to the missionaries in manuscript a pamphlet
which has made a considerable impression upon them. I see no
guarantee for the soundness of his doctrine or for the purity
of his life. I rather look upon his pamphlet as a crafty device
to conciliate the support and sympathy of the missionary body at
the time when the insurgents meditated the seizure of Shanghae."
It may naturally be asked, What has this to do with England's policy
towards China, and why should it affect the honourable neutrality she
was pledged to maintain? The answer simply is--a misrepresentation of
the acts and intentions of the Ti-pings might afford some colour of
justification for a line of policy which could not be defended.
The Bruce dispatch further states:--
"But as the chief (Hung-sui-tshuen) is an _ignorant fanatic, if
not an impostor_," &c.
We thus find this representative of the British Government not only
volunteering his unsupported opinion against a weighty mass of evidence
as to the religion, education, and acquirements of the chief, but
actually constituting the same tribunal as the sole judge of a solemn
question which must rest alone between Hung-sui-tshuen and his Creator.
About the middle of 1858, Hung-jin once more determined to try and join
his relative, the Tien-wang, and with this intent started in disguise,
and gradually made his way (by land) into the province of Hoopeh. In
December of the same year, while Lord Elgin's expedition was at Hankow,
he was heard from at a small town in the neighbourhood; in fact, he
managed to put on board one of the vessels a letter for Mr. Chalmers,
his teacher at Hong-kong. In the spring of 1859, he at last reached
Nankin, and soon after was appointed to the high rank of Kan-wang
(_i.e._, Shield Prince), in which position, and his subsequent one of
Prime Minister, he became familiar to Europeans. A letter which he wrote
to the Rev. Mr. Edkins, nearly a year later, contained the following
passage relating to the Tien-wang:--
"On meeting with his relative, the Celestial king, and having
daily conversations with him, he was struck by the wisdom and
depth of his teaching, far transcending that of common men."
Hung-jin--or rather the Kan-wang, as we must call him in future--joined
his friends at a troublous time, more than usually so even to a man who,
like him, had lived the prime of his life in difficulties and danger.
Within a few months after his arrival at Nankin, that city was closely
invested by a large and overpowering Imperialist army. Although since
1853, Nankin had frequently been in a state of siege, upon no previous
occasion had it been so hardly pressed. Towards the close of 1859, the
besieging forces were increased from 50,000 to upwards of 100,000
fighting men, all supplies were cut off from the city, and the
Imperialists flattered themselves that a short time would see the
garrison starved out. Darkly, though, closed that year around the
Ti-ping capital--surrounded as it was by savage foemen, thirsting for
the blood of its starving inhabitants--a danger, still more deadly, and
more bitter, was looming in the distance, although at the time
impalpable and scarcely conceived. It was a danger menacing the patriots
from civilized and Christian men, men who, in other lands, have given
their blood and treasure to causes far less deserving of their sympathy;
in short, it was the creation of the "China indemnity" extortion. Evil
as the effect of the Elgin treaty concluded in 1858 must have been to
the Ti-pings, it is yet possible that the successes they shortly
attained might have counteracted the prejudices so unjustly excited
against them; but when to this was added the question of indemnity, the
Ti-pings were doomed. It is probable that had they remained quiescent
until such time as the love of gold was satisfied, they might then have
been uninterfered with; unfortunately it was otherwise, a rapid series
of victories threatened destruction to the Manchoo dynasty, and with it,
of course, to the "China indemnity;" consequently, if the expenses of
this "little war" were to be secured, immediate action became
necessary, and the ruin of the Ti-pings inevitable.
In June, 1859, the British plenipotentiary, not satisfied with the route
_viâ_ Peh-tang, as proposed and decided upon by the Chinese authorities
for his passage to Pekin, had the coolness to choose his own path, and
when the mandarins naturally resisted such arrogance, to endeavour to
force it at the cannon's mouth. What would Englishmen think, and do, if
a Chinese fleet carrying an ambassador were to arrive in England, and,
refusing to land their ambassador according to our customs, advance
their fleet past all our fortifications without paying them the
slightest respect? This would be a very similar case to the Taku fort
disaster; and, moreover, it must be borne in mind that the affair took
place just after peace had been concluded, which must have given it the
complexion of a resumption of hostilities rather than that of a peaceful
embassy.
The excuse generally made for this sort of thing is, that it is
impossible to deal with semi-civilized nations as you would with
civilized ones, that is to say, the civilized nation is to descend to
the level of the semi-civilized one. This reasoning, illogical and
dishonourable at all times, is in this case totally inadmissible, for it
is at the least doubtful whether any cause for an appeal to arms
existed. It appears, however, that elasticity of principle and
inconsistency in action may be regarded as the important elements in the
policy of England--can it be better illustrated than by her conduct to
Germany and Denmark, to America and Brazil, to Russia and China?
Admiral Hope, a useful man to such a ministry, to use a nautical simile,
"went stem on like a Nor'-west buffalo" to the Taku forts, and
sacrificed a number of brave men needlessly. This led to the resumption
of hostilities, and we find Lord John Russell writing upon November
18th, 1859, to Mr. Bruce:--
"Unless, therefore, the most ample apology should be promptly
made and the other demands specified in my previous dispatch
complied with, you are instructed to state that _a large
pecuniary indemnity_ will be demanded by her Majesty's
Government from that of China."
By altering a few words, how like the ultimatum of a highwayman this
would read. Lord John Russell evidently did all he could to justify the
anecdote of Alexander the Great and the robber.
The Chinese indemnity plot thickened rapidly. Lord Russell's next
dispatch to Mr. Bruce, dated January 3rd, 1860, contained the
following:--
"We go to seek redress for these wrongs" (the resistance offered
by the Manchoo troops to the destruction of their barriers,
defences, &c., at the Taku forts, by Admiral Hope), "and to
require that the word of the emperor should be observed, and
that an _indemnity_ should be paid for the loss of men" (killed
trying to kill the Chinese troops who very correctly opposed
their unjustifiable attempt to force the fortified entrance of
the Pei-ho river), "and the heavy expense of obtaining redress"
(for their own fault).
Lord John Russell arrived at the superlative degree of the "China
indemnity" upon February 8th, 1860, when he penned the following to Mr.
Bruce:--
"It has been _decided_ between her Majesty's Government and that
of the Emperor of the French that the amount of indemnity-money
to be demanded of the Chinese Government shall be in each case a
sum of 60,000,000 _francs_," "towards the expense of the joint
expedition now on its way to the China seas."
Here was decisive action following promptly upon threats and
intimidation; who can say but that the finale to the Danish question
might have been different had the Foreign Secretary possessed equal
facilities for arranging the indemnity to be paid by Germany?
Upon the part of the British representatives it is denied that the
Chinese Government proposed Peh-tang as the route our plenipotentiary
should proceed by to Pekin; it is, however, admitted in the blue book
upon affairs in China, 1859-60, at page 43, that Mr. Bruce was
requested not to pass the river barriers:--
"They" (the Imperial Chinese commissioners) "would wish that on
his arrival at the mouth of the river he would anchor his
vessels of war _outside the bar_."
As this was disregarded by Mr. Bruce, it may naturally be inferred that
the request so constantly reiterated throughout the Chinese dispatches,
"that he (Mr. Bruce) must go by way of Peh-tang," was really made, but
was treated by the British plenipotentiary with the same contempt and
want of courtesy.
The instructions given to Lord Elgin upon his second embassy to China
were issued from the Foreign Office, April 17th, 1860; the conditions of
peace to be offered to China were:--
"First. An apology for the attack on the allied forces at the
Pei-ho" (_i.e._ the Chinese Government must apologize for
defending itself). "Secondly. The ratification and execution of
the treaty of Tien-tsin" (a treaty extorted from the Chinese
when under compulsion, the terms of which would probably not
have been really evaded). "Thirdly. The payment of an indemnity
to the allies for the expense of naval and military
preparations." (No wonder the Chinese ministers wrote "then the
demand for indemnity is yet more against propriety. Were China
to demand repayment of England, England would find that her
expenses did not amount to one half of those of China.")
Most undoubtedly previous to the _Arrow_ war the position of Europeans
in China was very unsatisfactory; but it is quite as certain that this
resulted as much from our aggressive and lawless proceedings, as from
the natural aversion of the Manchoo government for our intercourse. From
beginning to end, the whole history of the British connection with China
is discreditable. However just may have been the cause of complaint, it
is beyond all doubt that mean and disgraceful subterfuges have been
adopted as the _casus belli_ for each campaign undertaken against that
empire. Can an Englishman be found (excepting the opium traders, &c.)
who does not lament that blackest page of English history--the war that
was waged upon China in 1840, under the following circumstances:--
"In agreement with a treaty signed by British merchants, Captain
Elliott, her Majesty's superintendent of trade, caused 20,283
chests of opium to be delivered to Commissioner Lin. The opium
was destroyed by order of the emperor. The conditions for
terminating the war were, that China should pay £1,200,000 for
the opium; £3,000,000, which amounts to £1,000 per head, for the
destruction of 30,000 of her unoffending subjects, and bear the
expense of her own defence!"
The last war, which commenced in 1856, and was ultimately concluded by
the ratification of the treaty of 1858, by Lord Elgin in 1860, was
equally iniquitous with the first, and in the same manner was originated
by the detestable opium smuggling, the seizure of the opium smuggler
_Arrow_ being made the pretext for hostilities. Whatever may hereafter
be alleged, at the present time but few can be found to deny the fact,
that the wars with China have always been waged to force the opium
trade, and that by the last one the legalization of that vile traffic
was compelled.
Not without reason did the Manchoo great council of state use the
following passages in their dispatch to Commissioner Ho, who was at
Shanghae endeavouring to settle pacifically the Taku affair, and the
ratification of the treaty of Tien-tsin, previous to the resumption of
hostilities:--
"To come to the British minister's request to be properly (or
courteously) received when he comes north to exchange treaties,
if his intention be indeed peace (or friendly), he will (or let
him) leave it to the commissioner to think over all details
whatsoever of treaty arrangements in which management
(adjustment, compromise) may with propriety be effected; and
negotiations being set on foot at Shanghae, when both parties
are perfectly agreed, let him come north without a fleet, and
with a small retinue, and wait at Peh-tang, for the exchange of
the treaties; in which case China will certainly not take him to
task for what is past."
Referring to his former attempt to force his passage past the Taku
forts, when Admiral Hope was repulsed,
"But if he be determined to bring up a number of vessels of war,
and if he persist in proceeding by way of Takoo, this will show
that his real purpose is not the exchange of treaties, and it
must be left to the high officer in charge of the coast (or
port) defences to take such steps as shall be essential" (_lit.
as shall accord with right_).
This proposition, of course, was not entertained by Mr. Bruce or Lord
Elgin, who proceeded to act upon Lord Russell's instructions--"for the
joint occupation of Chusan, or some other portion of the Chinese
territory, in addition to the city of Canton, by the British and French
forces till the _indemnity_ is paid." So to obtain "material guarantees"
for this indemnity, the civilized nations proceeded to batter the
semi-civilized one into compliance, and the allied forces started upon
the Pekin campaign.
However wrong the Manchoos may have been, it cannot be denied that the
British _modus operandi_ in China has been equally bad; and whatever
right there may be on the civilized side, it would be difficult to read
the correspondence between the two governments and not admit that the
semi-civilized one has the best of the argument.
Commerce is a great and important element in the prosperity and
civilization of every nation, and especially so to England; but there is
something greater and more noble than commerce--that is, honour. The
advantages of trade, to be permanent and beneficial, must be conducted
honourably, and that is exactly what the Government of Great Britain has
been unable to do. All over the world its foreign policy, and its
attempts to force trade where it can be done with impunity, have not
only lowered the "just influence" of England and brought her into
contempt, but, in many cases, have created a burning resentment in the
breasts of those who have been wronged, that neither the present nor
future generation will forget. In every quarter of the globe mischievous
interference has taken place, often followed by those aggressive wars
which have been denounced by every great and enlightened statesman from
the time of Queen Elizabeth.
FOOTNOTES:
[28] This statement of Dr. Bridgeman's was incorrect. The opinions of
nearly all the other missionaries,--including the Rev. Drs. John,
Medhurst, Muirhead, Edkins, &c.,--acquainted with the Ti-pings and their
works, agree with the following explanation by the Bishop of Victoria,
of their acknowledgment of the inspiration of the Bible; besides which,
the proclamation of the Tien-wang (see page 84) fully states their
belief in the Divine equality of the Son (Celestial Elder Brother) with
the Father.
"While the imperial titles are raised by only one space, it is
interesting to observe that in their list of authorized books (published
as a preface to each volume), with the _imprimatur_ of Tae-ping-wang,
the words 'Old' and 'New Testament' each receive _an elevation of three
spaces_ in the enumeration, whereas Tae-ping-wang's name, even when
forming a portion of the title of books of their own original
composition, is only raised by _one_ space. This seems to be a plain
recognition of the paramount divine authority of the Holy Scriptures as
_God's Book_, above books of human authorship, and suggests the hope
that where so vital an element of essential truth _is present_, errors
will be rectified and defects expurgated, by the general circulation and
perusal of the Word of God, as the best and surest corrective of
imperfect views on the more mysterious doctrines of the Gospel. The
portions of the Holy Scriptures which they have already published,
exceed in quantity of contents all the other books which are of their
own composition added together. In the books recently brought from
Nankin, there is an impression in red ink, from a large moveable die or
stamp, with the two characters, Che Chun--'the Imperial Will
permits'--surrounded by the usual imperial symbols. This _imprimatur_ is
stamped upon the first page of the text in every book. With such a fact
as this before us, every _unprejudiced_ mind will perceive that there is
a new era of hope for the Chinese empire."
[29] Another part of the same explanation states the Ti-ping idea of
Christ's Divinity; while again, the following verse from the "Ode for
Youth" clearly sets forth his divinity and atonement. Were this not so,
it would evidently be the height of injustice to blame a people just
arising from the depths of idolatry and ignorance for a fault common
amongst ourselves; for have we not Socinians as well as Unitarians?
"It has been customary in native compositions, whenever the Chinese
names or titles of the Emperor occur, to commence a new column, as a
mark of honour, and to place the imperial name higher in the page by the
space of two Chinese words. The name of the Supreme Being is similarly
honoured, but has the distinction of being raised three spaces in the
page. An interesting modification of this usage is perceptible in the
imperial proclamations and manifestoes of Tae-ping-wang. The name of
Almighty God the Father is elevated three spaces; that of Jesus Christ
is raised two spaces; and the imperial name and titles of Tae-ping-wang
himself _are lowered one degree from the customary position_, and
receive the elevation of only one space. As minds are differently
biassed, this fact will be differently judged. To us, however, it
appears an indication that the insurgent leaders, although viewing Jesus
Christ as inferior to the Father as touching his humanity, recognize his
superiority to the most exalted of earthly potentates as touching his
divinity."
The unmistakable interpretation to place upon this, is,--no Chinese mind
could possibly place the _Son_ upon a _perfect_ equality with the
Father,--their entire system of thought and education debars this from
their comprehension; but with a reverence beyond all praise, the
Tien-wang actually lowered his own position to avoid trespassing upon
the divine attributes of his Saviour: which he has thus expressed in the
verse of the "Ode for Youth":--
"REVERENCE TO JESUS.
Jesus, His first-born son,
Was in former times sent by God;
He willingly gave His life to redeem us from sin.
Of a truth His merits are pre-eminent.
His cross was hard to bear,
The sorrowing clouds obscured the sun;
The adorable Son, the honoured of Heaven,
Died for you, children of men.
After His resurrection He ascended to heaven,
Resplendent in glory, He wields authority supreme.
In Him we know that we may trust,
To secure salvation and ascend to heaven."
Such are the sentiments of a man, who, besides his voluminous religious
compositions, has written the history of China; corrected her classics:
written innumerable works upon civil administration and foreign arts and
sciences, and who has nevertheless been designated in England as an
"_ignorant_ impostor and coolie." The British public must indeed have
been "green and greasy" (as Sir James Brooke once observed) to take in
all the secretary and under-secretary's reports, and swallow the
bullock, horns and all.
[30] In this opinion Dr. Bridgeman is also wrong; even his
fellow-voyageur X.Y.Z. thought differently, and wrote: "The titles
applied to these kings are no doubt _mere empty names_, without any
specific meaning, and are not necessarily to be understood as implying a
claim to super-earthly dignity."